




ARMY COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE

A REFERENCE TEXT
FOR
DEPARTMENT OF COMMAND, LEADERSHIP,
AND MANAGEMENT

1987-1988



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050



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
Office of the Commandant

19 August 1987

This is the twelfth edition of *Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice*. Like those preceding, it was prepared primarily for use by students at the U.S. Army War College but is also being given wide distribution throughout the Army for use by our mid-level and senior leadership.

The text was prepared by the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management of the U.S. Army War College. This edition was authored with the ongoing goal to improve our ability to explain how our Army runs. We have incorporated many excellent suggestions toward this goal from the Department of the Army Staff and the Army in the Field. We are very appreciative of this continuing assistance. Your recommendations for changes or improvements for future editions should be forwarded to: Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5050, ATTN: Editor, Colonel Leonard D. Hardy, Jr., AV 242-3845.

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JAMES E. THOMPSON
Major General, USA
Commandant


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PREFACE

This edition of the text was designed to further explain Army systems management and to improve understanding of how the Army is run. The text emphasizes and focuses on descriptions of various Army systems and subsystems. It provides Army War College students a resource to complement seminars, lectures, studies, and other readings on current Army management systems.

The contents are based primarily on documents, texts, studies, and individual contributions that are within the official domain. Users are advised that the portions concerned with plans, programs, policy, and various management systems are current as of the publication date. Like all dynamic systems, they are subject to change. Any proposed citations of this text as an official source of authority should be made with this caution in mind. We invite and welcome comments which would improve future editions. In this regard, we are grateful to the several hundred respondents who took the time to comment on the content of our previous editions.

This edition was prepared by the faculty of the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. Where appropriate, we drew upon the contributions from the Department of the Army Staff, the Army in the field, and on input from faculty and students. Special acknowledgement for the preparation of this text must be made to the workers who handled the monumental administrative task: the members of the Reprographics Division of the U.S. Army War College; the secretaries, SFC Ruth Eggleston (Administrative Noncommissioned Officer), and Leah Bolt the "Super Proofreader" from the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management; and Terri Groff and Thomas Bank who dedicated a summer's effort to this edition.



LEONARD D. HARDY, JR.
Colonel, Field Artillery
Editor

NOTE: *Since this text was last revised, several events have transpired causing significant changes to many of the chapters.* These events include the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433); the findings and recommendations of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission); the President's National Security Decision Directive 219 (NSDD 219) which implemented virtually all of the Packard Commission recommendations; the 1986 DOD Authorization Act which directed the President to submit a two-year budget proposal to Congress beginning with Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989; the 1987 DOD Authorization Act which directed that the Secretary of Defense establish an office solely for acquisition and procurement, and the implementing DOD Directive 5134.1 assigning the responsibilities, functions, and authorities of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition); and Public Law 99-591 (Making Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987) with its Special Operations Forces (SOF) provisions. *While virtually all aspects of the DOD have been affected by these events, the most significant changes have occurred in the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and in the research, development, and acquisition organizational structure. Many procedural changes induced by these events remain to be developed and/or refined. Known approved changes are included in this revision.* Readers are encouraged to read the text critically and to submit recommended changes to improve the accuracy, content, and clarity of the text.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This text is written for officers preparing to assume positions of high responsibility. The organization of focus is on the United States Army—a large, complex organization with a total strength of more than 2,200,000 military and civilian members, with an annual budget of over \$75 billion, and with operations and activities extending all over the globe.

Command, leadership, and management form the basis of the text. There is no real attempt made to differentiate between terms. Articles sometimes appear in magazines and journals that attempt to draw distinctions between the terms, but without much success. The terms can be defined well only in relation to specific acts and under certain conditions. The Army requires people who are commanders, leaders, managers, under the same skin, and when they act, it is the function performed that is important—not the label. It does not make any difference whether it is called command, leadership, or management as long as the function performed accomplishes the objective effectively and efficiently.

Of course, it is possible to have a good commander, leader, or manager who knows little about management and systems theory. Indeed, practitioners have contributed much to theory. The function of theory is to explain and improve understanding about things that happen or to predict what may happen. It provides a means of making explicit those things which are implicit or seem intuitively obvious, and it may make a good practitioner even better. Importantly, this text discusses the major Army systems and processes that provide the nation with the Army it needs.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this book is to provide a reference text in support of the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM) portion of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum. Elihu Root founded the institution “not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression.” He charged the faculty with directing “the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire information, devise the plans, and study the subjects indicated, and to advise the Commander in Chief on all questions of plans, armament, transportation, and military preparation and movement.” Much of that original emphasis is reflected in the current USAWC mission of preparing students to assume high level command and staff

positions and in the objectives of the DCLM program of instruction.

The Department of Command, Leadership, and Management presents the portion of the curriculum which is designed to promote a better understanding of the theory and practice of command, leadership, and management in the Department of the Army. Several methods are used—faculty presentations, lectures, and discussions with distinguished academicians and prominent practitioners, seminar group discussions, case studies, and practical exercises.

While the primary objective of writing this book is to provide a reference text for use in conjunction with the DCLM portion of the USAWC curriculum, there are secondary objectives that serve broader purposes:

- The text is used by nonresident students in meeting the objectives of the Corresponding Studies Program.

- The text is available as a general reference for members of the Army in the field and for service schools in the military education system.

ORGANIZATION

The text is organized into four functional areas: (1) A summary of theoretical concepts; (2) An examination of Army command, leadership, and management; (3) A review of organization and functions; (4) An understanding of how systems/subsystems operate within the Army. An important function of theory is to provide a lens to view organizations and to design managerial actions for practice. The treatment of theory is intentionally brief since there is a great deal of material available in the USAWC library. In any case, the students must possess enough background to enable them to relate theoretical concepts to Army management practice.

General Management Theory. The theoretical portion of this text is dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 provides an overview of current management theory and its emphasis on the nature and behavior of organizations. Chapter 3 focuses on the facets of “general systems theory” that are considered most useful in viewing organizations as total systems.

Army Command, Leadership, and Management. The “strategic decision system” includes four chapters

associated with the primary tasks of Army top command, leadership, and management—to relate the Army to its environment and to design comprehensive plans and systems. Chapter 4 identifies the principal components of the Army's general and task environment. Chapter 5 deals with command, leadership, and management at the major and senior levels within the Army. Chapter 6 describes the general features of Army strategic concepts. Chapter 7 discusses Army decision technology to include the use of analytical techniques and information systems.

Organization and Functions. The text then covers activities related to the "organizational design and force structure" of The Total Army as we move from strategy to structure. Chapter 8 addresses the Army as an organization and the subsystems that affect it. Chapter 9 delineates force readiness concepts, the system, and its reporting procedures. Chapters 10 and 11 identify the processes of force planning and design, determining manpower requirements, and developing the manpower management program. Chapter 12 deals with planning for mobilization and deployment. Chapter 13 considers the role, structure, and status of the Reserve Components.

Army Systems/Subsystems. The major and supporting systems of the Army are identified, described, and analyzed in the remaining 12 chapters. Chapters 14, 15, and 16 examine the Army's resource

management systems at HQDA, MACOM, and installation level, and the interface with the DOD systems. Chapters 17 and 18 describe the organizations, functions, policies, and procedures associated with Research, Development, and Acquisition, and logistical systems at Department of the Army and U.S. Army Materiel Command. Chapters 19 and 20 address the "military and civilian personnel systems." Chapters 21, 22, 23, and 24 examine Army training, Army information system, intelligence management, and health services support. With the completion of this portion of the text, the major systems used in carrying out the legal mandate of the Army have been identified and reviewed in detail.

The text concludes, Chapter 25, by identifying significant problems and issues in each of the major systems. To ensure that all elements of the Total Army are heading in the same direction as we face our many challenges over the next several years, goals have been established by the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff to mold the Army of the 1990's into a disciplined, well-trained fighting force. This text is in consonance with these goals as it addresses the areas of readiness, people, materiel, strategic deployment, future development, and management. The published goals encompass specific objectives for the Army, and they contain principles to guide its efforts in each area. We are obligated to provide the country the kind of Army that will achieve its goals. It is to that end, ultimately, that this book was written.

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF MANAGEMENT THEORY

INTRODUCTION

We are told that management is as old as civilization and to illustrate this many writers use the passage from the Bible when Moses' father-in-law advises him on how to organize and delegate. Yet, the formal study of management is relatively new. Management as a discipline for formal study did not receive serious attention until about 1900. Since World War II, the study and practice of management has undergone revolutionary changes in its theoretical constructs, techniques, methods and tools. This has resulted in much confusion. Therefore, the study of management is important for two reasons. First, our society depends on specialized institutions and organizations guided and directed by the decisions of one or more individuals who are designated "managers." Second, many individuals who were not trained as managers often find themselves in managerial positions. This chapter attempts to bound the field of management theory, making some connections between past and present thinking.

EVOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT THEORY

The growth in the number and size of organizations is relatively new in history. The study of management is therefore relatively new. Management began as a trial-and-error process; there was little or no theory and no forum for the exchange of ideas and practices. There are many individuals who have contributed to the study of management, both management practitioners and management scientists to include philosophers, mathematicians, sociologists, psychologists, economists, and engineers to name a few. However, there is no single universally accepted management theory.

"There are three well-established approaches to management thought: the *Classical Approach*, the *Behavioral Approach*, and the *Management Science Approach*. Although these approaches evolved in historical sequence, later ideas have not replaced earlier ones. What has happened is that each new approach has added to the knowledge of the previous ones. At the same time, each approach has continued to develop on its own. And at last, some merging has occurred as later theorists attempted to integrate the accumulated knowledge. Two of these attempts to integrate theories are the *Systems Approach* and the *Contingency Approach*."

The Classical Approach.

The Classical Approach was the first attempt to study modern management. Management began to be studied seriously by the early 1900's. Managers were seeking answers to questions such as how to increase the efficiency and productivity of a rapidly expanding work force. Technological insights became increasingly significant in efforts to expand productivity during World War I. These efforts led to a body of knowledge concerning plant design, job design, work methods, and other aspects of "the *management of work*." (1:5)

Simultaneously, many small companies were expanding into large multiproduct organizations. It did not take long to recognize that the management of organizations was quite different from the management of work. Thus began the study of problems of managing large, complex organizations. Management was viewed as the process of coordinating group effort toward group goals. It was in this period that *planning*, *organizing*, and *controlling* were identified as the functions which comprise the management process:

Planning helps an organization define and meet its objectives, outlining what an organization must do to be successful.

Organizing means turning plans into action with the help of leadership and motivation.

Controlling makes sure the actual performance of the organization conforms with the performance planned for the organization.

The Behavioral Approach.

The Behavioral Approach uses the concepts of behavioral sciences such as psychology and sociology to assist in understanding human behavior in the work environment. The emphasis focuses on the interrelationships between people, work, and organizations and concentrates on such topics as motivation, communications, leadership, and work group formation, which can assist managers with the people aspects of their job.

The Management Science Approach.

The essential feature of the Management Science Approach is the use of mathematics and statistics as aids in managing operations. It focuses on solving technical rather than behavioral problems. It concentrates on concepts and tools useful in solving problems related to

what the organization produces. The computer contributed greatly to the growth of this approach.

Attempts to Integrate the Three Approaches.

There have been attempts since the 1960's to integrate the three approaches to management. One of these attempts, the *Systems Approach*, views organizations as total systems, with each component linked to every other part. Another, the *Contingency Approach*, states that the particular situation will dictate the correct managerial practice to be applied.

The Systems Approach. The Systems Approach to management views an organization as a group of interrelated parts with a single purpose. The action of one part will influence the others. The individual parts cannot be dealt with separately. In solving problems using the Systems Approach, the organization is viewed as a dynamic whole. Individual problems are not solved, but rather, a total system of interrelated parts using the management functions of planning, organizing, and controlling are exercised to find the best solution. Using the Systems Approach, managers adopt a broad perspective of their jobs. With a systems perspective, they more easily achieve coordination between the objectives of the various parts of the organization and the objectives of the organization as a whole. (2:450)

The Contingency Approach. The basis of the Contingency Approach is that there is no best way to plan, organize, or control. This approach seeks to match different situations with different management methods.

Both the Systems Approach and the Contingency Approach provide valuable insights for students of management.

SOME CONTEMPORARY THOUGHTS ON ORGANIZATION THEORY

Managers must consider many complex factors and variables to design an optimal organization structure. The key *decisions* for organization design are division of labor, departmentalization, spans of control, and delegation of authority. In addition to the actual and contemplated size of the organization, these decisions reflect *environmental* and *managerial factors* as well. Managers do not have the luxury of designing a "one best way" structure; rather, the optimal design depends upon the situation as determined by the interaction of size, environmental, and managerial factors.

Organization structures differ on many dimensions, the more important being shown in Figure 2-1. In general, functional organizations are more formalized, standardized, centralized, and specialized than product organizations. They are also less differentiated and achieve integration through hierarchy, rules and procedures, and planning. Product organizations,

however, must achieve integration through lateral relationships and mutual adjustment. The effect of these dimensions is to channel behavior of individuals and groups into patterns which contribute to effective organization performance.

An integrative framework cited by Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly raises the following major managerial issues: (3:381-382)

(a) The task and authority relationships among jobs and groups of jobs must be defined and structured according to rational bases. Historically, practitioners and theorists have recommended two specific, yet contradictory, theories for designing organization structures.

(b) One theory, termed *classical design*, is based upon the assumption that the more effective organization structure is characterized by highly specialized jobs, homogeneous departments, narrow spans of control, and relatively centralized authority. The bases for these assumptions are to be found in the historical circumstances within which this theory developed. It was a time of fairly rapid industrialization which encouraged public and private organizations to emphasize the production and efficiency criteria of effectiveness. To achieve these ends, classical design theory proposes a single "one best way" to structure an organization.

(c) In recent years, beginning with the human relations era of the 1930's and sustained by the growing interest of behavioral scientists in the study of management and organization, an alternative to classical design theory has been developed. This theory proposes that the more effective organization has relatively despecialized jobs, heterogeneous departments, wide spans of control, and decentralized authority. Such organization structures, it is argued, not only achieve high levels of production and efficiency, but also satisfaction, adaptiveness, and development.

(d) The design of effective organizational structure cannot be guided by a single "one best way" theory. Rather, the manager must adopt the point of view that either the bureaucratic design is more effective for the total organization or for subunits within the organization.

(e) The manager must identify and describe the relevant subenvironments of the organization in terms of outputs, inputs, technology, and knowledge. These subenvironments determine the relationships within units, among units, and between units and their subenvironments.

AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANIZATION DESIGN




FIGURE 2-1

(f) The manager must evaluate each subenvironment in terms of its rate of change, relative certainty, and time span of feedback. These conditions are the key variables for determining the formal structure of tasks and authority.

(g) Each subunit structure is designed along the bureaucratic continuum in a consistent manner with the state of environmental conditions. Specifically, slower rates of change, greater certainty, and shorter time spans of feedback are compatible with the bureaucratic design.

(h) Concurrently with the design of subunit structures is the design of integrative techniques. The appropriate techniques, whether rules, plans, or mutual adjustment, depend upon the degree of subunit differentiation. The greater the differentiation, the

greater the need for mutual adjustment techniques. At the other extreme, the greater the need for rules and plans.

Authorities differ on what future organizations may or may not look like; however, the thoughts of two authors may be helpful:

— Warren Bennis contends that the bureaucratic form of organization is becoming less and less effective; that it is hopelessly out of touch with contemporary realities. (4:70)

— Chester Newland provides a summary listing of central features that many contemporary authorities consider will be characteristic of the future organizations (Figure 2-2). Issues that might be added to this list are the choice of centralization vs. decentralization and the management of organizational decline and fiscal cutbacks.

TOMORROW'S ORGANIZATIONS

Expanding cause/effects network.
More knowledge and technology.
Rapid change.
Resource constraints.
Mixed economy (public and private).
Participation expectations (and wider accommodation).
Increased interdependence.
Hierarchical and open systems models (like today).
Continued problems:

- Dehumanizing.
- Uncontrollable.
- Inefficient.
- Invisible elites.

FIGURE 2-2

The point is not that we necessarily know what's on the horizon, but that we must be aware that things are changing. New organizational forms are required and are being experimented with.

Hellriegal and Slocum (6:721-722) identified four change strategies. A *technology* strategy focuses on change in workflows, methods, materials, and information systems. The *organizational-structure* strategy emphasizes the internal changes that are brought about by the manager who is performing his or her decisional role. In this role the manager is constantly on the lookout for new ideas and anticipating the consequences of action undertaken. *Task strategies* focus on specific job activities that have been changed to increase both the quality of the employees' work experience and their on-the-job productivity. *People* strategies usually are directed toward improving communications and relations among individuals and groups to achieve increased organizational effectiveness.

The manner by which managers diagnose problems, and how accurately they recognize the need for change, will affect the change process. The success of a change program depends largely on the current levels of dissatisfaction, support by top management for the change effort, and the correct diagnosis of the sources of resistance to the change effort.

SUMMARY

In summary, we have not attempted in this chapter to educate the reader on management theory, rather to highlight a couple of important points:

1. Placing in perspective the variety of schools of management theory.
2. Outlining some of the more important managerial issues involved in organization design.

3. Identifying some accepted strategies that might be employed in effecting organizational change.

It should be noted at this point that the particular theory considered to be most useful in viewing the Army is systems theory. In view of its importance, the systems approach to management is treated in some detail in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 3

THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO FORCE INTEGRATION

INTRODUCTION

In the 1960's and 70's there was great stress placed on an integrative systems approach to managing organizations. Expressions such as systems analysis, management information systems, and weapons systems became part of the language of the Department of Defense. In society at large, terms such as social system, education system, transportation system, and economic system have become common place. In short, we now think of organizations, their environments, and many of the organizational parts and functions as systems. Let's begin this discussion by defining the term:

"A system is an assembly of parts of components connected together in an organized way. The parts are affected by being in the system and are changed if they leave it. The assembly of parts does something (has a purpose). The particular assembly has been identified as being of special interest."

This chapter will summarize the systems approach to organization theory and management practice and relate that theory to the Army's current focus on Force Integration.

GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY

The ability to record knowledge in books, the concentration of teaching and learning in schools and universities, the application of science to technology—all have contributed to the tremendous expansion of knowledge over the last two centuries. About 1950, academicians began to observe that knowledge evolved in many fields along parallel lines. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, a biologist, observed the following:

If we survey the various fields of modern science, we notice a dramatic and amazing evolution. Similar conceptions and principles have risen in quite different realms, although this parallelism of ideas is the result of independent developments, and workers in the individual fields are hardly aware of the common trend. Thus, the principles of wholeness, of organization, and of the dynamic conception of reality became apparent in all fields of science. (1:103)

Bertalanffy observed that "in modern science, dynamic interaction is the basic problem in all fields, and its general principles will have to be formulated in General Systems Theory" (1:103). He saw this as a way of understanding and integrating knowledge from a wide variety of fields. General Systems Theory became a useful macro view for generalizing several concepts with characteristics common to many different kinds of systems.

In generalizing the key concepts of General Systems Theory, contributions are drawn from several highly specialized areas of science. The language used in expressing these concepts reflects the flavor of blending them into an interdisciplinary terminology. For example, "systemic" is often used in physiology, "synergy" appears in medical discussions, "Gestalt" is a German word associated with a theory of behavior in psychology, "homeostasis" refers to the state of balance in biological organisms, "entropy" refers to the measurement of energy in physics, and "feedback" comes from cybernetics. Leontief was awarded the Nobel prize in economics for his use of the input/output model. General Systems Theory is applicable to such diverse fields as anthropology, sociology, mathematics, and the physical and social sciences.

An . . . "important aspect of general systems theory is the distinction between closed and open systems" (2:11). A living organism is an example of an open system. It is a system which maintains itself while the matter and energy continually enter and leave the system. "The organism is influenced by, and influences, its environment and reaches a state of dynamic equilibrium in this environment" (2:12). This description of a system also fits the typical social organization. Business organizations and armies are man-made systems that have dynamic interplay with their environment. The Army, as we shall see later, can also be viewed as a system of interrelated parts working together to accomplish a mission. The common characteristics of all open systems are:

1. The *input* of energy from the environment.
2. The *through-put* or transformation of the imported energy into some product form.

3. The *exporting* of the product back into the environment.

4. A *reenergizing* of the system from sources in the environment.

5. *Negative entropy*, which helps the system survive by importing more energy from the environment than is expended.

6. The *feedback* of information which helps the system maintain a steady state or homeostasis.

7. The tendency for *differentiation* and elaboration because of subsystem dynamics and the relationship between growth and survival.

8. The existence of *equifinality* whereby the system can reach the same final state from different initial conditions and by different paths of development.

Man-made or social systems are rarely, if ever, completely open or closed. Open systems exchange information, materials, and energy with their environments. A closed system, by definition, has no interaction with its environment.

The current concept is that organizational systems can be defined at any level. By definition, a system's environment is everything outside its control and outside its boundary. Therefore, the nature of the environment changes with the level of the system. At the operational level of the Army, a system's most significant environmental elements are the levels of the Army immediately above it. The environment of the Army as a whole is present but buffered by the levels above that of the system being considered. All systems in the Army are considered to be open; however, their environments from which resources, information, etc. are imported change with the level of the system. This is consistent with the concept of systems nested within systems at various levels of the Army's hierarchy. These nested systems are systems in their own right but are also subsystems of the systems at a higher level.

THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT

A useful way of viewing the systems approach is provided by the model in Figure 3-1.

Systems philosophy refers to a holistic way of thinking about the job of managing. The focus is on the whole, including parts and subsystems, with emphasis on their interrelationships.

Systems management refers to the application of General Systems Theory to manage a specific system or subsystem.

SYSTEMS APPROACH




FIGURE 3-1

From *THE THEORY AND MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEMS* by Johnson, Kast and Rosenzweig. Copyright (c) 1973 by McGraw-Hill, Inc. Used by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Systems analysis refers to a method or technique used to solve problems or reach decisions—it includes the body of analytical tools used in the evaluation of alternatives for decision.

THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

The process of change in the Army, best exemplified by the present program of Force Integration, requires that commanders cope with a tempo of change that is increasingly fast-paced and with a scope that involves every aspect and activity of their organizations. Effective management in this environment requires greater functional specialization but, at the same time, an integration of effort that transcends functional boundaries. The simultaneous and compatible accomplishment of these two tasks is at the heart of the commander's job. As the nature of Army organizations grows more complex, the job of systems integration becomes more critical.

Systems integration is defined as the "systemic, conjoint application of behavioral, management and systems sciences in achieving unity of effort to meet the challenges posed by change in our Army." Systems integration deals with people, things, resources and concepts.

Behavioral Science is the foundation of systems integration and serves as the basis for the systems integrator's influence. Effective integration can only be accomplished through people. A knowledge of organizational development will equip the systems integrator with the requisite skills to deal with the human element of integration.

Management Science assists in achieving effective decisionmaking through the process of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling. Systems integrators must have an understanding of the capabilities of quantitative analysis and the mechanics of resource allocation. They must be able to communicate in terms of analytical and quantitative implications.

Systems Science provides a perspective of the whole. An understanding of the dynamics of complex systems is essential to the integrator's ability to provide quality advice and recommendations concerning functional interfaces.

The glue which bonds these disciplines together is *information*. To execute systems integration, a systems integrator must be able to analyze, define and improve information flow within organizations. Organizational efficiency is, in large part, determined by how well people within organizations process information.

The senior commander or staff officer is a vital systems integrator. He performs at the organizational level where organizational climate is established. When organizational change is required, he should understand the Army's systems outside of the functional focus of his organization. This understanding enables him to be effective as a linker among subsystems. All of these roles promote effective systems integration.

A SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY

An organizational chart is a conventional way of depicting the principal components of a large complex organization such as the Army. It shows the pattern of relationships by prescribing the chain of command, the channels of communication, and the hierarchy of

organizational elements. We can see the organizational elements as subsystems with no difficulty. However, there are other subsystems which are not so well defined or easily recognized from organizational charts. These are major subsystems of activity which cross organizational boundaries (e.g., the financial, personnel, materiel, training and readiness systems). While they may not be evident on organizational charts, these subsystems are very important to the job of managing the Army.

There is one basic systems model that is particularly useful in viewing such organizational activities. That model (Figure 3-2) depicts a system as consisting of an input, a series of transformation activities and an output. The Army can be viewed using this transformation model. In a dynamic relationship with the environment, it receives various inputs, transforms these inputs in a variety of ways (e.g., training), and provides an output.

This simple model can be a very useful way of thinking about managing the Army. The Army has a mandate in Section 3062 (b), Title 10, U.S. Code, to be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. What is our output? While there may be numerous intermediate outputs, the ultimate output of the Army is ready units for prompt and sustained combat. When not engaged in actual combat, the Army is measured in terms of its readiness to perform the roles and missions expressed or implied by that mandate.

The Army determines its goals and objectives and its whole integrated task structure based on those output considerations. The Army develops processes and activities that enable it to be properly organized, trained, and equipped. The Army is an open system that engages in activity to transform resources into forces that are needed by the nation to implement the national security strategy.

This simple model makes it easy to understand the essence of Army posture statements of recent years. Our strategy is keyed to *readiness* (output). We must be organized, trained, and equipped for that purpose (transformation processes). We need money from

BASIC SYSTEMS MODEL




FIGURE 3-2

Congressional appropriations to acquire other input resources such as manpower from the recruiting base and materials from industry. At the risk of oversimplification, the Army's input-transformation-output model (minus a necessary feedback loop) might appear as in Figure 3-3.

It is more difficult to identify the boundaries of organizational systems than mechanized or biological systems. Similarly, it is somewhat more difficult to identify the boundaries of open systems than of closed systems. At the strategic level of the Army, where open systems characteristics are relatively more pronounced, boundaries may influence the ability to exert influence and control. Although we attempt to gain consensus on the domain of the Army and other organizational systems, in a real sense these relationships are constantly evolving through the dynamics of interaction with the environment.

As discussed earlier, internal subsystems are considered to be open systems in their own right with different environments than the systems at a higher level. The subsystems are buffered from the higher level system's environment but the higher level system is also a significant element of the subsystem's environment. For example, the Army would protect the training base from the short term effects of fluctuations in the political or economic variables of the environment. The further we go into the operating level subsystems of the Army, the more we can achieve certainty and control over the variables of the environment.

We want to avoid closure of a system because there would be no exchange with the environment. The system would fail to transform its resources into something useful. It would eventually move to a state where its energy inputs would be consumed by its own activity and suffer eventual collapse.

Bureaucratic organizations such as the Army are susceptible to this phenomenon. When we look at the basic Army systems model in Figure 3-3, we observe that the ACTIVITY is oriented toward the production

of OUTPUT in the form of readiness or combat effectiveness. A great deal of energy enters the system, and enough of that energy must appear in the form of output so that the Army achieves its goals and objectives. The danger exists, of course, that we may consume too much energy in the activities of the Army and not see enough emerge in the form of readiness. This is a condition often described as the "activity trap" and is illustrated in Figure 3-4.

In natural systems the processes and means for survival and growth are endemic to the system. The human body attempts to adjust to such external conditions as heat or cold through perspiring or shivering. Similarly, when one of its subsystems is weakened, others compensate in some way so that the body can adjust and adapt. However, man-made systems lack the natural processes, so adaptive mechanisms must be provided to maintain equilibrium.

We must be careful about making an exact analogy between an organizational system and either a mechanical or biological system. The Army is a *contrived* system, and it cannot rely on nature to provide the adaptive mechanisms. It is an imperfect system constructed by imperfect people. It is subject to the variable nature of the people within it; and it is confronted with an uncertain and often hostile environment. Therefore, the Army must provide its own maintenance mechanisms to achieve balances; it must have adaptive mechanisms which give it a dynamic equilibrium—one that changes over time and anticipates the demands of the future. These essential mechanisms are found in enlightened command, management, and leadership in the Army.

In maintaining a steady state, the concept of feedback is vital to the Army. Information about the output or the processes of the system are fed back to the leadership so that necessary changes and adjustments can be made. The system and information model shown in Figure 3-5 depicts this. Recall that the legal mandate of the Army is to be trained, organized, and equipped

BASIC ARMY SYSTEMS MODEL




FIGURE 3-3

APPROACHING POSITIVE ENTROPY--THE ACTIVITY TRAP




FIGURE 3-4

primarily for prompt and sustained combat. In peacetime the output is measured in terms of the state of readiness. The Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) system provides information to FORSCOM, DA, and JCS about the three elements of training, personnel strength, and equipment. Other feedback mechanisms include inspections, training evaluations, proficiency testing, and major exercises. Analysis of the information enables us to make adjustments and changes in the transformation process or to the resources as shown in Figure 3-5.

The concept of hierarchy is also very helpful in visualizing the Army as a system. The elements of organizational design and the force structure components are arranged hierarchically; they can be considered subsystems of the total Army. Similarly, the Army is a subsystem of several higher systems. As it has grown in size and complexity, the Army has become more elaborate in its organization. This leads to greater differentiation and specialization. This, in turn, leads to a more elaborate array of assigned missions and

objectives which are derived ultimately from those of the Army. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states that the Army will act in conjunction with other armed services to preserve the peace and security and provide for the defense of the United States, to support the national policies, to implement the national objectives, and to overcome any nation responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. Thus the Army is multiple goal-seeking as it attempts to satisfy the interest of its supra-systems, its own interests, and those of the people and subsystems within it.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND NOTION OF BOUNDARIES

To this point, we have introduced the key concepts of General Systems Theory, and related theory to practice by citing how the Army may be viewed as a system. We have demonstrated that systems philosophy is a very

FEEDBACK MECHANISMS




FIGURE 3-5

useful way of thinking about the job of managing the Army. However, this has not told us much about how systems management actually works.

The systems view emphasizes the relationship of an organization to its environment. The internal composition of an organization is composed of interdependent elements, and the whole organization is an interdependent element of a larger external environment. The larger environment consists of two rather loosely defined sets of variables, the task environment and the general environment, as illustrated in Figure 3-6.

One of the key concepts of General Systems Theory is the concept of boundaries. "Systems have boundaries which separate them from their environments. The concept of boundaries helps us understand the distinction between open and closed systems" (1:107). Open systems have flexible and penetrable boundaries.

The interaction of an organizational system with its environment is another key concept. It is important in thinking about the environment to differentiate between those features of the environment that impact on the organization in a general sense (general environment) and those features more directly related to the business of the organization (task environment).

Task environments of complex organizations sometimes extend into the less distinguishable areas of the general environment. Because the organization is

rather heavily dependent on the task environment for survival and accomplishing its purposes, identification and classification of the components of that portion of the environment are very critical.

Organizations also can be thought of as having internal environments. While managers attempt to act rationally in handling risks imposed by external constraints and contingencies, they exercise considerably more control in dealing with relatively more certain and controllable conditions within the organization. There is an implication that an organizational boundary exists to separate the task environment from the internal environment. Although a boundary is depicted on Figure 3-6, it is much less distinct in reality. Boundaries are more likely to be defined in terms of control, power, or influence in the relationships between the organization and the environmental element involved.

Ordinarily, the organization seeks to include within its boundaries the processes and competencies (the technology) necessary to accomplish its major mission. Such elements are included in the design and structure of the organization, and the increased control and added certainty reduces the impact from constraints and contingencies. However, even within its boundaries the organization is normally not without uncertainty.

The fulfillment of those needs is the reason that organizations come into being. Whether the purpose is

ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS




FIGURE 3-6

producing automobiles to accommodate the need for transportation, providing religious services for spiritual needs, or training an Army to supply a collective need for security, an organization must be responsive to the needs of the larger society.

ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSE/ GOALS/OBJECTIVES

Most definitions of management include some sort of reference to the accomplishment of mission, the achievement of goals, or the attainment of objectives. Figure 3-7 provides a useful hierarchy of terms—from lofty purpose to operating targets.

The purpose and goals of an organization are usually very broad and general statements about what the organization seeks to achieve in the future by performing in its selected area of activity. They tend to be vague, reflecting the uncertainties and the difficulties of perceiving and estimating the environment of the organization in the future. Goals typically embrace a long-range time period—perhaps five years, but some may have an enduring quality and be unattainable in the foreseeable future. Sometimes goals reflect management's values and may appear as a creed or statement of organizational philosophy.

Conceding that goals are characterized by broad and general expressions, nonetheless the management task is to offer specific statements of desired outcome to the whole organization where possible. Overall objectives that have more definitive characteristics, such as a terminal point in the future (short or long range), a quantitative measure, qualitative measure, or qualitative standard, should be used.

Objectives may be designated by higher-level management, assumed by management of the

subordinate element, or determined by interaction of the two. However developed, writing the statements of objectives with the features listed above is difficult.

At the bottom of the structure of organization purposes is a category of operational targets, project specifications, and measurements which represent the specific objectives of subelements. The differentiation of purpose goes down to the individual job and task in the organization. While total system closure is not entirely possible, further down the structure the system seeks certainty by exercising as much control as possible over all variables. Standards and measurements are specifically stated in terms of time, cost, and performance.

STRUCTURE OF MANAGERIAL TASKS

In most organizations a manager very obviously acquires more responsibility and control as he moves upward in the organization's structure. Three levels seem to emerge as having implications for management tasks in complex organizations: strategic, operating, and coordinating. A concept by Kast and Rosenzweig demonstrates the primary managerial task performed by the managerial systems at the three levels. (Figure 3-8).

— *Strategic subsystem*: The strategic subsystem has the managerial task of relating the organization to its environment.

— *Operating subsystem*: The primary task of management at the operating level is accomplishing stated objectives by effectively and efficiently engaging in the basic technical and operating processes of the organization.

STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSES




FIGURE 3-7

THE MANAGERIAL TASK: STRATEGIC, COORDINATIVE AND OPERATING SUBSYSTEMS

		ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS	TIME PERSPECTIVE	VIEWPOINT	GENERAL PROCESSES	DECISION-MAKING TECHNIQUES
ORGANIZATIONAL SUBSYSTEM	PRIMARY MANAGERIAL TASK	OPEN	LONG RUN	SATISFIC- ING	NONPRO- GRAMMABLE	JUDGMENTAL
STRATEGIC	RELATE OR- GANIZATION TO ENVIRONMENT; DESIGN COM- PREHENSIVE SYSTEMS AND PLANS					
COORDINATIVE	INTEGRATE INTERNAL ACTIVITIES					
OPERATING	ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY	CLOSED	SHORT RUN	OPTIMIZING	PROGRAMM- ABLE	COMPUTA- TIONAL

From ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMS AND CONTINGENCY APPROACH, 3d Edition, by Kast & Rosenzweig. Copy (c) 1979 by McGraw-Hill, Inc. Used with permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company.

FIGURE 3-8

— *Coordinative subsystem*: There are many internal functions and specialized tasks to be integrated by middle management as they translate strategy into action programs.

The concepts of Kast and Rosenzweig showing the levels of responsibility and control are placed into an expanded version of the model of the organization and its environments in Figure 3-9.

LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL




FIGURE 3-9

THE ORGANIZATION AS A SYSTEM

Managing a specific system or subsystem involves the application of both systems theory and philosophy. Systems approaches are appropriate for use in managing a large, complex organization (e.g., the Department of the Army), a major organizational element (e.g., MACOM), a major program or functional activity (e.g., personnel system), or a specific project (e.g., Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)). As illustrated in Figure 3-8, the primary managerial task at the coordinative level is the integration of internal activities. It usually includes the determination of programs; allocation of resources; and the design, operation, and evaluation of subsystems. In essence, it is the translation of strategic concepts into implementation processes.

We have discussed the uncertainties of the external environment and the fact that technology imposes constraints and contingencies on organizations. Yet the organization's desire for certainty leads management to adjust to conditions and adapt to maintain equilibrium. It holds that an organization is a function of its environment, the task it performs, the way it is structured, the technology it employs, and the people within it. This concept is illustrated in Figure 3-10.

A SYSTEMS VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS




FIGURE 3-10

Figure 3-10 is intended to portray the notion of a system model, or an organization, with a number of interdependent subsystems and an external environment. The idea is shown in increased detail by the diagram in Figure 3-11. A reading of the Kast and Rosenzweig 4th Edition text is necessary for a full understanding of their concept, but the main thrust is easy to grasp. A few important features of key subsystems are:

— **Goals/Values:** The important point to remember about this subsystem is it is not just management that establishes organizational goals—management, members of the organization, and actors in the environment all interact on the matter.

— **Technical:** This is not just hardware—but rather it is people using knowledge, techniques, materials, and facilities.

— **Structural:** The important thing to recognize in considering structure is that the formal structure, the

THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM




FIGURE 3-11

wiring diagram, is only the starting point—the informal linkages are even more important to an understanding of the organization.

— **Psychosocial:** This term is used to represent the human element—people with their own individual differences in values and expectations.

— **Managerial:** This subsystem includes all the things that management does such as goal setting, developing strategy, planning, and setting up control systems to aid in implementation.

Also important to enhancing the utility of the model is recognition of the interrelationships of the various subsystems:

- When management hires new people to import technology, a place must be found for them in the structure. This invariably impacts the psychosocial subsystem as new relationships emerge.

- The availability of technology impacts organizational goals—often it drives goals.

- Technology influences organizational behavior.

- Determines the nature of jobs.

- Impacts structure and process.

- Can cause anxiety.

FORCE INTEGRATION

Introduction.

The U.S. Army's focus on Force Integration since 1980 provides an excellent example of the translation from systems theory to operational reality. At that time, the Army began a series of unprecedented, revolutionary changes designed to enhance readiness significantly or effectiveness in prompt and sustained combat. A critical aspect of change was initiating the fielding of over 400 new equipment items. Some of these are designed to replace less effective items in the current inventory. For example, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS) replacing the M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier. Others, like the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), bring an entirely new dimension to the force structure. Coupled with this pervasive equipment modernization effort is the wide-spread reorganization of the structure of Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units to achieve the Army of Excellence (AOE) goals. In addition, to fulfill a commitment to improved unit cohesion, the personnel manning system has added the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) and Regimental philosophy to an already overburdened individual replacement system. Separately each of these changes would be a significant challenge. Together they are fully testing every facet of the Army's systems' ability to operate and manage effectively.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL (DAIG) INSPECTION

The extent of the changes occurring in the Army surfaced a wide range of system-oriented integration problems. The DAIG was tasked to conduct an Army-wide systemic inspection of the management processes which impacted on major equipment force modernization. The inspection which spanned the period FY 80 to FY 82 reported two principal findings:

- There were extensive documentation and execution problems in force modernization.
- There was a lack of knowledge at all levels of "How the Army Runs."

Since the publication of the results from the inspection, the term, "Force Integration," has gained wide usage in the Army. A definition for Force Integration is "the introduction, incorporation, and sustainment of doctrine, new organizations and/or equipment into the current force structure without reducing readiness." In terms of the model of Army management discussed on pages 3-3 and 3-4, Force Integration may be viewed as maintaining a constant output while the transformation activity absorbs

significant change. Thus, the focus of Force Integration centers on those subsystems that support organizing, training, and equipping the U.S. Army.

A follow-up of the 1983 Force Modernization Special Inspection was concluded in June 1986. The inspection included an assessment of the force integration process from threat identification to the fielding and sustainment of equipment, doctrine, and structure. The inspection report noted that although the Army is modernizing, changes in orientation and organization will result in more effective force integration.

The Functional View of the Army.

One of the key by-products of the DAIG special inspection was a relook at the functional structure of the Army system. As discussed earlier, the Army's supporting structure has grown in size and complexity resulting in greater differentiation and specialization. The traditional basis for that differentiation and specialization has been the functions of structuring, equipping, manning (personnel), training, sustaining, mobilizing, and deploying.

In each of these traditional functional areas and their component tasks; policies, procedures, and other tools have been developed over time to support the mission requirements of the various organizations which focus on a particular function. The sums of these aids are often referred to as supporting systems. As the Army entered the computer age, it became possible to create large data bases and rapid computational tools for the supporting systems. The products of these efforts tended to solidify vertical or "stove pipe" supporting systems by function. The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) is an excellent example of this phenomenon. Data are input at the lowest unit level and then consolidated, manipulated, and transmitted up the various levels of the personnel (manning) elements of the Army structure to HQDA. At the DA level, the data are used to update the Enlisted Master File (EMF) and the Officer Master File (OMF). These files are, in turn, used to support other planning and decision tools. One of the major unfortunate consequences of the evolutionary development of these vertical support systems is that the various data bases tend to be captured within the functions and their associated organizations and cannot communicate with other data bases which may require similar information. One of the objectives of the Army's Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD) effort, which will be discussed later in this chapter, was to create a unified data base.

The difficulties inherent in coordinating the various vertically-oriented systems have been amply exposed in the Army's force modernization effort and documented in the DAIG inspection results. It was this environment which led the DAIG to attempt to evaluate the Total Army from an operating and management perspective which could be better understood and used to isolate the frictions resulting from change. The result was the Life

Cycle Functional Model. Figure 3-12 portrays the framework of the model. The underlying philosophical concept is acceptance that the output of the Army system is combat ready units—a combination of people and things prepared to accomplish its mission. Each individual resource (a person or thing) required by a unit is somewhere on a life continuum which stretches from the establishment of need and entry into the Army to ultimate separation. The model details eight critical functions, and an individual resource will move clockwise through the model during its life span. The dynamic of the model, however, is that the Army leadership must resource and control all of the functions continuously since some resources will be in each functional stage all of the time.

Force development is the first phase of the life cycle and is the basis underlying all other functional areas. It provides the determination of the Army's requirements and authorizations for people and materiel. Force development involves identifying a threat, designing

units and force structure capable of defeating the threat, determining the personnel and materiel requirements, and then constraining distribution authorization to the resources available.

Having determined the composition and strength of the Army, we must then acquire the people and things listed in the requirements and authorizations documents as necessary to accomplish the mission. Normally, we view acquisition as an initial procurement activity that results in an asset being brought under military control. From a force modernization perspective, concern for the acquisition function extends beyond the specific materiel item being fielded to other complementary areas such as the availability of Associated Support Items of Equipment (ASIOE), publications, prescribed load list items, trained personnel, and appropriate facilities.

Acquired personnel must be imparted the discipline, drill, and practices of the military. The training function is the vehicle for accomplishing an orderly transition

FUNCTIONAL LIFE CYCLE MODEL OF THE ARMY




FIGURE 3-12

from civilian status to military life. In this context, the training function is somewhat different from what most Army officers think of when discussing training. At this point in the life cycle, training is considered only from the aspect of initial entry training or the requirement to provide soldiers with initial familiarization training on new or displaced equipment. In other words, it is the MOS-producing aspect of the training cycle that imparts new skills to the soldier or converts the individual into a soldier. This includes development of USMA, ROTC, and OCS graduates into officers through the basic course. It is applicable to units down to company/battery/troop level for the training of secondary MOS's as well as on-the-job-training.

Having produced soldiers and provided them with basic skills and knowledge, we must then distribute these people and materiel according to established priorities and constraints. Generally speaking, we view the distribution function as assigning or transferring people or materiel from the entry or wholesale level to the user.

After determining the distribution of people and things, we must then deploy units, people, and things not only in CONUS but overseas in accordance with the worldwide commitments of the Army. This involves not only agencies on the Army staff or at other levels of DOD but also civilian transportation organizations.

In peace or war the arrival of people and materiel in units, at a predetermined destination, establishes a requirement to sustain them. This requires training an organization at a designated level of capability through replacement, repair, or rotation of its existing assets. The ten classes of supply, the authorized stockage list (ASL), or prescribed load list (PLL) are some examples of systems or techniques used to sustain people and materiel. Maintenance is also a sustainment process for materiel. Included, too, is that aspect of training dealing with common soldier skills that maintain unit or individual proficiency to accomplish assigned missions. In essence, the Army sustains itself through the acquisition and use of resources to include people, things, money, time, and information.

While the Army is sustaining itself, it is constantly developing itself. The Army develops individuals by enlisted and officer education programs. Soldiers are required to take Skill Qualification Tests (SQT) and the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) encompasses all grades of the noncommissioned ranks. Similarly, the officer education program ranges from individual self-development to the officer school system, which runs from basic courses in the service schools through senior service colleges and civilian graduate education. Units are developed through collective training using devices such as Army Training Evaluation Program, Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises, and Operational Readiness Tests.

Finally, there comes a time when the Army does not have a requirement for specific people or equipment, and they are separated from military control. People

may be separated voluntarily by not reenlisting or through retirement. Involuntary separation may occur due to reduction in force actions or mandatory retirement. The Army normally separates materiel by the Property Disposal Office (PDO) process or through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) actions. In the case of older equipment being displaced by modernized equipment, the commander losing the older model may view it as a "Separation" action, while the commander receiving the displaced item will view it as an "Acquisition" function. In fact, displacing equipment in force modernization not resulting in a PDO or FMS action is, in reality, a "re-distribution" function.

The crosswalk between the life cycle view of a functioning Army and the traditional functions shown in Figure 3-13 provides a key perspective on the Army's true requirements. Achieving and maintaining a healthy life environment requires that agencies organized to focus on the traditional functions impact on the base product of the Army—combat ready units—in a very coordinated manner. The arrival of Bradley Fighting Vehicles in a unit without mechanics trained to maintain them or doctrine to fight them is a significant degradation to combat readiness. Solutions to such problems are often difficult because of the complexity of tracing back through the life cycle to isolate the problem, and the fact that short-term fixes often produce imbalances elsewhere. Figure 3-13 also provides a resourcing perspective breakout of functions. Although resourcing parallels the traditional stovepipe look, an initiative is underway to break those stovepipes and provide a totally integrated look at funding resource requirements. The functional breakout is done at HQDA to support the Army's input to the Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) cycle. At the MACOM's, specifically TRADOC and AMC, battlefield deficiencies are addressed in the PPBES process from a Mission Area perspective. A resourcing perspective is necessary because resources, like organizations, must be carefully coordinated to impact properly in the life-cycle model.

Force Integration—The Army War College Model.

The Life Cycle Functional Model provides a sound basis for viewing the Army as a total system. To aid in examining specific support systems and their interactions, the U.S. Army War College has adopted the model shown in Figure 3-14 in an effort to highlight key aspects of force integration. Each of the specific components displayed in the figure are detailed in subsequent chapters of this text. The underlying basis for this model is that force integration, in its simplest context, is management of change. The model, therefore, depicts the life-cycle continuum of a change in the Army.

Change is necessary when a future requirement is projected which the Army cannot fulfill with current capabilities. These needs are initially documented as deficiencies by TRADOC's Concept Based

THE ARMY AS A FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION

TRADITIONAL	RESOURCING	LIFE-CYCLE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • STRUCTURING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Doctrine — Design — Requirements • EQUIPPING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Research — Development — Acquisition — Distribution • TRAINING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Initial Entry — Specialty — Professional — Unit • MANNING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Accession — Assignment — Progression — Separation • SUSTAINING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Supply — Maintenance — Transportation — Other Services — (facilities, medical) • MOBILIZING • DEPLOYING 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • STRUCTURING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Doctrine — Design — Requirements • EQUIPPING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Research — Development — Acquisition — Distribution • TRAINING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Initial Entry — Specialty — Professional — Unit • MANNING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Accession — Assignment — Progression — Separation • SUSTAINING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Supply — Maintenance — Transportation — Other Services • MOBILIZING/ DEPLOYING • FACILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Construction — Repair • MANAGING INFORMATION <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Communication — Intelligence • MANAGEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORCE DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Threat Appraisal — Design — Manpower Requirements — Faces • ACQUIRE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Access People — Procure Equipment — Buy Real Property • TRAIN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Initial Entry — Specialty — Basic Officer • DISTRIBUTE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Assign People — Allocate Equipment • DEVELOP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Alter Equipment — Unit Training — Promotion — Professional Training — Improve Facilities • DEPLOY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Move Equipment — Move People • SUSTAIN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Maintain Facilities — Repair Equipment — Repair People — Repeat Core Training • SEPARATE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Release People — Release Equipment — Release Facilities

FIGURE 3-13


Requirements System (CBRS) and Mission Area Analysis (MAA) process. A deficiency may be resolved by a change in doctrine, training, organization, or

equipment or some combination of changes in two or more of these areas. The lower cost solutions are changes to doctrine and training, which can be matured



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE


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
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT



ARMY FORCE INTEGRATION

CONDUCT FORCE DEVELOPMENT

- DESIGN UNIT MODELS
- DEVELOP FORCE STRUCTURES
- DOCUMENT UNIT AUTHORIZATIONS




ERC - Equipment Readiness Codes
 ERPS - Equipment Release Priority System
 FAS - Force Accounting System
 FDTE - Force Development Test and Experimentation
 FIA - Force Integration Analysis
 FOTE - Follow-On Test and Evaluation
 IPR - In-Process Review

ITAADS - Installation the Army Authorization Documents System
 JSCP - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
 JSPD - Joint Strategic Planning Document
 LPMAD - Living Personnel Management Authorization Document
 LRRDAP - Long Range Research Development and Acquisition Plan
 MAA - Mission Area Analysis
 OMNIBUS - U.S. Army Operational Readiness Analysis

OPLANS - Operations Plans
 OT - Operational Test
 PBG - Program and Budget Guidance
 POM - Program Decision Memorandum
 PPBS - Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

QOPRI - Qualitative and Quantitative
 REQUEST - Recruit Quota System
 REQVAL - Requisition Validation Rep
 RETAIN - Reenlistment, Reclassifica
 ROC - Required Operational Capability

FIGURE 3-14



within TRADOC, packaged, and provided directly to the unit. If a reorganization is required, the necessary organizational changes must be matured in the Force Development process. If a change in equipment, the most expensive solution, is required, the Research and Development process must be initiated. It is axiomatic that equipment changes will require concurrent changes in structure which require research and development to be closely linked to the Force Development process.

Change from this perspective relates to specifics or "eaches"—a type TOE or an item of equipment. The other key ingredient to change is the extent to which the change will be promulgated throughout the Army. The controlling factor in this instance is resources. Thus, the Provide Resources process becomes the determinant of force size. In the first case, we are establishing what will be changed; in the second, we are determining how many. The marriage of these two processes occurs in the Structure and Composition System (SACS) which is the only approved requirements base for personnel and materiel. The importance of SACS, colloquially stated, is "If it ain't in SACS—it ain't." From SACS the processes to Acquire, Train, and Distribute Personnel and Acquire and Distribute Materiel, may be structured. Since at that point we are dealing with individuals and things, the linking of the thought process which analyzes the tools the Army uses to manage change with the functional requirements for producing combat-ready units portrayed in the life cycle model should be apparent.

Information Flow.

As discussed on page 3-3, information flow is a critical aspect of effective systems integration. In the Army's battle to achieve effective force integration, there have been several initiatives focused on improving information flow.

Force Modernization Master Plan (FMMP).

The FMMP was first published by ODCSOPS in 1981. This plan is designed to support integration of all modernized systems into a total package. As such, it provides a single source statement of the goals and objectives of the Army's modernization effort. To support these goals, specific management guidance is included in the plan. The transition plan for evolving to the Army of Excellence and baseline equipment distribution/redistribution projections were also included in the form of colored graphics. The Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP) provides a systematic way to support this aspect of the FMMP. In the case of these two functions, altered equipment delivery schedules and changes to other requirements tend to force continual revisions. Modifications to distribution plans are disseminated by message with a summarization of all changes being provided in the next FMMP. This communication network is also supported by the Force Modernization Milestone Reporting System (FMMRS).

Army Modernization Information Memorandum (AMIM).

The AMIM is published biennially with an annual cost data update by ODCSOPS. It basically provides all the information required by MACOM's to plan for Force Modernization. Detailed system descriptions are provided for each item being fielded. Updated distribution plans and organization designs are included to reflect the changes from the FMMP. The AMIM also includes Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) and density data for systems. This data is used to estimate support costs once the system is fielded. MACOM's use the data provided to prepare their input for the Program Analysis Resource Review (PARR) and Modernization Resource Information Submission (MRIS) which is the documentation used by HQDA to support resourcing the MACOM's for the modernization effort.

Force Modernization Milestone Reporting System (FMMRS).

The FMMRS is a data base system maintained by Army Materiel Command's (AMC) Materiel Readiness Support Activity (MRSA) at Lexington, Kentucky. FMMRS maintains 59 key data elements on each developmental system including the Life Cycle System Management Model (LCSMM) milestones which are discussed in detail in Chapter 17. The FMMRS includes all AMIM systems; other developmental items; Nondevelopmental Items (NDI); and the Product Improvement Proposals (PIP's) leading to type classification, materiel release, or Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The data elements are updated on a regular basis, and MRSA publishes a quarterly report which is distributed throughout the Army to provide visibility on the status of systems in development.

Functional Area Assessment (FAA)

The FAA is another tool which supports force integration by improving information flow and coordination. Originally the FAA was conceived as a detailed management review built on a type unit. With the focus on a unit type, all supporting functions—manning, equipping, structuring, etc. are concurrently subject to scrutiny. The proponent and coordinator of the FAA is normally the TRADOC Service School or Center responsible for that type unit. The assessment culminates with a presentation of the results to the Vice Chief of Staff with senior representatives from each functional area present. This meeting provides a basis for interactive communication, management guidance, and problem resolution. The interaction is handled in an informal, non-pejorative environment where anyone present (usually about 150) can speak on any of the issues presented. Designated issues are carried forward so that visibility is maintained community-wide on solving specific problems. Significant value is gained through the preparation for the FAA as many of the obstacles to effective Force Integration may be overcome as the various agencies coordinate to provide the assessment.

Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD).

In 1983, the Vice Chief of Staff formed a special Documentation Study Task Force to identify problems and recommend improvements to the Army's existing data management structure. The need for this effort was generated by the fact that as the Army began the modernization effort, off-line management became the rule rather than the exception in efforts to solve the crisis of the moment. It was obvious that a major portion of the difficulty was endemic to the proliferation of functionally-oriented data management systems that were not interactive. The Task Force recommended interim short-term fixes to the existing process; however, the long-term goal was to establish a single unified data system which would serve all functions. The initiatives studied and promulgated have been turned over for refinement and execution by the responsible proponents on the Army Staff and Headquarters, TRADOC.

Organization Integration (OI).

As a result of previous Force Integration activities, e.g. the DAIG inspections, FAA, the DCSOPS has been designated as the force integrator of the Army and, as such, is responsible for Army wide management of force integration. These responsibilities will be discharged through the concept of organization integration (OI). OI is a doctrine of change management that focuses Army management actions towards organizations to insure the orderly incorporation and sustainment of structure, equipment, and doctrine in the Total Army. The objective of the OI effort is to proactively assess the combined impacts of Army functional systems on units and ensure the appropriate mix of resources (structure, people, equipment, dollars, facilities) is available and fielded to support a planned activity for an organization or system at the appropriate time, with the result being combat ready units.

At HQDA, execution of this proactive process falls upon the organization integrators (OI), force integrators (FI), system integrators (SI), and the OI team. The OI is responsible for management of like-type battalion and separate company size units (e.g. armor) to the Unit Identification Code (UIC) level of detail. Specific duties of the OI are:

- Assess Army ability to provide required personnel, equipment, and facilities for units (primarily battalions and separate companies).

- Recommend allocating, fielding, and distributing personnel, materiel, facilities, and other assets to units as integrated packages.

- Chair OI team meetings—consisting of PEO LNO's, DALSO's, PERSSO's, SI's and other HQDA staff officers, as necessary—to facilitate vertical organizational integration.

- Analyze inputs from members of the OI team to develop recommended ODCSOPS priorities for phasing

in or replacing specified personnel MOS's, equipment, and facilities concerning battalions/separate companies and similar sized units.

- Evaluate and analyze the impact on unit readiness of changes in personnel, training, equipment, facilities, doctrine, or structure.

- Review distribution and redistribution plans, insure coordination of the plans and determine impacts of these plans on units, as necessary.

- Review appropriate Operational and Organizational (O&O) plans to insure plans are suitably specific, complete, and meet unit needs.

- Review applicable Required Operational Capability (ROC) to assess impacts of the new capability on unit structure, doctrine, or resources.

- Review, coordinate, and approve unit TOE's and concept plans.

- Maintain documentation audit trail on all additions, deletions, and other changes to unit MTOE.

- Control all unit changes by approving entries to the Force Accounting System (FAS) and Structure and Composition System (SACS).

- Ensure accuracy of data which define units in the TAADS and SACS.

- Insure that the requirements of the using organizations are adequately represented in all Force Integration and other HQDA processes (e.g., TAA, FIA, FAA, LRRDAP, PPBES).

- Act as Army Staff (ARSTAF) lead for appropriate FAA's.

- Review and assess impacts of mid-range and long-range planning considerations on battalions, separate companies, and similar sized units (includes new doctrine, equipment, personnel MOS's, standardized facilities, training devices, etc.).

The FI is responsible for horizontal integration for large units, such as divisions, separate brigades, and corps. Specific duties of the FI are as follows:

- Assess the Army's ability to provide required personnel, equipment, facilities, and fiscal resources for major units (primarily larger than battalion) in the near term and over the long run.

- Chair meetings of appropriate organizational integrators to facilitate integration across major organizations.

- Develop and maintain organizational Program Development Increment Packages (PDIP's) for major organizations (includes personnel and dollar resources).

- Provide prioritized alternatives to increase or decrease Army program/budget documents through analysis of the resource needs of major organizations; assess impacts of alternatives on units and provide appropriate recommendations.

- Act as the communications link between resource allocators (e.g., functional panels, appropriation directors) and organizational integrators.

- Evaluate and analyze the aggregate impact of incorporating personnel, facilities, equipment, doctrine,

structure, and capability changes into major organizations of the Army.

—Ensure that major units are adequately represented in all Force Integration and other HQDA processes (e.g., TAA, FIA, FAA, PPBES).

—Act as ARSTAF POC for appropriate command plans developed by MACOM's.

—Review and assess impacts of mid-range and long-range planning on major units (includes new doctrine, structure, technology, stationing, strategic policy, training strategies, mobilizing, sustaining, resource strategies, etc.).

The system integrator (SI) assists the OI and FI in managing equipment oriented aspects of integration. The SI has duties similar to the former Force Integration Staff Officer (FISO), but will concentrate on the front-end combat development/requirement determination process and fielding, with less emphasis on the management of "eaches" during the acquisition cycle. Specific functions of the SI are:

—Act as the point of contact for determining requirements, accomplishing fielding and other user-oriented functions related to materiel acquisition.

—Participate in OI team meetings.

—Develop and coordinate DA position on proposed materiel requirements documents.

—Review, validate, and determine the affordability of the materiel requirements produced by CBRS.

—Develop acquisition alternatives.

—Recommend ODCSOPS materiel acquisition priorities for research development, test, evaluation, procurement, and product improvement programs.

—Develop and coordinate DA position on combat developer proposed basis of issue plans (BOIP).

—Provide recommended priorities for materiel distribution.

—Participate in system design reviews.

—Ensure that during initiation of a requirement and throughout the acquisition process, care is given to the possible rationalization, standardization, interoperability of Army systems with those of other U.S. services, NATO allies, and other appropriate members.


—Review appropriate O&O plans for materiel user implications.

—Review equipment portions of Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)/Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE)/Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for adequacy and accuracy.

—Coordinate input and provide recommendations concerning Required Operational Capability (ROC) to the approval authority.

The OI team includes representatives who have knowledge of the doctrine, design, structure, personnel, acquisition, equipping, resources, facilities, information management, and training activities which will impact upon a unit. As required, representatives from MACOM's and reserve components may be included in the team. The leader of the OI team is the Organization Integrator. The OI team uses and shares information available in existing Army information systems. Where disconnects appear in the information validity or Army plans, the OI team is charged with fixing the disconnect. The OI team is an informal organization. Each action officer on the team is responsible for preparing, handling, and coordinating actions in his area of expertise. A representative team is shown at Figure 3-15.

ORGANIZATION INTEGRATION TEAM



OI	— ORGANIZATION INTEGRATOR
\$ MGR	— DOLLAR MANAGER — PROGRAMMER
SI	— SYSTEM INTEGRATOR (ODCSOPS)
PEO LNO	— PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE LIAISON OFFICER (ASARDA)
PERSSO	— PERSONNEL SYSTEM STAFF OFFICER (ODCSPER)
DALSO	— DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY LOGISTICS SUPPORT OFFICER (ODCSLOG)
TSM	— TRADOC SYSTEM MANAGER (NORMALLY LOCATED AT SERVICE SCHOOL)
PM	— PROGRAM/PROJECT MANAGER
FAC MGR	— FACILITIES MANAGER (ACE)

FIGURE 3-15

SUMMARY

In modern complex organizations everything is likely to impact on everything else. The systems approach, particularly the systems conceptualization of organizations as interrelated subsystems in an environmental suprasystem, is a very useful tool for management to accomplish its job in a holistic and integrated manner.

The revolutionary changes being instituted in the Army and their associated problems have highlighted the need in our complex organization for the holistic approach. For that approach to be successful, senior Army managers must understand the nature of the interrelations of the subsystems and how they must be coordinated. Only then can force integration objectives be met.

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CHAPTER 4

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE ARMY

INTRODUCTION

The presentation of an abbreviated treatment of theory should serve the purpose of clarifying and explaining a variety of phenomena that predictably do or do not occur in practice. Theory tends toward generalization, and generalization permits the relative comfort of ambiguity and vagueness. Descriptions of practice, however, are much more specific and require a sharper focus to clarify and explain a particular phenomenon. In studying management practice, added precision can be achieved by concentrating on a selected organization. The organization of focus is the Department of the Army. While narrowing the field of view to the Army, systems philosophy does not permit us to completely isolate the Army from its environment. This chapter, therefore, will begin the discussion of Army management practice by describing the relationship between the Army and its environment. An overview of the Army's principal management systems and processes is described in the chapters which follow.

External Influences.

A primary task of top management is to relate the organization to and interact with its environment. With this in mind, management must formulate a strategic concept by which the organization can function to fulfill its basic purposes. Applying this to the Army, it becomes imperative that the environment be viewed as sets of forces and pressures which influence the way of thinking about managing the Army.

The identification of environmental factors which represent external influences on the Army as an organization is a necessary first step toward classification and treatment of those variables in the top management decision processes. Before a managerial strategic concept is formulated, it is necessary to consider the choices imposed upon the organization and the limitations to courses of action to be taken by the organization. Identifying the external influences and classifying them into specific categories for further study and description presents some difficulty. The dynamic characteristics of the environment complicate the task immediately. That which exerts strong influence today may be relatively inert tomorrow. New factors come into play while others fade away. The pace and magnitude of the changing nature of the environment are sources of uncertainty and dependence for the Army. These are the influences which create contingencies and constitute constraints which must be continuously redefined and dealt with by those who must make decisions for the Army.

Classification of the Environment.

A theoretical basis for classifying the environment of a typical large, complex organization was presented earlier. That concept of dividing the externalities of an organization into (1) a task environment and (2) a general environment is the basic proposition followed in the presentation of this chapter.

Task Environment: Organizational Tasking Forces.

In theory, task environment is defined rather simply as those elements having actual or potential effect on setting and achieving the goals of an organization. Applying this view to the Army, a classification is established for those forces which affect the determination of the Army's tasks and its ability to perform those tasks. These elements will be presented in the latter portion of the chapter as follows:


- Forces affecting Army programs involved with national military strategy:
 - a. From the executive branch.
 - b. From the legislative branch.
 - c. From outside the government.
- National priorities in competition with Army programs:
 - a. From the executive branch.
 - b. From the legislative branch.
 - c. From outside the government.
- Pressure exerted directly on Army programs:
 - a. From the executive branch.
 - b. From the legislative branch.
 - c. From the judicial branch.
 - d. From outside the government.

The General Environment: Societal Pressures and Constraints.

This classification of external influences consists of all other pressures and forces acting directly or indirectly to produce constraints or contingencies for the Army. Since the Army is basically an instrument of power at the national level, the general environment of the Army can be studied by using the broad categories used in studying the elements of national power. These elements will be presented in the first portion of the chapter under the categories of cultural, historical, political, psycho-social (public opinion), technological, economical, and military influences in the general environment.

Model of the Environment. The model depicted by Figure 4-1 illustrates the two parts of the scheme for classifying and presenting the information in this

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON ARMY MANAGEMENT DECISIONS



 **TASK ENVIRONMENT**
 **GENERAL ENVIRONMENT**

FIGURE 4-1

chapter. While the model does not portray exact or precise sets of relationships (e.g. the magnitude or directness of the influence), it does portray most of the principal external influences on Army top management decisions.

SOCIETAL PRESSURES AND CONSTRAINTS

Societal pressures and constraints, which appear on the outer ring of the model in Figure 4-1, are relatively uncontrollable so far as the Army is concerned. They are the source of great uncertainty, and often they prompt a sudden reaction to an unexpected surge of energy from a normally placid province of the environment. Very much interrelated, some of these kinds of external influences on top management decisions are described briefly here.

Cultural.

Embedded in the culture of this nation are some fundamental beliefs about the basic nature of the Army of the United States and the roles it should perform. The colonist resented the presence of the British Army to enforce oppressive measures, so the new government took steps to limit the use of the Army as a means of internal control and repression. Civilian control of the small standing Army became a part of our way of life. Indeed, General Washington probably surprised many of his day, and perhaps historians of our own time, by disbanding the Army and rejecting its use as a base of personal power, and he warned of entangling alliances which might draw this nation into war. The nation would not initiate hostilities except as a defensive measure, and then sufficient military power would be achieved by a general mobilization. Peacetime conscription was anathema to the new nation. After all, the minutemen of the militia were adequate for the defense of this nation.

Many of the beliefs that accompanied the birth of our nation have persisted to some extent. And those basic attitudes that make up our culture are influences affecting our Army today. Consider only a few issues such as a peacetime draft versus a volunteer Army; a ready force in being versus reliance on traditional mobilization; or forward basing in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) versus a withdrawal to fortress America. These issues, and many others which may involve cultural conflicts, are aggravated by cultural growth, development, and change.

Historical.

On 14 June 1775, the Continental Congress created the United States Army. Although it was beset by every imaginable adversity, General George Washington and his Army of patriots persisted for six long years until

they won a decisive victory at Yorktown in October 1781. The Army defended the young nation in 1814, and the Army led the westward movement by fighting and winning the Indian Wars and the Mexican War. The nation was held together during the Civil War through the most heartbreaking kind of conflict by the Army, and the Army fought and won through the Spanish American War, in World War I and World War II. The history of this nation through 1945 evolved about a winning tradition—about an Army that never lost a war. It became a vital part of “the leading power” of the world.

In 1950, that power was challenged, and the US Army, as part of a United Nations force, fought valiantly in a war that ended with a truce—because of new kinds of nonmilitary limitations, it did not win a decisive victory. A few years later a new president declared that the United States would go anywhere and fight any battle to preserve freedom; however, within that decade the Army was hopelessly bogged down in Vietnam which was eventually lost. Civilian leaders began to question—perhaps we should only be “a leading power”—perhaps military missions should not read “to destroy” an enemy—perhaps force itself is no longer an important component of foreign relations.

Political.

While historically Americans have opposed a large standing Army, there has been little doubt about the necessity for an Army. Even in the infancy of the country, the Monroe Doctrine was a statement of national policy supported by military power, however credible at the time. And so it was with “54-40 or fight” and “speak softly but carry a big stick.” The power of the United States was in no small way represented by the Army. Obviously, the national policies set by politicians in our system of civilian control have great impact on the managerial strategy of the Army and require adjustments based on political objectives. Political agreements (e.g., mutual defense treaties) and political limitations (e.g., Vietnam) place major constraints and responsibilities on the Army’s top leadership.

Public Opinion.

Domestic politics are sensitive to the pressure of public opinion. The public may complain about large defense budgets and military waste, and the Congress may echo that theme loudly.

Public support for the Army reached an all-time low during the Vietnam conflict. Many reasons have been given—no perceived threat to national interest, no general mobilization to engender commitment of the public, the kind of news coverage which the conflict received and the tenor of commentaries, the anti-war movement with its riots and marches, the length and cost of the war, and others. Never had the nation experienced such a demonstration of hostility toward the Army during an engagement with an enemy.

Unfortunately, the low esteem for the Army came partly from such incidents as My Lai, the club scandals, the Presidio Mutiny, misconduct by generals, and widely publicized critics from within the system. The military profession sank lower and lower in public opinion polls as more and more unfavorable publicity was generated.

The formation of opinion, particularly with regard to governmental processes, decisions, and plans, is primarily a function of the mass media (e.g. newspapers, radio, television). Today, little that the government, including the Armed Forces, does escapes the attention of American and international press agencies. From time to time, the constant interaction of the two institutions—the press and the government—produces friction. Recently, notable examples of that phenomenon include the massive controversy surrounding exclusion of the press from military operations in Grenada, the bitter dispute between the Pentagon and a Washington newspaper concerning the latter's decision to publish sensitive information about a January 1985 space shuttle flight, and the charges and countercharges exchanged following an April 1985 test of the post-Grenada media pool arrangement for providing news agencies access to military operations.

Those problems highlight several facts which remain salient. First, modern news organizations are large, powerful institutions in their own right. In practical terms, that means they command the resources necessary to get just about any national security story they want independent of any assistance or support by the government. Second, refusal or inability on the government's part to participate in the development of a news story, whatever the motivation for doing so, almost invariably works to its disadvantage—simply because the government point of view has no chance of being presented. In plain language, if we won't talk to the press someone else will and that someone else may not understand the government position or may have an axe to grind. Third, the media's role in the formation of public opinion, however that term is defined, is both clear and significant. Recent polls establish conclusively that the media are the most powerful "agenda-setting" agencies in our society. Even if they don't tell the public what to think, they certainly tell us what to think about. Finally, the *only* interface between the government and the people is the media. We have no government news agency to perform that function; even direct appeals by the President to the people must be done through television, radio and newspapers—with the inevitable "instant analysis" of his remarks.

The lesson of all this for military professionals and others involved in national security policy formulation is that every action, every decision, must be examined on two levels: first, the prevailing mood of the general public, special interest groups, and those elements of society likely to be affected must be gauged beforehand and, second, public affairs planning must take place concurrently with operational planning. The latter necessarily includes very pragmatic analyses of the ways

the mass media can be used as a vehicle for creating public support of those actions and decisions.

Economic.

One of the principal areas of public and political concern is the rising cost of military programs. Among those who press for expanded welfare, income support, educational assistance, health care, and other worthwhile social programs there is little comfort in statistics which prove that outlays for the Army have declined in terms of purchasing power. Some are more concerned that it costs ten times as much now as it did in 1942 to pay a soldier, buy a tank, or build a barracks than the fact that the departments for social programs now consume more of the Federal budget than the Department of Defense (DOD).

Obviously, the Army is affected by periods of high inflation. Money appropriated in a current budget will not buy as much as planned during the two years required to develop the budget. Today, a weapons system is programmed for research, development, and acquisition over a period of several years. When it comes into the inventory it simply costs much more than was projected at concept. While cost growth and overruns are fairly ordinary in the private sector, as well as in other areas of public activity, they seem to develop a storm of protest when associated with a military program. Therefore, Army management must more accurately forecast the impact of new weapon systems decisions and other decisions involving long lead times on cost growth.

Of course, the problems of cost growth and competing demands from other Federal activities create pressures on the Federal budget, especially when recession or stagnation become a factor. Since the Defense budget represents the largest controllable portion of the Federal budget, the Army feels the pressure. While the procurement of equipment, ammunition, and materiel items is affected, attention is usually focused on personnel costs which account for more than half of the Army budget. Even with more modern, sophisticated hardware, the Army remains rather heavily labor intensive. Those exerting the pressure quite naturally point toward reductions in force as a quick, easy solution.

The economic variable represents a strong source of external influence on the Army management process. The relationship of the Army and society are often strained, as well as sometimes smoothed, by the economy. It is an extremely complex and often very fuzzy area, but it is also of vital importance to the Army. The economic pressure usually leads to the question: How much can the United States afford for an Army?

Technological.

A few years ago, talk about push-button warfare was fairly common. Sophisticated weaponry, communications, and mobility were pursued vigorously

in a race for technological supremacy on the battlefield. While the soldier was seen as the indispensable element of combat, it was fashionable to envision him with some sort of air fan, or rotary wing, or perhaps even twin jets, cavorting around the battle area with two-way communications and night vision devices installed in his helmet and armed with a light-weight, rapid-firing weapon. The technological explosion pushed the "state of the art" with great confidence that the magic of science, the resources of our nation, and the resourcefulness of our people could provide us a "modern" Army.

To be an effective resource for employment in the security of the United States, the Army must maximize its return on materiel resources. The Army faces problems of an appropriate balance in its programs to provide the right mix of high and low technology hardware. Modern weapons systems are being integrated into the Army at an unprecedented rate and the management of this program is one of the key challenges facing the Army. But the meaning of technology includes much more. The methods and techniques—the doctrine—for employing the Army are vital technological considerations. Also, in recent years, knowledge technology has become increasingly important. The Army must compete for skills and aptitudes in the environment; it must recruit the right people; and it must engage in extensive training to insure an adequate level of knowledge technology. There is no force bearing upon the top management of the Army with greater implications than recruiting and maintaining sufficient numbers of qualified personnel. The technological variables strike to the heart of the question: Can the United States Army achieve and maintain technological supremacy in the capability to wage modern land warfare?

Military.

Obviously, of all the variables in the external environment of the Army, that which has the greatest impact is the military. The military threat confronting the United States determines largely the need for an Army, the will to use it, the resolve to win, what kind of an Army is required, and how much Army can be afforded. Assessment of the military threat as reflected in the capabilities and the intentions of political and real enemies is extremely difficult, but no less necessary. Intelligence is critical, not only to the design and structure of forces to counter the threat, but to maximize participation with allied forces. Logically, we should assess allied strengths and weaknesses and consider their capabilities when we structure our force. In this respect, military management is complicated by a "foreign" external environment that must be evaluated in much the same way as we do our own. Intelligence assessments, estimates, and long range forecasts are vital to the formulation of national security strategy and force structure of the Army.

The Army is greatly affected by the total military situation and how it is perceived by those who control the Army. These variables influence the roles and missions of the Army, the scenarios for potential employment of the Army, and the resources made available to the Army. In turn, these external influences affect Army's top management decisions on programs and objectives pursued in the management of those resources. These considerations, (1) the use of the Army as a resource and (2) the internal management of resources by the Army, lead to a discussion of the tasking forces in the Army's environment.

ORGANIZATIONAL TASKING FORCES

Returning to the model of external influences depicted by Figure 4-1, the second major classification of environmental factors is Organizational Tasking Forces. These are forces which impact more specifically and more directly upon Army programs than the societal pressures and constraints. These are forces which lean heavily upon the goals, policies, and strategies adopted for the Army and resources allocated to perform its tasks.

In the remainder of this chapter, the Army's tasking forces are presented in three categories: (1) consideration of the forces involved in the formulation of the national military strategy; (2) a listing of competitive influences in the Federal budget process (which is a sort of statement of national priorities among the various national programs); and (3) pressures applied on the Army in the management of its programs.

Forces Involved with National Military Strategy.

National military strategy is one of the key elements of the total national strategy. This section is oriented toward the formulation of the national military strategy. Forces and pressures that have major impact on the Army are quite apparent in this aspect of the task environment. The brief sketches of the more prominent factors involved in the formulation of the national military strategy are arranged in the following sequence: from the executive branch, from the legislative branch, and from outside the government.

From the Executive Branch. — The President. Although the constitutional power for leadership in both foreign and national security policies is vested in the President, the actual power may vary. Many factors determine how active the President becomes in these matters, but strong-minded presidents have retained leading roles. President Truman asserted his power by firing General MacArthur; likewise, President Ford dismissed a Secretary of Defense. President Carter recalled and had reassigned a general officer who criticized in public an established national policy. There are many ways that the President indicates his personal

leadership—at press conferences or in speeches; in periodic reports, oral and written, to the Congress; or through formal declarations such as the Nixon Doctrine.

The President's role in national security is clearly derived from his constitutional designation as commander-in-chief of the armed services. The President has great influence over the complexion of the national military strategy as evidenced by the dramatic shift from a strategy of massive retaliation to one of flexible response initiated by President Kennedy. Not so clear, however, are the limitations of that power to commit forces, and the debate culminated in legislation near the end of the Vietnam conflict. Under emergency conditions the President must report to the Senate in 48 hours, and periodically thereafter, the circumstances surrounding any employment of forces and receive Congressional approval for the continuation of military activity beyond 60 days.

— *The National Security Council (NSC)*. The NSC is a mechanism created in 1947 by the Congress to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. Additional purposes include making recommendations to the President on the basis of (1) the assessment and appraisal of the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power and (2) a consideration of all policies of the Government concerned with national security.

The statutory membership of the NSC has changed three times since 1947; it now includes the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense—already members of the executive branch. Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs almost always attend meetings of the NSC. Other senior officials, with experience and knowledge relevant to a matter under consideration, are often invited to NSC meetings. Over the years, Presidents have used the NSC differently, ranging from extensive use by President Eisenhower to virtually none by President Kennedy.

In the past, several senior bodies at the secretary/under secretary level supported and assisted the NSC. There were committees involved specifically with defense, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations, foreign intelligence, and international energy matters. Other committees were charged with: studying policy issues, insuring the uniform execution of policy decisions, and meeting the special need for coordination in crisis situations. The current NSC has three senior interdepartmental groups (SIG's) formed to handle defense policy, foreign policy, and intelligence. The key to action in the NSC is the National Security Study Directive (NSSD), which identifies a problem requiring study by an appropriate agency. After study of the paper prepared in response to the NSSD, a decision by

the President is published in the form of a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD). Such decisions constitute a prime source of external influence on policy formulation within the DOD and Army.

— *The Department of State*. The element of the Federal bureaucracy most directly involved with conducting the foreign affairs of the United States is the State Department. It accomplishes the operational activities attendant to our relations with other nations. The Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor. His actual influence will vary with the preferences and style of the President. In recent years, the Secretary's role has differed from one administration to another.

— *The Department of Defense (DOD)*. The element of the Federal bureaucracy most directly involved with conducting the national security affairs of the United States is the Defense Department. Created by the National Security Act of 1947, it was established as an executive department of the government in 1949 with the Secretary of Defense as its head. The DOD includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military departments and the military services within those departments, the unified and specified commands, and other agencies established to meet specific requirements. The OSD and JCS perform vital roles in the process of developing and implementing the national military strategy as well as in defense resource management and military operations.

- The Office of the Secretary of Defense actively participates in National Security Council affairs by preparing DOD positions, policies, plans, and procedures in the field of international politico-military and foreign economic affairs. Among matters of interest are arms control and disarmament; negotiation and monitoring agreements with foreign governments and international organizations on military facilities, operating rights, and status of forces; and the development of guidance in the Security Assistance Program and the Mutual Security Program. Intelligence resources are managed and coordinated to provide intelligence, warning, reconnaissance, net threat assessment, and oversight of physical resources required to produce information for use in national security planning.

There may be subtle differences in viewing the nature and content of national military strategy outside the DOD; however, within DOD there must be some statement which provides the basis for strategic military planning and operations and resources management activities. Perhaps the most definitive statement of the national military strategy is found in a document called the Defense Guidance (DG), prepared biennially within OSD. The DG is a basic planning and programming document used by the JCS and the military departments.

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff evolved from World War II planning and operations and were formally established as "the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense" by the National Security Act of 1947. Since that time, changes have added a Chairman, modified the roles and functions of the body, and added the responsibility for advising the NSC. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) has further specified that the Chairman, JCS is the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense as distinct from the entire Joint Chiefs. The Act also established the position of Vice Chairman to perform the duties of the chairman in the absence or disability of the chairman and made the joint staff responsive directly to the CJCS and Vice Chairman.

Under the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the JCS (1) prepares strategic plans and provides for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces and (2) establishes unified combatant commands in strategic areas.

While there are several other responsibilities designated, the two listed above provide the basis for the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS). The JSPS consists of short, mid, and long-range strategic intelligence and planning documents while the JOPS prescribes uniform policies and procedures for the timely development of effective operation plans. Both JSPS and JOPS are given detailed treatment in Chapters 10 and 12; however, it is important to note at this point that the JCS is a highly significant element in the tasking environment of the Army. Further, the role of the unified Commanders in Chief (CINC's) in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System has recently been expanding. As the CINC's develop wartime strategy, the Army responds by providing forces required to implement that strategy. The CINC's' increased input into the resource decisionmaking process represents an additional important influence on the management of the Army.

From the Legislative Branch. Although the executive branch has the leading role in the development of foreign policy and the national military strategy, the Congress is a force to be reckoned with. Dissatisfaction with policies of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations led to greater initiative by the Congress to become involved in national security affairs. Under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, the Congress has the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all other powers vested by the Constitution to any officer or department. Such enabling legislation is usually preceded by hearings before Congressional committees. The administration's foreign policy may be thoroughly aired before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Similarly, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Service Secretaries, as

well as the Service Chiefs and the Chairman of the JCS, are given the opportunity to present statements of strategic posture before Congressional committees concerned with authorization and appropriation. The posture statements of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army constitute a prime source of top management views for the strategic direction of the Army.

From Outside the Government. As a conclusion to the consideration of forces involved with the formulation of national military strategy, we look briefly to forces outside the government. Since the United States is a member of the United Nations and relies heavily on our allies in various treaty commitments, policies cannot be developed in isolation. In addition to other governments, there are many private organizations, both profit and nonprofit as well as domestic and multinational, that represent varying degrees of force to be considered.

Competitive Influences in Setting National Priorities.

The budget of the United States is more than a financial plan or a mere set of figures. It presents a program of action proposed by the President to the Congress each year to meet the continuing growth of the nation's responsibilities at home and abroad—together with anticipated costs and proposals as to where the money should come from.

There may be some disagreement about the existence of a national strategy composed of a specific set of national programs with a sharply defined order and hierarchy. However, the interests of the government are manifested by the formal programs adopted and pursued. Further, the relative priorities of the programs may be inferred somewhat from the budget process. The whole Federal budget process brings competing elements into a complicated procedure of moves and countermoves to acquire funds for their programs. Dollars become the common denominator between all kinds of programs. The Army must project its resource requirements to convince others having influence and interests in the process of setting national priorities. Some of the most prominent forces are in the executive branch, the legislative branch, and from activities outside of the government.

From the Executive Branch. Although the Army falls under the executive branch, it is greatly affected by competitive strategies, constraints, and contingencies arising within that branch of the government. Competitive influences come from such sources as the President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Federal bureaucracy, and dominant personalities close to the President.

— Army programs are in competition at the DOD level with the programs of other services for scarce

resources. Each service proposes programs which are examined at OSD and accepted, modified, or rejected in relation to priorities and resources available. Forces from other services, JCS and OSD all impact on the priorities and decisions within the budget process.

— The President is ultimately responsible for the policies and programs of his administration, and he can exercise tremendous influence on the relative priority given to programs within the government. His personal support for legislation, his veto power, the use of executive order, his personal pronouncements and speeches, and the use of presidential appointments are only a few of the many sources of personal power accruing to the President. As the commander-in-chief, the President can do much to enhance or curtail the Army simply through exercising his constitutional powers.

— The Office of Management and Budget provides the President with an institutional staff capability in such areas as program evaluation and coordination, government organization, information and management systems, and the extremely important functions of preparing and executing the Federal budget. The OMB has authority to assemble, correlate, revise, reduce, or increase the request for appropriations of the several departments and establishments. The extent of their influence varies from administration to administration depending upon how the President wishes it to operate. The OMB is, of course, involved in the defense budget process, often in a micro way, and represents a force of considerable strength in the Army's task environment.

— The Federal bureaucracy is a name conveniently attached to the "departments and establishments" referred to earlier. As used here, it includes the various departments headed by the members of the President's cabinet as well as the numerous agencies, commissions, and other activities established by law to perform government operations. The "departments and establishments" are the means by which the President can relate the government to the domestic and international environment. He must be as sensitive to their needs in promoting the programs of his administration as he is to those of the Army.

— Dominant personalities within the administration become significant competitive influences in setting national priorities. Members of the White House staff, certain cabinet members and trusted advisers have influence and power which is derived from their proximity to the President.

From the Legislative Branch. Historically, the most important single curb in the Constitution on the powers of the President is the congressional control of funds. Paragraph 7 of Section IX, Article 1 of the Constitution

states: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by laws." This provision is one of the strong points in the system of checks and balances in the Federal government, particularly between the executive and legislative branch. While the executive branch has considerable influence in setting national priorities, as reflected by the President's budget submission and legislative proposals, the Congress has its say about the priorities through the legislative process of authorization and appropriation. Briefly described here is the influence from congressional committees, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and dominant groups and individual personalities.

— Congressional committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives hold hearings on proposed legislation before it is referred for action by either of the legislative bodies. Joint committees may be formed to resolve differences of the separate committees or to hear matters of significance and mutual interest. The committee system is the operational mechanism by which the Congress discharges its constitutional responsibilities to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States." During the committee hearings, witnesses are called from the administration, from selected groups, or from any source in the general public to contribute relevant testimony. The committees probe and inquire into the conduct of government operations and evaluate the effectiveness of programs as a backdrop to legislative activity and as a part of the budget process: e.g., recently the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have increased the emphasis on linking the resources identified in the budget process with national military strategy and Congress is struggling to keep the Federal budget deficit within the targets of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficiency Control Act.

— The Congressional Budget Office was created by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to provide the Congress with a better means of exercising control over the budget. With the assistance of the CBO, the Congress is able to assume effective supervisory control over the entire budgetary process. Each year Congress will determine the appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures, thereby having considerable influence on the setting of national priorities.

— Dominant personalities seem to emerge from the members and rise to positions of prominence with power over priorities attached to legislation. While there is a formal organization and set of procedures for conducting the business of the Congress, the political nature of the body overrides all other considerations. The members of Congress are elected in a political process; they, in turn, select their own leadership and

make their own rules politically; and they do their work with acute awareness of the political implications and consequences which may evolve. Majority and minority leaders consider the relative priorities of programs as they move legislation through the Congress. Certainly, committee chairmen, as a part of the formal process, are in a position to inject their personal influence to push legislation of interest to them. Also, some individuals and groups are the champions of causes which they promote vigorously.

From Outside the Government. To conclude this portion, we look outside the formal machinery of the government to those activities which attempt to influence the governmental processes. Some elements from the general environment, such as lobbyists, may come forth in a more identifiable and direct way, while special interest groups are less direct.

Industries with defense contracts may find it beneficial to support large defense budgets. A conservationist group, a trade association, or a professional society may attempt, however blatantly or subtly, to influence legislation in their favor by direct contact with the Congress or administration officials. By demonstrations, rallies, and other attention-getting tactics, some groups hope to get public support and sway the administration or Congress. In a totally different approach, the Brookings Institution calls attention to issues with an annual publication of an analysis of the budget and alternative arrangement of priorities.

Pressures on Army Programs.

The description of Army tasking forces begins with the forces affecting the formulation of the national military strategy. Next the orientation shifts to the broad effects of competitive influences involved in setting national priorities as a sort of national strategy to achieve the national goals. Now the focus on Army tasking forces is narrowed even further to a consideration of pressures applied more directly to Army programs. Retaining parallelism with earlier portions, this presentation includes those from the executive branch, the legislative branch, from outside the government, and a new element — judicial considerations.

From the Executive Branch. Strategic military planning by OSD and JCS emphasizes the role of the Army as a resource for employment in support of the national military strategy. Another major role of the Army is the *management of its resources* which are distributed to various programs.

The management of Army programs is performed under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Management systems of the Army are integrated into those of the Department of Defense, principally through the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

The FYDP is the central program of the DOD, and Army programs exist only within the framework of that structure. There are eleven major mission-oriented divisions in the FYDP, and each includes major mission and support responsibilities. The elaboration of both mission and support objectives necessitates a substructure consisting of a great many program elements which provide total visibility of the mission and support functions. The FYDP is the official, formal written record of resource decisions that are made by the Secretary of Defense.

The DOD PPBS exists as a means of changing the FYDP. The effectiveness of the national military strategy is dependent upon the availability of the appropriate resources at the time and place required. The PPBS is a decision system that (1) facilitates the coordination of a wide variety of management functions, (2) establishes a highly visible schedule for the decision process and a time sequence to events, and (3) prescribes the roles and functions of responsible persons in developing the DOD budget for submission to the President.

The PPBS management process is the DOD method of integrating the activities of OSD, JCS, and the military departments. It incorporates the functions of strategic military planning, the programming of resource requirements, and the budgeting activities to acquire and allocate those resources. Program and budget decisions are the source of great pressures on Army resource management activities. A detailed description of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is presented in Chapter 14.

From the Legislative Branch. The pressure on Army programs does not end with the submission of the President's budget. The founding fathers endowed the Congress with the power to raise and support armies and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. The constitutional power of the Congress and that granted to the executive branch seem to create a battleground for conflict over who should control the military forces. The Congress exercises much of its power and control through the Federal budget process. Through the various committee hearings in the legislative process, Congress has an opportunity to survey, question, evaluate, criticize, and approve or disapprove funds for the Army's programs.

— Congressional committees are the actors who have roles that most directly involve the Army. Certain committees have almost a fatherly interest in the Army. They are the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee. Before recommending legislation to the full House or Senate, the committees hold hearings on the President's Budget and receive testimony from military representatives. These committees act on all legislation which authorizes forces or appropriates funds.

It is important to understand the difference between authorization and appropriation in this process. The *authorization* function is performed by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. Acting for the Congress, the two committees separately investigate and review various fiscal and policy matters bearing upon requirements outlined in the President's Budget. After extensive hearings and close scrutiny, the committees recommend legislation authorizing the expenditure of funds within amounts stated. The authorization bill does not include all items in the Defense budget; rather, the Congress selects those of special interest to them. Specific areas for authorization have increased over the years and now include such categories as:

Year	Authorization Category
1949	Construction
1950	Procurement and R&D of aircraft and missiles
1965	All research, development, test and evaluation
1967	Tracked combat vehicle procurement
1969	Reserve component average strength
1971	All other weapons procurement
1972	Active Army average strength
1973	Active Army end strength
1974	Military training loads
1975	Civilian end strength
1976	Training and education
1977	Ammunition production base construction
1981	Operations and Maintenance

The *appropriation* function, performed by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, leads to the legislation which provides funds. This action is independent from the authorization of programs. It is quite possible for a program to be authorized but have no funds appropriated.

— The Budget Committees of both Houses were created by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Although the groups have been active for a relatively short period of time, the duties assigned to them by law make it clear that they will be looking closely at Army programs in the future. One of their functions is to make continuing studies of the effect on budget authority and outlays of relevant existing and proposed legislation and to report the result of such studies to the House on a recurring basis. Both the House Budget Committee and the Senate Budget Committee have organized national security related task forces to review defense programs.

— *Micromanagement of programs.* While the power of the Congress in budgetary matters is well established by law and precedent, there is a continuous interest by the Congress into the management of the Army. This is certainly indicated by the number of items requiring authorizing legislation listed above. By failing to authorize certain programs or by restricting funds for others, the Congress can, indeed, disapprove a

program. Congressional oversight is also an increasing phenomenon. The General Accounting Office (GAO) is known as the watchdog of the Congress by virtue of its review and audit of expenditures connected with appropriated funds. The GAO can act on its own initiative or when called upon by a member or a committee of Congress. The Congress has also indicated a distinct willingness to look at specific areas. Subcommittees with special staffs can conduct hearings to determine the necessity of special legislation.

From the Judicial Branch. Within the last decade, the Army has been confronted with an extremely large increase in legal activity. The sources of the "law explosion" are roughly separated into two categories.

— The military justice system is based on the constitutional provision that Congress may legislate rules for the government and regulation of the forces. The Uniform Code of Military Justice was promulgated as a result of such legislation and is the bulwark of discipline in the services. Review by the higher Federal courts leads to an increasing number of decisions affecting the military justice system. The courts have moved to protect the rights of the individual, and the peculiarities of military service do not set aside constitutional safeguards.

— Management operations are frequently the target of legal maneuvers. For example, when the Army announces a base closure, they can usually expect an injunction to be filed in Federal court to delay the action pending some sort of legal action. Civil works programs may be delayed or cancelled because of actions filed under laws protecting the environment. Even a blackbird control program at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was stalled by legal action. President Carter directed a review of discharges from the Vietnam War to determine on an individual basis the equity and justice of the discharge. Constantly the Army is involved in lawsuits, and the legal staff of the Army has the task of defending and protecting commanders and programs in the courts.

From Outside the Government. Pressure on Army programs may come from sources outside the government. As previously discussed, the media can be a major force to consider in planning, developing and implementing any Army program. In addition, special interest groups, foreign governments, and others may actively promote their programs with adverse impacts on the Army. For example:

— Pressure by foreign governments and special interest groups can stimulate the sale of tanks and antiaircraft weapons to other countries. Without arguing the merits of foreign military sales, one of the results of such pressure can be equipment shortages and a reduced state of readiness in the Army.

— Toward the end of the Vietnam conflict, antiwar activist groups pressured Congress into legislation that severely limited Army tactical movement into certain areas.

— Corporations may exert influence to adopt their item of equipment over another or to maintain procurement levels. Individual and regional interests can pressure members of Congress into seeking Army contracts.

— Studies prepared by nongovernmental "think-tanks" can give impetus to many unsolicited proposals.

SUMMARY

The Department of the Army is an open system that continually interacts with other systems of activity within its dynamic environment. The organization is dependent in many ways upon the environment — a dependence that may be assessed in terms of the services provided as well as the sources of input. Thus, the environment imposes many constraints and contingencies upon the Army as it seeks to perform its role and accomplish its missions.

The top management of the Army relates the organization to its environment and develops a managerial strategy which will adapt and adjust the Army to cope with constraints and contingencies. Before conceiving a managerial strategy, it is necessary for management to be appropriately aware of the environment—to assess its present state and future state and determine where the organization is, should be, and where it is going.

Identifying and classifying the uncontrollable variables of the Army's environment can be approached by examining two broad categories: (1) those societal pressures and constraints and (2) the organizational tasking forces. Those in the general environment, the societal pressures, are cultural, historical, political, economic, technological, public opinion, and military.

Those in the near environment, the organizational tasking forces, include the forces involved with the formulation of the national military strategy, competitive influences that affect the position of the military in setting national priorities, and the more immediate pressures on Army programs.

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CHAPTER 5

SENIOR COMMAND

INTRODUCTION

No other word depicts the uniqueness or better captures the essence of the profession of arms than "COMMAND." The explicit authority and responsibility inherent in command positions flow directly and legitimately from the electoral process—the Congress and the President, who serves as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Command is the principal ingredient of and the foundation for successful organizational performance—for mission accomplishment. Together with its component structure—the chain of command—it provides for specific task assignments, a precise line of control and communication, and a clearly identifiable audit trail of responsibility and performance.

According to Roger H. Nye, the art of commanding military units is one of the few human endeavors that cannot be learned by taking courses leading to a degree in "Commandership" or "Commanderism." To command at any level is to do more than just manage military forces, if management means "working with and through individuals and groups to accomplish organizational goals."

The vast literature of management theory can help the commander in the process of planning, organizing, controlling, and coordinating his unit, especially in a peacetime environment. Just as a commander changes his methods as he moves from junior to senior to very senior levels of command, so the manager adopts new ways on the path from supervisory to middle to top management levels.

Management theory has its limitations, however, because the research that supports it is based almost wholly on civilian institutions. Management literature is virtually silent on the commander's requirement to shoulder 24-hour responsibility for "employees" whose livelihood and motivation depend substantially on federal law and bureaucracy. The commander will not find in management theory the insights and values that can explain to soldiers why their organization is more important than they are, why it can be sacrificed to national need, and whether they may live or die in the process.

The purpose of this chapter is to focus attention on command at senior levels. Command at this level is defined as a process of indirect influence which encompasses all aspects of leadership and management; however, the focus of activities is upon the organization as a whole instead of unique individuals or specific resources, and the perspective is of synthesis and

integration instead of analytic cause and effect. Command at the senior level is qualitatively different from command at the junior levels — not simply more and better of the same thing.

THE COMMANDER

Leadership is a complex process, although it is sometimes treated simply. And while much has been learned from recent research and study, demands on leadership have increased markedly over the past decade because of the increased lethality and complexity of weapons systems and wider variety and intricacy of organizations. Moreover, predictions of future combat operations indicate the probability of conventional land battles that will place unprecedented stress on the abilities of senior commanders. The environment of senior commanders is one filled with uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, yet highly volatile. This should not suggest a change to our traditional leadership ethic, but rather the necessity to devote more time and effort to the leadership equation. One of the gravest dangers in approaching leadership at the highest levels is oversimplification. Successful leadership of large organizations requires recognition that problems usually arise from multiple causes which are increasingly complex and interdependent, and that satisfactory resolution requires a clear understanding and explicit knowledge of higher-level command, leadership, and management.

Another important consideration is that knowledge has advanced to the stage where there can be assurance that effective leadership is not a matter of supernatural qualities given only to a few fortunate individuals. One can be an effective leader when he understands the organization of which he is a part, demonstrates competence and integrity, and skillfully uses the forces by which his organization is moved. Effectiveness results from knowledge and a rational and conscious application of sound principles and ethical practices.

Leadership is an influence process requiring abilities to diagnose the functional requirements of an organization and to furnish actions which will fill these requirements. Through such actions, the commander influences his people to perform and accomplish missions.

A distinction often made is that leadership is more of an organizational function rather than a personal quality. The idea of leadership as an organizational function stresses the requirements of organizations and of leadership situations. It leads one to look at the kinds

of actions which fill these requirements. On the other hand, leadership as a personal quality refers to a special combination of personal characteristics. It leads one to look at the qualities and abilities of individuals. The problem with leadership as a personal quality is that, except for a high level of motivation, successful leaders seem to differ widely in their characteristics. There has not been found a single set of abilities or traits characteristic of all successful leaders.

Although the particular characteristics of a leader seem to influence his success, those which are essential vary considerably depending upon the circumstances. On the other hand, leaders who differ widely in abilities and traits are sometimes equally successful in the same or similar situations. Therefore, although the personal characteristics of individual leaders are certainly important, it is not fruitful to consider leadership as a universal pattern of characteristics possessed by certain people. It is more useful to recognize the importance of skills, attitudes, and actions which can be acquired by individuals who differ widely in their traits and abilities.

Leadership can be viewed as an activity, an organizational function. No more sense can be made of it than is allowed by one's understanding of the context within which the activity occurs. For this reason, it will be necessary to examine both the organizational role of the leader—in this case, the senior commander—and those factors within the organization that must be dealt with if effectiveness is to be achieved.

In his leadership role, the commander strives to create within his organization those conditions which will be most conducive to maximal effectiveness of each subordinate unit and individual. It is the leadership role of the senior commander of a large, complex organization to: set vision, design interdependencies, create the culture, and engineer information systems.

The first task of the senior leader involves giving the organization direction and priorities, the specification of desired organizational end-states. . . a vision of what the organization should look like. The concept of vision is the senior commander's source of effectiveness—his "inner light." He must focus forward—project into the future sufficiently to envision the impact of major system-wide program implementation on the organization. Perry M. Smith states that the great senior leaders of our time have been not only effective operators and decisionmakers, but also people of vision who have had a marvelous sense of what was possible, how to set and articulate goals, and how to motivate their people to strive successfully for these goals. Great leaders tend to be great planners. A vision is also important in another way. This level of leadership forms the broad framework within which leadership at all lower levels is developed, nurtured, practiced, and sustained.

A second task for senior commanders involves designing interdependencies between subordinate elements of the organization. This is the area of organization dynamics and answers such questions as:

Who has coordinating power? Directive power? Responsibility to monitor? Who provides liaison to whom? How much is delegated? How much authority? Who has responsibility?

Once these interdependencies are decided and the organizational structure is set, the senior commander must demonstrate a capacity to see the dynamics of the total system, i.e., how the various elements of the organization operate as a whole, including the interdependencies, so that decisions taken in one area will not have unanticipated adverse impact in another. Systems integration is described in greater detail later in this Chapter.

The third responsibility of the senior commander involves his obligation to establish the institution's culture. Edgar Schein defines culture as a pattern of basic assumptions—invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. There are certain core values that are central to and serve as the bedrock of the United States military profession. The Army requires its members to embrace a professional ethic that guides the way that members live and duties are performed. It is the responsibility of the senior leadership to articulate the professional Army ethic—our values of loyalty, duty, selfless service and integrity. This professional ethic is strengthened by instilling four individual values within each soldier—active and reserve—and Army civilian. The four values are commitment, competence, candor and courage. The Army ethic and individual values together form the foundation of the institution's culture.

If there is anything that sets the senior commander apart, it is his ethical visibility. In this respect, the senior leader must serve as a role model, promote ethical development of subordinates and develop and sustain a positive ethical climate.

The fourth major task of the commander is to establish effective information systems. A landmark study of military effectiveness by J.A. Olmstead, H.S. Christensen, and L.C. Lackey concluded that the most critical factors in the effectiveness of a military unit was "its ability to sense changes in its internal and external environment, internally process the information, and make necessary adjustment to this newly sensed data."

Information requirements differ from one echelon to another in terms of where the needed information must be found, and the form it needs to take. In a good organization, an information subsystem will provide the required information in a form directly relevant to the critical planning and decision tasks of that echelon. It also will filter out, but not lose, irrelevant information.

Information is the lifeblood of a mission-focused organization. It must be timely, accurate, complete enough to allow the required decisionmaking to occur,

free of distortion, and sufficiently economical (acquisition and processing) to be affordable. An information subsystem thus must get information from the right sources, interpret it, process it into a form suitable for use by leaders at each echelon, distribute it at the right time, and store it for future use. All these actions must be taken in view of the information requirements of their critical tasks. Decisionmakers who design and operate information subsystems must understand the information requirements of the total system. Therefore, the senior commander must insure that three functions are satisfied. First, information processing must be adequately performed. Secondly, improved proficiency of the people who process that information results in improved information flow within an organization. Finally, the feedback mechanisms throughout the organization must be provided for.

THE ORGANIZATION

It is useful to view a large command as an organizational system. The basic notion of a system is that it is a set of interrelated parts. Implicit in this concept is a degree of "wholeness" which makes the whole something different from, and more than, the individual units considered separately. One of the most significant ways in which the systems concept is useful is in the consideration of subordinate units as the parts of a system. This includes such units as divisions, battalions, companies, departments, etc., which appear on the conventional organization chart. Also included are *ad hoc* committees, boards, and groups that have official status but are frequently not shown on the chart. Thinking of a command as a system offers two benefits: it focuses on the relatedness of activities carried on by different individuals and units; and it emphasizes the fact that, to meet the particular requirements of a specific mission, each of the subunits of which the command is composed must receive as careful attention in its development as does the overall command. This is important because each part of a system affects and is affected by every other part.

The essence of the commander's job is not simply that of solving individual problems in specific areas but, rather, of achieving some measure of integration between the many subsystems that form his command. This is a distinguishing characteristic of the command leadership role. For example, the G4 on the commander's staff will certainly be more intimately concerned with the single subsystem of supply than the commander should be. But what distinguishes the commander's job from the G4's is that the commander must integrate a variety of subsystems.

A senior commander must be constantly concerned with how things relate to each other. He serves as the point of contact between a multiplicity of groups, issues, pressures, and values. Since every unit in the command is concerned primarily with its own operations, each constantly acts as a pressure group

demanding that its point of view and ideas be given more consideration, that things which hamper its activities be changed, that other units give way to it, and that it be expanded or improved so that it can do a better job. Thus, the supply system will be devoted to its own methods and procedures; it will want to have better techniques, more records, and closer controls; and it will give the impression that all other activities should be subordinated to its routines. To other units, it may appear that the supply people think the command is being run for the exclusive benefit of supply interests. In the same way, however, the medical system seeks to improve and expand its activities, seeks more authority, and tries to exert more control over command activities. Similarly, other systems struggle to build up their functions. Furthermore, as part of the pressures from the different segments, there are frequent frictions and conflicts between them, many of which are carried to the top commander for settlement. Thus, he must not only try to decide on and maintain the proper balance between the segments, but he must also preserve harmony and cooperation among them and understand the interdependencies.

A systems view of organization recognizes the mutual interdependencies of various contributing factors. The formal organizational structure affects and is affected by the objectives of the command. It is the interrelation of these elements that constitutes the total pattern of organization, which is what the commander is attempting to influence.

No institution or enterprise can endure without a clear understanding of its purpose and objectives. Because the Army runs the most traumatic gamut of purpose—from peace to war, and an almost schizophrenic existence in peacetime as it maintains its readiness for war—an unequivocal and purposeful guide must be established. Without this guidance, all kinds of useless and nonproductive activity persist. Commanders must keep asking themselves: What is our mission?

General Creighton W. Abrams, in a statement delivered before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on 14 February 1974, succinctly phrased the essentiality of our profession:

... The Army exists to serve just two ends. First is defense of our land. That is the irreducible imperative. Second is the preservation of freedom of action, which might be defined as immunity from coercion Over the years we have emphasized our warfighting ability, which, when all is said and done, is our primary purpose for being.

The Army has translated its warfighting purpose to its principal peacetime mission: readiness. The maintenance of a ready warfighting capability should provide the President and the American people with the assurance that threats to American vital interests will be

minimized—that preparing for war will serve to preserve the peace.

The most important point with respect to setting objectives is that it is a strategy—a way of leading an organization. The setting of objectives is perhaps the most obvious way of connecting mission and action. Properly formulated objectives provide stable guides for the determination of policies, responsibilities, and duties. Furthermore, objectives instill in organization members an identity of outlook, a sameness of intentions, a sense of common identification and common values. Thus, if the chief function of goals is understood—the creation of unified action—it is apparent that a system of objectives provides useful support to the more personal techniques of leadership.

The somewhat ambiguous role of a military organization makes the problem of setting objectives a particularly difficult one. The traditional concept that publicly guides a military unit is that the ultimate objective is readiness to take specific military action. This would be sufficient to serve as a basis for the development of the entire structure of objectives—if it were the only requirement that the military establishment had to meet. But the reality is that the kind of military action that can be taken or the kind of readiness that can be achieved is limited by other factors. Many of these factors involve considerations that are only remotely connected with military readiness and military actions; for example, political, technological, and economic considerations.

Furthermore, if missions are clear and stable, and if the objectives are precise and limited—as they usually are for tactical units in wartime—the problem of formulating objectives becomes relatively simple. However, when ultimate objectives are vague and general, and when unit objectives are subject to constant redefinition—as they tend to be for noncombat units anytime and for tactical units under current “peacetime” conditions—then the problem becomes difficult. It becomes difficult because the obvious solution—more elaborate and stricter administrative controls over objectives at all levels—may well be self-defeating, by introducing rigidity where flexibility is needed.

One thing is sure, objectives and purposes cannot be imposed solely by directive. All of the available evidence indicates that achievement is closely related to the degree of understanding that members have, first, of the basic mission of the organization, and second, of the mutually supporting nature of their individual objectives and responsibilities.

Accordingly, the solution is more likely to be found by examining questions of what a commander might do to provide day-to-day awareness of objectives and to develop in subordinate leaders the skills necessary to imbue their units with an orientation toward accomplishment. Could the commander do more to keep the eyes of personnel focused on objectives? Could he do more to get his subordinates, regardless of the role

they have been assigned or the levels at which they work, into the habit of looking at their missions from the standpoint of achieving specific objectives? Could he do more to get them to look at their activities in terms of their contribution to larger objectives? Above all, could he do more to ensure that subordinates at all levels skillfully and constantly direct their own units so that organization objectives become a vital driving force in the activities of the command?

A couple of important conclusions can be offered. “First, synthesis and integration—rather than analysis and differentiation—are paramount at higher organizational levels. Second, maintaining a future orientation is central to setting an appropriate vision for an organization, and creating the future depends in large part upon one’s corresponding day-to-day orientation around a future vision.”

THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND

The process of maximizing the effectiveness of subordinates is a continuous one. No master plan will ever solve the problem once and for all. Instead, a senior commander must consider the human element in all his decisions and actions and manage the dynamics of his master plan.

It is important to realize that the commander’s skill in measuring things is a major component of his effectiveness as a manager and his reputation as a credible leader. Measurement techniques can be used to educate, motivate, sensitize, or act as a deterrent. Consequently, measurement techniques have enormous impact on the command climate—and are closely related to the concepts of mutual trust and expectations regarding competence. They have a powerful influence on operations and are de facto promulgators of priority. Furthermore, measurement techniques and systems are closely related to communication within the organization, particularly to feedback concepts. Measuring things accurately and reliably is both an art and a science. Measurement techniques themselves as well as the production of associated statistics can generate both useful insights and dysfunctional side effects. Inappropriate or poorly designed measurement systems are a major source of leader frustration and ethical dilemmas in the Army.

The competence of the commander in directing subordinates, his skill in serving as a focal point for communication, his ability to build team relationships, his understanding of how best to use the resources of his subordinates—all these areas of skill help the commander to create and maintain the conditions under which subordinates can most effectively perform their duties. However, underlying each of these aspects is the basic principle that the concept of leadership, no matter how precisely it has been analyzed for the purpose of understanding, applies in fact to a complex relationship between people.

At senior levels of command, the process of leading involves a reciprocal relationship between superior and subordinate, in which the senior officer guides as well as directs the junior. Sometimes, the junior will guide and direct the senior. In exercising this guidance, the commander must provide a command climate which will make it possible for the subordinate to have access to the experience of the senior, know what is expected of him, understand the broader context into which his own efforts fit, and use his own abilities for maximum effectiveness.

Teamwork within the command is a fundamental requirement for effective action by a military organization. A variety of elements influence the development of team relationships; however, the commander is primarily responsible for developing and maintaining them within his unit. Because of his position as the link between many related activities and individuals, the commander is the only person who can wield sufficient influence to pull the various elements of his organization into an integrated whole. He may encourage subordinates to share this responsibility through their own contributions to teamwork, but he can never lose sight of the fact that, as commander, his behavior will set the tone. Accordingly, the commander must constantly strive, in contacts with subordinates, to provide the example in terms of behavior conducive to teamwork.

In addition, the team-minded commander will work to build and maintain in subordinates a sense of responsibility both for achieving overall command objectives and for supporting each other in the accomplishment of lesser goals. He will try to provide each team member with the stimulation necessary to discourage complacency and passive disinterest in the accomplishments of others. He will help each member to become aware of greater possibilities, more encompassing values, and broader, more significant objectives than solely the subordinate's own narrow unit interests.

SUMMARY

At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that the term "command" captured the essence of the military profession. It seems appropriate to conclude with emphasis that integrity, professional competence, ethical performance, and sound leadership practice are the hallmarks of command and of the ideal commander. A senior commander who lacks integrity, who does not adhere to a high code of values is an aberrant. Certainly, he is not a complete commander and cannot be an effective leader.

Leadership at senior levels of command is an intricate process which requires skills of the highest order. In as complex an organization as the Army, effectiveness is not likely to emerge unless a commander gives it explicit attention, unless he consciously and continuously fosters conditions which encourage it to develop. The

use of his skills to cultivate these conditions is the chief responsibility of the commander as leader.

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CHAPTER 6

ARMY STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 4, external factors that influence Army management decisions were presented. These constitute many of the so-called environmental forces that impact either directly or less obviously on the decision processes of the top level leadership who develop the managerial strategy for the Department of the Army.

As used in this chapter, "managerial strategy" is a broad term which includes the sets of goals, strategies, and policies embraced by the highest ranking decisionmakers in the organization. In contrast to the more narrow use of "military strategy," this concept of strategy includes an elaboration and understanding of (1) the basic purposes of the organization, (2) the means or resources to achieve the purposes of the organization, and (3) the organization's ability to adapt to constraints imposed by the environment. "Strategic management" is a term that conveniently incorporates all three elements. The primary task of managers at the "strategic level" is to deal with these elements; i.e., to relate the organization to its environment and to design comprehensive plans and programs to achieve organizational goals. All of these elements must be in balance if the organization is to be stable and viable. In his book, *Business Policy and Strategic Management*, William Glueck defines strategic management as "that set of decisions and actions which lead to the development of an effective strategy or strategies to help achieve corporate objectives." He also points out that "probably the first major institutions engaged in strategic management were the military organizations. Earlier works on business strategy used many terms developed by such military theorists as von Clausewitz."

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the Army's strategic level of management. Because of its highly dynamic and complex nature, no single conceptual model is used to portray the Army top management process or Army strategic management concepts.

The Army has developed a management philosophy and published that philosophy in Army Regulation 5-1 (see Appendix 6-1). There are those who think that the Army is a captive of DOD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and all major decisions are cost driven. Others argue that the will of the people, as expressed by the Congress, will result in arbitrary resource allocation to the defense establishment regardless of how well the Army formulates its

corporate strategy based on the needs for national security.

One characteristic of the Army leadership seems to be certain; the personalities change frequently. Each Secretary and Chief of Staff affects not just what happens from day to day during his tenure but, as a result of the long-range plans and programs developed and decisions made, they impact upon the Army well beyond the end of their tenure. One finds that the visions of former Army leaders are becoming realities today. Another characteristic of Army leadership seems to emerge. The magnitude of the task of leading/managing the Army and the nature of its strategic management process dictates that conceptual skills and visionary thinking are critical to leadership/management at the strategic level. Coping with change in a large, complex organization such as the Army must be adaptive in nature, not reactive. Situations must be anticipated and dealt with while there is time to plan and adapt.

The remainder of this chapter presents Army strategic management concepts through a brief description of the following:

- Army leadership structure.
- The need for integration.
- Basic purposes of the Army.
- Army posture and plans.

ARMY LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

The leadership of the Department of the Army (DA) are responsible for corporate strategic planning. They are the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Under Secretary of the Army, and the Vice Chief of Staff.

The Army Leadership.

The formal structure of Army leadership is prescribed by law. Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012 provides the statutory basis for the organization of the Army leadership with the Secretary of the Army (SA) responsible for "all affairs" of the Department. In addition to heading the Army, the Secretary is a member of the Secretary of Defense's Armed Forces Policy Council. The Secretary's principal civilian assistant is the Under Secretary of the Army (USA). The

Under Secretary of the Army is the deputy to the Secretary of the Army and acts with full authority of the Secretary in the general management of the department.

The duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) are set forth in Section 3034, Title 10, United States Code. He is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Army for the efficiency of the Army and its plans and preparedness for military operations. Further, he serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Armed Forces Policy Council. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) has authority to perform any statutory or other duties which the Chief of Staff is required or authorized to perform with respect to the DA. Traditionally, the VCSA is oriented toward internal management of the Army so that the CSA can devote time to JCS matters and other matters external to the Army. It is clear, however, that the requirement to testify before Congress causes the CSA to be intimately familiar with internal issues and, hence, he too is heavily involved in the internal management of the Army.

The formal organization charters do not specify detailed divisions of work for the Army leadership. To determine the strategic management for the Army, they thread a course between the various viewpoints of each other and between the formal Army, JCS, and DOD management systems that exist. This requires that they integrate their actions to strike a balance between relating the Army to external factors and managing the Army to control internal factors. To manage both the internal affairs of the Army dealing with resource management and the external affairs of the Army dealing with military operations requires that the Army leadership agree on their respective tasks. Generalizing about the role of top managers, Peter Drucker says, "Their job is multidimensional. There is no top-management task; there are only top-management tasks. And this is just as true for public-service institutions as it is for business." "The fact that the top-management tasks, or at least a good many of them, while continuous tasks, are not continuous work and the fact that the top-management tasks demand a diversity of qualifications, skills, and temperament makes it essential that every top-management task be clearly assigned to someone."

It is significant that the collective effect of the Army leadership in forming the Army's strategic management concept cannot be cast in a cookbook fashion. In reality, their efforts are largely determined by the unique personality characteristics of each. Again from Peter Drucker:

It therefore makes little sense to talk of an 'ideal' top-management structure—as a good many of the books on the subject do. The ideal top-management is the one that does the things that are right and proper for its enterprise here and now. We need, to be sure, a theory of top-management. But the specific application must be

developed concretely, indeed pragmatically. It must be tailored to the individual enterprise. It must be developed from an analysis of the specific enterprise. It must, above all, follow the strategies of the enterprise and be in harmony with them.

Support for Army Leadership.

Three staff chains of management in the Department of the Army support the Army leadership.

— The first staff element is organizational recognition of the law and supports those statutory functions performed by the Secretary of the Army without further delegation to the CSA. The majority of this role is in such matters as procurement policy, civil law, and civil works and is performed within the Army Secretariat.

— The second staff element stems from those functions for which the Chief of Staff has direct responsibility to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and JCS. These staff activities address the requirements generated in support of the plans and operations of the unified and specified commands (see Chapter 10—Army Force Planning). The commands use the Army as a resource in military operations that may be performed to implement military strategic planning.

— The third staff element has two divisions, the remainder of the civilian secretariat and the remainder of the Army Staff. These staff elements support the Army leadership in resource management—planning, programming, budgeting, and budget execution—and the traditional Army Staff functions (discussed in detail in various chapters that follow).

Office of the Secretary of the Army. In addition to the personal staff of the Secretary, the Office of the Secretary of the Army includes the following principal assistants, with such staff as may be required:

- Under Secretary of the Army.
- Deputy Under Secretary of the Army.
- Assistant Secretaries of the Army:
 - Civil Works.
 - Installations and Logistics.
 - Financial Management.
 - Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
 - Research, Development, and Acquisition.
- General Counsel.
- Administrative Assistant.
- Chief of Legislative Liaison (a military official).
- Chief of Public Affairs (a military official).

— Director, Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization.

— Auditor General

— Inspector General

— Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers.

Subject to the direction and control of the SA, these assistants are authorized and directed to act for the SA within their respective fields of responsibility. This authority extends not only to actions within the Department of the Army, but also to relationships and transactions with Congress and other government and nongovernmental organizations and individuals. Each is charged with responsibilities for specific functions which collectively embrace the civilian supervision of the administration, management, and policy formulation aspects of the mission of the Department of the Army.


The Army Staff. It is the chief function of the Army Staff, under the direction of the Chief of Staff, to provide the specialized knowledge within the numerous functional areas of Army activity and to coordinate these activities into a homogeneous, consistent, unified

Army policy. The principal elements of the Army Staff are the Army General Staff, the Special Staff, the Personal Staff and other staff agencies required by HQDA (Figure 6-1). Of course, the Office, Chief of Staff is constituted as the principal decisionmaking element of the Army and, as such, the channel through which decision papers flow upward from the Army Staff to the SA, the JCS, and OSD; and downward to the Army Staff from higher echelon sources.

— **Army General Staff.** The senior segment of the Army Staff is the Army General Staff, a coordinating staff organized into broad functional management areas which together comprise all activities of staff. Each staff section is concerned with a broad field of management interest. The staff sections constituting the Army General Staff are the offices of the: Chief of Staff; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Two key staff elements within the Office of the Chief of Staff are Programs Analysis and Evaluation Directorate and Management Directorate.

— **Special Staff.** Under the direction of the Chief of Staff, the Special Staff assists the CSA/SA in professional, technical, and other specialized functional areas included in, but narrower than, the broad fields of

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY STAFF



1/ REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF AS PERSONAL STAFF OFFICERS FOR DESIGNATED FUNCTIONS

2/ REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (CIVIL WORKS) FOR CIVIL FUNCTIONS

FIGURE 6-1

interest of the General Staff. The Special Staff consists of the offices of the Chief of Engineers; The Surgeon General; the Chief of Chaplains; The Judge Advocate General; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Chief, Army Reserve.

— *Personal Staff.* The Personal Staff to the Chief of Staff includes his aides and any other members of the Army Staff whose activity he desires to coordinate directly or whose duties impinge upon the entire spectrum of command.

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION

If the goals and objectives of the Army are to be achieved, the decisions of the Army leadership must be carefully coordinated and integrated. Activities and personnel must be available and organized to accomplish the coordination and integration required and the right kind of information must flow to the appropriate decisionmaker when needed. We have briefly described the staff support available in the Secretariat and Army Staff as formally organized. Here we will explore other integrating functions and activities that facilitate the strategic management process.

Individuals.

The individual on the Army Staff charged with the integrating function is the Director of the Army Staff (DAS). He is responsible to the CSA and VCSA for guiding and integrating all Army Staff efforts and coordinating the activities of all agencies reporting to the CSA. A conclusion can be made that the VCSA is also a key integrator of Army Staff actions, particularly those that pertain to strategic level matters. As chairman of two key committees, the Select Committee (SELCOM) and the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC), and co-chairman of the Army Personnel Systems Committee (APSC), the VCSA acts not only as a decisionmaker but frequently provides the guidance that bonds the corporate strategic management effort.

Two other individuals in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army (OCSA) are exceedingly influential in strategic management activities. The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) guides and integrates Army Staff actions relevant to the development of the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The Director of Management (DM) integrates management policy at the OCSA level and is the principal advisor to CSA in the management of Army studies that support strategic management decisions.

The principals of the general staff agencies also play significant roles as integrators, not only as heads of their agencies, but through their responsibilities as program and/or appropriation directors and their participation as members of key committees, principally the SELCOM. In later chapters, the full role of these

general staff principals will be discussed along with their functional activities.

Committees.

Probably more key to strategic management integration are the various committees established to support the decisionmakers. While the establishment of a committee is normally the last resort to accomplish a task, committees are desirable when the product to be gained cannot be accomplished effectively by the normal staff action process. This is true of many of the actions to be accomplished as part of the Army's strategic management processes, particularly within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

Clearly the Army's senior staff committee is the SELCOM. It is the senior integrating forum on all matters pertaining to the Army which involve Army planning, programming, budgeting, and budget execution and major policy. The committee is authorized to make decisions on policy matters and to require other subordinate Army Staff committees and the Army Staff agencies to provide information in their support. Four subordinate committees, the Strategy and Planning Committee (SPC), the Program and Budget Committee (PBC), the Study Program Coordination Committee (SPCC), and the Army Automation and Communication Steering Committee (AACSC) prepare guidance, analyses, and make recommendations for SELCOM consideration in their respective areas of resource responsibility. The SELCOM is chaired by the VCSA and the Under Secretary of the Army. It is comprised of: the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; The Surgeon General; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communication, and Computers; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation and Logistics; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management; Chief of Engineers; Chief, National Guard Bureau; Chief, Army Reserve; Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, OCSA; and Director of Management, OCSA.

The International Programs Steering Group (IPSG) and its subordinate committee, the International Programs Coordinating Group, provide a collective Secretariat and Army Staff forum to consider all aspects of Army policy and operations concerning the many international programs.

The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC) is a committee of the SA and is a part of the OCSA. It is an interesting committee because of its membership: five Army Reserve, five Army National Guard, and five Active Army general officers.

Senior Army Councils.

HQDA employs five formally-constituted senior councils that meet on a regular basis: the General Staff Council (GSC), the Army Staff Council (ASC), the Army Policy Council (APC), the Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC), and the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).

The Army Policy Council (APC) is the senior advisory council for consideration of important matters of Army policy by the SA and his principal civilian and military assistants. This council has been in existence since 1950. The General Staff Council (GSC) and the Army Staff Council (ASC) were established as continuing committees in 1956 and 1974, respectively. They are similar in nature to the APC and are the senior advisory bodies for the CSA. The GSC consists of the CSA as chairman, the VCSA, the Army General Staff principals, and the DAS. The ASC is comprised of the same members plus the Special Staff principals and directors in the OCSA.

The RC³, established in September 1976, reviews progress on Reserve Component matters related to readiness improvement; ascertains problem areas and issues; and coordinates requisite tasking to the Army Staff.

The Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) was formed to facilitate selected high-level program decisionmaking and is the Army's highest council in the management of systems acquisition. The ASARC reviews major programs and designated acquisition programs and recommends appropriate action to CSA or SA.

These councils are neither decisionmaking bodies nor vehicles for obtaining concurrences, but they do discuss matters which could later involve decisions by the Chief of Staff or higher authority. As a continuing coordination effort, the councils review Army policies, goals, and objectives and maintain surveillance over the Army's capability to perform assigned missions. In this respect, they represent an important integrating element of the strategic management process. In addition, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff serve on the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC) chaired by the Secretary of Defense. Established by statute, the AFPC is an advisory body for the consideration of matters of broad policy concerning all of the Armed Forces.

The Army senior councils and functional overview committees as described above facilitate quick dissemination of information, guidance, and instructions. They also promote staff interaction and influence, bringing group deliberation and judgment to bear in the decisionmaking process. As can be seen, the senior councils and overview committees have overlapping memberships as a common characteristic. They gain linkage primarily through the Army General Staff who participate in both the GSC and SELCOM, thus providing common direction to the common effort. Finally, in keeping with a continuously changing organization, other integrating agencies or offices are

formed as the need arises and disestablished when the function is completed.

BASIC PURPOSES OF THE ARMY

Strategic management necessitates a clear understanding of the basic purposes of the organization. Goals and objectives can then be derived for the organization. Goals and objectives then are the basis for the organizational structure and the allocation of resources to various activities within the organization.

The Purpose of the Army.

The purpose of the United States Army is drawn from many interrelated sources—legal, philosophical, and historical. As an expression of the will and intent of the Congress, the Army's legal purpose—as expressed in Title 10, United States Code, section 3062—is the principal basis of Army philosophy and doctrine. Under this statute:

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—(1) preserving the peace and security and . . . providing for the defense of the United States . . . ; (2) supporting the national policies; (3) implementing the national objectives; and (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

Acting within this legal framework for over 200 years, certain fundamental roles, principles, values, and ideals have emerged which underlie the Army's more transitory military organizations, strategies, tactics, and technologies. Field Manual 100-1, entitled *The Army*, describes the most enduring of these fundamentals which govern the employment of US Army forces in support of United States national security objectives. In FM 100-1, the strategic aim (purpose) of the Army is stated as follows:

The Army conducts combat operations on land that defeat the enemy and seize, occupy, and defend land area.

The enduring principles of war are: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. And, the Professional Army Ethic is structured around: loyalty to the institution, loyalty to the unit, personal responsibility, and selfless service. Additional information concerning missions, structure, and related information about the Army's role in national security can be found in the *Department of the Army Manual*.

The Army's basic role within the American defense establishment is unchanging, but the real world in which

that role must be played is shifting dramatically. As a result, areas of actual and potential turbulence are increasing significantly. Within this environment of change, it is the mission of the Army to carry out the landpower tasks of the United States so that turbulence is reduced, stability preserved, and peace promulgated. These are the broad objectives of actual warfighting. Their achievement requires the Army to be able to defeat enemy forces in land combat and to establish control over land and people. Short of warfighting, deterrence is the basic rationale for maintaining the Army.

No one can predict with certainty how the United States may be called upon to use its military power. Military forces must be prepared to support the national strategy in the face of any aspect of the threat. They should first of all be able to deter conflict; then to control war if one erupts; and finally, to conclude hostilities. This imposes an almost unlimited range of missions on the Army. It must be ready for, at least, the most important of them. This fundamental outlook is the galvanizing force behind the Army's posture. It means that the Army must stand ready to do anything which modern military operations demand of American landpower, both today and in the future.

The Total Army.

It should be clearly understood at this point that the role described above is for the Total Army. "The Total Army" policy reflects the bond among the Active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve and the civilian work force. Effectively integrated, they form a fully combat-ready Army. The Total Army also has a legal basis in the statutory role of the Army (10 USC 3062).

... The Army consists of the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Army Reserve; and all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Army without component.

The Chiefs of both the Army Reserve and the National Guard Bureau sit as members on the Army Policy Council.

ARMY POSTURE AND PLANS

One of the first steps in the strategic management process is to identify the corporate strategy being used. This is not so simple. Very few firms have a written, explicit, carefully considered strategy; yet every firm must have an implied strategy that it follows. Robert L. Katz, one of many theorists who has written on strategic management in business, says that corporate strategy "... refers primarily to the relationship between an enterprise and its environment." He goes on to say that "strategy has two aspects:

— Strategic posture which refers to an actual existing relationship between the enterprise and its environment at a specific point in time, usually the present; and

— Strategic plan which refers to an intended, future relationship."

Another theorist, William F. Glueck, defines strategy as "a unified, comprehensive, and integrated plan relating the strategic advantages of the firm to the challenges of the environment. It is designed to ensure that the basic objectives of the enterprise are achieved."

Katz and Glueck's definitions of corporate strategy provide a framework for looking at the Army's managerial strategy.

Army Posture.

As indicated in the introduction, the posture of today's Army is greatly influenced by decisions made in earlier years. It is important then to first identify the Army's current posture through inference from its goals and objectives, environmental assumptions, and current policies and actions.

Early each calendar year, the SA and the CSA present posture statements and justify the Army's budget request before Congressional committees. Their reports and subsequent testimony before committees of Congress set forth the conditions faced by the Army, its current status, and future goals and needs. It is the unclassified posture statements that perhaps come the closest to providing a comprehensive articulation of the managerial strategy for the US Army. The posture statements also provide considerable impetus for ultimate distribution of resources and management attention from the Congress. In recent years, the SA and CSA have presented a joint Army assessment to the Congress, concentrating on the means by which the Army intends to improve its state of total force readiness. Clearly, the annual posture statement of the Army's Secretary and Chief of Staff outlines the essence of the Army's strategic management decisions. Other indicators of Army managerial strategy can be found in papers, speeches, decisions, guidance documents, etc., by the Army leadership.

Army Plans.

The full realization of the Army's capability lies in the future. Therefore, the Army's resources must be effectively and efficiently structured in a way which creates a maximum performance potential. Plans must be translated into a time-phased program that efficiently converts dollars into the resources (manpower, materiel, and facilities) needed to achieve the Total Army goals and objectives. Although we are now looking inward, the Army leadership are very much involved in the decisions of how we transition from the Army of today to the Army of tomorrow. In each biennial Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBES) cycle, the Army prepares a

Program Objective Memorandum (POM) in response to specific strategy, resource and program guidance contained in the OSD Defense Guidance (DG) document. The POM represents a five-year projection of Army programs that will shape the Army of the future. Just as the posture of today's Army results from decisions taken in earlier years, so the decisions in addressing the current plans will affect the posture of the future. Strategic management is closely linked to the PPBES planning and POM development process, e.g., the Army attempts to influence the content of the DG through unilateral input; the Army leadership provide direction through their participation in ongoing Joint and Army actions; and the JCS with Army input outline a recommended national military strategy and a series of risk reduction measures aimed at providing advice to the SECDEF for his development of the DG. The JCS also propose a planning force which is capable of executing the national military strategy with some measure of risk. This force is used as a measurement device to gauge the capability of the POM forces that are derived in each DOD PPBS cycle.

At the beginning of each POM development cycle, the SA/CSA issue a statement of broad Army priorities which are translated into specific programmatic priorities and integrated into The Army Plan (TAP). TAP provides planning, policy, and resource prioritization guidance which provides the Army's blueprint for the future. This document assigns responsibilities and provides specific guidance to be used by the Army Staff, MACOMS and Army agencies in providing input to the POM development process. In this respect, it translates the Army's goals, objectives, and priorities into action steps that lead to preparation of the POM. An Extended Planning Annex (EPA) of the POM represents the Army long-range projection (POM + 10 years) of investment and operating costs. The EPA provides an opportunity to analyze longer-term needs of the Army and to illustrate the long-range impact and affordability of major weapons systems. It enables Army planners to develop necessary program adjustments to prevent unacceptable materiel aging and to develop support rationale for sizing the force during the five years of the POM.

Recently, the role of the CINC's in the resource allocation process has been enhanced. Not only do they make presentations to the Defense Resources Board (DRB) during the planning phase of the PPBS and formally comment on the DG, for the past two years they have submitted priority lists of requirements to the DEPSECDEF/JCS during the program development phase. They now also formally sponsor issues at the summer program review.

Chapter 14 discusses the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System in detail. To be sure, many other documents are used in the Army planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process; however, TAP, the POM, and EPA, in particular, are closely aligned to the strategic

management decisions. Of consequence also is Army participation in the Joint Strategic Planning System which is discussed in Chapter 10.

SUMMARY

This chapter has brought together various aspects of Army strategic management. The responsibility for the strategic management and leadership of the Army rests with the Army leadership. The Vice Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Under Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Army are aided by staff elements of the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat. The staffs perform the roles necessary for the formulation of a managerial strategy by which the Army plans for, acquires, and uses resources to maintain a ready force available for employment in support of the national military strategy. DA is thus involved in both the formulation and execution of military strategy as well as resource management. It is necessary to consider both roles of the Army in order to appreciate the strategic management concept. It is as limiting to say that the SA should not be aware of joint military strategy and military operations as it is to say that the Chief of Staff should not enter into resource management decisions. A valid, workable, strategic management concept includes both—and ultimately requires close coordination between the Army leadership and all elements of their staff support.

The substance of the managerial strategy for the Army obviously comes from a combination of many elements, e.g., the posture statements, The Army Plan, committee meetings, advisory councils, formal and informal staff actions, the law, Congressional and OSD guidance and constraints, the Total Army goals and objectives, Army guidance and policies, and the ongoing programs developed by the resource allocation process. One must look to these and many more elements to complete a composite picture of Army strategic management concepts. The managerial strategy of the Army is largely concerned with acquiring and efficiently managing resources so that the Army will be ready for military operations. Later chapters will address the processes and Army systems involved in resource management that implement the Army's managerial strategy.

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ARMY MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY

Extract from Army Regulation 5-1, dated 15 September 1983.

Summary.

This regulation has been revised to incorporate the latest Army management concepts. It introduces the Army's philosophy of management designed to be more effective than previous traditional concepts. This philosophy is the capstone for the AR 5-series of management regulations. It will be used by Army leadership to develop sound management practices.

1. Purpose

This regulation prescribes policies and responsibilities on the Army management philosophy. It provides—

- a. A foundation for Army management initiatives, policy, and practices.
- b. The capstone for the AR 5-series.

2. Responsibilities

a. The Director of Management, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army will revise the Army management philosophy as needed.

b. Commanders, managers, and leaders at all levels will perform the following actions:

- (1) Become familiar with this regulation. Weigh their decisions in view of its principles (para 5).
- (2) Incorporate the philosophy into the Army education, training, and development systems. Institute the philosophy in practice.
- (3) Consciously apply this philosophy at all times.
- (4) Incorporate the principles in revising AR 5-series regulations.

3. Management sequence

Under the Army management philosophy is a management sequence (a through e below). This sequence is for Army organizations to use in defining their management, mission, goals, and so on. It is not meant to be all inclusive; it is meant to promote clarity and consistency in Army management.

a. *Management.* A systemic and interdisciplinary process to achieve optimum production through the effective and efficient allocation and use of resources.

(Resources include people, money, materiel, facilities, information, and time.) Management involves—

- (1) Defining the mission.
- (2) Providing direction.
- (3) Making decisions.
- (4) Implementing actions.
- (5) Solving problems.
- (6) Measuring progress.

b. *Performance management.* A top down management process, based on a linked set of values-based leadership practices and results-oriented procedures, to provide clarity of direction and to guide and evaluate progress toward the accomplishment of objectives with the least expenditure of resources.

c. *Mission.* A concise description of the desired outcome of an organization's total efforts. The mission is determined by both the external factors (the organization's purpose) and internal factors (top management's emphasis). The mission is the focus for achieving the organization's goals and objectives.

d. *Goal.* A general statement of intent that specifies long-term achievements expected of the whole organization. A goal is consistent with the organization's environment and supports its mission. Goals normally do not specify time limits or assign responsibility for accomplishment. They do not require frequent change.

e. *Objective.* The desired outcome of the work efforts of individuals and groups in the organization. An objective is directly related to the realization of mission and goals. The objective statement will say what is to be accomplished and when it will be accomplished. It will be measurable.

f. *Task.* A specific action in support of an objective. It can be measured, specifies time for starting and ending the action, and designates who is responsible and accountable.

4. Background

Army leadership issues are very complex and far-reaching in their importance. From manning to modernization and training to mobilization, the issues are critical to the nation's preparedness. Decision-makers are faced with great challenges, and their resolution demands innovative management concepts. These concepts are described in the Army management philosophy.

5. Description and objective of the Army management philosophy

a. *Description.* The Army management philosophy is a set of principles and beliefs which provide management guidance to all members of the organization. The set of principles and beliefs under this management philosophy are listed below.

(1) The Army mission will be accomplished through commitment to goals-based organizational objectives that flow in an integrated fashion from the top of the organization, through the chain of command, to all levels.

(2) Organizations function most effectively and efficiently when decisions are made in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence at the lowest command level where adequate information exists.

(3) People are our most important resource. The Army consists of military and civilian professionals who loyally serve their nation in rewarding careers that demand specialized knowledge and skills.

(4) The values of loyalty to the Government, the Army, and the unit; personal responsibility; and selfless service are fundamental to the Army goals. Values help set the climate of trust and intimacy in which people make decisions and achieve objectives. By establishing an environment that promotes adherence to these values, the Army insures the most productive use of resources entrusted by the American people.

(5) A system's perspective will be maintained. This perspective views an organization as a complex institution of units and work groups that are related and dependent on each other. One unit cannot be detached from the institution and be expected to function the same as when attached. A system is more than the sum of its parts.

(6) A performance management approach will be used which enables organizations to develop a unified effort around goals and objectives. This approach will also enable organizations to improve leadership and management practices through the following actions:

(a) Establishing a process to collectively develop a purpose and a common value system for the organization.

(b) Linking goals and objectives to human, material, and financial resources consistent with constraints and priorities.

(c) Linking organizational and individual objectives, through the performance appraisal system, for measuring individual performance.

(d) Assigning responsibility, accountability, and monitorship of the organization's progress and productivity.

(e) Delegating authority consistent with responsibility.

(f) Improving teamwork and developing cohesion to support the organization's objectives.

b. *Objective.* Consistent application of this philosophy will help achieve increased effectiveness, efficient use of resources, and a more favorable work environment. The end result is combat effectiveness for the U.S. Army soldier.

CHAPTER 7

DECISIONMAKING AND DECISION SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss selected aspects of decisionmaking.

Specifically, this chapter considers:

- The nature of the decisionmaking process;
- Ethical dimensions of military decisionmaking;
- The use of quantitative methods; and
- The importance of analysis.

THE NATURE OF THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Decision theory as an academic discipline is still relatively young. It is only since the Second World War that operations research, statistical analysis, and automated data processing systems have been brought to bear on the process of choice. Behavioral sciences—sociology, psychology, and social psychology—have also begun to contribute to the body of knowledge comprising decision theory.

Decisionmaking is an integral part of any organization and involves ethical questions concerning the rightness, goodness, or justice of human conduct. In this context we may define ethics as the standard for decisionmaking and the application of values to the process of making a decision. A broader definition of ethics would be as a set of standards for the study of the morality of human actions, where the degree of morality is determined by conformance to a norm (a group consensus on what ought to happen in a given situation).

Decisionmaking is a complex, interdisciplinary process. As a separate area of study, it may be viewed as being applicable to all organizations and central to necessary actions involved in command, leadership and management. Figure 7-1 depicts some of the major disciplines that influence most decisions.

The disciplines of management science, mathematics, economics, and statistics are especially applicable in the analyses and ranking of alternative choices. Managerial decision-making typically requires the input of much information, both quantitative and subjective. The contribution from other disciplines such as ethics and values is important to making the right decision. The

personality, propensity to accept or avoid risk, perceptions, and conscience of the decisionmaker; and group considerations involving consensus, communications, common interests, and interaction also affect the decision process.

THE INTERDISCIPLINARY NATURE OF DECISIONMAKING

<i>Considerations</i>	<i>Disciplines</i>
The Environment	Law, Political Science, Government, Economics
Values and Ethics	Philosophy, Religious Studies
Individual and Group Behavior	Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology
Quantitative Analysis	Management Science, Economics, Mathematics, Operations Research, Statistics, Automated Data Processing

FIGURE 7-1

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS IN MILITARY DECISIONMAKING

When we consider the effect of decisions on basic values, we give an ethical dimension to the decisionmaking process. A decision that conforms to ethical standards and preserves the values held by the people involved or affected by the decision, may be said to be an ethical or moral decision. The terms “honest” and “right” are also used to describe an ethical decision.

Ethics may be thought of as a set of behavioral standards and the term "ethical standards" relates to a set of principles or ideals for human conduct. The rightness of a decision should be measured by these standards and the goodness or fairness of anticipated results.

The role of objectives in decisionmaking pertains to the setting of objectives, the development and evaluation of alternatives, the selection of an alternative and consideration of the consequences of the decision. When we agree on basic assumptions, we are influencing the decision process with our own sense of value. When we identify constraints or limitations, we further limit the set of decision options by omitting consideration of what we judge to be morally unacceptable.

One ethical dilemma posed by defense-related decisionmaking is the desire to be loyal to your service on one hand and the need to consider what is best for the nation on the other. Ethics aims at finding the truth about the rightness or wrongness of human conduct in any situation and thus provides guidelines for defense decisionmaking. In terms of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, military forces are designed to deal primarily with the first level of human consciousness—SECURITY. It is within this context that ethical decisionmaking guidelines are formulated by military decisionmakers.

ANALYSIS

Analysis includes consideration of all factors, quantitative and qualitative, important to a particular decision situation. Many things can be measured (quantified) and are important to analysis. At times, judgment and insight gained from qualitative evidence may also supplement quantitative evidence. When dealing with problems such as a choice of weapon system or force structure, judgment alone is simply not enough, and quantitative techniques are required.

The Department of Defense (DOD) devotes considerable time and effort to planning for the future. Inevitably, since resources are limited, the central issue in most planning problems concerns resource allocation decisions.

Making major resource allocation decisions is difficult for many reasons such as the following:

- Objectives are not always clear-cut;
- Alternative ways are usually possible for attaining a given set of objectives;
- Uncertainties abound, particularly in those cases where lead time for a new weapon system spans a number of years (the time from program initiation to operational deployment); and
- Time available to clearly develop facts is limited.

In short, resource allocation problems have become increasingly complex. Thus, for decisionmakers to

exercise their judgment effectively, ways must be found to assist them with complicated and interrelated issues.

Analysis may be defined as:

. . . a systematic approach to helping a decisionmaker choose a course of action by investigating his full problem, searching out objectives and alternatives, and comparing them in the light of their consequences, using an appropriate framework—insofar as possible analytic—to bring expert judgment and intuition to bear on the problem.

Note that this definition involves investigation of problems so that all relevant facts and appropriate data may be brought to bear. Quantitative and qualitative analysis complement each other by isolating and sharpening the key information from basic data for the decisionmaker's benefit.

Analysis is designed with the intent of supplementing the judgment and intuition of the decisionmaker. The objective is to provide a better basis for exercising judgment and intuition through: (a) a more precise statement of the problem; (b) the discovery and discussion of alternatives; (c) comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of each alternative; and (d) development of insight into the nature of the problem and the impact of the decision to be made; and, (e) study of the relevant facts.

In very complex problems, there are many incommensurables (i.e., political, psychological, ethical, sociological); thus, an analyst will not "make" the decision, but should assist the decisionmaker in such a way that his basis for judgment is better than it would be without the results of the analysis.

TYPES OF DECISIONS

Classifying types of decisions is a first step toward gaining deeper insight into the decisionmaking process.

Harrison concludes that a single thread runs through all classification systems dividing decisions into two categories that are either:

- basically routine, recurring, and characterized by a high degree of certainty; or
- nonroutine, nonrecurring, and characterized by considerable uncertainty. Figure 7-2 depicts his categorization. He states further that the strategy for arriving at decisions in this latter category requires reliance on judgment, intuition, creativity, individual processing, and heuristic (trial and error) problem-solving processes (1:13-14). It is this latter category of decisions that is of prime importance to top-level management.

A CATEGORIZATION OF DECISION CHARACTERISTICS

CATEGORY I DECISIONS		CATEGORY II DECISIONS
CLASSIFICATIONS	PROGRAMMABLE; ROUTINE; GENERIC; COMPUTATIONAL; NEGOTIATED; COMPROMISE	NONPROGRAMMABLE; UNIQUE; JUDGMENTAL; CREATIVE; ADAPTIVE; INNOVATIVE; INSPIRATIONAL
STRUCTURE	PROCEDURAL; PREDICTABLE; CERTAINTY REGARDING CAUSE/EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS; RECURRING; WITHIN EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES; WELL-DEFINED INFORMATION CHANNELS; DEFINITE DECISION CRITERIA; OUTCOME PREFERENCES MAY BE CERTAIN OR UNCERTAIN	NOVEL, UNSTRUCTURED, CONSEQUENTIAL, ELUSIVE, AND COMPLEX; UNCERTAIN CAUSE/EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS; NON- RECURRING; INFORMATION CHANNELS UNDEFINED; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; DECISION CRITERIA WILL BE UNKNOWN; OUTCOME PREFERENCES MAY BE CERTAIN OR UNCERTAIN
STRATEGY	RELIANCE UPON RULES AND PRINCIPLES; HABITUAL REACTIONS; PREFABRICATED RESPONSE; UNIFORM PROCESSING; COMPUTATIONAL TECHNIQUES; ACCEPTED METHODS FOR HANDLING	RELIANCE ON JUDGMENT, INTUITION, AND CREATIVITY; INDIVIDUAL PROCESSING; HEURISTIC PROBLEM-SOLVING TECHNIQUES; RULES OF THUMB; GENERAL PROBLEM- SOLVING PROCESSES

FIGURE 7-2

We all know how to make decisions. Our lives have been, and are, full of decisions. For some decisions the process is completed in a heartbeat—others may take days, weeks or months. Daily life in an individual as well as organizational context involves a myriad of decisions. Some of these are often so “automatic” that we scarcely recognize them as having involved any real choice. After all, wasn’t it just a few years ago that we learned that the decision to do nothing could be a valid choice? Or was it that if we chose to do nothing in a given situation, or to wait, or to seek more information that we were making the “right” decision? Somewhere along the way we learned that a decision is a choice. It involves a group or someone to make the choice—the decisionmaker(s); a situation that requires choosing some alternative; and a goal-oriented process or environment that requires continuous evaluation of possible consequences of our actions.

THE DECISION PROCESS

Decisionmaking is a dynamic process. Decisions are made within the context of a sequence of actions directed toward an end—and these actions form a continuously changing procedure. Figure 7-3 shows one way to interrelate the process and the factors which cause change. One will recognize in the first four blocks the essence of the “Estimate of the Situation.” Note,

however, that the process includes both decision “implementation” and “follow-up.” Both of these steps give rise to much of the dynamism inherent in decisionmaking—new objectives surface, new alternatives for achieving goals and objectives are discovered, and corrective action is applied to implementation procedures.

Since no organization is self-contained, or unaffected by its environment, decisionmaking does not operate within an organizational vacuum. Information flows in from the environment and impacts upon the decision process at many points, particularly where:

- Tasks are assigned.
- Data are needed for alternative comparisons.
- Criteria of choice are determined.
- Users react to products produced or policies established. Control of this flow of information is a primary function of the manager and decisionmaker.

The steps of the decision process are largely self-explanatory. They have a dynamic and iterative nature. Ethical considerations are embedded in the answers to questions the manager must ask himself about the process such as:

THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS




FIGURE 7-3

- Are my objectives responsive to the tasks and mission assigned me? Am I attacking the correct problem?

- Have I uncovered all of the reasonable alternatives for solving this problem? Are the alternatives responsive to the objective? How are the alternatives constrained?

- Am I being effective and efficient in my comparisons of alternatives? Am I failing to employ a quantitative analysis that might be useful? Am I forcing the use of quantitative analysis inappropriately? How good are the data?

- Do I have realistic criteria for choosing among alternatives? Were they set without bias? Can alternatives be measured effectively against the criteria? What is the impact on the people involved?

- Am I ready to recognize and consider new alternatives as they arise? What are the predicted results of each alternative?

- Are my organizational objectives being achieved? Within the budget? On time?

There are many variations of the decisionmaking process. Figure 7-4 emphasizes the cyclic nature of the process.

Information.

It is apparent that the decisionmaking process is significantly and functionally dependent upon the information available to the decisionmakers. It is logical to desire "perfect information" to make a decision, but such a state is difficult, at best, to achieve. One major reason is that there are costs associated with gaining information. For example, the Battalion Commander must make certain decisions about placing companies into a defense. The S-2 calls for a patrol to determine what the enemy is doing in some portion of the area. The patrol's casualties, rounds expended, etc., are all costs associated with gaining that information. At some point the cost of additional information becomes so great that it is no longer affordable. For that reason the great majority of decisions are made without

perfect information. Such terms as certainty, uncertainty, ignorance, risk, and probability, therefore, become key to the lexicon of decisionmaking.

Risk implies that as a result of a decision there is some possibility of hazard or exposure to loss or injury. This possibility is often referred to as decisionmaking under risk. It is initially appealing to associate more information with reduction of risk. The more that is known, the greater the ability to predict and take appropriate action to reduce the exposure to loss. Logic dictates that if the outcome may be predicted exactly (certainty), then risk becomes zero, but this final step of equating certainty to no risk is false. Even if an outcome is known, risk may be endemic to the action. It may be certain that a particular size force can defend against a much smaller force, but the defending force still risks taking casualties.

Ignorance and uncertainty are terms which describe the availability of information about the state of an event. Ignorance normally relates to a prior event—something which has already happened. Uncertainty focuses on a future event. In simple terms, ignorance can be reduced to zero. If the cost is affordable, one can gain perfect information on exactly what has happened. In contrast, uncertainty implies that more than one outcome is possible. Since the outcome cannot be predicted with certainty, the information sought in decisionmaking focuses on defining the processes which determine what the outcomes might be. Probability is nothing more than a method for measuring uncertainty. In probability a percentage of chance between 0 and 100% is assigned to each specific possible outcome. The sum of all the possible outcomes for an event must equal 100% (or 1 if proportions between 0 and 1 are used). In the case of a particular anti-armor missile, we might say the probability of kill is .9 or 90%. It then follows that the probability of not killing the tank is .1 or 10%. This rather simple concept for measuring uncertainty permits building into many of the quantitative methods discussed below which provide the decisionmaker ways to generate information to aid in the decisionmaking process.

USE OF QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN DECISIONMAKING

Problems involving weapon system effectiveness, manpower planning, force structure costing, base development, and the like are inherently quantitative. Because there is a broad range of decision situations that involve large dollar amounts, the preparation and analysis of cost estimates are essential activities in the decisionmaking process. There are many quantitative techniques available to aid the decisionmaker in arriving at a choice that meets his objective. Such tools are particularly valuable in evaluating alternative courses of action.

THE CYCLIC NATURE OF THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS




FIGURE 7-4

The contribution of quantitative techniques to decisionmaking is largely in the appraisal step, the analysis of decision possibilities. Once alternatives have been defined, these techniques can be powerful tools for making quick and accurate appraisals.

Modeling.

Within the decision cycle we can identify another process that often applies to highly complex decisionmaking—the process of developing a model. One example of this process is depicted by Figure 7-5.

A model attempts to portray something without completely being the thing itself. Models are used to aid understanding of an actual event or possible occurrence. Models can be symbolic, such as mathematical portrayals of actuality. They can also be analog, such as scale models and “mock-ups.” A model can be constructed to combine portions of actuality with simulated (or modelled) portions of reality. Such is the case with a war game that uses actual players to make decisions based on a simulation (model) of realistic events.

In the case of past events, models can be developed that completely explain selected aspects of the event. This is the case when the past event is well known. When a past event cannot be sufficiently explained based upon historical research, a model may only be a rough approximation of reality. The term “realistic” is used when dealing with future events since reality can only be known as a current or past event. Even with historical events it is often difficult to find common, wide-spread descriptions of relevant reality, i.e., what is known.

Single mathematical equations are examples of simple models that are very often so based on reality that their use to explain potential future reality is highly accurate. Many relationships such as these are found in the “hard” sciences. As models increase in their degree of

THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A MODEL




FIGURE 7-5

complexity and inclusion of the human dimension, results may involve relatively more subjective judgment and uncertainty. Were all of the relevant variables accounted for? Was there a realistic relationship between the variables?

Models are used for many purposes. Many are used to examine selected aspects of a posed or real situation in order to explain or to predict events. Models are also used for educational and recreational purposes. They are most applicable when it is either impossible, infeasible, or too expensive to replicate reality. As abstractions of reality, models attempt to represent those aspects of the real world which are known or judged to be most applicable to the issues under examination.

In the Army, models range from extensive field exercises to concise mathematical statements used to examine a specific weapon. Their purpose includes training, testing of plans, analysis of force structures and evaluation of weapon systems. Specific models have also been developed for logistics, electronic warfare and many other subsets of the modern battlefield.

Models can be developed for map maneuvers, war gaming, and random occurrence simulation such as arrival time of targets on the battlefield. Model building provides a frame of reference for consideration of a problem. Whereas a model may be thought of as describing a large weapon system or complicated force structuring process, any set of equations designed to represent a particular problem area can be thought of as

a model. Once the situation is accurately represented and the model made workable, numerical values can be assigned and the problem solved using the quantitative technique that is appropriate. Therefore, even though models are abstractions, their ability to draw upon innumerable past "realities" makes them capable of accurately predicting many requirements.

Other considerations include:

- Models need not be highly formal and only mathematical to be useful. Modelers are always well advised to consider simple, easily understood constructs.
- Model building can be both an art and a science. It is often experimental and generally an iterative process.
- A good model will include and highlight those factors most relevant to the problem at hand, and suppress those which are relatively unimportant. Unless the latter is done, the model is likely to be unmanageably large.
- The main purpose of designing a model is to develop a meaningful set of relationships among the model variables and to use these relationships to gain insight into the decision situation.
- Provision must be made for the explicit treatment of uncertainty.
- Since a model is an abstraction from reality, the model must be built on a set of assumptions, clearly and explicitly stated.

Lastly, the decisionmaker must be aware of possible shortcomings by asking the following questions:

- What is the accuracy and completeness of the data?
- Does the model identify the right variables for the problem at hand? Does it correctly state the interrelationship of those variables?
- What about variables that cannot be quantified?

Most importantly, models must be designed such that a range of values can be assigned to an uncertain variable. The model can then be manipulated over a range of values to evaluate the sensitivity of such changes. Sensitivity testing can then become a recorded part of the analysis. Sensitivity analyses may yield the most revealing insights about the model and its representation of the decision situation to the decisionmaker. Since it can show a variable range of results based on a series of "what if" type questions, any analysis lacking sensitivity tests is incomplete.

Other Quantitative Concepts and Techniques.

Early contributors in the quantitative area, such as Gantt, the Gilbreths and Taylor, gave birth to the "scientific school" of management thought. Their concerns with efficiency in production led to a task-oriented, engineering, quantitative approach to production and operations management which has influenced many other disciplines.

During World War II, the British formed interdisciplinary teams for Operational Research. Behavioral and organizational specialists teamed up with scientists and engineers to explore ways of how best to accomplish a mission with limited resources. After World War II, American businessmen and academicians extended the field of Operations Research (OR) to maximize or minimize objectives.

Developments in statistical quality control, reliability, availability, and maintainability derive from probability theory. Probability is relevant to chance events and is often associated with a percent likelihood that some event will occur. OR specialists, along with systems analysts, readily incorporated aspects of probability and statistical theory into their work. Management scientists further adapted OR techniques to management problems.

All quantitative efforts to manage large amounts of men, money, machines, and materiel (the traditional list of the four basic resources) have been greatly aided by developments in Computer Science and Management Information Systems (MIS). The computer has been a valuable tool for analysis and the development of models to aid the act of choice (decision).

Study of the process of decisionmaking led to the development of decision science or decision theory. Decision theory seeks to explain the process and anatomy of decision by using quantitative techniques such as sequential logic diagrams (decision trees) and matrices which show various options (strategies) and the pay-offs if they are chosen.

Game Theory is a closely related area of study to decision theory that attempts to quantify the pay-off (or loss) to different sets of players (decisionmakers, wargamers) in view of the various strategies (moves) that they make in a conflict or competitive situation. In the light of this information, it seeks to determine optimal strategies for the players. A zero-sum game means that one player's gain is the other's loss (addition of results is zero), so that the players are "perfect antagonists" and no collusion is possible. A nonzero-sum game lessens this complete enmity and permits collusive outcomes.

Utility Theory has underpinnings in economics and attempts to quantify individual preference for something relative to another thing (or things). Utility theory expands on the mathematical determination of probable outcomes by integrating an individual's perception

(combination of personal values, probability of success and degree of risk) into the decision process along with the quantitative analysis. It provides for personal experience and subjective analysis of the context of the decision.

Probability.

Expected Value. Expected value permits the decisionmaker to place a value (usually monetary) on the consequences likely to result from a particular alternative. The expected value of the alternative is the summation of the products obtained by multiplying the probability of the occurrence times the value of the outcome if it occurs. If guided by expected value criteria, the decisionmaker might choose the alternative that offered the highest positive value. Thus, a valuable bit of information may be provided in a choice between two alternatives with different risks.

Analytical Frameworks. Two frameworks are available to utilize the three concepts just discussed. One is the pay-off table or matrix which is simply a two-dimensional array to show pay-offs for various combinations of an alternative and a particular event or circumstance. The expected value for each alternative is then computed. Under conditions of risk, each circumstance may have a weighted pay-off. Another useful framework is the decision tree. A decision tree diagrams the path (course of action) that leads to a possible outcome. Each node of the tree represents an event and each branch an alternative course of action. Associated with each branch is a value determined by a probability and pay-off. The value of an outcome is the sum total of the values of the branches for a particular path. Decision trees are also useful as an aid to thinking about what might occur in a given situation, in what sequence things might occur, and in how many ways an outcome can happen. It also provides a convenient means to communicate how you are thinking about a problem.

Optimization-Mathematical Programming. Solutions to optimization problems (or best choice) may take several approaches depending upon the form and complexity of the objective function (the equation or model) or the constraint functions (dollars, weight, speed, etc.). The principal approach by far is linear programming which has a special computational algorithm easily adapted to a computer. In this fashion, an objective, such as to minimize total cost, can be specified and a solution determined that aids the decisionmaker.

Quantitative Methods Without Optimization. In many situations, there is the absence of a measurable criterion to indicate a best choice, or the relationship among the decision variables and the criterion may be too involved to use mathematical models. In this case, other models of decision situations can be developed,

not to determine the best solutions but answer "what if" questions. If carefully developed, the model may be able to test a wide range of alternatives under a variety of conditions. These models are usually called descriptive or predictive models and frequently employ simulation or gaming techniques. Simulation models involve simulations of some specific process or operation involving random occurrences such as queuing problems. In this type problem, there are too many variables and complex interactions to be represented by a logical mathematical tractable method. Because of high speed computers, such uncertain situations can be sampled many times to generate a distribution of potential consequences from "what ifs." Gaming refers to simulation where human participants are actively involved and play specific decisionmaking roles.

Regression Analysis. A very useful predicting device in decisionmaking is regression analysis. In its simplified form, it is an attempt to find two characteristics (or more than two in multiple analyses) that appear to have some relationship or move together in some predictable way. Based on readings in different situations at different times, we can make predictions about what will probably be the case in another situation.

Computer Models for Management Science.

Pertinent topics in management science, decision science, and operations research include the following:

- Linear Programming
- Transportation Models
- Assignment Models
- Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) and the Critical Path Method (CPM)
- Minimum Spanning Tree
- Maximum Network Flow
- Shortest Route
- Decision Analysis
- Markov Chains
- Inventory Models
- Queuing Models

Many extensive computer programs for each of the above topics have been around for several years. Programs are also available for use on small computers.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

One of the most important areas for the use of quantitative techniques for the Army decisionmaker is economic analysis. We seek maximum defense effectiveness for every dollar appropriated, hence the dollar becomes the standard of value against which all needs must compete. It is a logical standard by which such diverse elements as weapons systems, combat

formations, supply depots, training bases, and the like can be compared. Costs cannot be ignored—they must be analyzed with intelligence, knowledge, and judgment. However, costs alone do not provide the information necessary to determine the alternatives that should be implemented. Costs must be compared with outputs that relate to mission requirements.

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 7041.3, titled, "Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for Resource Management," and *AR 11-28*, which implements it, provide the basic policy guidance and procedures for consistent application of:

- Economic analysis of proposed programs, projects, and activities.
- Program evaluation of ongoing activities.

Economic analysis is a conceptual framework for systematically investigating problems of choosing how to employ scarce resources. In *DODI 7041.3*, the term "program evaluation" is used to identify economic analysis of ongoing actions. This was done to highlight the fact that economic analysis is just as important to ongoing actions as it is to new programs. The concepts of economic analysis and program evaluation constitute an integral part of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), and all project officers and managers must be prepared to demonstrate the cost effectiveness of budget proposals and to submit detailed analyses in support of budget estimates.

The following cases are illustrative of the kinds of programs, projects, and activities to which the concept of economic analysis or program evaluation apply. (From *AR 11-28*)

- Budget proposals and reprogramming actions.
- Acquisition of products or services.
- Modernization projects to mechanize, prevent obsolescence, improve work flow and layout, or increase capacity, which lead to a reduction in costs or an increase in mission performance.
- Repair or replacement of weapon systems, and for equipment, machine tools and other industrial production equipment.
- Lease vs. buy, e.g., lease or purchase general purpose real property such as office buildings, warehouses, and associated land.
- Consolidation of facilities, such as warehouses, maintenance and storage depots, and repair activities to decrease cost for any reason or to enhance mission effectiveness.

- Refurbishment to reduce operating and/or maintenance costs.

- Material and supply handling projects to increase efficiency or capacity.

- Development of automated data systems and selection and acquisition of data processing resources.

- Research and Development (R&D) projects to increase effectiveness or promote efficiency in military and other programs, and increases in research and development funding to provide for new maintenance concepts and procedures intended to reduce total operations and maintenance costs or to extend equipment/systems operating life cycles. Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEA) are performed on major R&D projects.

Economic analysis involves the measurement of both costs and benefits. Whereas benefits are a measure of the output provided by an alternative, costs are a measurement of the resource inputs required to achieve those benefits. A cost estimate must be developed for each feasible alternative to identify the magnitude of all relevant costs. Certain key points that must be considered are:

- data sources;
- time-phasing of costs;
- life cycle costing;
- which costs are relevant;
- application of estimating relationships;
- constant dollars vs. current dollars;
- time value of money (discounting);
- uncertainty and risk (recall the distinction); and
- sensitivity analysis.

Once estimates of the costs and benefits for each alternative have been developed, the alternatives can be compared. Recognize that the comparison may show that the benefits to be realized outweigh the high costs involved.

Initial cost estimates for major systems are based on many uncertain elements. Nevertheless, these estimates are used to plan future force levels, to request funds from Congress, and to evaluate contractor's proposals. Realistic cost estimates are indispensable throughout the development of a system for the same reasons. It is imperative therefore that cost estimates come under close scrutiny during the decision process.

SUMMARY

In the broadest sense, this chapter includes reasonable approaches to decisionmaking, particularly to the highly complicated problems of choice that confront high-level command, leadership and management. The emphasis has been on the importance of examining alternative ways for doing a job and utilizing decision

technology, where and when appropriate, to compare and evaluate alternatives. There is no clear-cut way to always make a "best choice." Ethical considerations must always be included. Management practices are not easy to change and the tendency is to stick with what is familiar. Peter Drucker says "that the first managerial skill is that of making effective decisions." The military decisionmaker must consider the ideas and approaches that decision technology has to offer.

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CHAPTER 8

ARMY STRUCTURE —

THE ARMY AS AN ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION

How the Army is organized is the result of conscious decisions on how the Army is to perform its tasks and how it is to deal with its environment. While *AR 10-5* should be consulted for a description of Army organization, it is important to understand why the major components are arranged as they are, and why the units and subunits are linked together as they are. Such an insight is necessary for an understanding of how the Army operates as a system; it also enables one to weigh the advantages expected to be derived from changes to the system against the turmoil which reorganizations invariably bring with them.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM

The Army can be considered an open organizational system of three primary components: the combat, production, and integrating/coordinating subsystems. Each of these has tasks to accomplish, each operates in a given environment, and each requires and acquires resources.

Although the system view is useful as a conceptual look at what the Army does, one must go beyond it to understand how specific Army tasks are accomplished and examine some design criteria. The process of further dividing the subsystems is one of organizational design and structure.

The Contingency Model: Differentiation and Integration.

Organizations are designed and structured along two primary dimensions. The first is task and/or functional specialization, or what has been called "division of labor." The second, needed to tie together the functional specialists, is integration.

Differentiation. Organizations are, or should be, designed so as to meet specific needs. To deal with the threat and peculiar locale of Europe, including our allies, the Army has organized U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Conversely, the Army Recruiting Command was established to deal with the soldier acquisition task. Because these two aspects of the Army's facts-of-life have different demands, the Army's organizational response ought to be different. USAREUR likely would be as ineffective in dealing with the recruiting environment in CONUS as Recruiting

Command would be in dealing with the situation faced by the Army in Europe.

Task or functional specialization is also a dimension of the structure of Army organizations. Such functions as personnel management, resource (funds and manpower) management, war plans, operations, intelligence and security, logistics, and research and development are found separately identified in both staffs and commands.

A major result of task specialization is that organizations tend to be designed and structured to fit the requirements of their subenvironments. Depending on the demands of the environment, organizations in one functional specialty tend to be differentiated from organizations in other specialties in terms of their:

- goals;
- orientation on time, i.e., a focus on short-term vs. long-term results;
- degree of formality of structure of organizations, i.e., rules, job descriptions, chain of command adherence; and
- interpersonal orientation—ways of dealing with people, i.e., very mission-oriented vs. a concern for relationships with others.

Integration. The environment with which the Army deals requires basically one principal output: combat-ready forces, and the Army is essentially successful only to the extent that it produces them. The widely diverse environments which the Army faces also require a high degree of differentiation if the Army is to meet their requirements. Obviously these two environmental demands—output and high differentiation—must be reconciled and the Army must integrate its diverse elements to produce combat-ready forces. One should expect that the greater the degree of differentiation in an organization, the more difficult it is to get the necessary coordination and interdependence or integration.

There are three kinds of integrative devices, ranging from simple to complex, the use of each depending on what kind of integration is desired. The simplest devices which can be used to deal with a rather certain environment are standard rules and procedures. Integration is achieved and no direct interaction is necessarily required between organizational units. Somewhat more complex is a plan. Interdependence is achieved through an operation plan or order in which the responsibility for and sequence of task accomplishment are specified. A Program Evaluation

and Review Technique (PERT) chart is an example. Third, and relatively most complex, is the process of mutual adjustment in which close coordinative contact is required within the management hierarchy (or chain of command) and which also implies cross-functional teams or individual integrators. A good example of the last device is the battalion task force approach to integrating tanks and infantry. A project management organization also exemplifies integration by mutual adjustment. Each of these devices is operating in any Army organization to some extent. Effective organizations facing more diverse environments will use many types of these integrative devices.

Conflict Resolution.

The difficulty of achieving simultaneous differentiation and integration must be recognized, as these two tend to work at cross purposes. In fact, there is great potential for conflict between the differentiated units and the integrators.

THE PRODUCTION SUBSYSTEM

The Army's purpose is to always be prepared to fight, when necessary, and win. The forces needed to fight are composed of people and machines. While the combat subsystem welds them into units and organizations, the job of the production subsystem is to secure from its resource environments the "raw materials" for its many production efforts: recruiting untrained people, searching for usable technology, and dealing with producers of outside goods and services. Its task, accomplished through its people and structure, is to convert the "raw materials" into the "intermediate goods" required by the combat system. Training centers and schools transform untrained people into tank crewmen, infantrymen, and mechanics. Schools convert ideas and knowledge into doctrine, tactics, techniques, and training methods for the use of the combat subsystem. Laboratories, arsenals, procurement and test organizations convert technology and contractor effort into weapons systems and equipment for the combat subsystem. Other parts of the production subsystem provide such sustaining support to the whole organizational system as health care, commissary support and services. The production subsystem serves primarily to meet the needs of the combat subsystem.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

This organization is one of the two major components of the production subsystem, the other being the Army Materiel Command (AMC). TRADOC is a result of the realization that the then-existing Continental Army Command (CONARC) and Combat Development Command (CDC) organizational designs for producing training, doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and the required user representation in materiel acquisition were not equal to the changing environmental demands. On one hand, it was determined that some combat development functions then held by CDC, e.g., doctrine development and user representation, should be more closely integrated with the training function then held by CONARC. On the other hand, it was recognized that CONARC, already overextended with responsibilities covering initial entry training, service schools, and combat readiness of units, could not absorb any CDC functions. In terms of differentiation, the task of producing training, doctrine, and materiel acquisition interface required a different perception of objectives than did the force readiness tasks. One organization, CONARC, could not concentrate on the goals of both a major part of the combat subsystem and a major part of the production subsystem.

The analysis leading up to the CONUS reorganization also indicated the need for another kind of integration—one within the larger maneuver and firepower, logistics, and administration functional communities. To provide integration of doctrine and training for their related schools, the Combined Arms Center, Logistics Center, and Administration Center were included in the TRADOC design. The Combined Arms Center, for example, in focusing on brigade, division, and higher-level doctrine, must integrate the efforts of the combat arms, logistics, and administration schools and centers to assure proper fit of all the components into a coherent whole.

The organizational choices made by TRADOC in adapting to the post-reorganization environmental changes illustrate how the requirements of differentiation and integration can be approached. One of the choices has been the evolution of matrix type organizations to manage such activities as training aids and simulators, and skill qualification test development and production—both responses to demands for unit training assistance. These organizations are integrative devices much like project management activities.

Army Materiel Command (AMC).

Producing weapons systems and other materiel is not simply a matter of developing, buying, and shipping the systems to the organizations in the combat subsystem. It also is most importantly a matter of continuing the support of the systems after they are fielded, including providing repair parts, diagnosing causes of failure, and developing necessary modifications. This continuing support plays a large role in maintaining the system's combat readiness. It is a task in which performance feedback must be very fast and vigorous. The environment (combat unit-customers) is not very diverse nor uncertain, so time orientation tends to the short-term and structure is relatively formal. Integration is achievable through procedures and the hierarchy.

Base Operations.

One other important task also has had a large influence on structure. This is the base operations task—the function of managing the “company towns” like Forts Benning, Sill, and Jackson for TRADOC (or, for FORSCOM, Forts Bragg, Campbell, Hood and Lewis). Although this function is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 16, its organizational impact is pertinent for our consideration here.

The task faced by the large FORSCOM posts has two major parts—force readiness and efficient base operations. The need for differentiation in dealing with these subenvironments is met by having two organizations—the post directorate staff for base operations and the corps/division for readiness. Integration is largely satisfied by placing the commander of the corps/division—the major organization on post—in charge of both functions.

On TRADOC installations, the same process is used for integration except that on most TRADOC posts there are FORSCOM organizations, and the installation commander—the TRADOC school or training center commander—is also responsible for the readiness of the FORSCOM units. This arrangement is a structural adaptation to the unique dilemma posed by the splitting of CONARC into two parts; few of the installations are “pure” force or training related. To the extent possible, Standard Installation Organization (SIO) provides a common organizational structure for installations.

Stovepipes.

Not only is the base operations task common to both the combat and production subsystems, but parts of the base operations function have become recognizable “specialty” commands—and therefore part of the production subsystem—providing their goods and services usually to both the combat and production subsystems. For example, the U.S. Army Information Systems Command is responsible for almost all Army local information services in CONUS and overseas as well as the “long lines” connecting services; Health Services Command operates most Army medical activities in CONUS; Criminal Investigation Command directs all criminal investigators; and all commissaries are under the central control of the Troop Support Agency.

There was no grand plan looking for functions to “stovepipe.” The change in each case was the result of performance not meeting requirements. There was evidence from the late 1960’s of criminal investigation results relating to influential people not being made known to the senior leadership group—or worse, investigations not being initiated. Delivery of medical care did not make sufficiently good use of decreasing resources due, at least in part, to the fragmenting of scarce medical skills between the Surgeon General-run general hospitals and the installation-owned station hospitals and dispensaries. Lack of adequate commissary performance was another example.

A second common reason is that the required degree of integration for all the “stovepiped” functions differs from those functions which have remained the responsibility of the installation commander. Each of the functions which has been “stovepiped” is a goods or service producer which can stand apart from the major mission of the installation, whether force readiness or training. Mission performance does not require that telephone service, or commissary operations, or medical care delivery be meshed closely with facilities or maintenance so that unit readiness or training objectives can be met. The same is not true of functions like maintenance or personnel which more directly affect installation goal achievement.

Thirdly, the conceptual model would suggest that achieving greater performance from these functions could best be accomplished by improving the degree of differentiation. The “stovepipe” organizational model appears to do just that. The central control reinforces the commitment by the local agency to the functional goals—high quality, efficient telephone service and medical care, good commissary support, meeting recruiting objectives, carrying out engineer construction projects—by emphasizing the uniqueness of the function and demonstrating career paths for civilian employees.

Nevertheless, it is only fair to point out that the establishment of the stovepipes has met with some resistance. The opponents raise the issues of lack of unity of effort and control, of divided loyalties, and of fragmenting scarce Army resources into semi-independent structures.

The Nonstovepipe Specialty Commands.

A second category of organizations within the producer subsystem is the group of service-producing, special-purpose organizations reporting to Headquarters, DA. This category includes, among others, the Military Personnel Center and Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA). They have tasks which do not require field units to produce the service, so they do not fall into the stovepipe category. Their services also are used by both the producer and combat subsystems, as well as Headquarters, DA. Because of their specialty tasks, they have a direct tie-in with a particular element of the DA staff, yet we do not class them as extensions of the staff because their functions are operational, rather than staff. Most are categorized as field operating agencies.

THE COMBAT SUBSYSTEM

The combat subsystem’s major task is to convert the Army’s intermediate products, obtained from the production subsystem, into combat-ready forces, that is, into units and organizations. Each element of its structure welds together individual soldiers, equipment, and procedures and produces combat readiness. The

combat subsystem engages in a process of continued interaction with its resource environment, primarily the production and the integrating subsystems. Its task environment includes the enemy threat(s), the unified commands, allied forces with whom it must deal, and, especially in peacetime, OSD and the Congress.

The Army in the Field.

This subsystem of the Army consists of five Major Commands: the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR); Eighth U.S. Army (in Korea); U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ); U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) in Hawaii (which is also the Army Component of PACOM); U.S. Army South in Panama (the Army component of SOUTHCOM); and Forces Command (FORSCOM). The Army is waiting for Congressional approval which will dissolve WESTCOM and put U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) in its place. USARJ will then become a major command of USARPAC. In some respects each command faces similar environments although they differ from each

other in many ways. Each has the task of providing combat-ready land forces—the primary output of the Army. Each has developed an organizational structure reflecting its environment. For brevity's sake, we will discuss only USAREUR and FORSCOM in some detail.

U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) (Figure 8-1) is faced with a most complex environment, including a threat which can at any time change USAREUR's focus from that of preparing combat-ready forces to one of actually fighting a major conventional or nuclear war as part of a multi-nation coalition, i.e., NATO. This prospect of becoming a prime participant in a conflict in which U.S. national survival would be at stake is a fact of life recognized in the organizational structure. The NATO allies are another significant part of the environment, and their existence requires strenuous efforts at integrating American forces into the alliance at many levels in the common hierarchy. This integration problem creates a need for forces and command and control systems compatible with allied armies and command centers.

U.S. ARMY EUROPE




FIGURE 8-1

USAREUR's organizational response to these major environmental requirements must be viewed in the context of the NATO organizational system. As Figure 8-1 indicates, USAREUR headquarters does not control the major combat organizations in wartime. Nevertheless, CINCUSAREUR becomes the commander of the NATO Central Army Group in wartime. Also, in wartime part of the CENTAG headquarters staff comes from USAREUR headquarters personnel. The difficulties of transition from peacetime to wartime environment are partially reduced by the integration devices of "dual hatting" the leader and some of the staff. While part of the reason for dual-hat staffing is no doubt limited manpower, the dual responsibility arrangement—a type of "contingency matrix organization"—is an effective approach. It requires periodic command post exercises to force staff officers to turn their attention from their immediate problems within the USAREUR headquarters to the process of transition to the wartime environment. Recent NATO-controlled field training exercises, emphasizing cross-boundary coordination between allied corps, have dramatized the necessity of rehearsing this complex transition and its diverse follow-on procedures.

The requirement of the (Senator Sam) Nunn Amendment to the Military Authorization Act for FY 1975 has caused major rethinking of wartime support concepts (and their organizational implications). The "we must run it all ourselves" philosophy gradually has given way to the realization that Germany has a highly developed economy capable of performing many functions previously planned or performed for Europe by the U.S.-based "production subsystem." The performance of functions by the German economy, referred to as Host Nation Support, is an integral part of present contingency plans. Thus, this major development in USAREUR's environment came to produce a major change in organization structure. Nevertheless, host nation support has raised issues of dependence and inflexibility which take a long time to resolve.

Forces Command (FORSCOM) was created in the major CONUS reorganization of 1973 for the principal purpose of improving the readiness of deployable forces. It is the largest part of the "combat subsystem," with its major "product," like USAREUR's and Eighth Army's, being combat-ready forces.

FORSCOM, as USAREUR, faces a complex environment—one characterized in the main by geographic size and the task diversity of readying for combat the active forces, U.S. Army Reserve forces, and the state-commanded National Guard organizations. Just as USAREUR must live within the political realities of Europe, so FORSCOM must deal with the many local and state interests and the senators and congressmen whose states or districts are affected by FORSCOM activities. The legislative relationships of Reserve Component organizations are also of

importance in this environment. And, of course, FORSCOM's environment includes its providers of resources: principally DA, AMC, and TRADOC. The last forms an additional, important part of the environment in the many instances where TRADOC activities are located on FORSCOM installations and vice versa, and also because of the many joint doctrine and materiel development efforts.

THE INTEGRATING SUBSYSTEM

Tying all the subordinate subsystems together is the integrating subsystem, which, for the Army as a whole, is the Headquarters, Department of the Army. Its tasks are to decide what is to be "produced" or accomplished by the whole system and to see to it that the system performs as expected. It also is the source of money for the subsystems, obtaining it from its resource task environment, i.e., Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress.

Since, as in any large organization, the headquarters has the major function to see to it that the major tasks of the organization are accomplished, it is the most prominent integrating device in the organization. The challenge for the integrating subsystem is one of forming units which have the tasks of effectively:

- Determining the nature of demands and requirements (e.g., from OSD, Congress, the Public, other Services, the nature of the threat);
- Charting a course for the Army;
- Allocating responsibilities, objectives, and performance requirements to the combat and production subsystems;
- Evaluating the performance of the subsystems' organizations against the requirements;
- Bringing about change in cases where performance does not meet requirements; and
- Securing the necessary resources (appropriations, authority) for the Army.

The exercise of these functions calls for both a high degree of differentiation within the headquarters and many integrative devices. Each function must relate to a similar functional group in OSD, to some extent to interested committees in the Congress, and to members of the same specialist community in the combat and production subsystems.

Achieving Differentiation.

Differentiation is achieved through the assignment of functional responsibilities to the Army General Staff directorates and the DA special or personal staff sections. It is within the directorates that assigned tasks such as recruiting, JCS planning, or budgeting can be dealt with, goals can be reasonably clearcut, appropriate time dimensions exist, and the proper degree of formality of structure is established. The directorates possess knowledge and experience

sufficient for most decisions which concern their task environments.

It is important at HQDA that the requirements of particular environments be well understood. This includes both upward relationships—with OSD, OMB, and Congressional committee staffers—and downward relationships with the major commands. The DA directorate has a large influence on goal setting and performance evaluation for the whole functional or specialty community within the Army and a similar influence on getting the needed resources from OSD, OMB, and the Congress.

Differentiation in the Secretariat. Part of the past debate on DA reorganization was the belief that the structure of the Headquarters, DA, actually complicates the achievement of the required differentiation and performance. The object of the criticism focused on the functional parts of the Army Secretariat and the Army General Staff directorates which seemed to be duplicating each other's efforts or have overlapping responsibilities. Title V of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 required the full integration of the two staffs in those areas viewed by Congress as essential to effective civilian control of the Military Departments. Acquisition provides a good example of the differentiation sought by Congress. The Assistant Secretary for Research and Development has now incorporated into his office by law the acquisition function assigned by Congress, so the office has become the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition. As a result of this reorganization and further differentiation, the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition is now the Deputy Acquisition Executive for the Department of the Army.

Achieving Integration.

Since the 1974 DA Staff reorganization and abolition of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff office, there has been a shift of influence back to the Army staff agencies. Just how much influence the Army staff will continue to have under the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act remains to be seen. In the past ODCSOPS has provided a significant integrating role because of its planning force structure responsibilities.

Integration also is achieved in daily and weekly meetings of the senior staff with the Vice Chief and with the Secretary and Chief of Staff, through the staffing procedures which provide explicitly for coordination of decision memoranda with the relevant agency in the Directorate of the Army Staff, and through the PPBES process and procedures (see Chapter 6: Army Strategic Management Concepts). The heads of the staff agencies, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff themselves, have a principal integrating role—serving more as a corporate management committee, as in the SELCOM, rather than as representatives of their staff agencies. And there is also a multitude of task forces, working groups, and

committees with membership from lower levels of the hierarchy which also serve as important knowledge-based integrators.

The Inspector General performs a singularly important integrative function in evaluating the accomplishment of the overall mission, that is, maintaining combat-ready forces (by implication, efficiently).

Integration is also the primary function of the "Big Four": the Secretary, Under Secretary, Chief of Staff, and Vice Chief of Staff. Theirs are the decisions on management strategies: stability, modernization of equipment, balance. These strategies, enunciated in the yearly Posture Statements, are unifying, integrating statements of objectives which relate directly to the dominant overall issue—maintaining combat-ready forces. And in a more recent development, the SELCOM's responsibilities have been expanded, in the words of the directive, "to function as a board of directors . . . to assist the Office of the Chief of Staff in the integration of Army Staff efforts. The SELCOM will become involved in actions that involve significant changes in policy, the approved program or budget."

Integrating the efforts of the Army at times requires extraordinary steps. The Force Development Office in DCSOPS coordinates the organizational and equipment modernization efforts. The prime focus of ASA(RDA) is on getting materiel fielded, with its integration, including provisions for required support, taking a back seat. The Force Development Office concerns itself with both. USAREUR, FORSCOM and AMC have also found it necessary to organize offices which deal with force modernization.

Interlevel Integration.

The discussion of the integration subsystem so far has focused on actions within Headquarters, DA. There is, in addition, a second aspect of the integration process which exists to tie together the top management at Army Headquarters with that at the major commands.

Among the most significant devices are the periodic "four star" meetings, bringing together with the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff the commanders of TRADOC, FORSCOM, and AMC, with CINCUSAREUR attending as appropriate. These meetings have the great value of providing direct communication about rapidly changing environmental requirements, mutual clarification of the principal management strategies and their implications, and a focus on performance in executing those strategies.

A more specialized device is the System Program Review. It focuses the attention of leaders in all three subsystems on one strategically significant subenvironment. For example, a review of the anti-armor systems in April 1976 brought together over 70 general officers representing the combat, production, and integrating subsystems. This review focused upon the threat, tactics, organization, training, and materiel

systems concerned with the Army's readiness for anti-armor warfare. The review integrated technology with doctrine, tactics, techniques, and organization design to focus on the Army's dominant end product, success on the battlefield. From such a review comes a critically important contribution to the integrating process—the rationale showing the linkage between the end product, success on the battlefield, and the primary resources—people, money, and materiel—which are necessary to produce the end product. That rationale can then be used by Headquarters, DA in dealing with the Army's resource environments through the PPBES, in the posture statements, and in Congressional testimony. It also is used to clarify the understanding of members of both the production and combat systems of the linkages between the end product and the intermediate products; in this case, tanks, TOW, assault helicopters, tactics, etc. In a real sense, the System Program Review can serve as one of the most significant integrating devices for the whole Army.

Integration Shortcomings.

One integration shortcoming is the institutional inability to pull together into a comprehensive and sensible picture the needs of the major subenvironments and to identify and fully assess the consequences of the various policies and strategies adopted at Headquarters, DA. The DA staff organizational structure contains no group whose principal function is to focus both on the demands of the strategically important task environments and on the performance of the organization in meeting those demands. This would suggest the need for some organizational mechanism which can perform this especially important integrating function.

Another missing integration element is that of viable conflict management. There are three distinct methods of resolving conflict in organizations: "forcing," "smoothing," and "confrontation." Forcing is the technique of letting the bosses resolve the conflicting views, i.e., forcing the decision up the hierarchy, with the result that those making the decision are not the ones who necessarily have the greatest knowledge of its consequences. Smoothing is the technique of glossing over points of conflicting view, subsuming or ignoring them in the hope that the conflict will somehow go away. The last technique, confrontation, is that of requiring the parties holding the conflicting views to surface them and hammer out an agreement which they each can live with. The present structure does not facilitate the use of such a confrontation technique. The impression is that the structure and attitudes tend more to the smoothing of possible conflict. As a result, conflict is frequently neither prevented nor resolved—but is left to smolder just beneath the surface, ready to erupt at a slight provocation.

REORGANIZATION-MANAGING CHANGE

To the extent the "fit" between what seem to be the requirements of the Army's environments and the design and structure of its organizations can be improved, there must be a process for adapting the design and structure.

The contingency model is a concept of what is dynamic about organizations and their environments. The notion of "contingency" implies a dynamic adaptation to a changing environment and this change in environmental demands on the Army is what brings about reorganizations. As Martin Blumenson, the distinguished Army historian, put it: "Reorganization continues, for the Army is an ever-changing institution designed to function in an ever-changing world". The Army has had a major reorganization in process every five-to-ten years since 1940.

Criteria for Reorganization.

It is not enough to simply say that when the environment changes, the Army changes its organizational design and structure. One must first ask how the leadership knows when or why or how it should reorganize. How does the leadership separate the need for change in design and structure from a need for change in people or leadership or their behavior? Once the leadership sees a need to reorganize, how should the process be planned? How should it be implemented? And once reorganized, how does the leadership know it has done the right thing?

Recognizing the Need to Reorganize.

These questions, in many respects, lead to the process of adapting—knowing when and why to reorganize. The first question is one of recognizing the lack of fit between the requirements of the Army's environments and the ability of the Army to perform adequately to meet those requirements. The history of Army reorganizations suggests that the impetus for change comes from two main sources: the leadership of the Army (primarily the Chief of Staff/Vice Chief of Staff) and from outside the Army (since 1947, the Secretary of Defense and Congress).

Lack of Internal Pressure.

Normally, the rush for change does not come from within the Army for several reasons. First, no group other than the top leadership is exposed to the feedback on performance of the really significant tasks of the Army. That feedback comes from the Congress in its role as the "board of directors," the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS, the other Services, allies, and others in the strategically significant task and

resource environments. Secondly, large parts of the Army organizational system have a sizable stake in maintaining the status quo. Realignment and reorganization present enormous uncertainties about the outcome: "who wins, who loses?" The only certainty about reorganization is that it will create upheavals, dislocations, and realignment of tasks—all very disruptive to the organization.

OSD Influence.

The major external source of initiatives for organizational change is probably the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). OSD has played a role ranging from Secretary McNamara's direct influence in initiating the 1962 Army reorganizations, to that of being insistently suggestive of specific changes. Most of these latter suggested changes had to do with the research and development function—for example, the requirement for an independent operational test organization in the 1973 reorganization, and the pressure to separate logistics from R&D functions which helped to precipitate the Army Materiel Acquisition Review and the resultant AMC organization of 1976. Except for the demand for the "new broom" of the McNamara directive—a process characteristic of the incoming Kennedy Administration—demands for change from OSD tend to be function-specific. One or another OSD assistant secretary perceives that the Army is not performing in accordance with expectations and pushes for change.

Congressional Influence

A growing perception in Congress that the Department of Defense could not reorganize from within led to the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433. Title V of the Act required changes to the Headquarters Staffs of the Military Departments, clarified the roles of the Service Secretary and the Chief of Staff, and imposed reductions in the overall number of personnel assigned to these staffs, including the number of general officers.

The Act further established a ceiling on the number of Active Duty List officers who may be assigned. Title V also contained a general requirement to eliminate duplication of effort between the Secretariat and the Army Staff, and required the full integration of the two staffs into one within the Secretariat in eight areas:

- Acquisition
- Auditing
- Comptroller (includes financial management)
- Public Affairs
- Information Management
- Inspector General
- Legislative Affairs
- Research and Development (less military requirements and user test and evaluation)

The new Secretariat organization resulting from this Act is shown in Figure 8-2. The new organization of the Army Staff can be found in Chapter 6 (Figure 6-1).

SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION (NEW ORGANIZATION)




FIGURE 8-2

Making the Decision to Reorganize.

Dissatisfaction with the status quo usually builds in intensity over several years until it reaches the point where action must be taken to review and analyze the need for change and to develop alternative organizational designs and structures. In this part of the process, the Army leadership *de facto* commits itself to change and employs an organizational element to accomplish the cataloging and proposed development tasks. With force modernization, Standard Installation Organization, the Living TOE, the information systems revolution, and the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, the Army is managing the most ambitious process of change in its peacetime history.

SUMMARY

The Army is an organization with an open system interacting with a complex, diverse, and fairly uncertain environment through the three major subsystems: combat, production, and integrating. The contingency theory of organization provides a conceptual model to understand the organizations which comprise the subsystems. The model has helped to keep our eye on performance by focusing on how Army organizations meet the demands of their environments by the ways in which they differentiate and integrate their organizational units. The look at the reorganization process has suggested a technique for initiating and managing the process of adapting the design and structure of Army organizations to an ever-changing environment.

In the end, we should be left with the conclusion that the design and structure of Army organizations are and must be a result of environmental demands. Design and structure choices represent a large part of our management strategies in meeting those demands. To the extent there is a good fit between the people, organizations, and the requirements of the Army's environments, there will also be high performance.

As a final note, all of us might keep in mind the comment of Peter Drucker, the known management consultant, in his discussion of organizational design:

Organization is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Sound structure is a prerequisite to organizational health; but it is not health itself. The test of a healthy business is not the beauty, clarity, or perfection of its organization structure. It is the performance of people.

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CHAPTER 9

FORCE READINESS

INTRODUCTION

The Army's key strategic management goal and number-one priority is improving force readiness. It isn't enough just to say this. It must be demonstrated in Army planning, programming, and day-to-day operations. This chapter is a snapshot of factors affecting force readiness and initiatives underway to enhance the Army's ability to manage force readiness.

Chapter Organization.

This chapter places the functions of mobilization and deployment in their proper relationship to the other functions of force readiness, and complements the discussion in Chapter 12, Planning for Mobilization and Deployment. The discussion of force readiness is presented in six sections:

- Force Readiness Concepts
- Managing Force Readiness
- Measuring Unit Status
- Measuring Other Aspects of Force Readiness
- Programming and Projecting Force Readiness
- Summary

The chapter relies heavily on a HQDA booklet, "Managing Force Readiness," 5 October 1984.

FORCE READINESS CONCEPTS

Estimating Capability.

Force readiness is only one of the elements of military capability. Estimating or measuring capability is a very difficult task because each element is made up of many factors—some subjective, some quantifiable. For example, an estimate of military preparedness would have to include these factors:

- Unit status (of many units, aggregated judgmentally).
- Design of weapons systems (both qualitative and quantitative comparisons).
- Design of force structure (qualitative comparisons).
- Construction of facilities (judgmental).
- Availability of supplies (quantitative inventory; judgmental requirements).
- Relationship with allies (judgmental).
- Strategic intelligence capability (qualitative and quantitative).

- Civilian and military airlift (quantitative inventory, judgmental requirements).
- Civilian and military sealift (quantitative inventory, judgmental requirements).
- Civilian and military land transportation assets (qualitative inventory, judgmental requirements).
- Line of communications preparation (quantitative assets, judgmental requirements and locations).
- Availability of prestocked equipment (quantitative inventory, judgmental requirements).
- Mobilization capability (highly judgmental until executed).
- Recruitment of manpower for military and industry (highly judgmental).
- Capability to receive, process, and transport forces in theaters (highly judgmental assumptions about conditions in theaters).
- Senior leadership—quality of strategic planning and decisionmaking (qualitative judgment).
- Capability of the Threat (qualitative and quantitative comparison; largely judgmental).
- Quality and morale of personnel (judgmental).

Estimating capability is difficult and highly situational. Yet the American people and their elected representatives need to know how much security is required and what it costs. Short of war, the only measure of return on the dollar that the services can show is some level of force readiness—as deduced from analytical tools and other indicators.

Incremental Costs of Readiness.

Another concern is the incremental cost of force readiness. Readiness of the current force is a budget issue that must be balanced against other program needs. With a fixed level of resources, we must purchase a balanced program which satisfies future or investment needs such as research and development, procurement and new facilities on the one hand, and current readiness needs such as spare parts, depot maintenance and war reserves on the other. Further, we must choose between a current force which is large in structure, but at lower readiness levels, or one which is smaller but better manned, equipped and trained, and at higher readiness levels. Historically we have chosen the former alternative. The Army of today, however, is being deliberately maintained at a constant Active Component end strength, concentrating on quality, while improving both the quality and quantity of Reserve Component Forces.

Another aspect of this concern is the high marginal cost of attaining the highest readiness levels. The

incremental costs increase sharply as the maximum levels are approached. At the unit level, maximum readiness is highly perishable. A unit can attain a very high level of readiness and a short time later, without continued intensive resource allocation, have the trained expertise and peak maintenance levels ebb away. Expensive repair parts and supplies, and markedly increased training costs (especially for ammunition, fuel, and maintenance of combat equipment) all contribute to increased incremental costs.

Because of the incremental costs of readiness and the response times of war plans, the Army maintains some units at a higher level of readiness than others. This stratification of readiness is brought about in several ways. First of all, this is accomplished by assigning units Authorized Levels of Organization (ALO) commensurate with their primary mission and required availability dates from the war plans. The Army is the only Service that uses an ALO system. The system has a significant effect on unit status ratings and trends. Second, the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) prioritizes units according to their deployability dates. Equipment and personnel are then distributed roughly in DAMPL sequence. Since resources are constrained, this causes a higher readiness status for early deploying units.

The incremental costs of readiness add to one of the most perplexing problems facing the Army—tying readiness to resources. The resource-to-readiness equation is complex but essential to the proper management of total force capability; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES); and justification of Army programs to Congress and the people.

Strategic Tasks and Force Readiness.

There are eight strategic tasks which must be accomplished for going to war.

- Insuring the Army's forces and supplies are sized and available for employment or deployment in a timely manner.

- Determining the size and composition of the forward deployed forces.

- Determining the level of war reserve stocks and the locations/amounts of those stocks that will be stored in-theater.

- Transporting forces and supplies to CONUS airfields and ports to maximize the use of available strategic lift.

- Sizing the strategic lift to deploy the Army's forces and supplies as required by war and contingency plans.

- Receiving and processing the Army's forces and supplies in the theater of operations, or war zone, to meet employment requirements.

- Employing the Total Army's forces in joint/combined operations.

- Sustaining the forces in operations to defeat the enemy.

Force Readiness Outputs.

The expected outputs of achieving the capability to do all eight strategic tasks in order to execute a war plan are:

1. Timely deployment of units and supplies.
2. Generating sufficient combat power.
3. Sustaining units in combat.

MANAGING FORCE READINESS

Figure 9-1 portrays existing systems, reports and initiatives for managing force readiness, and how they are linked. Part of the Army's readiness task is to select which of these systems/models/initiatives are to be institutionalized. The acronyms in Figure 9-1 are fully explained when they first appear in this chapter.

Definitions.


The differing definitions, interpretations, and understandings of "readiness" and related terms by the Army, DOD, Congress, the media, and the public has added to the resource-to-readiness dilemma.

For example, when readiness is taken to mean either fast reaction time (high deployability posture) or high unit status, confusion is inevitable. High unit status ratings and maximum deployment status are somewhat incompatible. Actions to improve reaction time such as restricting leave, stopping training exercises, and loading and packing equipment and personal gear tend to degrade unit status by adversely impacting on training and morale, and through unproductive use of time.

The problem of interpretation has not gone unrecognized. DOD in 1982 adopted a definition of "military capability" based on four components, one of which was readiness:

- (1) Force Structure: number, size and makeup of units.
- (2) Modernization: technical sophistication
- (3) Sustainability: staying power
- (4) Readiness: ability of units to do what they were designed to do.

ARMY READINESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM



DAMPL – DEPT OF ARMY MASTER PRIORITY LIST
 MICAF – MEASURING IMPROVED CAPABILITY OF ARMY FORCES
 OMNIBUS – OPERATIONAL READINESS ANALYSIS
 PPBES – PLANNING, PROGRAMING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM
 SORTS – STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM

SPS – STATUS PROJECTION SYSTEM
 TAA – TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS
 TAP – THE ARMY PLAN
 TLR/S – TOTAL LOGISTICS READINESS/SUSTAINABILITY

FIGURE 9-1

MEASURING UNIT STATUS

The Army defines unit readiness as the ability of a unit to deliver the output for which it was designed (in concert with the above DOD definition of readiness). However, the Army also uses the term “force readiness” which can be equated to the DOD term “military capability.” Force readiness is defined as the readiness of the Army within its established force structure, as measured by its ability to station, command/control, man, equip, replenish, modernize, and train its forces in peacetime, while concurrently planning to call up, mobilize, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain them in war to accomplish assigned missions.

These combinations of force readiness functions can best be seen as a set of interrelated, sequential, responsive, reciprocal and comprehensive functions for the preparation and conduct of war. The functions are responsive to the time/phasing requirements of war plans. The interrelationships can be shown with the model at Figure 9-2.

Force readiness is affected by many tangible and intangible factors. For example, it is easy to measure the status of personnel, equipment or war reserves. It is not so easy to assign a value to morale, cohesion, or the increased use of full-time manning in Reserve Component units.

Because force readiness is so dynamic, encompasses so many functions, and is influenced by so many factors, as yet no single measurement system has been developed by the Army. The next sections in this chapter describe some of the systems used to provide indicators of force readiness and, where appropriate, initiatives being taken to improve the systems:

Historical Development.

Since its establishment, the Army has continuously devised and improved means of assessing its readiness.

The need for a formalized readiness reporting system was felt in 1961 during the Berlin crisis. As the Army prepared to reinforce its European-based units, it discovered that in many cases unit status was considerably worse than had been estimated. The following year, a study group was formed within Headquarters, Department of the Army, with the mission of developing a formal unit readiness reporting system. After designing, staffing, and field testing a draft system, the first formalized readiness reporting system, *AR 220-1*, was published in August 1963.

During this development of the Army system, a parallel development took place within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The National Defense Act of 1947 established the requirement to provide the Department of Defense with a current combat capability assessment of operational forces, but a formal system was not developed until the 1960's. Using the Army system as a model, the OJCS required each of the services to design a system for combat readiness assessment, and in 1967 OJCS incorporated these into a comprehensive joint system called the Readiness Operations (REDOPS) Report. Then, the OJCS gradually increased its requirements and coordinated them with other aspects of unit operations, logistics and personnel reports under the Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT).

THE ARMY'S WARFIGHTING SYSTEM (THE PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF WAR)




FIGURE 9-2

The Army continued to revise its own system, vascillating between the emphasis on the management and status aspects of the report, adapting its system to new automated data capabilities, and adapting to the additional requirements of the OJCS FORSTAT. In 1976, it was determined the Army reporting system needed a substantial revision to improve its effectiveness and credibility. On 11 July 1976, the Army's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) completed a comprehensive analysis of the readiness system which included a survey of the attitudes of Army people toward the reporting system. Many of the conclusions and recommendations of the SSI, and many other substantial changes, were incorporated into a revised *AR 220-1*. A new *AR 220-1* was published with an effective date of 15 August 1978. That version was further revised by an interim change in December 1979. The change was required to coincide with JCS standardization of the rating method and criteria by which all services report unit readiness. The JCS action also changed the title FORSTAT to Unit

Status and Identity Report--UNITREP. In addition the Army revised *AR 220-1* to emphasize the report being prepared was a "UNIT STATUS REPORT" not a "UNIT READINESS REPORT" since it provided only an indicator of readiness. In August 1986, JCS changed the name "UNITREP" to "SORTS," Status of Resources and Training System, changed the meaning of the alphabetical prefix "C" in C-1 through C-5 from "combat" to "category" and substituted the word "level" for "rating," i.e., from "combat rating" to "category level." The 11th iteration of *AR 220-1* was published on 16 September 1986 and was effective 16 December 1986.

The Unit Status Report (USR).

The USR is a part of the JCS Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). The primary purpose of the USR is to provide the JCS and National Command Authority information that can be used to make operational decisions.

Status is the condition of a unit at a given point in time compared to wartime requirements as specified in the unit Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE).

The information that must be submitted in the USR is prescribed in *JCS Publication 6: Unit Status and Identity Report*. The Army Unit Status Reporting System is established by the Army Supplement to JCS PUB 6 and *Army Regulation 220-1*.

JCS PUB 6 requires all reporting units to report their status in the areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training. The Army requires additional data which increases the value of the USR as a resource management and operations tool. The supplemental data required by the Army was selected by HQDA in coordination with the MACOM's. This information passes through but is not retained at JCS. The higher level of detail allows units to better express their status and all levels of command to use the report to analyze key status indicators.

Unit Status Reporting Procedures.

Unit Status Report data are transmitted through command and control communications channels. For this reason the report cannot be all-encompassing. Problems are highlighted for commanders and operators. Detailed reviews of problems are conducted using other data systems.

Details of Army unit status reporting procedures are explicit in *AR 220-1*. Since procedures for measuring and reporting unit status have changed considerably with each revision, each commander, manager, or staff officer concerned with readiness should carefully study the detailed guidance and requirements of the latest edition. A summary of the key aspects of the procedure is included here to provide a basic understanding of the system.

There are several significant features to the reporting procedure. The regulation format and organization have been oriented to the user at unit level. Instructions for completing the unit status worksheet (DA Form 2715) are very detailed and arranged in sequence.

Each combat, combat support, and combat service support unit, including those of the National Guard and Reserve component, will report an overall unit resource and training status level. The category status level (C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5) indicates the degree to which a unit has achieved prescribed levels of personnel and equipment and the training of those personnel and the maintenance of the equipment. These levels reflect the status of the unit's resources and training measured against the resources and training required to undertake the wartime mission for which the unit is organized or designed. Category levels do not project a unit's combat ability once committed to action. The overall unit category level will be based only upon organic resources and training under the operational control of the reporting unit or its parent unit. The five categories of overall unit category levels are:

1. C-1. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

2. C-2. Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

3. C-3. Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

4. C-4. Unit requires additional resources and/or training to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with resources on hand.

5. C-5. Unit is undergoing a directed resource change and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. C-5 units are restricted to:

a. Units undergoing major equipment conversion/transition.

b. Units placed in cadre status.

c. Units being activated, inactivated, or reactivated.

d. Units not manned or equipped, but are required in the wartime force structure.

e. Units tasked as training units that could be tasked to perform a wartime mission.

The Unit Status Report measures unit personnel and equipment against wartime requirements and provides a subjective training rating. The personnel rating is the lower of the calculated strength, MOS, and senior grade ratings.

All unit Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE's) have been annotated with Equipment Readiness Codes (ERC). Equipment coded A is essential to and employed directly in support of the mission. This provides each type unit with a unique list of mission essential equipment to report against.

The status of pacing items is considered when determining both the Equipment on Hand (EOH) level and the Equipment Readiness (ER) level. The term "pacing item" refers to a unit's major weapons system, aircraft, and major items of equipment that are central to an organization's capability to perform its designed TOE/MTOE mission. A unit's EOH and ER level can be no higher than the level of its pacing item(s). Not all units have a designated pacing item; however, all units will consider the availability of key items of equipment when the overall level is determined.

Training data include a measure of the degree to which resource constraints are prohibiting the unit from maintaining a training tempo necessary to achieve and sustain desired levels of readiness. The factors considered include:

1. Assigned strength shortfall.
2. Borrowed Military Manpower.
3. Funds.
4. Equipment/materiel.
5. Qualified leaders/status of aviators.
6. Accessibility of training areas/facilities.
7. Fuel.
8. Ammunition.
9. Time.

AR 220-1 strongly advises higher commanders not to consider status reports as adversely reflecting on the reporting unit, because many locally unmanageable factors can cause a low rating. This guidance is designed to promote an objective reporting atmosphere, stressing accuracy and minimizing command pressure. Whether the reporting commander perceives pressure will depend


on the atmosphere generated by his immediate commanders.

Reports are forwarded as shown in Figures 9-3 and 9-4. They are prepared initially on DA Form 2715 and converted to machine-readable format at division/installation level.

Active Army unit reports must arrive at OJCS within nine working days following the as-of date, generally the 15th of each month. Commanders above the reporting unit level are not permitted to change any ratings but are permitted to submit comments necessary to amplify the report. At installation, division, or below, commanders above the reporting unit append their remarks directly to the report in punched card format. Commanders higher than division or installation forward their comments, if any, by separate communication.

HQDA requires Reserve Component (RC) units designated to report to submit a report semiannually, as of 15 April and 15 October. However, the National Guard Bureau requires Army National Guard units to report quarterly. The report must reach OJCS within 21 calendar days following the reporting period. Reporting channels are shown in Figure 9-4. Mobilized RC units

UNIT STATUS REPORTING CHANNELS ACTIVE ARMY AND ARMY RESERVE



MUSARC: Major US Army Reserve Command

FIGURE 9-3

UNIT STATUS REPORTING CHANNELS ARMY NATIONAL GUARD




FIGURE 9-4

will submit Unit Status Reports to arrive at OJCS within five days after arrival at mobilization station.

Initiatives to Review and Improve USR.

The USR has proven to be a valuable operations and management tool. The following initiatives are being taken to review and improve this system.

— Revision of Army Regulation 220-1. A review of existing AR 220-1 revealed it contained out-of-date information due to changes in equipment and organizations, lacked sufficient guidance in some areas, and contained some procedures that resulted in distorted ratings. With these factors in mind ODCSOPS has been working in coordination with MACOM's and ARSTAF agencies to prepare a revised AR 220-1. The primary goals of this effort are to make reports more reflective of a unit's status, more useful, and easier to complete. A revised AR 220-1 was published on 16 September 1986 and was effective 16 December 1986.

- Equipment on-hand calculations were revised because under the old system minor changes in equipment fill could cause a unit's EOH rating to drop from C-1 to C-4 without a corresponding reduction in readiness. A C-level for each LIN and/or pacing item will be determined using the old procedures currently in effect. However, a new weighted average method is used to determine a unit's overall EOH rating. The new system provides a rating that is more representative of a unit's status.

- Procedures for determining composite ratings for major combat units were revised because the old system skewed ratings by giving too much weight to a relatively small number of units. Levels are now based on the average C-levels of all organic units versus dividing these units into three categories and using the lowest category average.

- A unit's training level is now tied to its mission essential task list (METL). This provides training focus

and a better yardstick against which to determine a training level. Commanders have also been given more guidance on factors to consider when preparing a training level, and CPX and FTX participation.

- The Army established several policies to offset the bias of unit category levels due to the modernization process. This includes such actions as: changing E-dates if resources are not available to support the change; amending resource guidance when resources will not be available in a reasonable period of time; and designating selected equipment in lieu of newly authorized items. Incorporating this guidance in AR 220-1 strengthens efforts to reduce this problem. These policies are an interim measure, whereas implementation of the Living TOE is the long-term solution to the modernization bias problem.

- The use of C-5 ratings has been expanded to recognize degradations of a unit's status that are beyond the control of a unit commander because they are due to a DA planned program. Increased use of C-5 reporting brings the Army more in line with the other Services.

- Guidance on the development of a mission accomplishment estimate (MAE) by C-4 and C-5 units has been expanded. The MAE provides a more definitive estimate of C-4 or C-5 units' ability to meet mission requirements. This will aid operational planning regarding the use of these units.

- Assigned roundout units are addressed in the remarks section of Active Component units submitting composite reports. This strengthens the affiliation between these units and aids operational planning and management actions.

- The remarks sections of the report have been improved and remark cards entries have been formatted in many cases so that automated programs can be used to collect and analyze this data.

- Efforts were taken to make reports easier to complete by simplifying the language in the regulation, improving the format, and adding rating outlines.

STATUS REPORTING MANAGEMENT

This section describes how the status reporting system is used at various headquarters.

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JCS Memorandum of Policy 172 dated 1 June 1982 establishes uniform policy and criteria for reporting the military capability status of U.S. Armed Forces. The National Military Command Center is required to maintain the capability status of U.S. Armed Forces assigned to support approved JCS OPLANS, and to

provide information, as needed, to the National Command Authority. The requirement for military capability reporting is accomplished by the Services using two reports—the Commander's Situation Report (CINC SITREP) and the unit status portion of the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS).

1. **Commanders' Situation Report (CINC SITREP).** A SITREP is provided annually by each of the Unified/Specified Commanders. A six-month update addresses significant changes to the annual report. The SITREP provides an assessment of the four subelements of capability (readiness, sustainability, force structure, and modernization) and an evaluation of significant factors that substantially improve or degrade the capability of the command to meet the requirements of JCS-approved OPLANS. The CINC SITREPS are provided to the SECDEF in the Annual JCS Capability Report, with additional input provided from the Services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA).

2. **Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS).** A portion of the SORTS is the Unit Status Report described in the preceding section. The SORTS is used also to track changes in unit locations, command lines, and mobilization and deployment status. The SORTS is continuously updated to provide current status and is available to the National Command Authority (NCA), National Military Command Center (NMCC), the JCS, and CINC's via the WWMCCS Information System (WIS) and Army WIS. This information would be used in conjunction with other readiness inputs in the event the use of U.S. Forces was contemplated by the NCA. Further, SORTS data has been fully integrated into the Joint Deployment System (JDS) which can be used during crisis action by any member of the joint deployment community.

Unified Commands.

Each unified command submits CINC SITREPS directly to the JCS and maintains an accurate status of its assigned forces. The unified commands are not in the chain of command for management of service resources, but the role of the CINC's in the PPBS process is increasing and becoming more prominent. Forces Command (FORSCOM) is discussed here, although each unified command has a similar role.

Unit status data for designated units is provided to JCS by FORSCOM in monthly SORTS reports (see Figure 9-3). These reports include major combat units, such as divisions and separate brigades, and most support-type units. The unit status data is used for contingency planning and development of Joint Task Forces. FORSCOM recommends units for selection in conjunction with established war plans, and the responsibility for deployment of CONUS elements in times of national emergency and for planning joint force training rests with FORSCOM. Unit Status

Report information is essential to keep abreast of the condition of its forces.

Department of the Army.

At DA level, the Unit Status Report is only one part of a larger readiness picture compiled from many functional reports and sources. It provides a quick channel whereby the chain of command is alerted to the status of units and, thus, can exercise the appropriate management actions and provide the required assistance.

The Department of the Army uses the Unit Status Report in conjunction with other personnel and logistics reports to optimize resource management of people, equipment, and the programming of facilities and training areas/exercises to increase the combat effectiveness of subordinate elements.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) receives the reports from the major commands through the JCS. Upon receipt, ODCSOPS prepares Unit Status Report summaries for Active Component units and for Reserve Component units. Copies of these summaries, in the form of computer printouts, are provided to elements of the DA Staff, as well as other logistics and personnel agencies, and service schools. Data is arranged in these summaries in a large variety of ways to meet specific needs. For example, data is assembled by type unit, OPLAN, major command, and unit category.

The Chief of Staff receives a monthly written summary report and a quarterly force readiness briefing from the ODCSOPS. The status of major units by OPLAN is provided and special interest items, such as division reorganization or equipment conversion, are covered. The DCSOPS has a monthly readiness review with key ARSTAF general officers. This briefing provides the latest readiness information to the Army Leadership; and provides a forum to identify trends and address readiness issues in a timely, proactive manner.

Each principal DA Staff element uses the information provided by ODCSOPS to effect resource allocation in consonance with the DA Master Priority List (DAMPL) and ALO. Inputs from the Unit Status Reports also serve as a yardstick to judge how well the functional systems in the personnel and logistics fields are performing.

Major Commands.

The use of status information as a management tool is probably more sophisticated at the major command level, e.g., Forces Command and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), than at any other level within the reporting chain. At each major command, Unit Status Reports provide information which is used by the commander and his staff to assist in the management of resources. Only two of the Army's major commands, USAREUR and FORSCOM, are discussed here since they control most Active Army combat units.

A key management tool at both Headquarters, FORSCOM and USAREUR is an array of data compiled in a monthly Unit Status Summary Book. FORSCOM refers to it as the "Blue Book." (The FORSCOM "Red Book" published semiannually displays data for all components, AC and RC, as a total force within the unit's CAPSTONE alignments.) While there are some differences between the two headquarters' status books, each is a complete and detailed report depicting, with charts, graphs, and tables, many varied aggregations of the latest data. These books depict trends and identify units not attaining ratings equal to their ALO, allowing for management by exception techniques to be used.

Detailed briefings on the status of subordinate commands are presented quarterly to CINCUSAREUR and to CG, FORSCOM. USAREUR also conducts a monthly unit status briefing chaired by USAREUR DCSOPS. Additionally, FORSCOM conducts a Semiannual Force Readiness Briefing highlighting the status of Reserve Component Units. The readiness briefing is normally attended by the command group, principal staff members, invited major subordinate commanders and others. At FORSCOM, other attendees often include general officers from the DA Staff, AMC, and TRADOC. At the briefing, each staff principal provides a complete overview of the unit status in his particular area, then highlights the problem areas, and tells what is being done to alleviate unit problems. In addition to being an excellent tool to stimulate staff actions, this briefing gives invited major subordinate commanders the opportunity to explain specific complex situations.

Both the Commanding General, FORSCOM and CINCUSAREUR actively pursue answers to questions on the depicted critical personnel, equipment, training, or monetary shortfalls at their unit status briefing, and each has the requisite representation of general officers from his and other headquarters to give impetus to efficient management of resource allocation and shortage difficulties.

Preparation for the scheduled briefing is in itself a major management process. In FORSCOM, as well as USAREUR, the ODCSOPS is in charge of overall coordination. In addition to briefing major divisional forces, Army National Guard and Army Reserve roundout elements are reported along with their respective affiliated division, and other special category nondivisional units.

In ODCSOPS USAREUR, there are personnel who devote their full time to unit status. They check the logistical rating of all reporting units on a monthly basis. They categorize units making and failing to achieve their ALO, both in equipment fill and condition. They work closely with the 200th Materiel Management Center (MMC) to identify problem areas, conduct a detailed review of problems noted, and recommend solutions. The 1st Personnel Command (PERSCOM) also considers the information a valuable

tool in distributing personnel assets. The MOS shortages reported are extracted and used to identify to DA on a quarterly basis the critical skill shortages in the command. 1st PERSCOM provides feedback to corps and division commanders on the MOS situation and advises commanders where they can substitute MOS, or take other local action. Reports are used to "cross level" personnel (within PCS constraints) and the personnel data is compared with other USAREUR sources for accuracy. The CG, 1st PERSCOM is briefed monthly by his staff and attends the CINC's quarterly and DCSOPS' monthly briefings prepared to address personnel problems surfaced by units.

Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA).

Each of the CONUSA is deeply involved in attempts to influence and improve readiness. Initiatives are focused on improving mobilization capabilities along with the readiness of RC units. The ability of mobilization stations to plan and execute their mobilization missions is assessed, as is their capability to bring C-4 units to an acceptable level of readiness for deployment. Based on analyses focused on information from Unit Status Reports, training reports, and command readiness inspections, in-house management processes are executed. These include prioritizing units, evaluating selected units, and conducting readiness forums. The methods used to monitor readiness always are under scrutiny and refinements are being implemented continually.

Corps.

Unit Status Reports are forwarded from the division/installation level directly to the major commands. Though corps are not in the reporting chain, and management methods vary substantially between corps, all corps commanders use Unit Status Reports as a primary tool in commanding their corps. Within each corps, a readiness management procedure has been developed to meet the corps' particular needs.

CONUS corps have more detailed and centralized readiness management procedures than the deployed corps, since CONUS corps commanders are also installation commanders. I, III and XVIII Corps have established a Readiness Management Center (REDMAC) to provide for effective readiness management. The REDMAC is an ad hoc organization which is the focal point for all aspects of readiness and deployment data. Normally, the REDMAC is manned by part-time or full-time representatives of AG and G-4 staff sections and supporting clerical people. The REDMAC operates under the G-3 operations officer. It is responsible for assembling and reviewing all divisional/unit "roll-up" data and coordinating all readiness data for presentation to the corps commander.

The corps commander normally receives a monthly briefing which is frequently attended by division commanders, assistant division commanders, principal

staff officers and AMC representatives. Prior to the meeting, the corps commander reviews comments provided by subordinate commanders in their status reports. Another management technique in use is the presentation of a readiness projection briefing to the corps commander 4-6 working days prior to the 15th of each month. The purpose of these briefings is to present the current and projected status of selected units and force packages to enable the corps commander to assess current and projected personnel, logistics, and training levels. Necessary actions are taken to maintain the highest possible state of readiness for the corps on a current and future basis.

In a deployed corps, such as V Corps, the unit status data is also received by the G-3 and disseminated to appropriate staff sections. Readiness operations are much more decentralized and less formalized than those described for the CONUS corps. The G-4 holds monthly meetings with appropriate logistical unit representatives such as the Corps Support Command, where each problem is discussed in detail. The unit status information is considered a key tool in the management of logistical readiness for deployed corps. Likewise, the Unit Status Report provides personnel managers with important data concerning personnel strength and MOS status.

An independent indicator of unit readiness is the corps' or installation Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE). The EDRE program complements other readiness indicators. On an unannounced basis, units are alerted, checked for plans, procedures, readiness to deploy, and training. These exercises also include maintenance inspections, administration inspections, equipment accountability, personal clothing and equipment inspections, and other areas as deemed necessary. This is an important means for ensuring the credibility of the Unit Status Report, because discrepancies between the report data and EDRE results would be highly visible.

Divisions.

Division commanders use unit status reporting as one of many management tools to determine whether subordinate commanders are using available assets effectively. Additionally, each division commander takes advantage of the commander's comments section of the Unit Status Report to give an overall assessment of the status of his command. They also use the comments section to highlight areas in which they need additional assets.

There are many different techniques for using the Unit Status Report as a management tool at division level, but there is also a great deal of commonality.

In a typical division, subordinate Unit Status Reports arrive at the Division G-3 the first working day after the 15th of the month. Copies are provided the G-1 and G-4 where they are reviewed and checked for accuracy. Actions are immediately initiated to solve problems or find out "why" by respective staff sections. The G-4

compares equipment data with other source data, and follows up on all requisitions and job order requests. Typically, the second working day through the fifth working day are spent scrubbing and correcting reports. On the fifth working day after the 15th, the division Chief of Staff is briefed, then the CG on the sixth day. Final output is processed and transmitted to the MACOM on the seventh working day. Many division commanders assemble subordinate commanders and their staff to review the units' status and trends. These briefings provide a valuable opportunity for the commander to express guidance and policy to subordinates.

Basic Reporting Unit Level.

At the separate detachment-, company-, or battalion-level organization where the Unit Status Report is prepared, there is less use of the report as a management tool because of the close daily contact between the commander and his subordinate elements. At this level the Unit Status Report serves primarily to give the commander a finite measure of his unit's status and progress. An important element of the report is the commander's comments portion, used to highlight situations where special attention or intensive management is needed.

MEASURING OTHER ASPECTS OF FORCE READINESS

The Army Readiness Management System (ARMS) currently uses a family of analytic tools to assess our force readiness. These tools, described briefly below, provide assessments of our recent capability gains, our current capability, and of our projected capability based on the Army's Program. This process highlights capability shortfalls and hence, provides insights to the Army leadership and the resource allocation community. The ARMS is currently being analyzed to determine appropriate enhancements to provide more comprehensive and integrated assessments of our capability and to provide more detailed guidance concerning current and future shortfalls.

Measuring Improved Capability of Army Forces (MICAF).

Until recently, no systematic means existed for measuring, reporting, and monitoring increases in warfighting potential as modernized equipment and organizations are introduced into the force. For example, the USR measures equipment fill but does not consider improved equipment capabilities—an M60 tank battalion may report the same C rating as an M1 tank battalion. MICAF is designed to fill this gap.

The MICAF model measures increased warfighting potential over time for divisions, separate brigades, and cavalry squadrons. Equipment inventory level (quantity and quality) is the primary driver in the model. MICAF

considers the impact of organic support and combat service support units on a major unit's potential. Once unit specific data are collected, they are entered into the computer with up-to-date threat data. A series of "duels" occur between the U.S. and threat units. The primary outputs are unit scores which are rollups of on-hand weapons scores. These scores can be used to determine a percent change of warfighting potential over time. Excursions are conducted to provide insights concerning the effects on the warfight of various proposed enhancements.

JCS Capability Report.

The JCS Capability Report, the successor to the JCS Readiness Report, was established by the DEPSECDEF in 1981 in order to provide the Secretary of Defense a vehicle with which to review service POM's to see if the CINCs' needs were being addressed. This report is an amalgamation of information from the CINCs' SITREPS. It discusses areas such as capability improvements and constraints, SOF overviews, and sustainability. Since its establishment, other measures have been taken to ensure the CINC's have a way to express their needs, such as the Quarterly Letter to the Secretary of Defense, the submission of the CINC's Integrated Priority List, and the Defense Resources Board. Because of these changes to the role of the CINC's in the PPBS, the content of this report is somewhat redundant. OJCS, J-7, is presently reviewing the report for possible revision and streamlining.

U.S. Army Operational Readiness Analysis (OMNIBUS).

OMNIBUS evaluates the current capability of the Army to mobilize, deploy, fight, and sustain forces when mobilized to support global conflict as described in the Defense Guidance Illustrative Planning Scenario. OMNIBUS is an annual study conducted by the Concepts Analysis Agency and the Logistics Evaluation Agency under HQDA sponsorship. A computer simulation deploys the actual, resource constrained force to a theater of operations such as Europe. There the force is "fought" and sustained against the estimated threat. Excursions are conducted to analyze the capability contributions of various weapons systems (e.g., Bradley vs. M113) and to ascertain the capability impacts of budgets and the POM.

Total Logistics Readiness/Sustainability (TLR/S).

Concurrent with OMNIBUS, a companion study is conducted by the Logistics Evaluation Agency (LEA) to examine logistical sustainability of the force. This analysis provides detailed findings which identify and measure the effects of various readiness and resource shortfalls and indicate possible solutions. Study results and assessments are briefed to the Chief of Staff. Upon approval, the results are incorporated into The Army Plan (TAP) and are used as an analytical basis for establishing priorities and allocating resources in the POM process.

Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS).

WARMAPS is a standardized, DOD-wide procedure for computing time-phased wartime manpower demand and supply and provides shortfall calculations for all services. It produces the official DOD data used in Congressional testimony and reports. It is prepared in conjunction with the POM and gives calculations for the first and last years of the POM. It is based on deployment and warfighting in accordance with the Defense Guidance scenario. WARMAPS data is provided for broad occupational categories, e.g., close combat, other combat, medical, etc., and is broken out by Officers, Warrant Officers, and Enlisted personnel. Similar manpower calculations at MOS level of detail are made by the Army in its 1322 System (Quantitative and Qualitative Match of Army Full Mobilization Requirements with Assets of the IRR/Standby Reserve). This detailed information is used for internal Army planning for utilization of personnel assets and development of the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOBARPRINT). The Mobilization Manpower Planning System (MOBMAN) is under development to perform the WARMAPS and 1322 System functions from a common data base and with computer programs that will permit interactive operation and the conduct of "what if" drills.

PROJECTING AND PROGRAMMING FORCE READINESS

It is difficult to gauge the impact of various program options or proposed budget changes on force readiness. No system is available that allows the Army to evaluate rapidly how it can best revise Program Development Increment Packages (PDIP) while minimizing the impact of decrements on force readiness. Many data sources have been developed but there is no one system that pulls Army data together and projects requirements in a form usable by decisionmakers. Additionally, the Army does not have the ability to project changes in the USR efficiently and timely. Without that ability, it is difficult to surface problems in programmed resourcing for units and to develop sound management plans.

Several initiatives seek to enhance the Army's ability to project and program force readiness. MICAF and OMNIBUS are two examples, others follow:

Status Projection System (SPS).

SPS is a decision support system that will assist the Army leadership in assessing the unit readiness impacts of various resource decisions at Army, MACOM, and UIC level of detail.

The SPS objectives are:

- Develop resource to readiness strategy;
- Assess unit readiness impacts of resource decisions;
- Develop readiness goals;
- Predict C-ratings; and
- Optimize resourcing.

To accomplish the above, the SPS approach will make maximum use of existing information systems, take advantage of on-going initiatives, and share data with other ARSTAF agencies.

In performing its analysis, SPS will use the following data bases:

- FAS/SACS (Requirements)
- PBD/AMP (Procurement)
- TAEDP (Distribution)
- PPBES (Budget/POM)
- FORECAST (Personnel)
- UNITREP (Unit Status)
- LR3 (Equipment on hand)

SPS will be used in conjunction with the analytic tools discussed above. Taken together, these tools can display both capability and unit readiness impacts of various actions.

Resources Allocation Model.

ODCSOPS is working to develop information concerning the interrelationships among the PDIP's in the Army Program. A model is being designed to identify all PDIP's that would be affected by a change in resourcing to a related PDIP. The data from this model will be used by the Prioritization Model.

Prioritization Model.

The main objective is to develop a consolidated and systematic approach to building the Army Program, and to identify program and budget initiatives with the greatest potential payoff for the Army. The model being designed will identify common attributes of PDIP's to prioritize PDIP's and to identify potential "bill payers" for each new initiative.

E-Date Model.

The E-Date Model forecasts equipment on hand in a unit for each year of the POM, and translates that data into a unit status rating. ODCSLOG, HQDA, has developed the model which will use the Total Army Equipment Distribution Plan (TAEDP) as its primary data source.

Logistics Readiness Rating Report (LR3).

LR3 provides ODCSLOG, HQDA, with a summary of readiness information, systemic problems and areas where management influence can be used to correct equipment on-hand readiness problems. LR3 is based on data available through the Total Army Equipment Distribution Plan (TAEDP), Structure and Composition System (SACS), The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), and Unit Status Reports (USR). Future plans are to link LR3 with the Readiness Integrated Data Base which contains equipment readiness and equipment status data.

Training Resource Model (TRM).

TRM is designed to quantify the cost of training and tie the cost to targeted unit status levels. TRM is an ODCSOPS, HQDA, initiative. TRM merges the

Comptroller of the Army's Program Resource Methodology (PRM) and ODCSOPS' Battalion Level Training Model (BLTM). PRM forecasts recurring operating and support costs while BLTM relates training activities to unit status levels in forming tiered operating tempos (OPTEMPO).

Department of Army Master Priority List (DAMPL)

The Department of the Army Master Priority List is the primary prioritization tool of the Army Readiness Management System. The DAMPL is a rank ordered list of all Army MTOE and TDA units and all non-unit claimants (e.g., war reserve packages). The rank ordering of the DAMPL is based on a first to fight, first resourced concept. Also reflected are specific leadership decisions regarding exceptional cases. Distributing scarce resources according to the DAMPL allows the Army to optimize the readiness value of these resources and to place the shortages where the least risk is involved and where maximum flexibility and time exist to fix resulting shortages.

Army Decision Support System (ADSS).

HQDA is designing and implementing a computer-aided decision-support system, the ADSS. The central purpose of ADSS is to provide Army decisionmakers current and accurate information on which to base decisions. Currently, the computer support for Army programming, budgeting, and operating decisions is functionally oriented and geographically dispersed. The information used by decisionmakers is often uncoordinated. Thus, for example, a decision to train on a new weapons system may not reflect a delivery delay by the vendor. ADSS is being designed to correct these shortcomings. It is projected all major portions of the ADSS will be in place by FY 89.

SUMMARY

Readiness is the primary mission of military forces in peacetime. Readiness is highly situational and subjective. Nevertheless, readiness is a yardstick for programming and budgeting and our readiness strategy entails maximizing readiness within available resources to meet the demands of war plans. The more accurately we capture and quantify readiness, the better we are able to articulate Army resource needs.

Unit status reporting is an indispensable part of the Army model. Currently, the Army uses the Unit Status Reporting System as an indicator of unit readiness.

The status reporting procedures prescribed by the latest revision of AR 220-1 define the Army's method for determining unit status. Each data item included or not included has been the subject of considerable study and debate. Nearly every point represents some degree of compromise. Unit status reporting procedures must provide operations personnel the status report they require and management personnel the information they need to optimize the use of resources.

The Unit Status Reporting System provides information to the commander at each echelon which he can use to manage his organization better. The data supplements information from other reporting procedures and it can also be used to cross-check inputs from other systems. At the organizational level, the USR's give the preparer criteria against which to measure his unit and its progress. It is also an opportunity to highlight problems which require additional resources. At the higher levels, the report provides data which the staff can use to assist subordinate units, and it is a vehicle to keep the commander informed. Unit Status Reports measure available resources against wartime requirements.

Other reports and analyses are now being used in conjunction with Unit Status Reports to examine and measure force readiness, e.g., MICA and OMNIBUS. Action is also being taken to improve the Army's ability to project changes in force readiness. This will enhance Army ability to make resource decisions and develop balanced programs that achieve desired results. Improvements in technology and new initiatives are making it possible for the Army to manage force readiness better.

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- (5) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 700-5: Total Logistics Readiness/Sustainability (TLR/S) Analysis*. Washington: 3 April 1978.
- (6) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 172: Military Capability Reporting*. 21 July 1986 (Rev).

(7) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 189: Status of Resources and Training System*. 5 August 1986.

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CHAPTER 10

ARMY FORCE PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the processes used within the Army, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the unified and specified combatant commands to determine the force levels required to meet the U.S. national and military objectives. The processes also determine the force levels to be used for development of the Services' programs which provide the basis for the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

At the joint level, military planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS is designed to complement the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and addresses intelligence, strategy, requirements, and capabilities. It also takes into account the projected force contributions of our allies.

The Army fully participates in the planning phase of the DOD PPBS through the Secretary of the Army (SA) by planning efforts that support development of the Defense Guidance (DG). The Army Staff supports the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in his role as a member of the JCS by performing analyses and providing input to the JSPS. Planning also develops force objectives as guidance for development of the Program Force and preparation of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

The Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) provides the procedural foundation for an integrated and coordinated approach to developing, approving, and publishing operation plans. This operational planning process is not part of the force planning procedure.

The Army system to support JOPS is the Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System (AMOPS). AMOPS provides the structure and process for Army participation in JOPS, as well as serving other purposes. AMOPS is not part of the DOD PPBS process.

While the emphasis of this text is on the Army management systems, it is necessary first to understand the larger framework of the OSD, OJCS, and the unified and specified combatant commands.

THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) and the recommendations of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission) many aspects of the DOD PPBS and the JSPS are undergoing change. These changes are being developed and/or refined by the OSD, OJCS, and the Military Departments. Where appropriate, known changes are included herein.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged by the National Security Act of 1947 with preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The JSPS, as prescribed by JCS Memorandum of Policy 84 (MOP 84), provides the framework for strategic planning and strategic direction for the Armed Forces. Joint strategic planning begins the process which creates the forces whose capabilities form the basis for theater operation plans.

Within the JCS, planning is primarily the responsibility of the J-5 and the J-8, who use input from the OJCS, OSD and other DOD and federal agencies, unified and specified combatant commands, and the Military Departments to provide policy, strategy, and force planning guidance. Primary responsibility for review of operations plans resides with the J-7.

The JSPS constitutes a continuing process in which each document or program is an outgrowth of preceding cycles and of documents formulated earlier, and in which development proceeds concurrently. The cycle begins by assessing military threats to national security in the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP) and the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). Requirements for military forces to execute the approved national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success are noted in the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD).

In the DG, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) provides a summary of the threat; articulates strategic objectives and the national military strategy; and provides force and resource (manpower and dollars) guidance to the Military Departments, other DOD agencies, and to the unified and specified combatant

commanders. Traditionally, the JSPD and DG have been annual documents; however, beginning FY 86 the JSPD and DG became biennial documents. The DG is an indispensable source document for both planning and programming. Considering its impact on planning and programming, it is essential that JCS advice be available in the formulation of the DG. As indicated below, this advice is given largely through the JSPD.

The JSPD initiates the planning phase of the DOD PPBS. It provides JCS advice to the National Command Authority (NCA) on the overall military strategy and force structure needed to support U.S. national security objectives. Within the JSPS, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides strategic guidance, contingency tasking, and apportions major combat forces to unified and specified combatant commanders for use in operational planning. Using this JSPS guidance, the unified and specified combatant commanders prepare Operation Plans (OPLANS) in accordance with the procedures of the JOPS.

HQDA and Army MACOM's interact with the operational planning process through the AMOPS. AMOPS VOL II (Strategic Employment of Army Forces) identifies major combat forces apportioned by the JSCP. Combat forces not listed in JSCP, combat support forces, and combat service support forces are not apportioned in AMOPS; however, priorities are established by which FORSCOM provides forces to fill OPLAN requirements. AMOPS VOL III provides policy and planning guidance concerning replacement and filler personnel and Army-controlled resupply. Planning interaction also takes place through Army commanders' conferences, normally held three times a year, the Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG), The Army Plan (TAP), and major Army command submissions.

Based on planning directives of the unified combatant commanders, AMOPS, and other guidance from HQDA, Army component commanders provide input to the theater commander's OPLAN/CONPLANS and participate in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) preparation and refinement process. TPFDD is the computer-supported data base which contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data and transportation data for a particular OPLAN.

Joint Planning Documents.

The JSPS is an integrated system of seven primary documents which, in combination, formulate the planning effort of the JCS (and, therefore, of the Military Departments) (Figure 10-1).

Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA). The JLRSA is reviewed annually and revised every four years preceding each Presidential election, thus providing each new administration a recent strategic appraisal. It consolidates intelligence estimates, strategic forecasts, broad force structure questions,

likely issues, and provides supporting analysis for the mid-range Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA) and JSPD. The JLRSA provides a basis for transition from long-range strategic planning. The JLRSA postulates four possible alternative future world environments and presents plausible trends and developments for selected regions and countries based upon specific environmental factors. For each world environment, significant military threats to the interests of the United States are stipulated, and an illustrative strategy to meet those threats is presented. Although the threats and strategies are clearly subject to change and improvement, the JLRSA provides a common base from which requirements may be evaluated and specific trade-offs may be developed.

Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP).

The IPSP establishes military intelligence requirements categories and priorities for the short and mid-range periods. As such, it provides advice to the SECDEF and the Director of Central Intelligence on the priorities required to support the national military strategy. The IPSP also provides intelligence planning guidance to the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands. It provides prioritized collection and production direction for intelligence activities which support the JIEP and JLRSA. The IPSP is prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and presented to the JCS for approval.

Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). The JIEP provides the principal intelligence basis for the JSPS. It contains estimative intelligence for the short and mid-range periods. It describes situations and developments throughout the world that could affect U.S. security interests in these periods and includes: (1) a global appraisal with an estimate of the world situation and the nature of the military threat; (2) regional appraisals, including estimates of the external and internal threats of countries of significance to the United States; and (3) estimates of Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Asian Communist military forces, and potential threats in various regions of the world including any Soviet capability to project forces into these regions. The JIEP is prepared by the DIA and submitted to the JCS for approval.

— A Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning Supplement provides additional estimative intelligence, consisting of: (1) significant changes in intelligence occurring between publications of the JIEP; and (2) force tables for selected countries. The JIEP Supplement is prepared and maintained by DIA and is continuously updated. The JIEP Supplement is not an approved JCS document. It is approved by the U.S. Military Intelligence Board and is circulated by the JCS for information.

Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA). The JSPDSA is an internal JCS document which provides the basis for drafting the JSPD as well as establishing the position of the JCS on national security matters. As an internal document, the JSPDSA is not included as one of the seven primary JSPS documents.

The JSPDSA consists of three parts: Part I, Strategy and Force Planning Guidance; Part II, Analysis and Minimum Risk Force Requirements; and Part III, Analysis and Planning Force.

— Part I provides military planners JCS guidance and taskings with respect to national military objectives

and national military strategy; and planning guidance as stated in the DG and other national security documents and expanded by the JCS for greater detail and focus. Part I references the national military strategy and force planning guidance and details the recommended illustrative planning scenario (IPS) for development of conventional force requirements. It is provided to the unified and specified combatant commands and the Services in sufficient time to permit submission of inputs for the development of Parts II and III and the JSPD.

— Part II develops the minimum risk force levels required to achieve national military objectives with

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM DOCUMENTS




FIGURE 10-1

virtual assurance of success without requiring first use of nuclear weapons. The minimum-risk force development is based on analysis of the projected threat at the end of the mid-range period and the forces needed, in the judgment of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, and takes into consideration the anticipated availability and capabilities of allied and friendly nations. JSPDSA Part II consists of four sections:

Section I	Strategic Forces
Section II	General Purpose Forces (Conventional)
Section III	General Purpose Forces (Non-Strategic Nuclear)
Section IV	Allied and Friendly Forces

NOTE: The composition of JSPDSA Part II is under review and may change.

— JSPDSA Part III consists of three books:

Book I	Strategic Forces
Book II	General Purpose Forces (Conventional)
Book III	General Purposes Forces (Non- Strategic Nuclear)

In Part III, the JCS:

(a) Develop planning force levels that the JCS consider necessary to provide a reasonable assurance of success in executing the national military strategy. The planning force is a fully structured, manned, and supported force (active and reserve). This judgment is based on full consideration of the prospect of simultaneous conflicts, allied and friendly capabilities and resolve, the threat, risk, force mobility and flexibility, and mobilization capabilities. Further, planning force development is based upon Service recommended planning force levels, the illustrative planning scenario (IPS) for general purpose forces (conventional and nonstrategic), the strategic force scenario in Part I and the minimum-risk force included in Part II. As necessary, a treaty-constrained strategic nuclear force will be developed in JSPDSA Part III, Book I. When planning force levels have been developed, considerations of fiscal, manpower, and materiel resources, as well as technology and peacetime industrial output, are applied. If elements of the planning force cannot be attained in the mid-range

period in consideration of these factors, advice is provided on actions necessary to redress the identified shortfalls.

(b) Summarize estimated manpower requirements and costs associated with the planning force levels and compare them with the most recent Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) force.

(c) Include an assessment of the total program force capabilities and identify the shortfalls and associated risks using planning forces as a benchmark. This risk assessment provides a basis for recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

(d) Evaluate the capabilities of the total current force.

(e) Include a summary of the mobility force requirements, as determined by the mobility analysis, and a discussion of significant risks and shortfalls.

(f) Provide the JCS military assessment on selected allied and friendly nations' force objectives, including the recommended priority for military security assistance and requirements for force development and improvements.

— Parts I, II and III are published biennially but are reviewed annually as required by changes to defense policy, strategy, or force planning requirements.

Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). The JSPD provides the advice of the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and the President. It provides a comprehensive military appraisal of the threat to the U.S. interests and objectives worldwide, a statement of recommended military objectives derived from national objectives, and the recommended military strategy required to attain national objectives in the midrange period. The JSPD also includes a summary of JCS planning force levels, i.e., forces which the JCS believe could execute the recommended strategy with a reasonable assurance of success. JCS views on the attainability of these forces, considering resource constraints and industrial capacity, are another feature of the JSPD.

The JSPD, prepared biennially, provides an appropriate basis for major policy and strategy review by the SECDEF prior to the drafting of the DG. The JSPD is intended to influence development of the "For Comment" draft of the DG and is published in mid-July of odd-numbered fiscal years. In the process, the JCS assess the capabilities and associated uses of the programmed force against their proposed planning force and derive a foundation for force planning recommendations to the SECDEF, including changes to the existing DG. The submission of the JSPD to OSD is a formal step in the PPBS process. The manpower

requirements and costs associated with the planning force are compared with the most recent FYDP force.

Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM).

The JPAM provides the views of the JCS to the SECDEF on the adequacy and capabilities of the Military Departments' composite POM force to execute the national military strategy. Primarily, the JCS will comment on the ability of the total force to execute the strategy and on the allocation of scarce resources. Additionally, the JPAM will assess the risks associated with programmed force levels. The JPAM includes an analysis of selected cross-Service programs/issues which have an impact on total force capabilities and provides an opportunity for CINC's to comment on the overall balance of the composite POM force. The JPAM also serves as a reference for the JCS views on the composite POM for use in the program review cycle and as a basic source document for SECDEF in making program decisions. The JPAM is not intended to be a critique of individual Military Department POM's.

Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM). The JSAM provides the JCS views on funding levels for U.S.-financed security assistance programs, security assistance manning levels, and key arms transfer policy matters. This military assessment is based on an analysis of U.S. military interests, security assistance objectives, and desired force levels for allied and friendly nations. It addresses security assistance objectives, programs, and priorities on a world-wide, regional, and individual country basis (including an assessment of alternate levels of funding). (NOTE: The JSAM is under review by the JCS.)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides JCS guidance to the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands and the chiefs of the military Services. It is a short-range plan prepared by the J-5 and the J-7 and is based on national security objectives and policy, intelligence estimates as detailed in the JIEP, projected forces available, and subsequent guidance issued by SECDEF. It is divided into two volumes: "Strategy, Planning Guidance, and Tasks" (Volume I) and "Forces" (Volume II). It also has numerous supporting annexes. The JSCP is reviewed annually and published biennially by the JCS. It is a document which is critical to the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands and to the Services. It describes what major forces will be available for planning purposes, assigns tasks, provides planning guidance for development of operation plans to accomplish those tasks, and gives planning guidance to the Services for support of the unified and specified commands in the execution of assigned tasks. The JSCP also includes sections presenting military objectives and strategy to include broad strategic policy and strategy considerations for deterrence and regional, global, and space conflict..

A detailed description of the JSPS is provided in JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 84 (MOP 84).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)

The DOD PPBS is the primary, formal resource management system for constructing and maintaining the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). It progresses from articulation of the national military strategy to defining the organizations, training, and support of the forces to support that strategy. During the planning phase, the SECDEF provides policy direction, program guidance, and fiscal and manpower controls for the remainder of the PPBS cycle.

The biennial DOD PPBS cycle (Figure 10-2) begins with receipt of the JSPD which initiates the planning phase (Figure 10-3). The JSPD outlines a planning force which provides "reasonable assurance" of being capable of successfully executing the national military strategy. The DG contains planning, programming, and resource guidance to the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies for the conduct of force planning and program development. The DG is reviewed, revised, and released to the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies for execution. An executive summary is reviewed by the President. The planning phase establishes force planning guidance in four categories known as the OSD "four pillars of defense." They are:

Readiness: Ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ without unacceptable delays—normally includes pre D-day measures).

Sustainability: The "staying power" of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment, often measured in number of days or in terms of uncommitted units and personnel. This includes those mechanisms, equipments, and facilities necessary to produce and deliver those people and things over prolonged periods (normally associated with post D-day measures).

Modernization: Technical sophistication and upgrading of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment (includes improvement of capability through acquisition and introduction of new equipment).

Force Structure: The manpower and materiel resources of units/organizations tasked to perform missions in peace and war.

The biennial DG is the primary OSD guidance document for providing general policy and direction for program development. It is the link between planning and programming. A draft DG containing Military Department, Defense Agency, JCS, and Unified and Specified Combatant Command (CINC) input from the "For Comment" draft DG is published in October of even-numbered fiscal years. When the draft DG issues cannot be resolved at the staff level, the Defense Resources Board (DRB) meets in November to resolve

The diagram illustrates the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) timeline, showing the flow of documents and reviews across four main tracks: WHITE HOUSE/NSC/OMB, OSD, JCS, and MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (SERVICES). The timeline is marked by months from JAN to JAN, with ODD FY and EVEN FISCAL YEAR (FY) indicators.

WHITE HOUSE/NSC/OMB:

- POLICY/NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY/PROVISIONAL BUDGET LEVELS (JAN-FEB):** Initial document from OMB.
- PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 2-YR (JAN):** Final output from OMB.

OSD:

- POLICY REVIEW/DRAFT POLICY GUIDANCE (JAN-FEB):** Document from OSD to JCS.
- STRATEGY/OPTION REVIEW (JUL-AUG):** Document from JCS to OSD.
- DRAFT DEFENSE GUIDANCE (OCT):** Document from OSD to OMB.
- DEFENSE GUIDANCE (DEC):** Document from OSD to OMB.

JCS:

- JPAM (JUN):** Document from JCS to OMB.
- PROGRAM REVIEW (JUL):** Document from OMB to JCS.
- PDM (JUL):** Document from OMB to JCS.
- BUDGET REVIEW (JUL):** Document from JCS to OMB.

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (SERVICES):

- PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMOS (MAR-APR):** Document from JCS to OMB.
- BUDGET ESTIMATES (SEP):** Document from OMB to JCS.

Legend:

- JCS - JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- JOPS - JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM
- JPAM - JOINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM
- JSCP - JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
- JSPD - JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT
- OMB - OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
- OSD - OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- NSC - NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
- PDM - PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUM

10-6

outstanding issues and to approve the DG prior to review by the SECDEF. The DG consists of Policy Guidance (Section I), Strategy Guidance (Section II), Force Planning Guidance (Section III), Resource Planning Guidance (Section IV), and Major Issues (Section V). A Fiscal Guidance Annex is also provided. (NOTE: The structure of the DG is under review and may change.)

THE ARMY PLANNING SYSTEM

The Army Planning System is designed to meet the demands of JSPS as well as DOD PPBS. It supports the Secretary of the Army (SA) and CSA through the conduct of strategic planning and interaction with PPBS to develop Sections I and II of the DG. Strategic planning in the Army is performed principally to support the JSPS. Through the JSPS, the Army provides its input to the joint documents which present the advice of the JCS to the SECDEF and the President.

The Army Planning System initiates the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). Note: The Army has chosen to add an E to the process acronym to emphasize the execution phase. The Army Planning System addresses the development of defense policies and the military strategy for attainment of national security objectives and policies. It determines force requirements and objectives, and establishes guidance for the allocation of resources for the execution of Army roles and missions in support of national objectives. It provides the forum within which the Army conducts all planning (Figure 10-4) except for operational (contingency) planning which is performed by the CINC's with JCS and Service assistance. Planning in the PPBES supports the planning phase of the DOD PPBS and the JSPS. It also provides guidance for the subsequent phases of the Army PPBES. Planning is defined as the continuing process by which the Army: attempts to perform its vital functions, establishes and revises its goals or requirements and attainable objectives, chooses from among alternative courses of actions, and allocates its resources (manpower and dollars) to achieve the chosen course of action. The value of comprehensive planning comes from providing an integrated decision structure for an organization as a whole. Adequate planning requires "causative thinking"—a way and means of making events happen to shape the future of an organization instead of adapting to a future that unfolds from "blind forces." Planning is experimenting with ideas that represent the resources of an organization without risking those resources. It is designed to reduce risk by simplifying and ordering as much information as possible upon which to make a decision. The Army Planning System includes strategic planning and force planning for both requirements and objectives. Strategic planning is the development of national defense policy, national military objectives,

and the national military strategy. It provides the framework for all other forms of planning and the remainder of the PPBES. Strategic planning provides direct support to the DOD PPBS and JSPS; it indirectly supports the Army PPBES. Estimates of threats to national security objectives are a prerequisite to the development of policy and strategy. Based upon strategic planning, force planning translates the strategy and policy into operational concepts and develops the unconstrained force requirements for that strategy. It then determines the constrained force objectives as guidance for the allocation of resources. Force planning directly supports the JSPS and the Army PPBES; it indirectly supports the DOD PPBS. These planning activities serve to guide the subsequent development of programs and budgets. The focus of the Army Planning System is the identification of policy and the national military strategy necessary to maintain our national security and support U.S. foreign policy; identification of the integrated and balanced military forces necessary to accomplish that strategy; and provision of a framework for effective management of DOD resources towards successful mission accomplishment consistent with national resource limitations.




FIGURE 10-3

PLANNING

- STRATEGY AND POLICY
- FORCE
 - REQUIREMENTS (UNCONSTRAINED)
 - OBJECTIVES (CONSTRAINED)
- OPERATIONAL (CONTINGENCY)
- PROGRAM & BUDGET

FIGURE 10-4

The DCSOPS has primary Army Staff responsibility for the Army planning in the Army PPBES. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) is responsible for the development of threat estimates. The Army Staff functional proponents are each responsible to support Army planning within his proponentcy. This staff support is essential to ensure the accuracy for macro-level resource projections. Staff participation in JCS actions is a major and continuous planning activity. The DCSOPS is assigned the additional responsibility of Army operations deputy (OPSDEP) for assignment, review, coordination, and staff supervision of all JCS actions in the Army Staff. Each agency head is responsible, within his staff area of responsibility, for advising the CSA, through the DCSOPS, on all matters of joint interest and necessary actions resulting from JCS decisions.

Army planning in PPBES focuses on the policy and programming guidance determined during DG development and the force requirements established during JSPD development. The Army planning process provides the systematic means to develop guidance for program and budget development. Conceptually, this process is a generalized risk assessment/management model that supports the senior leadership of the Army in decisions on resource allocation for the Army. Through its planning process and force integration analysis (FIA), the Army determines force requirements, projected force capabilities (objectives), and the resources needed to execute Army roles and missions. The resulting documents are used by the CSA, major commands, and Army component commanders of the unified combatant commands. Other DA staff heads support the DCSOPS as required during the planning process, to include threat estimates provided by the DCSINT.

Force Requirements Planning (Figure 10-5), is conducted in order to translate OSD policies and objectives into Army terms.

FORCE REQUIREMENTS PLANNING




FIGURE 10-5

Documents from the DOD PPBS and the JSPS are used in this effort as well as Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG). Army long-range

planning provides a logical and consistent framework for developing the future Army and for fielding requisite warfighting capabilities. It considers threats to national security, national military strategy, requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands, the Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine, and the long-range vision of the Army's leadership. The ALRPG document is published biennially in January of even numbered years. It relies on a combination of the leadership vision for the Total Army and the principles and guidelines that the Army's force designers need to develop specific force capabilities. These principles and guidelines include the Army's vectors and the "Key Operational Capabilities." As such, the ALRPG is the lead Army document in a long-range planning system. It provides guidance for preparing functional area and MACOM long-range plans in the form of annual and special area long-range goals. Further, the ALRPG serves as a reference document during the development of the Army's input to Part I of the JSPDSA and to OSD/JCS formal planning documents.

The Army's internal analysis to support the Force Requirements Planning phase is accomplished through the Mid-Range Force Study (MRFS). This study provides the analytical basis for Army mid-range conventional force planning by evaluating the impact of available resources on force capability within designated theaters. Additionally, MRFS supports development of Army Planning Force input to the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA), Part III (Planning Force), and the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). The Planning Force is the recommended Army force structure required to achieve national military objectives in designated theaters with reasonable assurance of success.

Based upon OSD guidance and JSPD force requirements, the Army Staff develops and evaluates constrained mid-range force alternatives in support of PPBES (Figure 10-6). During this part of MRFS,

CONSTRAINED OPTIONS PLANNING




FIGURE 10-6

approved force alternatives are developed which constitute the basis for establishing planning guidance to programmers for POM development. The SA/CSA-

approved alternative is the POM Objective Force which provides the Army Staff and MACOM's the optimum mid-range force given projected resource constraints. It represents SA/CSA guidance to the Army Staff and MACOM's for program development and is published in the Army Plan (Figure 10-7). Subsequently, based upon estimated resource constraints, the Extended Planning Annex (EPA) Objective Force is developed to identify long-range force levels. The EPA Objective Force is published in Army Long Range Planning Guidance, POM EPA Annex, and the Army Plan (Figure 10-8).




FIGURE 10-7

PLANNING PATH DECISIONS




FIGURE 10-8

The Army Plan (TAP) provides the basis for the development of specific programs. It establishes priorities for resource allocations, both dollars and manpower. The Army Plan is published biennially as Army Guidance Volume I. TAP 90-94 will be published in November 1987. It is used by the MACOM's in Program Analysis Resource Review (PARR)

development. The Army Plan establishes force packages for procurement and distribution using the Army Force Packaging Methodology (FPM). This methodology states that those forces that are most critical in the early stages of a conflict receive the highest priority and receive resources at a higher percentage than later deploying forces. FPM is a detailed statement of priorities based upon the decision of the SA/CSA. In essence, FPM permits decisionmakers at all levels to compare "issues" against a command criteria and ultimately to aid in defending those "issues."

Army "force planning" is based upon numerous documents and decisions to include the DG, the previous POM, the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), the Army Commanders' Conference decisions, SA/CSA guidance and direction, documents associated with the JSPS (JSPDSA I, II, and III, JSPD, JPAM) and Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG) input such as ALRA. This guidance establishes the framework for determination of Army force requirements to support the JSPS and development of constrained force alternatives for SA/CSA decision. The planning phase of the Army's PPBS is completed with the publication of The Army Plan. In October the Army Staff begins development of input for JSPDSA Part I which begins the next Army planning cycle. The substantial overlap of cycles thus becomes apparent and can be confusing to those who are new to the system. It is important to know just where you are in each cycle and to realize how decisions made in subsequent programming or budgeting phases in one cycle may disturb the planning phases of succeeding cycles.

Although it is tempting to say that at the completion of the planning phase the Army Staff moves into the programming phase of the cycle, it doesn't work quite that way. Overlapping of phases within single cycles is as common and necessary as the overlapping of the cycles themselves. The initiation of Army program development begins before formal receipt of Defense Guidance and The Army Plan, although the drafts of these two documents have provided guidance to the programmers. Within specified constraints, program development translates Army force planning objectives into a comprehensive and balanced allocation of force structure, manpower, materiel, and funds for a five-year period. The detailed allocation in the Army POM is submitted to OSD for review by the OSD Staff, the OJCS, and the Defense Resources Board and adjustment/approval by the DEP SECDEF. The POM provides the basis for formulating budget estimates, as amended by the PDM.

Another element of the Army Planning System includes the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). AMOPS provides the interface between unified command plans for utilization and deployment of Army forces and Army plans for providing mobilized forces and resources. It also serves as the Army supplement to the JOPS. The content of the former Army Capabilities Plan (ACP), which was

the Army implementer of the JCS short-range planning document, the JSCP, is now Volumes II and III of AMOPS. This portion of AMOPS provides guidance to Army Staff agencies, Army commands, and Army components of unified combatant commands for the employment and/or support of Army forces in the short-range period. It reflects specific tasks and capabilities attainable within existing programs and budget limitations. It also documents the Army forces available to execute contingency plans; presents the mobilization schedule and major combat forces together with planned availability for development of these forces; sets priorities for apportionment of combat support and combat service support units; presents joint strategic concepts; assigns tasks to commanders of major Army commands; provides personnel, intelligence, and logistics guidance; provides guidance for development of plans with and without mobilization; and provides guidance required to plan for mobilization of units and individuals to meet established force requirements in the event of the need to expand the Active Army.

THE FORCE SIZING PROCESS

In studying force planning, it is necessary to understand the approach used within the Department of Defense (including JCS and the Services) in determining the proper size forces the Nation should have. This "force sizing" is an integral part of PPBES which allocates limited resources, and adheres to its schedule and discipline. As in all other aspects of the PPBES, the guidance received from OSD plays an important part. The JCS consider the previous DG, National Security Study Directives (NSSD), National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), and other pertinent policy information issued by the Administration when they prepare their military advice for the JSPD—which initiates development of the DG. In turn, it is appropriate, while less certain, that the SECDEF and the President take into full account the military assessments and recommendations of the JCS found in the JSPD.

The force development process is not solely an Army process but rather it is accomplished by all the Services—usually in concert with one another but sometimes unilaterally. It is a process inextricably linked with DOD PPBS. Whether it be the sizing process characteristic of the midrange period (3-10 years) or the structuring process associated more frequently with a shorter period (0-6 years), force development receives its impetus from and is manifested in key documents of the PPBES. The development of the force must be based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved. Consequently, this process begins with the articulation of United States national interests and objectives by the political leadership and the formulation of a national strategy. Extracting from

the national strategy, the JCS develop a recommended national military strategy which is provided to the SECDEF and to the President. Using this national military strategy as a basis and taking into account the threat and, where appropriate, the externally imposed constraints (dollars, manpower, equipment, industrial capacity, technology, etc.), the force design process is begun (Figure 10-9).

The evolution of the force results from a sequence of actions which progressively refine initial estimates. Beginning with the minimum risk force requirement and progressing to the current force, one sees an increasingly detailed definition of the force structure and also increasingly restrictive resource guidance. As the resource constraints increase, the forces become progressively smaller and the amount of risk inherent in strategy execution increases. This concept is reflected in Figure 10-10 (also see Chapter 14—Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution).

Minimum Risk Force.

This force is developed by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands and the Services in the JSPS. The CINC's develop their minimum risk forces based on guidance contained in the JSPDSA. The JSPDSA is the major vehicle. Part I of JSPDSA provides to the CINC's and Services the JCS perception of the national military strategy. The Services participate in developing the guidance provided in Part I which also states the JCS view of the international environment and the threat to U.S. interests and objectives. With regard to General Purpose Forces, Part I provides guidance on specific force-sizing scenarios to include such key assumptions as extent of conflict, identification of the threat, specification of United States allies, and extent of mobilization for friendly and threat forces. The period for analysis is specified to be ten years into the future. For example, analysis conducted in 1987 would use 1997 as the time frame of the analysis. This is done to identify force requirements and objectives far enough in advance to allow development to occur and the programming process to adjust to the requirements and allocate resources for the necessary capabilities.

Based on the scenarios provided, the CINC's examine the threat, analyze the most probable nature of the conflicts they must be able to meet within the guidance, and develop their minimum risk force requirements for submission to the JCS. In some instances, these determinations are assisted in their development through the use of computer-assisted warfighting techniques. Although aware of worldwide problems, CINC's are not tasked to analyze scenarios external to their own area of responsibility. Neither do they address the active or reserve force mix since all forces would be active after mobilization. The process is portrayed in such a manner that current forces are not considered, i.e., as though the process were "zero-based."

FORCE DEVELOPMENT STAGES




FIGURE 10-9




FIGURE 10-10

The minimum risk force requirements are designed to provide those force capabilities which would be necessary to provide a very high assurance of successfully executing the national military strategy. In other words, as the title indicates, the minimum risk force is a low risk force. It is a fully structured and

supported force that is unconstrained by manpower and resource availability or by industrial capability (Figure 10-11). In the case of Army forces, the force requirement is described in terms of Division Force Equivalents (DFE's), Theater Defense Brigades (TDB's), and Special Operations Forces (SOF's). The DFE is a force planning tool which not only includes the Army division but also the non-divisional slice of combat support and combat service support that would be deployed in the overseas theater (Appendix 10-1).

Improvements in force planning techniques are constantly being made, but sophistication of the determination of minimum risk force levels varies. In some cases, it is a best judgment call.

Planning Force.

The planning force is developed by the JCS, with the assistance of the Services using an illustrative planning scenario which is representative of the national military strategy. With only minor changes to some assumptions, this scenario is used for planning, programming, and budgeting. Thus, this force planning scenario is initially provided in the DG. The JCS in Part I of JSPDSA expand on this scenario and provide additional guidance on geographical areas of conflict; simultaneity of the conflicts if there are more than one; threat forces, force size and military objectives; nations allied with the United States and their extent of

MINIMUM RISK FORCE

HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE
UNCONSTRAINED BY TECHNOLOGY AND
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
FULLY SUPPORTED
FULLY STRUCTURED
ANALYSIS YEAR TEN YEARS IN THE FUTURE
SCENARIO DEPENDENT
DEVELOPED BY CINCs

FIGURE 10-11

participation; degree of threat and friendly mobilization; the objectives to be accomplished by the United States and its allies, and other assumptions. Based on the scenario guidance in Part I, the Services recommend to the JCS what their portion of the planning force should be.

Using the minimum risk force requirements for the separate areas of conflict as a point of departure and the recommended planning forces provided by the Services, a planning force is developed by the JCS which insures the presence of the necessary joint force capabilities to meet the demands of the force sizing and structuring scenario. The planning force is designed so as to provide a reasonable assurance of successfully executing the national military strategy. Implicit in the development of this force is the recognition that the minimum risk force requirements, as well as the planning force requirements, are beyond the reach of peacetime availability or resources for defense. Consequently, a greater risk than that associated with the minimum risk force is accepted. The planning force, the concept for its employment, the rationale for its force level and the risks associated with the planning force are elaborated upon in Part III of JSPDSA. A summary of the planning force levels, together with a comprehensive military appraisal of the threat to U.S. interests and objectives worldwide, a statement of recommended military objectives derived from national objectives, and the recommended military strategy required to attain national objectives in the midrange period, is submitted to the SECDEF in the JSPD. It is a basis for major policy discussions with the SECDEF prior to the drafting of the DG.

As with the minimum risk force requirements, in 1987 the force planner will be developing a planning force for 1997. This force will have not only Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force components, but it will also have a strategic mobility force component. Based on required times established by the Services for the forces to be operational in the theater of operations, the Joint Staff conducts a computer-assisted mobility analysis which identifies a mobility force with the necessary air and sea components to meet the desired arrival schedules. In

addition, an analysis is made of the probable duration of the conflict, the availability of support facilities such as ports, POL pipelines, airfields and road-nets in the area of conflict in order to insure that the necessary support capabilities are identified for the planning force. In the case of Army forces, the planning force levels will be identified in terms of the same DFE's, TDBs and SOF's used for minimum risk force requirements. The planning force is fully structured and fully supported.

As a part of the planning force development process, the force is analyzed to determine its attainability by the end of the planning period. An expansion and modernization schedule is developed and evolves on a yearly basis towards the mature, total planning force. Using this schedule, the planning force is examined in terms of fiscal responsibility; the availability of technology; manpower, materiel, and resource availability; and industrial capacity to determine if the planning force is achievable in peacetime given allocation of sufficient resources. If a particular facet is identified as a problem area, the JCS provide advice on what steps should be taken to overcome the deficiency.

The planning force, as mentioned earlier, provides a reasonable assurance of successfully executing the national military strategy and, thus, is that force which the JCS believe necessary to have available at the outset of the conflict envisioned in the sizing and structuring scenario, should it occur. Consequently, the planning force provides Service programmers a sense of priorities and direction in allocating program resources. The expansion and modernization schedule is used as a guide for programming and the capabilities of the planning force are used as a bench mark in assessing the risk associated with the program, budget, and current forces in executing the national military strategy. Figure 10-12 summarizes the characteristics of the planning force.

PLANNING FORCE

REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS
RELATIVELY UNCONSTRAINED
FULLY SUPPORTED
FULLY STRUCTURED
ANALYSIS TEN YEARS IN THE FUTURE
RESPONSIVE TO OSD SIZING AND
STRUCTURING SCENARIO
DEVELOPED BY JCS WITH SERVICE
PARTICIPATION
ATTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED
BENCHMARK FOR ASSESSING PROGRAM
FORCE RISK

FIGURE 10-12

Objective Force.

This is the desired force in terms of force structure, readiness, modernization and sustainability which is

constrained by expected fiscal and manpower levels (Figure 10-13). The force provides SA/CSA guidance to the Army Staff and MACOM's for program development. The Army conducts an analysis of force alternatives to determine the best force mix. The decision on objectives by the SA/CSA is then reflected in The Army Plan.




FIGURE 10-13

Program Force.

As in the case of the objective force, the sizing and structuring scenario provided in the DG is used as a basis for developing the program force. However, unlike the objective force, resources projected to be available during the program years (2-6 years in the future) are more seriously constrained. Consequently, force programmers must now develop a force—the program force—which can be achieved with programmed resources. Using the objective force target, programmers develop the detailed program force and its components. This is a complex process involving the judgments of large portions of the Services' staffs.

The program force is neither fully structured nor fully supported. In the case of the Army, using major combat forces established as the objective force, extensive analysis is conducted to determine the achievable manning, equipping, and modernization levels for the major combat units. For the Army, once the objective force has been determined, and the specific number of Army divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, and special forces groups (above the line forces) have been identified, the combat support and combat service support (below the line units) required to support the force in combat are determined using Total Army Analysis (TAA) in the force-sizing scenario. The TAA takes the major divisional and non-divisional combat forces of the objective force and integrates the necessary tactical support units with the deployment of major combat units. This provides a basis for examining tradeoffs between types of units and in assessing risk when shortfalls occur in the program. The OMNIBUS study aids the program and budget process by revealing readiness and operational shortfalls in the current force (where the Army is now) that should be corrected. It is an assessment of the operational readiness versus

capability at full manning and equipping of the Army and provides valuable insights to the Army leadership on the Army's ability to mobilize, train, deploy, fight, and sustain forces in combat. Considerable data are amassed on the contribution various units make towards the combat effectiveness of the Army, and these data are used in assessing tradeoffs as the structure of the program force is determined. Similarly, extensive analysis is conducted to determine the amount and location of stockpiles and other logistical functions that can be programmed to support the program force. This information is also incorporated in the tradeoff analysis.

As a consequence of the numerous analyses mentioned, a program force is determined which is a delicate balance between resource availability and force capability. Careful definition on a year-by-year basis has been given to the force with a gradual growth towards the most capable force in the last year of the program. As might be suspected, the resultant program force has considerably more risk associated with it than the planning force. These risks are enumerated by the force programmers of the Services in their POM and by the JCS in the JPAM. The Services' POM presents its programs for achieving objectives in the areas of forces, manpower, equipment, materiel acquisition, and logistic support within constraints specified by the SECDEF. The JPAM provides the views of the JCS on the balance and capabilities of the composite POM force and the risks associated with Service programs. The JCS may offer specific recommendations to reduce identified risks. Figure 10-14 summarizes the characteristics of the program force.




FIGURE 10-14

Budget Force.

The budget force is that force and its associated capabilities which would be achieved if the budget requests were fully appropriated. The capabilities of the

budget force are slightly less than the program force, and it has an accordingly higher associated risk. Figure 10-15 summarizes these characteristics.




FIGURE 10-15

Current Force.

The current force is that force and its associated capabilities that is in-being today. It is that force which reflects real-time readiness conditions. The current force also represents the latest adjustments to the budget force based on congressional resource appropriations and command priorities and decisions. With more constraints applied to it than the budget force, it manifests a proportionately higher risk. Figure 10-16 summarizes these characteristics.




FIGURE 10-16

THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS)

The objective of JOPS is the timely development of effective operation plans throughout the unified and specified combatant commands. Through the use of uniform planning procedures and formats, JOPS facilitates JCS review of operation plans, incorporates

ADP techniques and interchange of data, minimizes the number of operation plans, and provides for reporting any force shortfalls and limiting factors identified during the planning process (Figure 10-17).

Planning in JOPS begins with the assignment of missions and publication of other data to unified and specified combatant commanders in the JSCP. The phases of deliberate planning under JOPS are:

Initiation Phase, in which planning tasks are assigned, forces and resources available for planning are identified, and stage is set for planning.

Concept Development Phase, in which all factors which can have a significant effect on mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed, the best course of action is determined, and the concept of operations is developed.

Plan Development Phase, in which force requirements are identified, the force list is structured, resupply and transportation requirements are determined, time-phased force deployment information is developed, and all elements of the plan are documented in JOPS format and submitted for approval.

Plan Review Phase, in which all elements of the plan are assessed, validated, and approved by the JCS.

Supporting Plans Phase, in which all required supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated.




FIGURE 10-17

When required during crisis action, execution planning is conducted as the transitional planning necessary to transfer an OPLAN or CONPLAN into an Operation Order (OPORD) for the purpose of achieving timely military response for a specific situation. It is initiated by a JCS alert order.

Clearly, all aspects of an OPLAN are of interest to the participating Service(s). Some are singled out here since they impact so heavily on the Army's force structuring process and ultimate assignment of priorities for unit deployment and levels of readiness. It is during the planning portion of the plan development phase that the component/subordinate commanders time-phase their force lists to sequence the arrival of forces in accordance with the visualized concept of operations. Planning for employment is the product of mission analysis and intelligence assessment and is keyed to the supported commander's concept of operations. It is based on Service doctrine, guidance, review, and the availability of forces. While this planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported joint commander or the CINC, the component commanders develop detailed lists of combat and support forces to be employed in accomplishing the assigned tasks, including the required closure time of forces (as specified in the supported commander's concept of deployment) to be deployed to the area of operations. This phase concludes with the production of the supported commander's Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD).

The TPFDD includes assigned forces, augmentation forces, and supporting forces which are to be deployed to the area of operation and forces stationed within the area of operation.

Closely related to major forces planning is support planning, where the support requirements necessary to sustain the forces are determined. This entails computation of support requirements based upon Service planning guidance and the time-phasing of this support in accordance with the supported commander's overall concept of support. Most critical to the process is the proper assignment of air or sea mode to time-phased requirements to insure optimum use of mobility/transportation assets.

Another significant consideration of the whole process is the identification of shortfalls and of associated risks. Coordination with and between all commands and agencies concerned is essential to make detailed adjustments necessary to resolve shortfalls or limiting factors.

When a plan has been approved, subordinate and supporting commands and Services must update/modify force and resupply requirements and identify units in light of real world asset availability/readiness. They must also consistently address the basic execution planning tasks: identification of forces required, designation of units, determination of movement requirements to include actual resupply, and planning the movements of forces and supplies.

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

Unified and specified commands provide for the integrated effectiveness of U.S. military forces in combat operations and for the projection of U.S. military power in support of U.S. national policies. They are established by the President through the SECDEF with the advice and assistance of the Chairman, JCS (CJCS). The chain of command extends from the President to the SECDEF through the CJCS to the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands. Forces are assigned under the authority of the SECDEF. This prevents any Service from unilaterally removing its forces, thereby undercutting the authority of these commanders. A unified command is a command with the broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services. A specified command is a command which has a broad continuing mission and is normally composed of one Service. Unified and specified commanders have full operational command of those forces assigned (Figure 10-18).

The unified commands are:

U.S. Atlantic Command, is responsible for the defense of the eastern approaches to the U.S. and the lines of communication in the Atlantic area. CINCLANT is also Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), a major NATO commander.

U.S. Southern Command is responsible for the defense of the Panama Canal and fulfills our military responsibilities throughout the Latin American area.

U.S. European Command is responsible for the U.S. contribution to NATO and for commanding our forces assigned to Europe. Its area of responsibility also includes portions of the Middle East and most of the African states bordering on the Mediterranean. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) is also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a major NATO commander, and as such is responsible for the defense of Allied Command Europe.

U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for defense of the U.S. from attacks through the Pacific Ocean, and for U.S. defense interests in the Pacific, Far East, South Asia, South East Asia, and Indian Ocean.

U.S. Central Command is responsible for Southwest Asia (SWA), the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa.

U.S. Space Command was activated 23 September 1985. USSPACECOM is responsible for integrated tactical warning and space operations. USCINSPACE, as CINCNORAD, is responsible for

binational aerospace surveillance and warning and atmospheric defense of North America.

U.S. Special Operations Command was established 16 April 1987. USSOC consists of all Special Operations Forces stationed in the United States, with the exception of Naval Special Warfare Groups. The principle function of the USSOC is to prepare Special Operations Forces to carry out assigned missions


U.S. Transportation Command, established in 1987, is responsible for transportation world-wide. Its component commands are the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

The specified commands are:

Strategic Air Command (SAC) is responsible for worldwide strategic nuclear operations and is composed of USAF strategic bombers and missiles. The Navy ballistic missile submarines are assigned to Navy fleets, but are targeted by SAC in conjunction with our nuclear operations plan.

Forces Command, established in 1987, is responsible for providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce the unified and other specified commands. FORSCOM will also be responsible for the land defense of CONUS.

UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE



UNIFIED COMMANDS:

US EUROPEAN COMMAND (USEUCOM)
 US PACIFIC COMMAND (USPACOM)
 US ATLANTIC COMMAND (USLANTCOM)
 US SOUTHERN COMMAND (USSOUTHCOM)
 US CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)
 US SPACE COMMAND (USSPACECOM)
 US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOC)
 US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM)

SPECIFIED COMMANDS:

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND (SAC)
 FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOM)

— COMMAND
 - - - - - SUPPORT
 / / / (SEE *PARA BELOW)

FIGURE 10-18

***Role of the Chairman, JCS (CJCS).**

Public Law 99-433 (Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986) specifies that the Secretary of Defense may assign to the CJCS responsibility for *overseeing* the activities of the combatant commands. However, such assignment by the Secretary to the Chairman *does not* confer any command authority on the Chairman and does not alter the responsibility of the commanders of the combatant commands. Subject to the direction of the President, the commander of a combatant command:

- performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense; and
- is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

SUMMARY

Joint planning is conducted under the guidance of the Services and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JSPS is oriented toward identifying and evaluating the threat facing the nation, looking at various times into the future. It provides the basis for formulating the nation's strategy and resource needs in terms of forces and materiel. This activity is mainly conducted at the JCS level. Two key documents of the JSPS are the JSPD and the JSCP which formally initiate two other key cycles.

PPBS is primarily concerned with resource allocation, which means it is primarily dollar and manpower oriented. Although the OSD and JCS are directly involved with the system, the main players are at the Service levels. The PPBS is primarily concerned with the acquisition of those resources necessary to meet the threat and to execute the strategy identified by the DG. Cost is balanced against risk, with an objective risk assessment being provided by the JCS in the JPAM. Thus, the JSPS intersects the PPBS starting with initiation by the JSPD and through the risk assessment of the JPAM.

JOPS focuses on operation planning and crisis action execution. The JSCP translates the national military strategy into tasking and requires that plans be completed to accomplish tasking missions within available resources. The unified and specified combatant commands are the main players in this activity. JOPS is oriented on the most effective use of the nation's current military capability against the near-term threat. The JSCP is the JSPS document that starts the deliberate planning process. The JSCP is the only formal tie between JSPS and JOPS.

There is no formal relationship between PPBS and JOPS, yet PPBS is strongly influenced by it. As operation plans are developed, resource requirements become evident. Requirements become apparent as "shortfalls" and the Services become involved in correcting these deficiencies through the priority allocation of scarce resources in the PPBS.

The details of planning change constantly, but the overall procedure of identifying the threat, developing a military strategy, structuring forces to support the strategy, providing resources for priority requirements, and planning for the deployment of those forces to meet contingencies, remains essentially the same from year to year. Force planning is not a very precise activity, even though the resulting force levels are stated precisely in terms of divisions, airwings, carriers, and the like. There are many uncertainties involved in force planning and the procedures used in determining force levels, as well as the risks inherent with a particular force level, are judgmental in nature. Force planning is complex and is characterized by an interrelated series of analyses to determine an affordable force. It begins by establishing the minimum risk force requirements and accepts resource and time constraints to develop the program, budget, and current forces. Throughout this process, the key consideration is how to execute successfully the national military strategy and to keep risk to a minimum. Much analysis and time is spent in developing a force within resource constraints to execute that strategy. The JSPS, PPBS, and JOPS are processes that have worked over the years and will continue to be used as the main vehicles for force and operation planning.

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APPENDIX 10-1

DIVISION FORCE EQUIVALENT

General.

Land forces are composed of Army division force equivalents, theater defense brigades, special theater forces, and general support forces.

Division Force Equivalent.

The Army DFE is a shorthand force accounting tool. A DFE is a fully-structured division with all support necessary to provide warfighting and sustaining capabilities. It includes the division and all nondivisional combat, combat support, and combat service support units required to support the division within a theater of operations. The DFE is divided into three increments: a Division Increment (DI), a Nondivisional Combat Increment (NDCI), and a Tactical Support Increment (TSI). These increments are notional planning concepts and are not standard organizations. Their composition depends on the type of division supported, the mission, the environment, the tempo of activity, and the overall force employed.

DI. An Army division consists of a division base and maneuver battalions which are under command of brigade headquarters, of which there are usually three. The numbers and types of assigned maneuver battalions determine the combat capabilities and characteristics of the division and its designation as infantry, mechanized infantry, armored, air assault, airborne, or high technology. The mix of maneuver battalions can be adjusted (tailored) as required by the mission and the operational environment. The division base consists of artillery and separate combat support and combat service support units. Division artillery provides organic conventional artillery support to all divisions and organic nuclear artillery support to infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored divisions. The division support command provides organic combat service support and includes supply and transportation, medical, and maintenance battalions. The division base also contains separate battalions (aviation, CEWI, cavalry, engineer, air defense, and communications) and companies (chemical and military police) that provide organic combat support.

NDCI. The nondivisional combat increment may contain separate infantry, mechanized infantry, or armored brigades and armored cavalry regiments; conventional and dual-capable nondivisional field and air defense artillery battalions; attack and assault aviation units; and combat engineer units required to support the operations of Army divisions.

TSI. The tactical support increment contains the nondivisional combat support and combat service support units necessary to sustain the division and the nondivisional combat increment within the theater of operations. Examples of TSI units are military police, signal, medical, construction, and logistic units required to support the division and the theater.

Special Theater Forces (STF).

STF is a planning concept that employs units specially designed for the peculiarities of a particular mission in a designated critical area. Special Theater Forces (STF) include Theater Defense Brigades, Special Forces Groups, and ranger units. A TDB is generally a light infantry brigade that is predesignated and equipped for a specific operational area. STF may contain more than the usual amount of support such as air defense, signal, and engineer units. In some cases, STF units are tasked to support other Services in maintaining key installations.

Special Operations Forces (SOF).

SOF have proponentcy for missions which cannot be accomplished by other conventional forces and which require assets and skills not available to or inherent in other uniformed organizations. Conventional military forces establish their own environment, while SOF operations are undertaken in the environment of a

foreign culture. Missions characterized as special operations are: foreign internal defense; unconventional warfare; strategic intelligence, and strike. SOF include special forces groups, psychological operations, civil affairs, and ranger units. Each of these categories possesses its own unique capabilities and characteristics and, consequently, each is designed to perform separate, although complementary, functions.

General Support Forces (GSF).

The GSF are the sustaining base and provide the necessary resources in CONUS to support mobilization and expansion of the force, and equipment, training, consumable supplies and replacements to sustain the force when it becomes engaged in prolonged combat. The sustaining base must be sized to meet requirements of deployed forces.

CHAPTER 11

ARMY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Discussion in Chapter 3 of this text identified force development as the beginning of the Functional Life Cycle of the Army and the underlying basis for all other functions. It is a process which consists of defining the military threat, designing units and a force structure capable of defeating the threat, determining personnel and materiel requirements and, within available resources, the authorizations for manning and equipping the Army.

This chapter explains the Army force development process using the schematic framework provided by the Army Force Integration Chart at Figure 3-14. The chart shows a network of processes, each of which provides an essential force integration function, and how the functions relate to each other. For example, each of the processes for determining future requirements, conducting research and development, and providing resources provides input to the force development process. The products of force development, in turn, provide the basis for acquiring and distributing personnel and materiel in the Army.

Force development begins with battlefield requirements for new materiel or organizations generated by TRADOC's Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS), by guidance interjected from time-to-time by the Army's senior leadership, or any information on the evolution of new materiel flowing from the Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) process. This input allows TRADOC, the Army's combat developer, in coordination with AMC and the other materiel developers (Health Services Command, Information Systems Command, and Intelligence and Security Command) to accomplish the first force development task--the design or modification of unit models (Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE)).

The second force development task is to develop a force structure composed of a balanced mix of each kind of unit. This task is based initially on relatively unconstrained strategic and operational requirements, but is ultimately constrained by the resources (manpower spaces and dollars) provided through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

The final task of force development is to determine and document the exact numbers of personnel, by skill, and equipment items, by type, authorized in the force structure. This task is accomplished in the Structure and Composition System (SACS). Each system or process that contributes to the accomplishment of the three

force development tasks is explained in the following paragraphs. Use the Force Integration Chart (Figure 3-14) to visualize how each system relates to the others and contributes to the accomplishment of each task.

CONCEPT BASED REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM (CBRS)

Overview. Traditionally, the Army force development process has fostered equal competition among materiel systems, organizations, training, and doctrine to develop feasible solutions to resolve perceived deficiencies in the force. In recent history, due to fascinating technological advances, materiel systems have captured more attention than changes to training, doctrine, or organizations thereby creating a potential imbalance/inefficiency in correcting deficiencies. Increased visibility for organizations, training, and doctrine in the solution process are important, mainly because of the associated cost and timesaving advantages over materiel development programs. To reestablish a competitive balance among the optional solution areas, the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) was created.

The CBRS is a system by which concepts are developed and analyzed and from which doctrinal, training, organizational, and materiel needs of the Army evolve. The CBRS refocuses the development direction of past decades from a materiel-oriented flow to a concept-based flow. In other words, the Army starts with a concept of battlefield operations, then acts to modernize the force with requirements derived from the concept.

First, operational concepts are developed to describe how the Army will fight and support. They are detailed concepts representative of particular battlefield functional areas. They evolve from a refinement of broad concepts that describe how the Army will operate in the short and long term. Once approved, these concepts become inputs into the Mission Area Analysis (MAA) process.

MAA is an extensive assessment of force capability within a particular battlefield mission area. It is the methodology designed to provide a continuing examination of preestablished mission areas. MAA determines major weaknesses and exploitable strengths in present capabilities, identifies corrective action opportunities, and recommends corrective action strategies in light of current technological opportunities. MAA requirements analysis-based materiel solutions

provide the impetus for developing an Operational and Organizational (O&O) plan.

An O&O Plan is based on operational concepts and should be able to relate its origin to one or more of these concepts. The plan normally contains an operational, organizational, training, and logistical plan for the implementation of a hardware system within the Army organization. Equally important, the O&O Plan is a mandatory document that initiates the materiel acquisition process.

Fully coordinated and integrated Mission Area Development Plans (MADP) are critical to understanding the combat developer's perspective of required corrective actions. MADP's provide a time-phased road map of corrective action strategies for doctrine, training, organization, and materiel developments addressing each MAA capability issue. These plans, prepared by each mission area proponent, convert proposed solutions into specific programs and support TRADOC input to the PPBES and long-range planning processes.

Finally, the Battlefield Development Plan (BDP) is created to integrate and prioritize the major capability issues derived from all mission areas and provide an overview of national military objectives, threat, HQDA guidance, and an historical perspective. The resulting prioritized list is translated into specific Army requirements. The completed MAA, MADP, and BDP establish a clear direction for writing doctrine, developing new materiel systems, initiating changes in force structure, and developing training programs.

Each step in the CBRs process will now be described in detail.

Operational Concepts. The development of operational concepts is an iterative process that begins with an examination of Army goals and missions, threat, and technology. The inputs include current and future Army missions provided by the Army leadership, historical perspective, technological opportunities, and the Soviet BDP. The Soviet BDP, prepared by the Army Intelligence Agency, provides the concept developer one of the principal challenges to which he must respond. Concept exploration generates feasible solutions to the challenges of the Soviet BDP and postulates needs out beyond the range of current Army programs.

After exploring alternative ideas, a broad operational concept, referred to as the umbrella concept, is established. The umbrella concept generally describes how the Army will operate and is the basis for further development of all operational concepts. The Army's current umbrella concept is AirLand Battle.

Each functional area within the umbrella concept is then developed starting with a concept statement. The concept statement describes in general terms what is done, why, how, when, and where on the battlefield, and by whom (i.e. combat, combat support, or combat service support units). A particular concept statement may generate the need for an operational concept, but,

the majority of the time, several concept statements form the need for one operational concept.

Operational concepts are updated as necessary when changes occur to the development input and feedback from functional area assessments, testing and evaluation, and the field. Approved operational concepts are published in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 525 Series Pamphlets and provide a basis for conducting MAA.

The Commanding General of TRADOC is the final approving authority for all operational concepts. TRADOC centers and schools are tasked, as necessary, for assistance in developing the umbrella concept and further development of operational concepts that describe each functional area on the battlefield.

Mission Area Analysis. MAA is the methodology for examining current Army battlefield potential within predefined mission areas to identify weaknesses and strengths in Army capabilities. Corrective actions generated in MAA to alleviate capability issues stress, in order of priority, doctrinal solutions, training solutions, organizational solutions, and materiel systems solutions. Note that less expensive solutions are sought first.

There are 12 mission areas analyzed separately in the MAA process (Figure 11-1). Each analysis is conducted by the mission area proponent with careful and strict adherence to the study guidance. The underlying principles and fundamentals of the MAA process are essentially the same for, and equally applicable to, all 12 mission areas.

The process begins with an analysis of the mission area threat projected five years beyond the POM for a geographic region. After the threat has been analyzed, battlefield tasks and subtasks associated with the mission are identified to facilitate closer scrutiny. Performance requirements, evaluation criteria, and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE's) are then developed for each task and subtask to determine the contribution of each to the success of the mission area. Capability issues identified that will require a materiel system solution generate the development of an O&O Plan.

The capability of the Programmed Force to execute the required tasks is evaluated using the MOE's as performance measures against the required tasks and subtasks. Models and wargames are used to simulate the battlefield capability against the projected threat. The resulting battlefield capability assessment, when compared to the previously identified requirements for task performance, identifies the battlefield requirements.

Mission area capability issues are directly related to specific tasks that cannot be performed to required standards or offer potential enhancement opportunity to attack threat weaknesses. These capability issues are then prioritized, with fact sheets to provide additional detail.

MISSION AREAS

PROPONENT

MISSION AREA	PROPONENT
CLOSE COMBAT (HEAVY)	U.S. ARMY ARMOR CENTER, FT KNOX, KY
CLOSE COMBAT (LIGHT)	U.S. ARMY INFANTRY CENTER, FT BENNING, GA
AVIATION	U.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER, FT RUCKER, AL
AIR DEFENSE	U.S. ARMY AIR DEFENSE CENTER, FT BLISS, TX
ENGINEERING & MINE WARFARE	U.S. ARMY ENGINEER CENTER, FT BELVOIR, VA
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	U.S. ARMY LOGISTICS CENTER, FT LEE, VA
FIRE SUPPORT	U.S. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY CENTER, FT SILL, OK
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL	U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL SCHOOL, FT MCCLELLAN, AL
COMMAND & CONTROL	U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FT LEAVENWORTH, KS
COMMUNICATIONS	U.S. ARMY SIGNAL CENTER, FT GORDON, GA
INTELLIGENCE & ELECTRONIC WARFARE	U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER, FT HUACHUCA, AZ
SPECIAL OPERATIONS	U.S. ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER, FT BRAGG, NC

FIGURE 11-1

Once the capability issues are known, corrective actions can be proposed and analyzed in light of current technology and opportunities. This phase of the MAA cycle marks the transition from an unconstrained analysis of required capabilities and tasks to a constrained consideration of the alternative solutions to resolve capability issues. The constraints imposed on solution development are manpower ceilings, funding, uncertainty of decision environments, and personnel. To evaluate the corrective actions in light of these externally determined constraints, the proponent prepares a macro affordability analysis that estimates funding and manpower requirements in addition to resources currently programmed in the POM. Proposed solutions must also consider personnel factors, such as aptitude requirements, training time requirements, task time requirements, and physical requirements.

Having completed an examination of corrective actions and technological opportunities, the proponent develops an objective force for his mission area based on the proposed corrective actions. This objective force is then analyzed relative to the original tasks, frequency, conditions, and standards to determine if the synergistic effect of the combined corrections produces a viable force capable of executing required tasks. The reports generated in the MAA process are retained and kept current to provide up-to-date input into other processes, specifically the development of the MADP and BDP.

HQ TRADOC is tasked by HQDA to conduct MAA for the Army. HQ AMC provides current technological information for the process.

Mission Area Development Plan. The annual MADP prepared by each mission area proponent provides a

time-phased road map of corrective action strategies and a summary of significant changes from continuous analysis of mission area capabilities. The MADP is a rapid reference to user requirements and program priorities rationale. It serves as the Systems Program Review (SPR) action plan and provides tracking information to assess progress toward resolving capability issues. MADP's contain an historical audit and crosswalk of all capability issues, both major (BDP) and nonmajor, to corrective actions.

Battlefield Development Plan. The BDP summarizes major capability issues identified during the 12 individual Mission Area Analyses. The MAA reports are the primary input to this process. The BDP document provides information on: historical perspective, national objectives, threat, Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) and Army Guidance, AirLand Battle doctrine, mission area structure, MAA process, and prioritized capability issues. The BDP integrates and prioritizes the key issues and translates them into specific Army requirements. It states the operational and analytical rationale underlying the integration and prioritization and expresses TRADOC's views on matters pertaining to prioritization. In addition, the BDP provides guidance necessary to focus, prioritize, and integrate TRADOC efforts in support of current and future Army missions. The Mission Area Development Plan (MADP) is completed during BDP development by mission area proponents and provides the necessary detail for each proposed solution. This plan converts proposed solutions into specific programs and supports TRADOC input to the PPBES process. The approval of

specific corrective actions generates guidance that is subsequently disseminated to the force development and other life-cycle functions.

Operational and Organizational Plan. The O&O Plan is a detailed plan outlining the impacts of the employment of a new hardware system into Army organizations. It describes how the system will be integrated into the force structure, deployed, operated, and supported in peacetime and wartime. The O&O Plan establishes required readiness objectives and is the basis for Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning.

The O&O Plan addresses the following seven distinct areas: purpose, threat deficiency, operational plan, organizational plan, personnel impact, training impact, and logistics impact. The purpose describes the need for an operational capability to defeat the threat or eliminate an operational deficiency. In addition, the purpose should also identify where in the MAA process the deficiency is located. The evolution from the deficiency to the corresponding need is described. The need should be stated in broad major characteristics only. The threat/deficiency area describes the objectives to be obtained; i.e., the threat to be countered or the operational deficiency to be eliminated.

The operational plan and the organizational plan are the key aspects of the O&O Plan. The operational plan explains how, what, when, and where the system will be employed on the battlefield and how it will interface with other systems. Equally important, the organizational plan designates the type units that will employ and support the system and, when appropriate, the system to be replaced. This plan will support preparation of the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP), and identification of key Associated Support Items of Equipment (ASIOE).

The remaining three areas in the O&O Plan are the personnel, training, and logistics impacts. The personnel impacts are determined based on an examination of the system design and an assessment of the personnel skills needed to operate and maintain the system. This plan facilitates preparation of the Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI) and assists in the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) process. Training impacts identify the type and amount of training required and the need for training devices and simulators. This information assists in the preparation of the Training Support Plan. Finally, the logistics impacts are evaluated based on the compatibility of the system with the Standard Army Logistics System, i.e., the extent to which the new system interfaces with this system and uses standard tools and existing Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE). This plan will support development of the Logistics Support Plan.

In summary, the approved O&O Plan is the initiating document in the materiel acquisition process and provides important system detail needed to help

determine the management level of the proposed system.

HQ TRADOC is responsible for overseeing the development of the O&O Plan. The TRADOC materiel system proponents prepare the draft O&O Plan for materiel solutions generated in the MAA process. AMC assists the proponents to ensure critical technical concerns are considered. The HQDA staff reviews the draft O&O Plan and submits comments as necessary. TRADOC approves O&O Plans.

O&O Plans for major systems require the preparation of a Justification for Major Systems New Start (JMSNS) requirements document. Major systems are those in which Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) costs are expected to exceed 200 million dollars and production costs are expected to top one billion dollars. The JMSNS is forwarded to OSD for review/approval immediately prior to, or with, the POM submission and must be approved by the SECDEF before research, development, and acquisition activities for the new system can begin.

DESIGN UNIT MODELS

Introduction. The first force development task is to design unit models. Each tactical unit in the Army can trace its beginning to a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). A TOE prescribes the wartime mission, organization, and equipment requirements for an Army unit. TOE's are designed to reflect developments in doctrine, tactics, equipment modernization, and mission changes. Development of a new TOE or revision of a TOE requires input from many sources and is especially dependent upon Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) information.

The task of designing unit models consists principally of two interactive processes:

- Developing BOIP/Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI).
- Developing TOE.

BOIP/QQPRI. A BOIP is a planning document which states the planned placement of new or improved items of equipment and personnel in TOE's at 100% of wartime requirements. It reflects quantities of new equipment, and Associated Support Items Of Equipment (ASIOE), as well as equipment that is being replaced. In addition to its use for TOE development/revision, it is used by HQDA for logistics support and distribution planning for new and improved items entering the Army supply system. The combat developers (TRADOC community) use it with the QQPRI to develop manpower requirements criteria. Materiel developers (AMC community) use it as input for concept studies, life cycle cost estimates, and trade-off analyses during the research and development process. Army Major Commands (MACOM's) use it to

program for other equipment, facilities, initial provisioning, and personnel needed to support the new or improved items.

A BOIP provides personnel and equipment changes required to introduce a new/modified item into the Army inventory. The development of a BOIP can play an integral part in TOE development. A BOIP generally causes TOE's to be revised or, in some cases, generates a requirement for a new TOE. BOIP's are prepared in response to force design guidance from the Determine Battlefield Requirements function. As mentioned above, an O&O Plan for a new equipment requirement is one source of such guidance.

The QQPRI is a compilation of organizational, doctrinal, training, duty position, and personnel information that accompanies the BOIP as part of a package. It is used to determine the need to develop or revise military and civilian occupational specialties and to prepare plans for the personnel and training needed to operate and maintain the new or improved item.

The BOIP and QQPRI process begins when the materiel developer receives an approved O&O Plan from the combat developer. The Project Manager and/or materiel developer develops the BOIP Feeder Data (BOIPFD). The BOIPFD triggers the assignment of the developmental line item number (ZLIN) and the development of the QQPRI by the materiel developer's new equipment training personnel.

The BOIPFD and QQPRI package is then processed through AMC's Equipment Authorization and Review Agency (EARA) which reviews the package for accuracy, continuity, and completeness. It is then forwarded to TRADOC for the formal development of the BOIP and update of the QQPRI. During TRADOC staffing, the training impacts associated with the BOIP item and the proposed MOS decision(s) are developed. Staffing with each of the MACOM's is accomplished by TRADOC. When the BOIP and QQPRI are complete, TRADOC conducts a review board and then formally submits the package to HQDA for approval.

The BOIP, QQPRI, and proposed MOS decision(s) are received by HQDA's Force Development System Agency (FDSA), a field operating agency of ODCSOPS which staffs the BOIP/QQPRI package with the Army Staff for comments and concurrences. Based on the Army Staff responses, the BOIP/QQPRI package is approved and returned to TRADOC for updates, if required, and publication.

There may be at least three iterations of the BOIP: An initial BOIP, developed during the Demonstration and Validation Phase of system development; and amended BOIP's (ABOIP), which are based on updated information provided, as required, by the materiel developer 39 months and again 30 months prior to the first unit equipped date (FUED) and prepared prior to a production and deployment decision. This allows sufficient time for units receiving the equipment and their higher and supporting headquarters to plan and conduct personnel, training, and supply activities

essential to the orderly fielding of the equipment. A BOIP may be amended at any time during system development when new or changed information becomes available.

TOE. A TOE prescribes the required structure, manpower, and equipment for several organizational options for a particular type unit. These options provide a model for fielding a unit at full capability or at a reduced capability if resource constraints so mandate. A TOE also specifies the normal tasks the unit is designed to perform and the capabilities the unit has to accomplish its mission.

TOE documents prescribe the normal mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements for type units. TOE's are the basis for developing authorization documents at the unit level and a vital input for determining Army resource requirements for use by managers. In addition, these unit models establish increments of capability for the Army to develop an effective, efficient, and combat-ready force structure.

A TOE normally contains documentation for three organizational options based on the strength necessary to achieve the following percentage levels of combat capability: 100% (Level 1), 90% (Level 2), and 80% (Level 3). Equipment quantities for Levels 2 and 3 are equal to Level 1 with the exception of personal weapons and protective masks that correspond to the personnel strength at each level. Each level is a balanced organization, with Level 1 being the minimum requirements for sustained combat. Another strength level, cadre, is also documented in the TOE. The cadre level does not provide a balance between personnel and equipment, but does provide the nucleus of key personnel required to establish a base for activating a unit. TOE's provide a standard method for documenting the organizational structure of the Army and the relationship between unit requirements and authorizations. TOE documents affect the validity of Army requirements, the Army budget, efficiency and readiness of the Army, and the management of Army resources.

Force design guidance, developed during MAA, provides TOE developers with recommended TOE additions/modifications required to resolve battlefield capability issues. The missions and probable areas of utilization of a unit are provided by policy and doctrine. Policy includes guidance procedures and standards, in the form of regulations, on how to develop TOE's. Policy also contains guidance in the form of Standards of Grade Authorizations (SGA), which provides for the equitable grading of all MOS positions for use in the development of requirements documents. In addition, policy provides resource constraint parameters to be used in the development of TOE's for brigade and larger units. Doctrine describes how each type unit will perform its functions and details the mission and required capabilities.

TOE developers consider a type unit's mission and required capabilities when applying equipment utilization policies, BOIP, manpower requirements criteria (MARC), and SGA to develop the proper mix of equipment and personnel for an efficient organizational structure. Resource constraint guidance is considered during the development of draft TOE's to ensure that a type unit can perform its mission using resources available in the inventory.

The TOE development and revision process is controlled by the annual TOE Program Letter and Schedule. A draft letter and schedule are prepared by TRADOC and submitted to HQDA (ODCSOPS) for review and approval. The HQDA-approved letter and schedule provide the basis for TRADOC to task and issue expanded guidance to its proponent schools and centers who prepare and coordinate draft TOE (DToe). DToe are reviewed and finalized by HQ TRADOC and provided concurrently to HQDA and interested Army Major Commands (FORSCOM, AMC, USAREUR) for an Area Of Interest review (AOI). HQDA uses the results of the AOI review to make final changes and provide instruction to HQ TRADOC for documentation in the Consolidated TOE Update (CTU) file and publication on microfiche by TAGO.

TOE's are scheduled for revision to accommodate changes in doctrine, introduction of new or improved equipment, or to incorporate more effective organizational designs. Development of new TOE's is scheduled to accommodate requirements for new organizations. If a TOE is not scheduled for revision or replacement by a new TOE, it will be scheduled for cyclic review every three years.

The TOE System Modernization.

The Training and Doctrine Command has developed a "Living TOE" renamed the L-Series TOE (LTOE) system which will gradually replace current TOE and MTOE. The LTOE is a document which prescribes the organizational design, including personnel and equipment requirements, for a type of unit displayed in discrete evolutionary increments of capability. The TOE begins with a doctrinally-sound base design and provides a series of intermediate TOE leading to a fully modernized objective design. The LTOE is the basis for force programming and becomes an authorization document when resources, specific unit designations, and effective dates for the activation or reorganization are approved at Headquarters, Department of Army. The TRADOC plan is to convert the total force in LTOE by the end of FY 88. LTOE's have been implemented in the first Cavalry Division and in AG Companies for testing. As more organizations are documented in the new system, the process will be refined. The components of the system include:

Base TOE. An organizational design based on doctrine and equipment available. It is the lowest common denominator of modernization and identifies

the minimum essential wartime requirements for personnel and equipment based on equipment common to all units of a given type organization.

Incremental change package. A doctrinally-sound grouping of personnel and equipment change documents which is applied to a base or intermediate TOE to form a new TOE variation.

Intermediate TOE. An organizational design which results from applying one or more incremental change packages to a base TOE to produce an enhanced capability. These documents form the bridge between base and objective TOE and provide the primary tool for programming, executing, standardizing, and documenting the force structure during phased modernization.

Objective TOE. A fully modernized, doctrinally-sound organizational design which sets the goal for planning and programming of the Army's force structure and supporting acquisition systems, primarily in the last year of the POM and the extended planning annex.

TRADOC, in coordination with Headquarters, Department of Army and The Adjutant General's Office, will develop and publish periodically an authenticated subset of a type organization's Living TOE called a "Telephone Book." It will be formatted to portray mission significant incremented TOE changes of a specific unit as it moves from a base TOE toward its objective TOE.

Consolidated TOE Update (CTU). HQDA-approved BOIP and TOE, or changes thereto, are recorded twice a year in the CTU file maintained by TRADOC. Extracts from this file are used by Army MACOM's and subordinate commands and installations to update the requirements information contained in authorization documents for tactical units, (Modification TOE (MTOE)), and to refine planning and program data for the future fielding of new equipment. The CTU was implemented by TRADOC in late 1983, replacing the old Consolidated Change Table (CCT) methodology.

The first three-file CTU (Figure 11-2) was published in April 1984 (CTU 8404). The three files in this CTU are: the TOE file, an Unresourced Change file, and a BOIP file. The TOE file was defined originally to be the TOE file published in CTU 8310 (October 1983). The Unresourced Change file is the repository for all TOE actions not in a BOIP which require increased resources and cannot be implemented fully due to a lack of resources. BOIP development remains unchanged, but application of a BOIP to a TOE would not occur until all units affected by the BOIP have been equipped.

The three-file CTU is a step toward eliminating "instant unreadiness" problems caused by TOE changes which increased requirements without

3 FILE CONSOLIDATED TOE UPDATE




FIGURE 11-2

providing the associated resources (personnel, equipment) needed to accomplish the change. When each CTU is published, MACOM's/units need apply only those changes which have been resourced.

DEVELOP FORCE STRUCTURE

Introduction. The second force development task is to determine the mix of unit models that comprise a balanced and affordable force structure. Force structuring is an integral part of the OSD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). It is the resource-sensitive process portrayed simplistically in the Provide Resources section of the Army Force Integration Chart at Figure 3-14. It develops force structures in support of joint strategic and operational planning and Army planning, programming, and budgeting. The development of a force is based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, the threat, and externally imposed constraints (e.g., dollars, end-strength, etc.). The primary differences among the various force structures are the extent to which constraints are imposed and the period of time over which force structure requirements are forecast. These are summarized here, but explained in detail in Chapter 10.

The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit tradeoff analysis process. The Minimum Risk force, as its name implies, is developed in a minimum-risk/minimum-constraint environment. As the Planning

Force is developed, additional constraints are imposed in an effort to achieve a more affordable and realistic force, capable of achieving the national objectives but with some inherent level of risk. These two forces support joint strategic planning conducted by the JCS.

The Objective Force, developed during the Army's annual Mid-Range Force Study (MRFS), has more constraints imposed on its design than either of the two previous forces. This force, which focuses on the year after the last year of the current POM, is used as a realistic goal for the subsequent development of the Program Force.

The Program Force, the force supported by resource requests in the Army POM, is developed during the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. TAA analytically and subjectively generates the tactical support forces and the general purpose forces necessary to support the divisional and nondivisional combat forces contained in the Objective Force. The resulting force becomes the Base Force after review and approval by the CSA and is further adjusted for affordability and executability as the result of the newly instituted Force Integration Analysis (FIA) to become the basis for POM development. The initial Program Force becomes the approved Program Force after determination as to which force structure initiatives will be included in the POM.

Total Army Analysis (TAA). The Program Force is constructed during the four-phased TAA force structuring process. The first phase of TAA is the development of design force guidance used in the next phase of TAA to construct a balanced theater force structure (i.e., the design force). The third phase of TAA augments the design force with the necessary general support forces. This phase results in the generation of the Base Force which is adjusted by the FIA into the initial force for POM development. During the last phase of TAA, the POM is developed and along with it the initial Program Force is modified to produce the approved Program Force.

Design force guidance is developed with inputs from several sources. The Army Plan (TAP) provides military strategy, threat data, resource assumptions and priorities, and force structure guidance. The Objective Force is analyzed using the guidance provided in the TAP and changes are made to the current Master-Force (M-Force) as necessary. The TAP, plus other guidance (i.e., DG, Host Nation Support (HNS) assumptions, and other service requirements), is used to develop the threat and assumptions portion of the design force guidance. Unit designs and capabilities are drawn from the CTU.

The above inputs are considered during the development of TAA allocation rules which establish quantitative relationships between divisional forces and the so-called Nondivisional Combat Increment (NDCI), e.g., separate combat brigades; and Tactical Support Increment, e.g., combat service support units. The

resulting guidance is reviewed and approved at HQDA and provided to the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency for the conduct of the second phase of TAA, quantitative analysis.

The quantitative analysis process employs the combat force in a series of computer-assisted simulations of force deployment and warfighting. During quantitative analysis, information from the design force guidance and the M-Force is used to produce the design force for review and further analysis by HQDA. The design force is used during the third TAA phase, the qualitative analysis process, as a starting point for Base Force development. The quantitative analysis process employs a series of computer models/simulations to establish time-phased, geographically distributed requirements for nondivisional and tactical support units to round out and balance the theater force.

As indicated above, the purpose of the third, or qualitative analysis, phase of the TAA process is to develop the Base Force. This process incorporates the general support force (TDA) requirements with the design force requirements to achieve a balanced effective force structure. The FIA begins with the CSA being briefed on the Base Force in December and concludes the following December with the initiation of POM development, the fourth phase of TAA.

The Base Force specifies the units required in the force structure on the last day of the last year of the POM. The process to develop the Base Force consists of a series of analyses, reviews, and conferences to validate requirements, incorporate new requirements, and add CONUS support units to the design force. A force structure conference is held to review MACOM and HQDA inputs, changes, and additions to the force. Constraints such as end-strength guidance, stationing requirements, and affordability and supportability considerations have a significant impact on the results of the conference. The results of the conference are reviewed by the MACOM's and the ARSTAF, who then develop related issues and recommended changes. Once these recommended modifications have been finalized, they are reviewed by an O-6 Ranking Committee, and initial lists of claimants (end-strength increases) and bill payers (end-strength decreases) for each component of the Army (Active, Guard, and Reserve) are developed. These lists are necessary to ensure that end-strength changes are offset by an identifiable bill payer.

The TAA General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) meets to review the bill payer and claimant lists and the issues/recommendations raised by the MACOM's and the ARSTAF. GOSC recommendations are considered at the Force Program Review (FPR), chaired by the VCSA, and the resultant list of bill payers and claimants is forwarded to the CSA for approval as the Base Force.

During the reviews associated with the development of the Base Force, analyses are conducted to identify critical near-term force structure deficiencies and readiness capabilities. The Total Army Logistics

Readiness/Sustainability (TLR/S) Analysis and the Operational Readiness Analysis (OMNIBUS) study are used to support these reviews.

OMNIBUS is a computer-assisted technique used to assess the Army's Current Force capability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain forces in combat. It defines the state of readiness of the existing force by comparing its actual capabilities with its designed capabilities.

The TLR/S determines the resources needed to meet current and programmed requirements, how best to allocate these resources, and translates the improvements needed into specific action programs.

The Base Force must be subjected through the FIA to a detailed affordability and executability analysis if it is to be the realistic link between planning and programming processes. The transition to a Biennial PPBES provides the time to conduct this analysis, since neither a POM nor a budget will be developed in the odd-numbered calendar years. The FIA is intended to answer such affordability/executability questions relating to the Base Force as:

- Can the Force be equipped, manned, trained, sustained?
- Can the Force be provided facilities?
- Can the Force be mobilized and deployed?
- Can the Force be organized in the required time-phasing?
- What is the capability of the Force?
- Are the CINC's adequately supported?

The final output should result in an executable POM Force to be briefed, for decision, to the SA/CSA.

The product of the TAA and POM processes is the approved force structure for the Total Army which has been divided for resource management purposes into components; the Active Army (COMPO 1), the Army National Guard (COMPO 2), the United States Army Reserve (COMPO 3), and unresourced units (COMPO 4). COMPO 4 units, mostly Combat Service Support (CSS) units, are part of the Army's required force structure, but are deliberately unresourced so that available resources can be applied to higher priority force structure initiatives and other Army programs. Three other components (7, 8, and 9) comprise force structure offsets guaranteed by Host Nation Support Agreements, CINCs' estimates as to how much additional indigenous labor would be available in wartime, and contracts for additional support and services to be provided by domestic and foreign firms. Such agreements and contracts are said to "offset" requirements for force structure to accomplish essential service support tasks.

DOCUMENT UNIT AUTHORIZATIONS

Introduction. The third task of force development, documenting unit authorizations, can be viewed

conceptually as the integration of the products of the first two tasks, designing unit models and developing force structure. The unit modeling process is driven by battlefield requirements for specific military capabilities that will defeat a postulated threat. The results of this process are MTOE's or LTOE's for organizations staffed and equipped to provide increments of the required capabilities. LTOE's specify "what" the Army needs. Force structuring, on the other hand, is a resource-driven process which determines "how much" of each required increment of military capability the nation, and the Army, can afford to buy and maintain.

Because the Army is a complex array of people, each with one of a multitude of different skills, and many with one of a multitude of equipment, there must be an organized system for documenting what is required and how much is authorized. More importantly, as the Army moves forward with its equipment modernization program, and new doctrines and organizations evolve, the Army must have a way of keeping track of changes that are made so that they may be managed efficiently and with a minimum of turbulence. The Army's authorization documentation system meets these needs.

Each unit in the Army has its mission, structure, and personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations established in an authorization document. These documents are essential at each level of command for the Army to function. A unit uses its document for authority to requisition personnel and equipment and as a basis for readiness evaluation. Authorization documents data are used to manage personnel and materiel procurement, force planning, programming, budgeting, training, and distributing. Additionally, these data are used at various levels of command for inspections, surveys, special projects, and studies.

Force Structuring Guidance/Force Accounting System (FAS). Troop accounting and documentation guidance is prepared by HQDA and provided to the MACOM's, U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and the Army National Guard (ARNG) to permit development of authorization documents and to account for personnel allocations at all levels in the chain of command. This guidance is developed biennially when the M-Force is "locked" for POM submission, or with the results of the FIA during the "off" years, and it directs that specific force structure actions be carried out within allocated manpower resources. Troop lists for the current and budget years and for each of the program years are provided from the M-Force maintained in the Army's Force Accounting System (FAS). The FAS is the Army's authoritative record of force structure decisions and provides users with force structure planning information. Strength data are provided by military identity (officer, warrant, enlisted) and civilian category (direct and indirect hire). FAS does not contain force structure data at the MOS- and grade-level detail.

The FAS supports development of command plans by the MACOM's, the Troop Action Guidance (TAG) by the USAR, and the Troop Structure Program (TSP) by the ARNG.

Manpower Documentation/Command Plans. Two times a year, each MACOM is required to prepare a command plan to reflect how force structuring guidance provided by HQDA will be implemented.

MACOM command plans are developed based on three inputs. Three times a year, HQDA transmits available dollar and manpower resource information to each MACOM via the Program and Budget Guidance (PBG). The PBG updates existing resource programs to reflect current decisions and includes such information as the number and type of units, total manpower and strengths, civilian salary data, and any limitations on manpower for headquarters and overseas locations. Secondly, management information/guidance in the form of policies, goals, plans, etc., is provided continuously by HQDA, other MACOM's, and from within the MACOM. The last primary input used is the MACOM's current force structure, which is maintained by the MACOM. The force structure data contains the MACOM's portion of the M-Force and, depending on the MACOM, may be part of the automated Vertical Force Accounting System (VFAS). The data is refined by the Army Structure Message (ARSTRUC MSG) which reflects the results of the TAA process every other year.

These inputs are used by the MACOM to develop subsequent guidance that directs the subordinate organizations to submit a plan recommending the allocation of manpower to specific units. The MACOM command plan is developed by integrating the plans submitted by the subordinate organizations, considering earlier Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR) submissions, and incorporating the results of MACOM analyses and decisions. Following development, the MACOM command plan is submitted to HQDA for review and approval. The command plan contains troop lists representing the current and projected forces of the command, results of executability analysis, and justification for deviation from HQDA guidance. The command plan troop lists are used to update the MACOM force structure data in the FAS and, upon approval by HQDA, are the basis for the MACOM unit documentation process.

The USAR and ARNG prepare a command plan based on Troop Program Guidance (TPG) and develop plans for force structure actions. HQDA, Office of the Chief of Army Reserves (OCAR), refines the TPG and provides Troop Action Guidance (TAG) to FORSCOM. FORSCOM, Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSA's), and Western Command (WESTCOM) prepare a Troop Action Program that contains all organizational actions planned for the USAR in the program year. The Troop Action Program is submitted to OCAR for review in

coordination with HQDA. The National Guard Bureau (NGB), in coordination with the state NG HQ's, translates the TPG into the Army National Guard Troop Structure Program (ARNG-TSP). The ARNG-TSP, which contains all organizational actions for three years (one year before the TPG, TPG year, and the year after the TPG), is submitted to HQDA for review after acceptance by the states.

M-Force updates and TPG, as shown in Figure 11-3, are published each year in November and June. The June guidance is prepared from the M-Force after it is "locked" for POM submission in April of every other year. During the years when no POM is prepared, a TPG update will refine guidance from the PBG based on decisions made during the previous six months. The guidance published in January provides the latest force structure changes that have occurred since June, as reflected in the M-Force developed during the TAA process, or resulting from the FIA in the off years, and provides advance guidance for the upcoming June guidance update.

DOCUMENTATION PROCESS




FIGURE 11-3

The PBG is provided to the MACOM's during the POM years in May (POM), October (OSD budget), and February (President's budget) to initiate the development of the command plans. PBG are also provided during the off years to reflect changes resulting from decisions made in the FIA, those made for other reasons, or to correct previous errors. Additionally, the TPG is issued in November and January and used by the Reserve Components (RC's) to initiate the development of their required plans. The development of command plans begins prior to the receipt of the input using advance (draft) information provided by HQDA. The time allocated to develop the command plans is approximately five months, as shown in Figure 11-4. No specific amount of time is allotted for the development of the Troop Action Program and the ARNG-TSP; however, RC plans are due in February and in the October/November time frame.

Command plans are submitted to HQDA for review and approval. The command plans are compared with

COMMAND PLAN DEVELOPMENT

EVENT	TIME OF YEAR											
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
PBG RECEIVED		▲			▲					▲		
M-FORCE/TPG RECEIVED						▲					▲	
COMMAND PLAN DEVELOPED	▲							▲				
TROOP ACTION PROGRAM AND ARNG-TSP DEVELOPED		▲									▲	

FIGURE 11-4

the M-Force and PBG to determine if they comply with guidance. The procedures for reviewing the different plans are the same, although the mechanisms used depend on the format of the plan.

The M-Force is maintained at HQDA in the FAS, which is an automated management information system containing data necessary for force structuring, force planning, and accounting of all Army units. The VFAS is the MACOM portion of FAS and provides selected MACOM's with an internal automated force development data capability and a direct interface with HQDA.

MACOM's with VFAS capability submit command plans on magnetic tape, while the other command plans are submitted on DA-provided reports that permit an easy interface with FAS.

VFAS command plans are compared with the M-Force and PBG through a series of computer programs to assist HQDA in determining their acceptability. The initial review of non-VFAS command plans is conducted without computer assistance. After a plan is reviewed and specific force structure changes approved, the M-Force is updated to reflect the changes. The process is completed when changes from all plans are incorporated into the M-Force. This new (updated) M-Force reflects all force structure actions taken within the Army to comply with the PBG and other management decisions.

Materiel Documentation/Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP). Guidance for documenting equipment authorizations is provided to MACOM's in June and January by magnetic tape and/or hard-copy extracts of the TAEDP (Figure 11-3). The TAEDP is a program which compares force requirements and priorities against on-hand assets and projected deliveries to produce an equipment distribution program for the current, budget, and program years. It supports Army Modernization by supplementing new/displaced equipment planning information printed in the Force Modernization Master Plan (FMMP) (See Chapter 3), and in BOIP. It provides essential details such as quantities of equipment and distribution dates by unit so that MACOM's can

document the new equipment authorizations and units can requisition new equipment in a timely manner. A more detailed discussion of TAEDP is provided in Chapter 18.

Authorization Documents. There are two basic authorization documents in the Army: Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), and Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).

- **MTOE.** The MTOE is a modified version of a TOE that prescribes the unit organization, personnel, and equipment necessary to perform a mission in a specific geographical or operational environment. It reflects the organizational option selected from the TOE. Thus, the MTOE of a unit organized at Authorized Level of Organization-3 (ALO-3) has been based on the Level-3 organizational structure found in the TOE. At unit level the MTOE is the base document for:

- preparing personnel and equipment requisitions;
- distributing personnel and equipment resources;
- unit status reporting;
- preparing supply and maintenance records and reports.

- **TDA.** The TDA prescribes the organizational structure for a unit having a support mission for which a TOE does not exist and which may include civilian positions. TDA are unique in that they are developed based on the type and level of workloads associated with the unit's mission. Units with similar missions, like U.S. Army Garrisons, may be organized similarly but may have a substantially different mix and numbers of personnel and equipment authorizations due to differences in the population and composition of the post they support. At unit level, a TDA is used for the same purposes as an MTOE except for unit status reporting, which is not required of TDA units. At MACOM and HQDA level, MTOE and TDA are used to provide equipment and personnel MOS and grade details for planning, programming, budgeting, and force structuring activities.

The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS). Every Army unit (Active, Reserve, and Guard) and Army component of other agencies must have an authorization document to reflect a supportable organizational structure. Authorization documents state a unit's approved structure and resources and serve as a basis and authority for requisitioning.

The development and documentation of authorization documents is supported by The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS). TAADS is a HQDA-automated system that contains all unit authorization documents; maintains quantitative and qualitative personnel and equipment data for individual

units and the entire Army force structure; standardizes authorization documents for similar parent units; and interfaces with other DA-automated systems, such as FAS. The authorization document data maintained in TAADS are organizational structure and personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations. Vertical TAADS (VTAADS) and Installation TAADS (ITAADS) are standard automated extensions of TAADS at MACOM and installation levels, respectively. TAADS interfaces and relationships at MACOM and installation level are depicted conceptually on Figure 3-14.

Based on an approved command plan (troop list), the MACOM ensures an MTOE or TDA is prepared and documented for each command force structure (VFAS) unit as shown in Figure 11-3. The basic procedures for documentation are the same for MTOE and TDA units; that is, all unit personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations are written in the same detail. However, the basis for developing the two documents differs. MTOE's are derived by adjusting/modifying TOE's, when required, to meet specific operational requirements. A unit will be organized under the proper level of its TOE to the greatest extent consistent with the mission and the availability of manpower spaces as prescribed in the command force structure (VFAS).

Units will convert to the LTOE system based on conversion dates provided by the FAS in M-force updates, and document indicated changes in command plan and TAAD's submissions provided the requisite resources to do so are available. Once a unit has converted to the LTOE system, separate TOE and MTOE are no longer required.

As indicated previously, TDA's are uniquely developed for units with specific support missions. The organizational structure of TDA units will be developed to attain only essential manning, the most efficient use of personnel, and the most effective operational capability within the manpower spaces prescribed in the command force structure (VFAS). Staffing standards and personnel requirements from BOIP will be used to structure TDA manpower. Additionally, equipment utilization data and BOIP equipment assignments will be used to develop TDA materiel requirements.

In some cases (usually unprogrammed unit activations and reorganizations), a concept plan is required from the MACOM to support a "new" unit organizational structure. The concept plan will state, among other things, the purpose, objectives, advantages, and disadvantages of the proposed activation or reorganization. Proposed authorization documents are submitted concurrently with the plan to accelerate the review process. Approved concept plans do not serve as an authorization document but support the creation of one. In some cases, HQDA may specify the organizational structure of newly activated units and provide the authorization document to the MACOM in TAADS format. In other cases, MACOM's may be

delegated the authority to develop documents for newly activated units based on an approved concept plan.

Authorization documents are maintained in a MACOM document data store (VTAADS) and submitted to HQDA for review.

HQDA reviews all authorization documents (MTOE's and TDA's) submitted by the MACOM's to ensure compatibility among the unit's mission, capabilities, organization, ALO, and the allocation of resources. The documents submitted by the MACOM's are classified as either proponent approved or proponent proposed. Proponent-approved documents are documents for which HQDA has delegated approval authority to MACOM's and generally require only minor modifications, e.g., administrative, internal personnel/equipment balancing. Proponent-proposed documents are those for which MACOM's do not have approval authority, e.g., unit activations, inactivations.

Approved MTOE's and TDA's are documented in TAADS, which is used to update the M-Force. The Automatic Update Transaction System (AUTS) is designed to assist HQDA in the TAADS approval and M-Force update processes. AUTS performs a comparison of the current TAADS data base with the M-Force in FAS and produces reports highlighting any differences. These data are used to assist in the TAADS review process. New documents that are approved remain in TAADS and are used to update the M-Force. These approved documents are returned to the MACOM's for distribution to the appropriate units. Disapproved proponent-proposed documents are returned to the MACOM's with guidance for correction and resubmission.

As shown in Figure 11-5, the AUTS process is run two weeks after the closing of the Management of Change (MOC) windows (i.e., in mid-April and mid-October) to update and freeze the M-Force in a timely manner for use in the Structure and Composition System (SACS) process. To be included in the M-Force update process, the authorization documents submitted by the MACOMs must be approved by HQDA. The time required to complete a review varies from 30 to 60 days depending on the complexity of the document. As a result, the review of documents submitted near the end of the MOC window may not be complete when the M-Force is updated during the final step of the AUTS process. This may require HQDA action officers to manually correct the M-Force as it is being updated.

Structure and Composition System (SACS). The Structure and Composition System (SACS) is a network of computer programs which combine data from several management information systems and data bases to provide personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations needed for a specified force structure. SACS output is developed and finalized semi-annually and is not subsequently updated. A new computation based on revised data (BOIP/TAADS/TOE) and force structure information from FAS is completed for each




FIGURE 11-5

cycle. The SACS computes requirements and authorizations for a seven-year period (current, budget, and the program years). Because the Army manages its people and equipment differently, both a Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) and a Logistics Structure and Composition system (LOGSACS) are completed as different actions although based on an identical force. Figure 11-6 shows schematically how the SACS process works.

HOW SACS WORKS




FIGURE 11-6

The PERSACS combines data from the HQDA Master Force, TAADS, and TOE systems to state military personnel requirements and authorizations by grade and Military Occupational Specialty/Specialty Skill Identifier (MOS/SSI) for each unit in the force for the seven years of the SACS. This data supports planning for personnel recruiting, training, promoting, validating requisitions, and distribution. Additionally, Mobilization PERSACS (MOBPERSACS) is used by MILPERCEN for mobilization planning.

The LOGSACS combines data from the HQDA Master Force, TAADS, TOE, BOIP, and Shorthand Note (SHN) systems to state equipment requirements and authorizations by Line Item Number (LIN) for each

unit in the force for the current, budget, and program years of the SACS. Authorized/required quantities of currently documented equipment are determined for each unit from its authorization document in TAADS or, if none exists, from the unit TOE model. Data on unit equipment for new developmental items that are undocumented but planned for inclusion at a later date are applied to units through application of the BOIP file. Finally, the SHN process, which is an off-line process, provides the capability to modify the previously computed equipment data to reflect recent force structure and force modernization decisions that could not be incorporated in the FAS, TAADS, TOE, and/or BOIP systems in the time required for inclusion in LOGSACS. SHN's affect only the output of LOGSACS and do not correct the input systems. Consequently, to preclude the need for the SHN during a subsequent LOGSACS run, the affected automated systems must be updated to reflect the SHN information.

A summary of all unit requirements for a particular LIN, as computed by LOGSACS, is the Initial Issue Quantity (IIQ) of that LIN. The IIQ is used by the HQDA ODCSRDA as a base for the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) to support programming and budgeting for equipment procurement (see Chapter 18).

The PERSACS and LOGSACS products are produced semi-annually in October and April by HQDA (ODCSOPS). The M-Force is frozen in mid-October and April each year after completion of the AUTS process. A copy of the frozen M-Force is used to initiate the process.

FORCE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM MODERNIZATION

The Army is in the midst of the most massive and turbulent period of modernization and reorganization since mobilization for World War II. Thus far, the Army has done a reasonably good job of obtaining modernized equipment and conceptualizing its integration into the force. However, the Army has not done as well at projecting and documenting authorizations far enough in advance to allow for the requisition and distribution of people and things in support of established effective dates. Data management systems and the associated products have often been by-passed through the application of off-line management systems and procedures in an effort to solve the crisis of the moment. These systems and products include: FAS, SACS, TAADS, TOE, and CTU.

In an effort to regain control so these in-place systems can work as intended and not as obstacles, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army formed a steering committee in 1983 to study the documentation problem. The Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD) Study Group's charter was to standardize, stabilize, and

modernize the documentation system. These actions facilitate developing an integrated force structure which will be tied to the Army's ability to provide people and equipment in the proper sequence to maintain readiness. The goal was to manage authorization document change in a way that minimizes turbulence.

This group produced the following recommendations:

- Dampen organizational and documentation changes in the short term.
- Stabilize the force for the budget year so that asset management and distribution systems can catch up.
- Identify systemic problems in the automatic data processing systems and management techniques and supply specific recommendations for correcting each.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved a strategy to minimize documentation changes for the short term while adjusting existing systems. This will effectively synchronize requirements, authorizations, and resources. Some of the key initiatives to improve the documentation system are highlighted below.

Modernizing the Documentation System.

Modernization will be done with automated data processing technology. Current stovepipe data bases will be replaced with the Army Decision Support System, which will be shared throughout the Army. This system includes the integration of Army data bases (building a corporate data base) and the redesign/modernization of key automation systems. It is essential that management information systems be designed to be functionally compatible with the use of the corporate data base. Functional managers must continue to refine their own systems keeping in mind the corporate data base will be used and shared. The SACS, TOE, FAS, and SIDPERS are but a few of those systems which collectively will comprise the corporate data base. The products of the systems (e.g., M-Force), The Army Equipment Distribution Plan (Chapter 18), and the Personnel Management Authorization Document (Chapter 19) will be produced by applications software that will be used to extract needed information from a common data source at selected intervals (and on call) to produce requirement assessments, authorizations data, asset reports, and management extracts.

Stabilization will occur through policy decisions. The ability of the Army to stabilize the management of change is wholly dependent upon the Army leadership having timely and accurate information. The goal is for Headquarters, Department of the Army to issue guidance for execution once a year and tie it to a key event in the Department of Defense PPBS. At the same time, the latest decisions and changes must be captured in the corporate data base to ensure accurate computation of data. To accommodate these conflicting

goals of annual guidance and prompt updates, the corporate data base will consist of tiers of information. The top tier, the Official Army File, will change annually, and will be the basis for annual guidance. The second tier will contain all approved data, will change frequently as data changes are approved, and will become the top tier at the next annual update.

Standardization will be accomplished through clear definition of organizations and functions. Army leaders must recognize, accept, and enforce the following rules: the Department of Army makes policy, establishes authorizations, and directs actions; the Training and Doctrine Command develops doctrine, designs organizations, and conducts training; and Major Commands identify resource requirements, recommend solutions, execute actions, and report results.

TDA Initiatives.

It is necessary also to develop TDA initiatives to dampen change and ensure supportability of required changes in TDA activities. DOCMOD actions to stabilize, standardize, and modernize need to apply equally to TDA activities. A "Living Table of Distribution and Allowances" system will ensure improved supportability of TDA changes. These include the full incorporation of Table of Distribution and Allowances requirements in the TAA. This should link TDA requirements to support of the MTOE Army and capitalize on current efforts to standardize selected TDA units. The goal for full implementation is TAA 93.

TDA manpower adjustments associated with the TAA cycle will be made on a programmatic and functional basis. All changes must be coordinated with the appropriate program manager and approved by Department of the Army, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel as the single authority for directing changes to the manpower program.

The frequency of changes will be reduced through the following means:

- Elimination of cosmetic changes (e.g., minor title changes, renumbering, and job title changes).
- Enlisted standard of grade authorization changes will be addressed on a periodic basis through a scheduled review process rather than on an individual MOS basis.

The Department of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, issued a January 1985 supplement to the October 1984 PBG for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 at grade and skill level of detail. It described objectives for major commands and also provided the needed flexibility in documenting authorizations toward a feasible structure. Major commands used the Fiscal Year 1986 data for test and analysis. Fiscal Year 1987 data will be documented.

HQDA, ODCSOPS will take action in coordination with ODCSPER to develop a plan for converting

appropriate TDA activities (i.e., school brigades and battalions) to TOE units.

Stabilization of the TDA Army continues to be an essential part of the modernization game plan. ODCSPER, in coordination with the Army Staff and Major Commands, will be determining actions which can be taken to reduce turbulence in the TDA Army.

SUMMARY

Army force development is accomplished through the integration of two fundamental processes. One is requirements-driven and determines what the Army needs to give it the capability to deter or defeat the threat. The other is resource-driven and determines how much (money and manpower) the Army can have to buy and maintain its capability.

Force development begins with requirements for doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment derived from a concept of how-to-fight. These requirements initiate the three force development tasks; designing unit models, developing force structure, and documenting unit authorizations. The BOIP/QQPRI and TOE systems provide the unit models which are the building-blocks of the force structure. The resource-driven force structuring process determines the mix of units for a balanced force and how many units the Army can afford in our resource-constrained environment. Finally, the authorization documentation process documents the decisions of the unit modeling and force structuring activities and provides, in the SACS, the detailed forecast of authorizations that forms the basis for acquiring, distributing, and sustaining personnel, materiel, and facilities in the Army.

Although the Army's force development systems have, in general, served us well, they were instituted in the 1960's and need updating if the Army is to manage efficiently its extensive modernization program as well as its daily business. The DOCMOD initiatives are being implemented to accomplish the needed systems improvements. The principal features of this program are a corporate data base which will provide a single source of data for use by all Army systems managers, an automated decision support system, and the LTOE System which will simplify and standardize force structure documents and the documentation process. When fully implemented, the Army will have a modern, automated management capability to provide the Army's decisionmakers with the information needed to make wise decisions to carry the Army forward into the 1990's.

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CHAPTER 12

PLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

“Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies need not go. The blind, those who cannot carry a spear, are exempted. Anyone found at home after receipt of this order will be hanged.”

(1935 Ethiopian Mobilization Order
against Mussolini's Forces)

Haille Salassie's 1935 mobilization order is rather simplistic yet comprehensive and direct. Its purpose was to initiate the rapid expansion of Ethiopia's armed forces in order to defend against the incursion of Italy's Fascist forces under Benito Mussolini. Today's mobilization orders are not quite so simple, but their purpose is the same, to rapidly expand the Armed Forces of the United States to counter a threat.

The Army's force structure must be designed to generate forces for maximum early combat power and support units to sustain that power. The Active and Reserve Components must provide both capabilities without the lengthy preparation periods that have been characteristic of the past. The need for deploying a substantial number of Reserve Component units overseas in the initial stages of a conflict underscores the importance placed on the Total Army force structure.

The deterrent value of mobilization resides not only in the Active and Reserve Components, but also in the preparedness to convert civilian manpower and industrial production rapidly into military units, individual replacements, and supplies. The greater our capability for timely, total mobilization, the higher the risk which a potential enemy would incur as a result of actions which could escalate into war with the United States.

The capability of the United States to expand the active force rapidly and efficiently through mobilization is an essential factor in deterring potential enemies and assuring U.S. allies of U.S. resolve. Fundamental to achieving such a capability is the coordination of mobilization planning with the planned deployments for war plans which require mobilization.

This chapter covers mobilization and deployment planning systems. Although the focus is on joint planning systems, Army participation in these systems is explained in some detail. Also covered are DOD's objectives for improving industrial preparedness in the U.S. and the Army's Industrial Preparedness Program.

THE PLANNING SYSTEM

Joint military planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (discussed in Chapter 10) and the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS). These systems are related to each other and to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (discussed in Chapter 14) as shown on the Force Integration Chart (Figure 3-14). Army operations planning to implement joint planning tasks is conducted within the framework of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS).

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS is the means by which the JCS translate national security policy and resource planning guidance (as reflected in the Defense Guidance (DG)), and CINCs' requirements into strategic guidance, force structuring objectives, and operations planning guidance. The link with JOPS is through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which provides short term operations planning guidance to the military services and CINC's. (See Chapter 10).

The Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS). JOPS establishes policies and procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, and approval of joint operations plans. It also provides policies and procedures for execution planning in emergency or time-sensitive situations, including the creation of an Operations Order (OPORD).

JOPS provides guidance for planning procedures and documentation for use by unified, specified, and other joint force commanders. This includes service components and other commands and agencies which develop supporting directives in support of Operation Plans (OPLANS) and Concept Plans (CONPLANS) directed by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or other JCS directives.

The objective of the JOPS is the timely development of effective OPLANS/CONPLANS throughout the unified and specified commands. Through the use of uniform planning procedures and formats, JOPS facilitates JCS review of OPLANS/CONPLANS, incorporates ADP techniques and interchange of data, and provides for reporting any shortfalls and limiting factors identified during the planning process.

The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) is the Army's interface with the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS). It is applicable to Army components of unified commands, the MACOM's, Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and other supporting commands and agencies.

Structure. JOPS provides guidance, policies and procedures in four volumes.

— *JOPS I (Deliberate Planning Procedures).* Describes the joint planning process and provides instructions for the preparation of operation plans in both complete and concept formats. It also provides details of the review process and the administrative requirements for plan submission.

— *JOPS II (Supplementary Planning Guidance) (Classified).* Provides supplementary instructions for preparing selected annexes of an operation plan.

— *JOPS III (ADP Support).* Describes the system of computer programs and files used in the deliberate development and review of plans. It also provides instructions for the reporting and exchange of data associated with the programs and files.

— *JOPS IV (Crisis Action System).* Describes the Crisis Action System (CAS) which allows the JCS to make timely recommendations to the National Command Authorities for decisions on the use of U.S. military forces.

The Joint Deployment System (JDS). The JDS complements the JOPS and works within its framework. It is managed by the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), which is the JDS coordinating authority responsible for deployment planning. The JDA established the JDS for planning, coordinating and monitoring movements and deployments of mobilizing and deploying forces, nonunit personnel, and materiel. The JDS is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Planning Process. Prior to the publication of the JSCP, HQDA will issue a directive causing a review of OPLANS designated by JCS to be refined during the forthcoming fiscal year. The purpose of this directive is to highlight existing shortfalls and limiting factors within specified OPLANS, to determine Army near-term capabilities to resolve these issues, and to ensure that all agencies initiate actions from a common base.

Joint planning for a specific scenario begins when plan requirements and taskings have been established and the mission is assigned, and ends when execution is ordered or the requirement for the plan is rescinded. The five phases of the joint planning process used for deliberate planning are briefly described below.

— *Phase I-Initiation.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally by publication of the JSCP, assign tasks to the commanders of the unified and specified commands; identify major combat forces and JCS-controlled resources that are available for planning; provide information on replacement personnel and planning factors for gross calculations of resupply; provide airlift and sealift assets made available for planning; and identify the depth of planning required for each contingency. The Services, based on actual capabilities, identify other combat, combat support, and combat service support forces.

ODCSOPS at HQDA, through periodic revisions or changes to AMOPS, identifies major combat forces for planning based on JSCP tasking, allocates combat support and combat service support forces not addressed in the JSCP, and provides guidance on personnel replacement/filler and service-controlled resupply planning data.

— *Phase II-Concept Development Phase.* In this phase, all factors that can have a significant effect on mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed by the supported commander, the best course of action is determined, and the concept of operations is developed. For certain contingencies, only a CONPLAN is required in lieu of an OPLAN. In such a case, the process is essentially completed with the development of the concept of operations.

The supported CINC fully develops his concept of operations as the foundation for detailed plan development. HQDA and other designated commands/agencies provide the supported CINC with assistance as required through the Army component headquarters.

— *Phase III-Plan Development.* The supported CINC initiates this phase by providing Service components and supporting commands/agencies his concept of operations and guidance for Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) development. The supported Army component, based upon CINC guidance, determines Army force requirements. FORSCOM selects units to meet the requirements. Force shortfalls which are unresolvable at component/FORSCOM level are forwarded to HQDA for resolution/comment as appropriate. As far as possible, resolution is accomplished prior to component TPFDD submission to the CINC. Force requirements beyond the capability of the Army to fill are highlighted for the supported commander in the format prescribed by his planning directive.

Following development and analysis by supporting commands/agencies, the JDA will assist the supported commander with management of two TPFDD refinement conferences. The purpose of the first conference is to coordinate the inclusion of unit data, and nonunit-related personnel and cargo data. The Transportation Component Commands, Military Airlift Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military Sealift Command test the resultant TPFDD for feasibility and produce movement tables. The JDA then convenes a second TPFDD refinement conference to coordinate the combined transportation requirements and shortfalls with the CINC's and supported commands. The refined TPFDD is then transferred to the JDS deployment data base.

Throughout the plans development phase, HQDA, FORSCOM, AMC, and MILPERCEN, in conjunction with the Army component, attempt to resolve service-related shortfalls impacting on the supported commander's plan. Shortfalls which cannot be resolved are submitted by the supported commander to the JCS. In conjunction with the Services, the JCS review cited shortfalls and limiting factors and inform the supported commander of any adjustments deemed appropriate.

— *Phase IV-Plan Review.* After receipt of the supported commander's plan for final review, the JCS will forward it to the Services for comment. ODCSOPS staffs the OPLAN throughout the Army Staff (ARSTAF) for comments. ARSTAF agencies coordinate with MACOM's and other agencies as required. The review evaluates the adequacy and feasibility of the plan for accomplishing the mission assigned.

— *Phase V-Supporting Plans.* Supported and supporting Army component commands and, as appropriate, Army MACOM's and agencies will prepare and publish supporting plans for each OPLAN developed with the JOPS System.

Plans Maintenance. To insure accuracy for immediate execution, the JDA will intensively manage approximately the first 15 days of air movements and the first 30 days of surface movements of refined TPFDD's for JCS-designated OPLAN's. All major army commands monitor their portions of the data base and update it as necessary.

Planning Problems.

Time. One of the greatest problems in deliberate planning is the amount of time required to develop and coordinate an operations plan. With approximately 20 OPLAN's currently in existence, the Services, Transportation Component Commands, and JDA have a limited capability to conduct the detailed analyses/reviews required each year.

Resource Constraints. Contingency plans are based on available resources (forces, strategic lift, etc.), and there are usually not enough resources to provide a high assurance of accomplishing the mission. The Services normally cannot provide all the forces requested by the unified or specified commander as other priorities compete for available resources. Therefore, plans must reflect actual capabilities rather than the requirements the supported commander feels necessary to accomplish a mission.

Changes. Changes in military strategy, objectives, threats, and resources each require the update of existing plans and new coordination.

Future Developments.

In August 1982, the JCS approved development of a new planning and execution system. A description of functional and technical requirements for the new system, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), is intended to provide a single system that incorporates mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment. It will utilize modernized hardware and software fielded under the WWMCCS Information System (WIS) upgrade program. The new system should be initially operational worldwide in the early 1990's.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense in December 1986, approved a concept to establish the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). USTRANSCOM was activated on 15 April 1987 at Scott AFB and will reach full operational capability over the following eighteen months. Initially, CINCMAC will be dual hatted as USCINCTrans. The Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command, and their common-user forces are assigned as USTRANSCOM components. The Joint Deployment Agency will be integrated into the USTRANSCOM headquarters and will be relocated to Scott AFB.

THE ARMY MOBILIZATION AND OPERATIONS PLANNING SYSTEM (AMOPS)

The framework for mobilization planning within the DOD is provided by the DOD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP). The MMP provides a conceptual overview of the DOD mobilization planning process and its relationship to the development of military operations plans. It also provides a basis for making mobilization decisions within the DOD and managing the mobilization process to support military operations.

Army participation in joint operations planning and Army planning for mobilization must be integrated processes. JCS Pub. 21, "Mobilization," facilitates integration of these processes by identifying the

responsibilities of the JCS, Services, CINC's, transportation component commands and other agencies engaged in mobilization planning.

The AMOPS, published first in 1981, incorporates DOD and JCS mobilization planning guidance in a single Army publication. It recognizes the close relationship between operations planning and mobilization planning and provides the means, within the Army, to accomplish both in a coordinated manner.

The mobilization plans of Army MACOM's and agencies, together with those of Headquarters, Department of the Army, constitute the Army Mobilization Plan. AMOPS provides a standard set of guidelines for developing these plans and an integrated structure for the planning products.

The AMOPS is the vehicle by which all components of the Army plan and execute actions to provide and expand Army forces and resources to meet the requirements of unified commands. AMOPS serves as the Army supplement to the Joint Operation Planning System. It provides the interface between the unified command plans for deployment and utilization of forces and Army plans for providing mobilized forces and resources.

System Overview.

AMOPS:

- provides a set of documents for promulgation of policies, guidance and planning assumptions concerning short-range mobilization, deployment, and strategic employment;

- consolidates policies and procedures, and defines responsibilities for Army participation in the development, coordination, dissemination, review, and approval of joint operation plans and for Army participation in the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS);

- provides operational planning guidance for the short-range strategic employment of Army forces under both mobilization and non-mobilization conditions;

- consolidates policies and procedures, and defines responsibility for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, and approval of Army mobilization plans and for planning their execution.

AMOPS Documents. The set of documents which defines the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System is described below and summarized in Figure 12-1.

- *AR 500-5, The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System.* AR 500-5 establishes the AMOPS, defines the purpose of the system, identifies proponents for maintenance of AMOPS documents, and directs preparation of the mobilization plans constituting the Army Mobilization Plan.

- *AMOPS I, System Description, Responsibilities and Procedures.* AMOPS I describes the AMOPS documents, prescribes responsibilities for their maintenance, and outlines the mobilization process including actions at OJCS, HQDA, and MACOM levels. It describes the interrelated processes of mobilizing units, individuals, and materiel, and of expanding the CONUS sustaining base.

- *AMOPS II, Strategic Employment of Army Forces.* AMOPS II provides guidance to Army commands concerning the availability, allocation and employment of Army forces in the near term period. It is published in compliance with and in support of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

- *AMOPS III, Army Mobilization and Deployment Planning Guidance.* AMOPS III contains basic guidance for the mobilization of Reserve Component forces, their assimilation into the Active Component, the equipping and training of units and individuals, and guidance for forces and individuals designated to deploy to an overseas theater of operations.

- *AMOPS IV, Army Crisis Action System (ACAS).* AMOPS IV prescribes the ARSTAF crisis organization, staffing methods, emergency action procedures, and interface with OJCS during a crisis.

- *The Army Mobilization Plan (AMP).* The Army Mobilization Plan is the collected mobilization plans of HQDA and the MACOM's. AR 500-5 directs the preparation of mobilization plans or files at every level from MACOM to unit and prescribes the minimum plans to be included in the AMP. At present, there are ten mobilization plans for Army commands and agencies included in the AMP.

Responsibilities.

- *Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA:* has Army staff responsibility for Army mobilization doctrine and for mobilization and preparation of Army forces for deployment; has overall proponentcy for, establishes, publishes, and maintains the AMOPS; coordinates the structure of AMOPS with ARSTAF agencies and Major Commands and tasks agencies and commands for preparation of appropriate portions of AMOPS; coordinates the HQDA review of agency and command plans and insures that AMOPS guidance, policies and products satisfy applicable OSD and OJCS guidance and Army objectives.

- *Army Staff agencies* are responsible for: assisting the ODCSOPS, HQDA, in developing and maintaining those portions of AMOPS pertaining to their respective areas of interest and for mobilization and operational planning activities within their respective functional areas.

AMOPS DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT	PURPOSE	SCOPE
<p>AR 500-5</p> <p>AMOPS I</p> <p>SYSTEM DESCRIPTION, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES</p>	<p>ESTABLISHES AMOPS</p> <p>DEFINES SYSTEM FOR:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ARMY MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION 2. ARMY PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONSOLIDATES POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND DEFINES RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ARMY MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION AND FOR ARMY PARTICIPATION IN JOINT OPERATION PLANNING & EXECUTION • DEFINES MOBILIZATION PLANNING AS APPLYING TO ALL PLANS FOR RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVE FORCE UNDER SELECTIVE, PARTIAL, FULL AND TOTAL MOBILIZATION, AND PLANS OF HQDA, MACOMS, INTERMEDIATE HQ, INSTALLATIONS AND AC/RC UNITS • DEFINES OPERATIONS PLANNING AS APPLYING TO ALL JOINT AND SUPPORTING ARMY PLANS FOR CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES TO THEATER
<p>AMOPS II</p> <p>STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES</p>	<p>PROVIDES MOBILIZATION AND OPERATIONS PLANNING GUIDANCE PERTAINING TO AVAILABILITY, ALLOCATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES</p>	<p>APPLIES TO:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CBT, CS, CSS & GSF UNITS 2. DEPLOYABLE & NONDEPLOYABLE UNITS 3. ALL COMPONENTS
<p>AMOPS III</p> <p>ARMY MOBILIZATION & DEPLOYMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE</p>	<p>PROVIDES ARMY AGENCIES, COMMANDS, AND COMPONENTS OF UNIFIED COMMANDS GUIDANCE REQUIRED TO PLAN FOR MOBILIZATION & DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES</p>	<p>CONTAINS ADMINISTRATIVE, OPERATIONAL, AND PLANNING GUIDANCE. APPLIES TO ALL COMPONENTS.</p>
<p>AMOPS IV</p> <p>ARMY CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM</p>	<p>DESCRIBES ARMY CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM, RELATIONSHIP TO JCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM, PRESCRIBES HQDA CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION & STAFFING METHODS</p>	<p>DESCRIBES STREAMLINED STAFF ORGANIZATIONS OF JCS & ARMY, ARMY CRISIS STAFFING METHODS, MOBILIZATION DECISION SUPPORT PROCESS, ALTERNATE COMMAND CENTER OPERATIONS, PRE-POSITIONED AUTHORITIES FOR MACOM USE, RELATIONSHIP TO EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURES</p>
<p>AMP</p> <p>ARMY MOBILIZATION PLAN</p>	<p>ESTABLISHES PROCEDURES FOR MOBILIZATION EXECUTION WITHIN HQDA & EACH MACOM</p>	<p>IS COMPRISED OF THE COLLECTED MOBILIZATION PLANS OF HQDA AND THE MACOMS</p>

FIGURE 12-1

— *Major Commands* are responsible for assisting the ODCSOPS, HQDA, in developing and maintaining those portions of the AMOPS pertaining to their respective mission areas; mobilization and operations planning within their respective mission areas; and publishing a command mobilization plan as a volume of the Army Mobilization Plan. Such plans will be submitted to HQDA for review. Major Commands are also responsible for compliance with the guidance and procedures published in the AMOPS.

MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT

General.

Mobilization is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources. It is also the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel for active military service, call-up of Reserve Components (RC), extension of terms of service, and other actions necessary to transition to a wartime posture.

This section provides an overview of the mobilization process within the framework of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). It describes the functional subsystems of AMOPS, the types of mobilization, the mobilization process, and the interface with non-DOD agencies.

AMOPS Functional Subsystems.

The primary objective of the Army mobilization process is to mobilize, deploy and sustain the theater force. The major subsystems involved are theater force units, military manpower, and materiel. Supporting these subsystems are a number of interrelated CONUS-based functionally oriented subsystems; principally, mobilization stations, the training base, the logistics structure, the medical structure, and transportation support. These subsystems are interrelated as shown in Figure 12-2 and described in more detail below.

Theater Force Units

The theater force consists of theater force units, military manpower (individuals), and materiel apportioned for deployment to the theater of operations. The objective of the theater force units subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of Army units at ports of embarkation (air and sea) for deployment as prescribed in war plans or as directed by the JCS.

The approved force consists of Active, National Guard, and Reserve units. It also may include certain new, or unresourced, units that would be activated on order.

— **Active Army**—Active Component units do not require mobilization; they are either “forward-deployed” or designated to support one or more operation plans by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Volume II of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). When an emergency arises, the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert CONUS-based active units through FORSCOM channels; (through CINCPAC channels for Hawaii-based units). POMCUS units, which deploy by air to link up with prepositioned equipment, turn in equipment that will remain behind, load equipment to accompany troops (TAT), load equipment not authorized prepositioning (NAP) and items that may be short in POMCUS, and move to a designated airport of embarkation. POMCUS shortages may be shipped by air and/or sea as required by the TPFDD. Non-POMCUS units load their equipment and move either to an air or sea port of embarkation.

— **Army National Guard**—During peacetime, the preparation of Army National Guard units for mobilization is the responsibility of the State Governor. Guidance is issued to the Governor by HQDA through the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and by FORSCOM and WESTCOM to The Adjutants General of the respective States. ARNG units are commanded by the State Governor until federalized. Once federalized, ARNG units become Active Component units under the appropriate MACOM.

— **Army Reserve**—During peacetime, the preparation of Army Reserve units for mobilization is the responsibility of the Commanding General, FORSCOM; the Commander-in-Chief, WESTCOM; and the Commanding General, USAREUR for assigned Army Reserve units. Command is exercised through subordinate Active Army and Army Reserve headquarters. Army Reserve units are usually earmarked to support one or more operation plans or designated to become part of the CONUS base. Selected later-deploying units may receive interim assignments to augment a particular element in the CONUS base.

— **Unresourced and New Units**—FORSCOM prepares, in coordination with each supported CINC, a proposed activation schedule for each major planning scenario identified in the JSCP. Changes emanating from the CINC’s response to annual JSCP guidance (TPFDD shortfall), biennial TAA determinations of which units in the required force structure will be unresourced, and structure changes reflected in POM development will all be considered in the development of the proposed Unit Activation Schedule (UAS). The prioritized activations will include the support units required to “flesh out” the current force as well as new combat, combat support and combat service support units to expand the force structure. In preparing this activation schedule, close attention will be given to

FUNCTIONAL SUBSYSTEMS OF AMOPS




FIGURE 12-2

recognized equipment availability constraints, particularly major weapon systems. The composition of the proposed UAS and the recommended priorities will be reviewed and approved by HQDA.

Military Manpower. The objective of the military manpower subsystem is to ensure full and timely use of all available sources of individual military manpower to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment and to sustain the deployed force with trained fillers and replacements.

Prior service personnel are grouped generally by their training status. Pretrained individual manpower (PIM) is a generic term consisting of the following manpower categories: Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), Standby Reserve (SBR), and retired military personnel. The individuals in these categories are the primary source of manpower to reinforce Active Component and Reserve Component units during the early phases of mobilization and should not require extensive retraining. Each of these categories is explained further in Chapter 13. Prior service individuals who may require retraining will become members of the so-called "TTHS Account" (trainees, transients, holdees (patients, prisoners, etc.), and students); members of units to be inactivated upon mobilization (e.g., ROTC units); members of units that are reduced or disappear over the mobilization period (e.g., recruiters); and return to duty personnel (e.g., patients, AWOL's returned to duty). Volunteers may come from all of the above prior service categories.

Nonprior service personnel include Selective Service inductees, delayed entry enlistees, and volunteer enlistees who, by law, require a minimum of 12 weeks training prior to deployment. Selective Service inductees constitute the largest single source of postmobilization manpower. Delayed entry personnel are active and reserve enlistees who are high school graduates or students awaiting graduation, and reserve unit members who have completed basic training and are awaiting advanced training.

Materiel. The objective of the materiel subsystem is to ensure the full and timely availability of adequate military materiel to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment and to sustain the deployed force in accordance with requirements and priorities. Sources of supplies and equipment include the organic equipment of deploying and nondeploying units, POMCUS Units' Residual (left behind) Equipment (PURE) and that equipment scheduled for delivery through procurement and maintenance channels. War Reserve Materiel Stocks (WRMS) consist of military materiel acquired in peacetime to meet military requirements at the outbreak of war until the sustaining production base can be established. WRMS are acquired to meet the War Reserve Materiel Requirement (WRMR) established in the Army Guidance.

Mobilization Stations (MS). The objective of the mobilization stations subsystem is to ensure the orderly expansion of Army posts, camps, and stations and their timely ability to receive, house, supply, train and deploy theater force units. There are currently 51 designated Army mobilization stations.

Installations develop mobilization TDA's (MOBTDA's) based on guidance provided by their parent MACOM to enable MS's to meet surge population and operational requirements. Expansion of mobilization services is accomplished by deleting nonmission-essential services, extending the workweek, executing option clauses in existing contracts, contracting for personnel and services, and by using early-reporting, late deploying, and uncommitted units to support the mission until skilled augmentation personnel become available.

When mobilized units arrive at their designated MS, command passes to the MS commander. The MS commander is primarily responsible for correcting readiness deficiencies that restrict the deployment readiness of the units. He redistributes personnel and equipment in accordance with established FORSCOM/WESTCOM instructions, priorities, and policies. He is responsible for unit training and deployment validation in accordance with HQDA policy as implemented by FORSCOM/WESTCOM.

Training Base. The objective of the training base subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of trained manpower to mobilize for CONUS base support and theater force requirements. TRADOC and HQDA are responsible for operating the component organizations which comprise the postmobilization training base; induction centers, reception stations, training centers, and service schools.

Headquarters, Department of the Army (ODCSPER) is the agent for DOD in all matters pertaining to the operation of the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) and the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), also known as induction centers. MEPCOM, through the MEPS, is responsible for providing facilities for conducting physical and mental examinations, and inducting qualified registrants into the Armed Services.

The Army's capability for receiving and processing enlistees, inductees, and other accessions will be increased in event of mobilization. The existing reception stations (all collocated with existing TRADOC training centers) will be expanded. USAR training divisions/brigades will be mobilized to increase the capacity of TRADOC training centers and establish new training centers at selected FORSCOM installations.

The capacity and capability of the Army Service Schools will also be expanded. The existing TRADOC Service School structure will be expanded and selected United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) schools will be mobilized to expand the capability of designated

TRADOC Service Schools and to augment the U.S. Army Training Centers.

Logistics Support System. The objective of the logistics support subsystem is to provide logistical support to meet mobilization and deployment/employment requirements of the Total Army. Supply, maintenance, services, and facilities capabilities must be expanded to deploy and sustain the force.

The Army will expand its supply storage, handling, procurement, and production capabilities. Storage policies will be relaxed to permit open storage on improved and unimproved sites, public warehouses, and contractor facilities. The waiving of formal advertising and competitive bidding will expedite the ability to procure goods and services. Suppliers will accelerate deliveries by going to multishift production operations. A major objective of the supply system will be to expedite the availability of needed materiel for entry into the transportation subsystem and responsive delivery to the recipient. The Army will call on the existing (wartime) authority to utilize the national industrial base for preplanned production and buy, lease, or contract for goods and services from any available commercial source.

Upon mobilization, the Army maintenance structure has several immediate goals. It absorbs Reserve Component combat service support units, executes emergency civilian hiring procedures in accordance with mobilization TDA's and implements already negotiated maintenance contracts and interservice and Federal agency support agreements. Mission-essential items receive the highest priority of maintenance effort. First priority will go to equipment items for deployed and/or deploying Theater Force units. Equipment in excess of mobilization needs left behind by deploying units would be second priority and third would be specific items identified and managed by HQDA.

It will be necessary to expand troop service support (food services, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, and mortuary) to accommodate the expanded mobilization station population. Service facilities at newly activated mobilization stations will be renovated utilizing available materiel, funds, and manpower. As required, support units will be tasked to provide mobilization stations with unit facilities and equipment until general support force units can assume these functions.

The Army production base is comprised of Army controlled industrial activities. Included in these industrial activities are active and inactive ammunition plants, arsenals and proving grounds, missile plants, and other miscellaneous plants. These facilities are to be activated or expanded to provide maximum wartime levels of production of materiel.

Expansion of the CONUS training and sustaining base facilities will be required under full mobilization. Initially, expansion of capacity will be achieved from immediate cessation of nonessential activities;

relaxation of space, environmental, and other constraining criteria; and the rehabilitation of facilities using available labor and the self-help effort of using units. New facilities construction will feature modern prefabrication technology to provide increased living, storage and work space needed early in the postmobilization buildup period.

Medical Support. On Mobilization Day (M-Day), U.S. Army Hospitals will initiate conversion to their planned mobilization configuration to accommodate the vastly increased military population and expected theater force casualties. Health care services (inpatient and outpatient) will be limited to active duty military personnel, with the exception that outpatient occupational health services will continue for civil service employees. All nonmilitary inpatients will be discharged or transferred to civilian or other federal hospitals as expeditiously as possible. CHAMPUS advisory offices will assist eligible beneficiaries in completing administrative requirements for procuring health care from civilian sources. With the approval of the Commander, Health Services Command (HSC), and the Office of The Surgeon General, HQDA, inpatient services may be continued beyond M-Day to D-Day for family members and retirees (if M-Day and D-Day do not coincide). Medical Center/Medical Department Activity Commanders may continue outpatient services for family members and retirees as resources permit.

Transportation Support. The objective of the transportation support subsystem is to move the Total Force (units and materiel) within CONUS and to/from overseas commands. Overall responsibility for transportation support is vested in the newly established USTRANSCOM and its components. Intra-CONUS movements of mobilizing units and materiel are coordinated by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) in cooperation with installation transportation officers and various state and local agencies. Strategic transportation to and from overseas theaters is the responsibility of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the other two USTRANSCOM components.

Management of the surface lines of communication is split among MTMC, MSC, and the theater commanders. MTMC is responsible for CONUS line-haul and ocean terminal operations. MSC is charged with ship contracting and scheduling. The theater commander manages intratheater surface movements. The schedule for cargo movement and port operations must interface with the schedule for ships. Port throughput capacity, both in CONUS and in a theater of operations, is a major consideration and is often a limiting factor. Finally, surface transportation planning procedures must be flexible enough to allow planners to adjust to exigencies such as ship or port losses.

MAC is responsible for airlift operations. To meet response times postulated by the JSCP, planners must be able to develop and maintain flow plans that are capable of rapid execution. This capability requires detailed planning among the users of common-user airlift assets. In addition, MAC requires 3-4 days to achieve a full-surge airlift capability. This time is required to marshal Active Air Force elements and to mobilize and position essential Air National Guard and Air Reserve units. Therefore, to develop realistic flow plans, planners must carefully balance airlift requirements with capabilities until a full surge capability can be achieved and maintained. A limiting factor to U.S. airlift capability is the availability of SAC tanker resources which are periodically tasked to support other national-level operations. Planners must consider the potential availability of tanker resources when developing flow plans and must closely coordinate with other claimants for refueling aircraft.

The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) coordinates and monitors time-sensitive planning and execution of force and resupply movements for deployment of CONUS-based Army and Air Force combat forces. It also coordinates deployment planning with Navy and Marine Corps forces. (These deployments should not be confused with the normal rotation of units, ships, squadrons, etc. in peacetime.) The JDA assists the JCS in resolving transportation shortfalls with supported and supporting commanders, military transportation agencies, and the Services. Deployment management is discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter.

Types of Mobilization.

Generally, the magnitude of the emergency governs the type of mobilization. As authorized by law or congressional resolution and when directed by the President, the Department of Defense (DOD) mobilizes all or part of the Armed Forces. Concurrently, the DOD and other Federal agencies marshal national resources in order to sustain the mobilized force.

Selective Mobilization. For a domestic emergency, the Congress or the President may order expansion of the active Armed Forces by mobilization of RC units and/or individual reservists to deal with a situation where the Armed Forces may be required to protect life, Federal property and functions, or to prevent disruption of Federal activities. A selective mobilization would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

Presidential Call-up of 200,000 Reservists. The President may augment the active forces by a call-up of units and individuals of the Selected Reserve, up to 200,000 persons, for up to 90 days, to meet an operational requirement. An additional 90 days may be added under the provisions of this authority but the President must request and the Congress must approve

such an extension. Units or individuals called up may be deployed overseas under this authority. When a unit of the Selected Reserve, or a member of the Selected Reserve not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, is ordered to active duty under this section and the President determines that an extension of the service of such a member or unit on active duty is necessary in the interests of national security, he may authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, to extend the period of such order to active duty for a period of not more than 90 additional days.

Partial Mobilization. For a contingency operation or war plan or upon declaration of a national emergency, the Congress or the President may order augmentation of the active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) by mobilization of up to one million persons of the Ready Reserve (units or individuals) for up to 24 months. Actually, only the President is limited by the one million person ceiling. The Congress may establish any limit desired in a Congressionally-declared partial mobilization.

Full Mobilization. Full mobilization requires passage by the Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all RC units in the *existing approved force structure*, all individual reservists, and the materiel resources needed for this expanded force structure.

Total Mobilization. Total mobilization involves expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved force structure to respond to requirements of the emergency, and the mobilization of all national resources needed, to include production facilities, to sustain such forces. Congressional authorization is required for these actions.

Mobilization Authority.

The authority to order mobilization resides with the President and/or the Congress as shown in Figure 12-3. The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and recommendation of the Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), recommends to the President and the Congress the mobilization authority required to support a given contingency, OPLAN, or national emergency. The SECDEF directs mobilization of Reserve Component units and manpower through the military departments.

Peacetime Planning.

The Army plans and prepares for mobilization in peacetime. It participates in war planning to establish Army forces and the requirements for their augmentation. It programs and budgets resources and

MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY

Situation	Action Required	Authority	Personnel Involved	Remarks
1. Any level of emergency.	Publish order to active duty.	10 USC 672 (d) 10 USC 3504	Volunteers from National Guard and Reserves. Retired members of the Regular forces.	May be used for any lawful purpose. Consent of the governor is required for NG members serving under 10 USC 672 (d).
2. Domestic Emergency. (Selective Mobilization)	Presidential Proclamation to disperse under 10 USC 334 & Executive Order under 10 USC appropriate to purpose of the call	10 USC 3500, 8500 & appropriate orders of higher authority; 10 USC 331, 332, 333	National Guard & Reserves.	May be used for: Federal Aid to states in case of insurrection (10 USC 331); Enforce federal authority (10 USC 332); Suppress interference with State & Federal law (10 USC 333).
3. Operational mission requiring augmentation of active force (200K Call-up)	Presidential Executive Order	10 USC 673b PL 99-661	Units and individuals of Selected Reserve; limited to 200,000 (all services) for up to 90 days.	President must report to Congress within 24-hours on circumstances and anticipated use of forces. May not be used in lieu of a Call-up (10 USC 331 et seq., 3500,8500), or for disaster relief.
4. Contingency operation, war plan, National emergency (Partial mobilization)	Presidential Proclamation of a national emergency & an Executive order.	10 USC 673(a)	Ready Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve; limited to 1,000,000 (all services) for up to 2 years.	President may extend appointments, enlistments & periods of service when Congress is not in session. (10 USC 671 b)
5. War or national emergency (Full or total mobilization).	Passage of a public law or joint resolution by the Congress declaring war or national emergency.	10 USC 671(a) 10 USC 672	National Guard & Reserve units, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, members of Retired Reserve. No numerical or time limitation unless established by Congress.	May extend enlistments in Regular and Reserve forces & extend period of active service for duration of the war plus 6 months.

FIGURE 12-3

acts to man, equip, and train the total Army and to prepare for its employment during a war or other national emergency. Planning is accomplished in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). This peacetime planning essentially consists of war planning, intended to develop the OPLAN's for the conduct of operations addressed earlier in the chapter and in Chapter 10, and mobilization planning.

DOD Mobilization Planning Process. Mobilization planning, primarily a Service responsibility, is also based on guidance from OSD and the constraints imposed by resource limitations.

The DOD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP) prescribes policy and responsibilities within the DOD

which guide the "who" and "what" of mobilization planning. The MMP specifies the major actions and coordination which HQDA must accomplish.

JCS Pub 21, *Mobilization*, assigns general responsibilities and procedures for mobilization. The OJCS coordinates the mobilization plans of the Services and insures the interface of these plans with deployments.

Mobilization Planning in Other Federal Departments and Agencies. In addition to DOD, approximately 50 Federal departments and agencies have emergency planning responsibilities. Specific functions and the organizations responsible for them are covered by Executive Order 11490. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the Federal Government coordinator of these emergency

management activities in both peace and war. FEMA's responsibilities include policy guidance and planning to ensure that government at all levels is able to cope with and recover from emergencies. FEMA assesses national civil mobilization capabilities and develops concepts, plans and systems for management of national resources. It identifies actual and potential shortages in natural, industrial, economic and other resources; develops plans to mitigate their national security impacts; and fosters programs to reduce our national vulnerability to such resource shortages. FEMA is the principal respondent to military requirements for civilian sector resources during mobilization. It coordinates the response of the civil agencies to defense needs, always cognizant that without the might of the Nation's industrial production, transportation networks, work force, financial institutions, energy and

natural resources, there could be no national security. Likewise, without food, clothing, housing, health care and education, there would be no civilian population to support the defense of our way of life and our constitutional government. FEMA must, therefore, see to it that national resources are used to meet both the military and the essential civilian needs of the nation. A schematic of the role of FEMA vis-a-vis the major civil resource agencies is shown in Figure 12-4.

Army Mobilization Planning. The purpose of Army mobilization planning is to provide the resources required to support various OPLAN's. This includes mobilizing the units, manpower, and materiel required for immediate implementation of an OPLAN as well as the resources required to sustain the operation.

MOBILIZATION COORDINATION




FIGURE 12-4

The AMOPS incorporates the guidance of the DOD MMP and JCS Pub 21 and specifies the planning process used to develop HQDA and MACOM mobilization plans. The FORSCOM Mobilization Plan, with its associated Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan (MTBSP), details the time-phased flow of mobilizing RC units from home stations to their mobilization stations. The TRADOC Training Base Expansion Plan (TBEP) provides installations and training base augmentation units in the USAR with guidance on training base expansion activities.

Relationships of War Planning and Mobilization Planning. AMOPS provides the linkage between war planning under JOPS (Joint Operation Planning System) and mobilization planning as directed by DOD and the JCS. AMOPS establishes the who, what, where, how and why of mobilization. It further prescribes the Army Crisis Action System to manage the execution of mobilization and operation plans. The principal products of AMOPS are "on the shelf," executable plans and supporting information/data bases prepared and maintained for use during national crisis.

Mobilization plans incorporate the specific actions and responsibilities which must be accomplished both in peacetime and upon the order to mobilize. The HQDA and MACOM mobilization plans which constitute the Army Mobilization Plan (AMP) are based on guidance contained in AMOPS, the DOD MMP, and other documents. Most mobilization plans are oriented toward full mobilization. For selected contingencies, however, the Army has developed partial mobilization plans.

Peacetime Preparation.

Preparation for mobilization proceeds concurrently with planning. The Army programs, budgets, and funds resources to overcome the shortfalls and limiting factors identified from a continuing analysis of the various operations plans. Concurrently, the Army trains units and individuals. Within its capabilities, it identifies and preassigns augmenting manpower and prepositions materiel for use during war or national emergency.

Alert, Mobilization, and Deployment.

On receiving the order to mobilize, the Army begins a partial or full mobilization of RC units, pretrained manpower, and materiel. The mobilizing force, or portions of it, may augment an established theater force such as in Europe, or, alternatively, may augment a force deployed in a contingency operation. In any case, under the general supervision of HQDA, FORSCOM, and WESTCOM bring Active and Reserve Component units to combat-ready status and then deploy them by air and sea to areas of operation according to deployment plans. An initial pool of reserve materiel resources exists in war reserve stocks in the continental United States and prepositioned stocks in oversea areas. The initial resources sustain the deployed force until

reinforcement and resupply pipelines can be established or the emergency is resolved. The total force to be employed is made up of both Active and mobilized Reserve Component units. Active Component units in place in the theater of operations are referred to as "forward deployed" units. Other AC units, most of them CONUS-based, are earmarked by the JSCP and AMOPS to support one or more operation plans. When an emergency arises, units are alerted through FORSCOM or WESTCOM channels to deploy to the theater of operations in accordance with applicable OPLAN's.

Reserve Component units (ARNG and USAR) are ordered to active duty and, in the case of ARNG units, federalized by mobilization orders transmitted by HQDA through FORSCOM/WESTCOM Command Channels. Units may be earmarked to support one or more OPLAN's or they may be earmarked to become part of the CONUS base. Late deploying units may receive interim assignments to augment a particular support activity in the CONUS base.

FORSCOM Mobilization Planning.

FORSCOM publishes the FORSCOM Mobilization Plan (FMP) based on HQDA guidance contained in AMOPS. The FMP contains planning directives and guidance to CONUSA, Major Troop Unit/FORSCOM Installation Commanders, other MACOM Installation Commanders, State Adjutants General (in consonance with NGB) and the major U.S. Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC). The FMP also contains annexes on the various functional aspects of mobilization.

FORSCOM updates Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plans (MTBSP) based on OPLAN TPFDD. FORSCOM coordinates with TRADOC, HSC, MTMC, AMC, and NGB in preparing MTBSP data. The MTBSP includes data on all AC and RC deploying and non-deploying TOE and TDA units in CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Panama, Guam and the Virgin Islands. The MTBSP includes the following data (as applicable) for these units:

- (1) Unit description, component and home station.
- (2) Mobilization Stations.
- (3) Mobilization Day (in relation to M-Day).
- (4) Ready to Load Dates.
- (5) Port of Embarkation (air and sea).
- (6) Latest Arrival Date.

Mobilization Flow. Mobilization execution is decentralized to major commands. FORSCOM, WESTCOM, and USAREUR are the principal MACOM's which command mobilizing Reserve

Component units. Other MACOM's (TRADOC, HSC, USAISC, AMC and MTMC) assume command of designated nondeploying units. Upon receiving the order to mobilize, selected Reserve Component force units augmenting theater of operations forces may deploy directly by air or sea to the theater of operations. However, most Reserve Component units move to one of 51 mobilization stations within the five CONUS Army areas and the WESTCOM area to train before deploying or augmenting the CONUS base. Redistributing equipment and personnel assets, required to make units mission capable, takes place at mobilization stations. FORSCOM and AMC provide wholesale management for materiel. MILPERCEN serves in a similar management role for personnel.

Health Services Command expands medical support services and facilities. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers expands troop housing, training, industrial, and other facilities.

DEPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT

In the past 35 years, over 200 international crises affecting U.S. interests were grave enough for our government to consider using military force.

Since our national policy is not to strike first, our planning must predict, anticipate, and counter potential threats. This is conceptually more difficult than planning an invasion. Although many reactive plans have been prepared, almost all crises involve situations which are not predictable and for which there are no plans. When reacting to a crisis, the government may consider responses ranging from a wait-and-see approach to diplomatic or economic measures, covert actions, overt military operations, or combinations of the above.

In peacetime, we conduct deliberate planning for the more likely and more resource-taxing contingencies. In time of crisis, we determine whether there is an existing plan which can be applied. If there is one, we modify it and use it. If there is no plan, we conduct rapid, time-sensitive planning. The procedures for deliberate planning for contingencies are contained in the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) discussed earlier in this chapter. The procedures for rapid planning in time of crisis are contained in a volume (Volume IV) of JOPS called the Crisis Action System (CAS). The Joint Deployment System (JDS) procedures apply to both deliberate and time-sensitive planning. A schematic overview of crisis and deployment management is at Figure 12-5.

The Deployment Community

The complexity of military planning in general and deployment planning in particular is due in part to the large number of headquarters and agencies which support the National Command Authorities (NCA). Political and diplomatic activities involve the Department of State and the U.S. embassies in the

affected region. Military participation is directed by the President, who issues orders to the Secretary of Defense. He, in turn, directs operations through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Military Command System (NMCS), and the unified and specified commands.

Operation plans, force requirements, and operation orders are developed by the "supported command," usually the unified command having cognizance over the geographical area involved. The supported command may have subordinate unified commands (such as the U.S. Forces, Korea) and/or Service components (such as the U.S. Air Force, Europe).

The Service headquarters and their logistics commands participate in deployment planning and execution; so does USTRANSCOM and its three components: Military Airlift Command (MAC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). Other government agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), play important roles within the deployment community.

JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

The Joint Deployment System (JDS)

The objective of the Joint Deployment System is to provide a system to plan, coordinate and monitor movements and deployments based upon OPLANS submitted to JCS by unified or specified commands or during a JCS-directed no-plan contingency. Its provisions are to:

- Facilitate the preparation, review and coordination of deployment plans associated with deploying forces by prescribing standardized formats and procedures.

- Provide automated support which can be used from the planning stage of an operation through its execution.

- Maintain to a high level of accuracy the first 15 days of air movements and the first 30 days of sea movements of refined OPLANS to ensure currency of deployment data and executability of the plan.

- Provide a single JCS deployment coordinating authority.

The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA)

To provide for planning and coordination of deployments during crises, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1979 formed the Joint Deployment Agency. It is collocated with the USTRANSCOM at Scott Air Force Base in Belleville, Illinois. The JDA coordinates and monitors time-sensitive planning and execution of force

CRISIS AND DEPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW




FIGURE 12-5

and resupply movements for deployment of all forces. The JDA assists the JCS in resolving transportation shortfalls with supported and supporting commanders, military transportation agencies, and the Services.

In addition to its crisis role, the Joint Deployment Agency serves as the JCS focal point for the deliberate development and coordination of contingency plans in peacetime, and the refinement of Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) for the major operation plans prepared by the unified commands.

A further responsibility assigned to the JDA is to design, develop and operate an automated system to support crisis management and to use effectively the products of the joint planning process. The Joint Deployment System concept is illustrated in Figure 12-6, Joint Planning Summary.

The Deployment Data Base.

The compatibility of deployment planning in the deliberate planning process and the Crisis Action System is in the continuous maintenance by JDA of a deployment data base. This deployment data base, the Joint Deployment System (JDS), is initially derived from TPFDD's associated with major operation plans. It provides the basis for deployment planning and modification of plans in crises and no-plan situations.

Approximately the first fifteen days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement of each refined OPLAN TPFDD are maintained in JDS to ensure accuracy of initial deployment requirements. Periodic reviews of the initial portion of each TPFDD are conducted by the JDA in association with supported and supporting commanders, Services, and the transportation component commands. Changes are submitted to the JDA for consolidation. The JDA then forwards the changes to the supported commander for review and approval. Upon approval, the updated TPFDD data is entered in the JDS data base. This procedure allows the JDA to maintain the initial portion of both the OPLAN TPFDD and the JDS data base in a current status.

Transition to Crisis-Execution Planning

The plans maintained in the JDS provide a starting point for course of action development and assessment during crises. Data for the current crisis is entered. If a proposed course of action is similar to an existing plan, the applicable data from the plan is entered in the data base. Changes to the data or data for new plans or courses of action are entered by the deployment community, as shown in Figure 12-6.




FIGURE 12-6

The USTRANSCOM's components play a key role during execution planning. Forces and supplies required to be airlifted to the theater of operations must be scheduled by the Military Airlift Command on a mission-by-mission basis to fit into a smooth flow that meets the delivery dates without wasting airlift resources. If the forces or cargo are not already in place at the airport of embarkation, overland or air movement from origin must be arranged by the Military Traffic Management Command and closely coordinated with the MAC schedules.

For larger, sustained deployments, only the personnel and some critical logistics items are airlifted. Heavy equipment and supplies are transported by sea in ships which are either controlled by or made available to the Military Sealift Command. For such split shipments, close coordination of departure and arrival dates must be maintained among all three transportation components, as well as the JDA, the supported and supporting commands, and a host of other agencies, both U.S. and allied. Effective coordination of

schedules is necessary to ensure that personnel, equipment and supplies can be brought back together in one place, at the same time, possibly under hostile conditions, to be reconstituted into an effective fighting unit.

Deployment Execution

After an Execute Order is issued by the JCS based on a National Command Authority (NCA) decision, the JDA, using the JDS, supports the JCS and the overseas commander by monitoring and managing the deployment flow of units, personnel, and supplies. Supporting and subordinate commands and the transportation component commands use the JDS to provide current information to the JDA, which acts as the focal point for deployment management. The JDA provides periodic progress reports to the deployment community.

As shortfalls or conflicts are discovered and substitutions or changes in the force movement

JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM FOR CRISIS ACTION




FIGURE 12-7

sequence are requested, the Joint Deployment Agency takes the lead in coordinating the necessary schedule changes with the supported and supporting commands and the transportation components. This coordination is continued throughout deployment execution until the forces, non-unit personnel, and non-unit related supplies in the deployment data base have arrived at the port of debarkation in the theater of operations.

Reception of forces and supplies and movement tracking within the theater are responsibilities of the supported command and Service components.

CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM

A crisis, from a military point of view, is an incident external to the Continental United States (CONUS) that develops rapidly, and creates a condition of such diplomatic, political, or military importance to the U.S. Government that commitment of U.S. military forces is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives.

The JCS Crisis Action System (Figure 12-7) provides a framework for developing and exchanging time-sensitive information within the deployment community, evaluating military courses of action, and

producing the operation orders necessary to carry out the decisions of the National Command Authorities. The Crisis Action System is explained in JOPS Volume IV.

Operation Planning and Execution

Planning for a military operation which includes deploying forces from CONUS, whether done rapidly in a crisis or deliberately on a scheduled basis, requires certain steps. The supported commander must make an estimate of the situation and develop feasible courses of action, together with a concept of operation. Using inputs from the Service component commanders, a list of the required combat forces must be assembled, together with the dates they should be at their destinations, ready for action. The force list must then be expanded to include support forces, sustaining supplies, and replacement materiel and personnel.

Forces not already in the theater of operations are usually described only in notional terms as augmentation "type forces" to be supplied by a providing organization in CONUS such as FORSCOM. Together with these notional forces, standard supply factors are used, and rough estimates of available transportation are made. This leads to preliminary

JCS CRISIS ACTION PROCESS




FIGURE 12-8

estimates of closure time for each course of action considered.

In general, once feasibility is established, and a decision to proceed with a specific course of action is made by the National Command Authorities, actual forces and supplies at specific bases are matched with actual transportation resources to produce the movement flow schedules. If deployment is ordered, its progress must be closely monitored and subsequent movement schedules adjusted to conform to the realities of the fast-changing situation.

The Crisis Action System procedures are divided into six phases to be performed in sequence, but if the time available is short, one or more of the phases may be compressed, combined, or omitted. The Crisis Action System is explained step-by-step below. Use Figure 12-8 to follow each step and to provide a comparison with the deliberate planning process discussed earlier.

— *Situation Development Phase.* This phase covers day-to-day activities leading to the detection and initial

assessment of an event or problem that is serious and may become a crisis. When an event is detected, the nearest unified commander submits an assessment to the JCS. This report states what forces he has readily available, the earliest time they could be committed, and any limiting factors to their deployment.

— *Crisis Assessment Phase.* During this phase, surveillance and reporting are greatly increased. The President and his advisers evaluate the extent of the crisis. If the President determines that a crisis exists that may warrant a United States response, he may direct the development of options including diplomatic and military courses of action. A JCS warning order would also be prepared for release. It is possible that the President could decide immediately on a single military course of action and assign an execution time. Such a decision would mean moving directly from the crisis assessment phase to the decision phase, eliminating the course of action development phase.

As a crisis evolves, special teams are formed to deal with the situation. These teams are variously named Battle Staff, Crisis Action Team, Deployment Action Team, Operations Action Group, or Operation Planners Group. They may include representatives from any or all staff agencies. Generally, emergency response teams can be formed at all levels, from individual units and commands up to the NMCC.

— **Course of Action Development Phase.** Release of a JCS Warning Order normally signals the start of this phase. In addition to initiating this phase of planning, the Warning Order establishes command arrangements for forces participating in the operation, suggests some potential courses of action for the commander to consider, and updates the information available from the JCS perspective. A Planning Order may be substituted for a Warning Order when the JCS have selected a course of action and require execution planning prior to submission to the NCA for approval. The commander then further defines the mission and considers alternative courses of action. In this process, existing operations plans should be reviewed for suitability. If suitable, an OPLAN is modified to fit the existing situation. If a CONPLAN can be used, it must be expanded to include forces and support requirements. If no plan exists, an OPORD must be developed from scratch.

The commander consolidates all available information to submit his commander's estimate to the JCS, who will evaluate it in the light of information gathered from other sources. He only recommends a course of action in the CAS, instead of selecting the best course of action as he does during deliberate planning. The Commander's Estimate is also sent to the transportation component commands and to JDA who use the information to finalize deployment estimates and update the JDS deployment data base.

— **Course of Action Selection.** The JCS review the commander's estimate, the courses of action, the CINC's recommendation and deployment estimates developed by the JDA. With this information, they formulate a recommendation and present it to the Secretary of Defense and the President. By now, nonmilitary options may have been prepared by the National Security Council, the State Department, or the CIA. If, after considering all recommendations, the President believes that the military option may be used, he will select a course of action or, more typically, approve the recommended course of action. His decision is announced in a JCS Alert Order which is prepared for release.

— **Execution Planning Phase.** This phase begins with the receipt of the JCS Alert Order or Planning Order to the supported commander and the participating members of the deployment community. The Alert Order describes the military course of action selected by

the National Command Authorities, sets actual or tentative target dates, and provides the necessary evidence for preparation of an operation order which is the end-product of the execution planning process. The supported commander, assisted by the deployment community, completes the force list using actual forces, origins, and dates. Resupply and replacement requirements are detailed to the extent possible.

The Planning Order reflects a JCS decision on a military course of action. Normally, a Planning Order will be issued when execution planning is desired prior to NCA approval of a course of action, or to compress the phases of the Crisis Action System while obtaining NCA approval on a JCS-selected course of action. The primary purpose of the Planning Order is the timely development of an OPORD that can be implemented when directed by the National Command Authorities. The supported commander develops the OPORD and ensures that force and deployment data are established in the Joint Deployment System.

An Operations Order (OPORD) is then prepared. Supporting commands, and the transportation component commands develop supporting OPORD's as required. The Joint Deployment Agency helps to update the force list and coordinate the development of the flow plans and transportation schedules. The deployment data base at the Joint Deployment Agency constitutes the authoritative, up-to-date source of the force and resupply information. The JDS data base can be queried at JDA by the entire deployment community via the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN).

— **Execution Phase.** Based upon a decision by the President to execute the planned operation, the Secretary of Defense authorizes and directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue an Execute Order instructing the supported commander to execute his OPORD. The supporting commands, Services, and transportation component commands execute their OPORD's in support of the operation. JDA monitors the status of deploying military forces and selected critical material and keeps information current for reports to JCS. During the deployment, the supported commander can request changes to the deployment flow. JDA coordinates such requests and makes adjustments in the flow schedule.

INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS

We must maintain a viable industrial base that can respond adequately to mobilize and sustain the force. Since it is not feasible or economical to have large stockpiles of supplies to support all possible conflicts, the military services must plan with industry to convert rapidly to needed wartime production rates. This is the basis for industrial preparedness planning.

DOD Industrial Base Preparedness Objectives.

OSD's objectives for improving the preparedness of our nation's industrial base to meet the M-day equipment shortfalls of the total force and to sustain that force have been relatively unchanged for several years. There are four objectives set forth in the Defense Guidance:

- Develop an industrial-base capability to produce and deliver our five-year peacetime procurement program efficiently, effectively, and as quickly as possible.
- Develop an industrial-base capability which will provide surge responsiveness for selected critical systems.
- Develop an industrial-base capability which will permit accelerating the attainment of our programmed sustainability levels for selected critical systems.
- Maintain real growth in industrial preparedness planning funding levels. Use the funding to support planning and to accomplish the first three objectives.

The DOD strategy that can be inferred from these objectives is relatively straightforward. To begin with, the focus is to improve the peacetime capability of the industrial base. This involves research, financial support, and incentives for industry to improve manufacturing technology and modernize production lines and equipment. Ultimately, modernized production facilities and techniques result in faster and lower-cost production of our military hardware in peacetime and facilitate the capability to expand production for a national security emergency. The next two objectives deal with improving the industrial base's capability to surge production in peacetime and reach wartime required production rates as soon as possible after mobilization. An improved surge capability for anti-tank missiles, for example, would ensure the availability of more of these weapons during the early days of a war when expenditure rates are expected to be the highest. Attainment of the wartime required production rate for an item soon after mobilization, minimizes war reserve stockage requirements for the item.

DOD-Level Industrial Preparedness Management.

It is DOD policy to maintain a state of industrial preparedness by working with private industry to produce, maintain, and repair materiel for meeting mobilization requirements. Where it is determined that required mobilization items cannot be provided by the private sector, then Government-owned facilities and equipment are acquired and maintained to produce them.

Overall responsibility for managing the DOD Industrial Preparedness Program is vested in the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Logistics (ASD(A&L)). The Office of the ASD(A&L) develops policy to ensure the rapid and coordinated production of materiel to meet mission requirements; to provide a basis for planning, programming, and budgeting related to improving industrial base responsiveness; and to direct the industrial preparedness programs of the Services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). It develops procedures to guide the allocation of available surge and mobilization industrial production capacity to avoid conflicts or over-commitment and also provides the DOD focal point for other federal agency efforts related to the industrial base.

OASD(A&L) is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on the relative urgency of acquisition programs. The recommendations are presented as the DOD Master Urgency List (MUL) and provide the priority basis for assigning production resources.

The DOD MUL includes the items and quantities in the highest national priority or the highest DOD urgency categories. Essential support items are assigned to the same urgency category as their end items.

National and military urgency categories have been established in the following order of precedence:

— BRICK-BAT programs have the highest national priority by reason of key political, scientific, psychological, or military objectives.

— CUE-CAP programs are selected military, research and development, and industrial programs and projects of the highest DOD priority based on military criticality.

— DRY-DAY programs are those needed to support expanded forces during mobilization.

— ELK-EAR programs are those desired to support war reserve requirements during mobilization.

BRICK-BAT items must be approved by the President. These items are assigned a Highest Defense Order Priority Rating (DX), indicating the highest national priority. All BRICK-BAT items are of equal priority.

CUE-CAP, DRY-DAY, and ELK-EAR items must be approved by the Secretary of Defense. These items are arranged in descending order of priority within each category.

All CUE-CAP items that take priority rankings will be used to determine resource use.

Specific premobilization uses of the MUL are to:

— Identify the most important defense programs, projects, and items requiring industrial resources.

— Aid the Secretary of Defense in settling departmental-level conflicts in procurement, production planning, and test resources.

— Aid the Army (AMC) in settling conflicts in procurement, production planning, and test resources.

— Serve as a guide in processing special priority assistance requests.

— Serve as a factor in the allocation and distribution of funds for industrial resource programs.

— Indicate the approved DOD urgency for proper scheduling to meet military requirements.

In addition to the above, specific post-M-Day uses of the MUL are to:

— Emphasize procurement and production scheduling for essential military items.

— Guide the preparation of specific urgency lists for supporting industrial resources.

— Guide the realignment and restoration of production capacity if damaged or destroyed.

Since the production of every item needed by the Services in the desired quantities to sustain the force during a major war is prohibitively expensive in the current resource-constrained environment, the key to a successful industrial preparedness program is the careful selection of critical materiel on which to apply scarce resources. The following exemplify this management philosophy.

— The Defense Materiel System—Used to assure the availability of an adequate supply of industrial resources for defense requirements. Producers of steel, copper, aluminum, and nickel alloys are required to set aside a portion of their products for Defense purposes. The quantities of the set-asides are based on quarterly estimated requirements submitted to OSD by HQ, AMC.

— Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile Act—The National Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile consisting of inventories owned by the government of commodities deemed to be strategic and critical. Commodities are so designated because they are basic industrial raw materials important in the production of military weapons or for essential civilian defense. Further, they are materials of which the production within the United States has not been and is not sufficient to supply this country's estimated requirements in defense emergencies.

— DOD Key Facilities List (KFL)—List of facilities of such importance that loss through sabotage, subversion, terrorism, or other hostile acts would seriously impair the national defense posture of the United States and for which adequate or duplicate

industrial facilities do not exist. FORSCOM uses the source documents in fulfilling its responsibility for CONUS land defense planning.

Army Industrial Preparedness Program.

The DOD-level management philosophy applies to the Army's Industrial Preparedness Program as well. DA depends on private industry as the foundation for production of military materiel. Therefore, when Army production facilities or depot-level maintenance do not exist, first consideration will be given to developing private industrial facilities which produce critically-needed items. Management tools include the following:

— Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP)—Conducted to insure that an adequate industrial base is established, maintained, and retained to be responsive to military materiel requirements in the event of an emergency. It involves the assessment of the capability of the industrial base to support peacetime and emergency operations, and planning with industry to insure adequate procurement, production, and maintenance capabilities to meet support requirements.

— DA Critical Items List (DACIL)—List prepared by HQDA (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) which provides annually a priority list of items which would be required to sustain war fighting for an indefinite or surge contingency. It also provides stable mobilization requirements to support planning with industry. The DACIL is the basic document from which industrial preparedness planning is conducted.

— Industrial Preparedness Planning List (IPPL)—Prepared by AMC from the DACIL. The IPPL consists of critical items having long lead time components, or components requiring special manufacturing skills or other production challenges which make detailed planning essential.

— Production Base Analysis (PBA)—Describes the status of the Army's industrial readiness assuming a fixed day of mobilization, normally 1 October, the first day of the fiscal year. It shows the base required for production and depot-level maintenance of IPPL items. Mobilization production requirements are matched against the capacity of the industrial base, and actions needed to improve base readiness are identified.

— Industrial Preparedness Measures (IPM)—Actions to end production deficiencies in the Army's industrial base. IPM's are designed to shorten production lead time, increase production or repair capacity and reduce inspection time.

SUMMARY

The utility of the Army to the nation depends to a large extent on whether its forces are properly deployed to fulfill their missions and, secondly, whether they can be moved rapidly and effectively and reinforced as the need arises.

The process of planning for contingencies, i.e., for the eventualities that Army forces are needed somewhere to accomplish specified tasks, is a continuous, all-encompassing process. It includes all aspects of Army management, be it manpower procurement, training, materiel development, or fiscal assets and constraints.

Central to the task of reinforcing existing active forces is the ability to mobilize Reserve Component assets and to deploy them with the least possible delay to where they will be needed. This call-up of reserves may require a mobilization of the industrial base and of all economic and human assets of the United States.

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CHAPTER 13

RESERVE COMPONENTS

INTRODUCTION

Definition.

The reserve forces of the Army consists of two components: the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). These forces, which will be referred to in this chapter as the Reserve Component (RC), together with the Active Component (AC) and the Civilian Component (Department of the Army Civilians) make up the Total Army.

The Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard is an important link in a unique American tradition tracing its origin back to the militia ("minutemen") in 1636. Many of the ARNG units in the eastern U.S. can trace their lineage back to local militia organizations who fought on the side of the British during the French and Indian War and later against the British in the Battle for Independence.

The term "National Guard" was first used to honor the Marquis de Lafayette. On his visit to New York in 1824, the American honor guard was renamed the "Battalion of National Guards" in tribute to Lafayette's command of the Garde Nationale of the French Army in Paris during 1789. With the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA-1916), the term "National Guard" became the official name.

The NDA-1916 was amended to establish the National Guard when ordered to Federal service as part of the Army of the United States. The Guard remained a state force but the amended Act provided increased Federal assistance. When units reached established Army standards of strength, equipment, and skill, they were "Federally-recognized" and eligible for Federal support.

Following World War II, a dual status and mission were established for the Guard. The National Guard of the U.S. (NGUS) was to be a part of the Army of the United States (AUS) on mobilization. At the same time, in a state role, the Guard was to preserve peace, order, and public safety during local emergencies in its respective states. The Federal government was to supervise military instruction, furnish field training facilities, pay, uniforms, equipment, and a portion of the expense for the construction of armories. Since 1947, the National Guard structure has consisted of both the Army and Air National Guard.

The Army Reserve.

In 1908, Congress established the Army Medical Reserve Corps. The USAR had its beginning in that

legislation. Later legislation provided for an enlisted Army Reserve, an Officers Reserve Corps, Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), and other reserve categories. Following World War I, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1920. This act established the Organized Reserve Corps which included all of the earlier categories. Many Reserve officers participated between World War I and II, and large numbers of these officers were called to conduct the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) program. The Reserve Corps, divisions, and support units organized after World War I were mobilized for World War II. During the Korean War, 64% of the total RC mobilized were USAR members.

In 1955, the Reserve Forces Act (RFA) set a six-year (eight for officers) obligation for individuals enlisted or drafted into the Army. The RFA prescribed six months of active duty training, followed by duty in an Army Reserve or National Guard unit to meet the obligation. This was further described in the Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963 (REP-63) which established a uniform six-year Ready Reserve obligation for ARNG and USAR enlistees. This obligation was extended to 8 years on 1 June 1984.

The initial period of active duty for training (ADT) was established at a minimum of four months but flexible enough to qualify an individual in any MOS. The initial period of ADT has now been changed to a minimum of twelve weeks.

Reserve Component's Role in the Total Army.

Title 10, *U.S. Code*, contains the general and permanent laws governing the Armed Forces. Various sections of Title 10 establish and govern the RC. Specific provisions of the Code pertaining to the Army and Air National Guard are contained in Title 32.

The role of the RC as stated in Section 262, Title 10, is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or when national security requires. Title 32 further states that Army National Guard units shall be ordered to Federal active duty and retained as long as necessary whenever Congress determines they are needed. These basic roles are further defined through policy statements.

The role of the RC clearly has been expanded from one of wartime augmentation only to now being an integral part of the deterrent force. Today's Army can meet no major contingency without the Reserve Components. The Total Army is no longer just a concept. It is a guiding principle.

Categories.

There are three major categories of reserve service: the Ready Reserve; the Standby Reserve; and the Retired Reserve (Figure 13-1).

CATEGORY	RESERVE OF THE ARMY	STATUS
Ready Reserve	SELECTED RESERVE ARNG units, USAR troop program units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees and Active Guard and Reserve	Active
	INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (USAR only) Control groups, annual training, and reinforcement	Active
	Control groups: Officer active duty obligor, ROTC, and delayed entry	Active
	INACTIVE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG only) ARNG individuals	Inactive
Standby Reserve	STANDBY RESERVE (USAR only) Control group active	Active
	Control group inactive and ineligible	Inactive
Retired Reserve	RETIRED RESERVE (USAR only)	Retired

FIGURE 13-1

The Ready Reserve.

The Ready Reserve has three subcategories:

The Selected Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists of ARNG and USAR unit members, Active Duty Guard and Reserve (AGR), and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (USAR only).

Normally members of ARNG and USAR units attend 48 paid training assemblies, each of which is a minimum of four hours' duration, and perform approximately two weeks of annual training (AT) each year. The prevalent system in most units is to conduct multiple unit training assemblies (MUTA's) consisting of four assemblies or one weekend per month (MUTA-4s). Individuals are also eligible for Full-Time Training Duty (FTTD), (ARNG only), or Active Duty for Training (ADT) to accomplish military training and schooling. The minimum training objective is that each unit attain company-level proficiency during peacetime.

USAR members are acquired primarily through USAR AGR recruiters working for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). ARNG members are acquired primarily by AGR recruiters working for state ARNG recruiting organizations. In both cases, unit members provide important leads for identifying prospective recruits. Losses occur for such reasons as expiration of term of service (ETS), transfers due to civilian employment, retirement, medical, and misconduct or unsuitability. Both ARNG and USAR units have technicians who serve as Federal civil service employees during the week and as members of the unit during training assemblies or periods of active duty. Reserve Component personnel serving on active duty in an AGR status and members of the Active Component, attached directly to the units, provide full-time support.

Officers' assignments are made by the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) from the Individual Ready Reserve and by Total Army Career Counselors (TACC) for officers leaving active duty. Officers are referred for voluntary assignment in units of the ARNG through a coordinated effort between ARPERCEN and the NGB.

The charts at Figures 13-2 and 13-3 show the growth in the strength of the Selected Reserve projected through the end of FY 1990. Note that the contributions of full-time personnel in the AGR Program and Individual Mobilization Augmentees are included in the totals.




FIGURE 13-2




FIGURE 13-3

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) are assigned to AC wartime-required (mobilization TDA or MTOE) positions that are not authorized in peacetime.

They are also assigned to Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Selective Service positions. As members of the Selected Reserve, IMA are subject to the Presidential 200K call-up (See Chapter 12). The IMA program provides for a mandatory two weeks (14 days) of annual training. Starting in FY88, 24 drills will be authorized for approximately 1,200 soldiers or 10% of IMA strength. This will be increased to 20% by Fiscal Year 1992 under current plans.

Individual Ready Reserve (USAR only). The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) exercises command and control over the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Stand-by Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The IRR consists of members (officer and enlisted) in seven basic control groups. These control groups provide for control and administration of USAR personnel not assigned to troop program units. USAR control group "Annual Training" consists of obligated nonunit Ready Reserve members, with a training obligation, who may be mandatorily assigned to a unit by the Commanding General, ARPERCEN. USAR control group "Reinforcement" consists of obligated members who do not have a mandatory training requirement and those nonobligated members interested in nonunit programs which provide retirement point credit. Many nonobligated reservists are assigned to this group while attached as students in a United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) school or members of Reinforcement Training Units (RTU), units organized to train nonunit members of the USAR. See AR 140-1 for definitions of the other five control groups. The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS—USAR) broadens the scope of training opportunities for IRR and unit officers. The Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS-USAR) focuses on training IRR enlisted members.

The IRR constitutes the largest of the pretrained individual manpower categories. These personnel provide the majority of fillers required to bring both the Active Component and Selected Reserve units up to the wartime required personnel strength in the event of mobilization, and initial casualty replacement/fillers in the fighting theaters. Figure 13-4 shows the history of growth in the IRR since 1981 and the projected strength by the end of FY 1990.

Legislative initiatives in 1983 resulted in an increase in the Military Service Obligation from six to eight years. This will provide further growth in the IRR beginning in FY 90. Another initiative resulted in the 1 June 1984 implementation of an IRR Reenlistment Bonus which provides \$750 for soldiers reenlisting for three years in a specified critical skill. A comprehensive IRR refresher training program is under development to improve the mobilization readiness of selected soldiers. This program will be implemented by the end of FY 88.

The FY 88-92 Defense Guidance (DG) directed that, commencing in FY87, the IRR of all services serve at least one day on active duty each year for screening. The




FIGURE 13-4

Army program began on 1 October 1986. The IRR is screened to determine their physical condition, dependency status, MOS qualification, civilian skills, and availability. The screening program is intended to reinforce IRR understanding of their military service obligation increase IRR interest in selected reserve duty, and ensure IRR personnel records are current to permit rapid mobilization.

Inactive Army National Guard (ING). The Inactive Army National Guard provides a means for individuals who are unable to participate actively to continue in a military status in the ARNG. While in the ING, individuals retain their Federal recognition and Reserve of the Army status as members of ARNG units. They are subject to immediate involuntary mobilization with the units to which they are assigned in time of Federal or state emergency. Personnel transferred to the ING normally will be attached to their former ARNG units. They are encouraged to participate in annual training with their parent unit.

Individuals assigned to the ING are accounted for in the Ready Reserve strength of the Army. ARNG units schedule an annual muster day assembly for their ING personnel each fiscal year. The muster serves to:

- Screen soldiers for mobilization.
- Inform soldiers of unit training plans and objectives.
- Conduct showdown inspections of clothing and/or equipment.
- Update personnel records.
- Determine requirements for immunization and physical examination.
- Discuss transfer back to active status (especially with those individuals who possess a critical skill).

The strength of the ING has remained at about 10,000 personnel since FY1985.

Standby Reserve (USAR only).

Individuals in the Standby Reserve are those who have completed all active duty and reserve training requirements and have either requested reassignment to the Standby Reserve to maintain an affiliation with the military, or who have been screened from RC unit or IRR roles for one of several cogent reasons. Key employees of the Federal Government (e.g., members of Congress or the Federal Judiciary), whose positions cannot be vacated during a mobilization without seriously impairing their agency's capability to function effectively, are examples of Standby Reservists. Other reasons for a Standby Reserve assignment include graduate study in a health profession, temporary (one year or less) medical disqualification, or temporary extreme hardship.

Standby Reservists may not be ordered to active duty unless a national emergency is declared by the Congress. Those assigned in an active status are authorized to participate in Ready Reserve training at no expense to the government. Such participation includes training to earn retirement points or to qualify for promotion. Those assigned in an inactive status are normally not authorized to participate in reserve duty training.

Retired Reserve (USAR only).

Individuals who are eligible for and have requested transfer to the Retired Reserve are in this third category. Included are those individuals who are entitled to retiree pay from the Armed Forces because of prior military service or who have completed 20 or more qualifying years of reserve (ARNG or USAR) and/or active service for which retirement benefits are not payable until age 60. In addition, ARNG/USAR officers and warrant officers who are drawing retired pay after completing 20 or more years of active Federal service are, by statute, members of the Retired Reserve. Regular Army enlisted men, retired after 20 (but less than 30) years of active service, are transferred to the Retired Reserve until they have completed 30 years of service. Members of the Retired Reserve are not provided any form of training and are not available for military service except in time of war or a Congressionally-declared national emergency. Additionally, anyone over 37 years of age with a minimum of 8 years' service is eligible for transfer to the Retired Reserve.

RC MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

As with the Active Component, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are affected by actions of the Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Army.

Congress.

Congress has enacted various laws establishing general and specific policies for the ARNG and USAR.

Certain areas such as pay and allowances and officer promotion are controlled closely, while other areas such as force structure are reviewed only occasionally. The most significant Congressional actions may be establishing and approving the annual strength authorizations. Each year minimum average strength floors are authorized to support appropriations for reserve pay and allowances. Although floors are established, Congress has been known to appropriate less money than needed to fund the authorized strength.

Strength authorizations and other matters concerning the ARNG and USAR are proposed by the Armed Services Committees of both Houses. The Defense Subcommittees of both House and Senate Appropriations Committees prepare the Appropriation Acts which allow funding.

Department of Defense.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD(RA)). Overall responsibility for all Reserve Components at DOD level is vested in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD(RA)).


Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB). Also at DOD level, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) acts as advisor to the Secretary of Defense on RC matters. The RFPB includes Guard and Reserve general officers, a civilian chairman, the Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of each service, and one Active Component general or flag officer from each military department. A RC general officer also is designated to be the executive officer of the board. The Secretary of Defense is formally associated with the RC community through the RFPB.

National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. This DOD-level committee has been in operation since 1972 with the intent of bettering relations between civilian employers and local ARNG and USAR units. The committee has been quite successful in resolving employer/employee misunderstandings arising from RC service. It operates on an informal basis with the goal of assuring individuals the freedom to participate in training without job impediment or loss of earned vacations. In FY 79, state chairmen were appointed to work with the national chairman. The use of state committees was intended to provide better coverage for the program.

Headquarters, Department of the Army.

The management structure for the Reserve Components in CONUS is shown in Figure 13-5. Almost all USAR Troop Program units are commanded by Forces Command (FORSCOM). ARNG units are commanded by their respective state governors until federalized by Presidential executive order. In the Pacific, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Western

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR THE RESERVE OF THE ARMY



*Some USAR General Officer Commands (GOCOM) report to US Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM). US ARCOM and GOCOM who report directly to CONUSA are known also as Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC).

----- Coordination - - - - - Channel of communication - Training assistance

FIGURE 13-5

Command (WESTCOM), commands all assigned USAR troop program units and assists in training Hawaii and Guam Army National Guard units.

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA(M&RA)). Within DA, overall responsibility for Reserve Components is vested in the Office of the ASA (M&RA).

Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC). The ARFPC reviews and comments through the OCSA and the ASA (M&RA) to the Secretary of the Army on major policy matters directly affecting the Reserve Components of the Army (ARNG/USAR). Membership on the committee consists of five Active Component general officers on duty with the Army Staff, five ARNG general officers and five USAR general officers. TRADOC, FORSCOM and AMC

provide representatives. The Director of the Army Staff serves as the committee monitor. The committee chairman is selected from among the Reserve Component members, and serves a two-year term. The committee normally meets in February, May, September, and December. Reserve Component members are appointed to serve on the ARFPC by the Secretary of the Army for three-year terms.

Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC). The RCCC, established in September 1976, reviews progress on Reserve Component matters related to readiness improvement, ascertains problem areas, issues and coordinates requisite tasking to the Army Staff, and reviews the progress of staff efforts. The Council is chaired by the VCSA and membership includes selected general officers from the Army Staff, Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau and Army Reserve, Director of

the Army National Guard, the FORSCOM Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB is the legally designated peacetime channel of communication between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the National Guard. It is both a staff and an operating agency. The Chief, NGB (CNGB) reports to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force through the respective Chiefs of Staff and is their principal staff advisor on National Guard affairs.

As an operating agency, the NGB is the channel of communication between the states and the Departments of the Army and Air Force. This means that the CNGB must deal directly with the state governors and The Adjutants General (TAGs) (Figure 13-6). Although he has no command authority in these dealings, cooperation is facilitated through control of funds, end strength, equipment, force structure programs, and by authority to develop and publish regulations pertaining to the ARNG when not federally mobilized.

The CNGB is appointed for a four-year term by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,

from a list of National Guard officers recommended by the state governors. He may succeed himself. The grade authorized for this position is lieutenant general.

The function of the NGB is to formulate and administer a program for the development and maintenance of National Guard units in accordance with Army and Air Force policies. The NGB is a joint bureau of the Departments of the Army and Air Force.

The CNGB is the appropriations director of six appropriations by law: three Army National Guard and three Air National Guard appropriations (pay and allowances, operations and maintenance, and construction). He delegates administration to the Directors of the Air National Guard and Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard. The Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG) directs resources to provide combat ready units. In support of the Federal mission, the DARNG formulates the ARNG long-range plan, program, and budget for input to the Army staff. The DARNG administers the resources for force structure, personnel, facilities, training, and equipment. The DARNG organization is at Figure 13-7.

NATIONAL GUARD MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE




FIGURE 13-6

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD




FIGURE 13-7

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR). The mission of the Army Reserve is to provide trained units and individuals to support Army Mobilization Plans. OCAR provides direction for USAR planning for the execution of this mission. The CAR is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and holds the rank of major general in the Army Reserve.

The functions of the Chief of Army Reserve are:

- Advisor to the Army Chief of Staff on USAR matters.
- Directly responsible to the Army Chief of Staff for matters pertaining to the development, readiness, and maintenance of the USAR.
- Responsible for implementation and execution of approved Army plans and programs.
- USAR representative in relations with governmental agencies and the public.
- Advisor to Army staff agencies in formulating and developing DA policies affecting the USAR.
- Assists in development of policy and plans for mobilization of the USAR.
- In coordination with other appropriate Army Staff Agencies, recommends, establishes and promulgates DA policy for training the USAR.

• Director for three USAR Appropriations (Pay and Allowances, Operations and Maintenance, and Military Construction).

• Member of DA and OSD Committees as required.

• Director of the USAR portion of Program 5.

Figure 13-8 shows the organization of the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE




FIGURE 13-8

The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). This organization is a field operating agency of the OCAR which serves the U.S. Army Reserve with a mission similar to that performed by MILPERCEN for the Active Component.

The major responsibilities of the Commanding General, ARPERCEN, are:

a. Personnel Management.

(1) Command and Control of the IRR, Standby Reserve, and retired personnel.

(2) Manage and implement OPMS/EPMS for the Army Reserve.

(3) Plan and implement management information systems to support personnel management.

(4) Administer the USAR Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), and IMA Programs.

(5) Support statutory and regulatory programs that provide assistance to soldiers, former soldiers, government activities, and the general public.

(6) Develop Army Reserve data for the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.

b. Records Management.

(1) Serve as the depository for the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) of the U.S. Army Reserve and retired soldiers eligible for mobilization.

(2) Provide support services for other agencies and activities; e.g., MILPERCEN, with respect to data on reserve personnel.

c. Mobilization.

(1) Prepare for mobilization and mobilize required numbers of trained individual reserve soldiers and retired soldiers to enable the Army to successfully wage war.

(2) Prepare for demobilization.

ARPERCEN provides those services necessary for maintaining high individual morale and esprit de corps by administering to those individuals who are veterans or retirees. In this capacity, ARPERCEN provides information to various government agencies to be used as a basis for obtaining entitlements or benefits. ARPERCEN corrects records, replaces essential documents, verifies status and service, and accomplishes many other functions involving the individual military personnel record. In addition, ARPERCEN provides administrative support for many DOD programs involving records in its custody, as well as records of discharged personnel in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Major Army Commands.

U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). The missions of the Commanding General, FORSCOM, include command of all assigned USAR troop program units in CONUS, and supervision of training of the ARNG. He is responsible to organize, equip, station, train, and maintain the combat readiness of assigned units. He also manages the RC advisory structure and exercises command of the USAR units through the CONUSA commanders.

On 1 October 1984, FORSCOM completed a reorganization designed to streamline the management structure and provide increased responsibility and authority in the Reserve Component chain of command. CONUS Armies were increased from three to five and the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMR) were eliminated. USAR troop program units are commanded by FORSCOM through the CONUSA.

All USAR units are assigned to either an Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) or to a functional General Officer Command (GOCOM). An ARCOM, authorized a major general as commander, is an organization with command of USAR units located in a specific area. GOCOM are organized along functional rather than regional lines. Examples are training

divisions, engineer commands, corps support commands, and maneuver area commands. Army Reserve organizations which report directly to CONUSA headquarters are designated Major U.S. Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC).

Among USAR units are such diverse organizations as combat brigades, combat support, and combat service support units; training divisions with a mobilization mission of conducting Basic Training (BT), Advanced Individual Training (AIT), and One Station Unit Training (OSUT); Maneuver Area Commands (MAC) with a mission of writing and conducting brigade, group and higher unit CPX, FTX; Maneuver Training Commands (MTC's) with a mission of writing and conducting battalion and lower unit ARTEP, CPX, FTX; Army garrisons with a mobilization mission of staffing a post; and USARF schools which conduct enlisted MOS courses, special courses, Officer Advanced, and USACGSC courses. The USAR, in addition to maintaining units, has individuals in nonunit control groups as described in the section on the IRR. In addition to the major USAR organizations, there are approximately 3,300 company/detachment-sized units.

TRADOC. TRADOC is responsible for initial entry training for RC members. All nonprior service male enlistees under the Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963 (REP-63) perform an initial period of Active Duty for Training (ADT) for a minimum of 12 weeks. This includes Basic Training (BT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) under Active Component auspices. Non-prior service females are also required to complete BT and AIT. An alternative method of conducting this training is the "split-train" concept whereby a RC member may do BT during one year and AIT the following year.

State Adjutants General (Army National Guard).

Army National Guard units are located in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. The ARNG mans more than 4,464 units located in over 2600 communities throughout the country. Command of the ARNG when not in active Federal service is vested with the governors of the states. The governors exercise command through The State Adjutants General. The State Adjutant General (TAG) is a state official whose authority is recognized by Federal law. The TAG is normally appointed by the governor but in certain instances is elected or appointed by the President. The grade authorized is normally Major General.

TAG's of the several states manage federal resources to build combat-ready units. Their management staffs include both state and federal employees. ARNG commanders under the TAG lead their combat-ready units in training during peacetime. A State Area Command (STARC) is organized within each state for command and control of ARNG units during

premobilization and is charged with initial postmobilization command and control of mobilized ARNG units until the units arrive at their mobilization station.

The ARNG consists of predominantly combat units. ARNG forces are assigned to five infantry divisions, two mechanized infantry divisions, two armored divisions, one light infantry division, four Roundout divisional brigades, 14 separate combat brigades, and four armored cavalry regiments. Additionally, there are numerous other separate combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

The United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO). The USPFO is an officer of the National Guard of the United States (Army or Air) ordered to active duty under the provisions of Title 10, USC. The USPFO receives and accounts for all Federal funds and property and provides financial and logistical resources for the maintenance of Federal property provided to the State. Moreover, the USPFO furnishes advice and assistance to units/organizations/activities within the State to insure that Federal property is used in accordance with applicable DA and DAF directives as implemented by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. Further, this individual manages the Federal logistics support systems (Army and Air Force) for the states and, upon mobilization of a supported unit, provides that support necessary for the transition of the mobilized entity to active duty status. Additionally, the USPFO functions as a Federal Contracting Officer and is responsible for Federal procurement activities within the State. The USPFO also performs as the Transportation Officer responsible for mobilization movements planning and transportation of ARNG personnel, technicians, supplies, and equipment.

Funding of Facilities. The National Defense Act of 1950 provides for Federal support of ARNG facilities construction. This law permits construction of facilities on sites furnished by states at no cost to the Federal Government, or on Federal property licensed to the states specifically for Army National Guard purposes. Funding for approved armory construction is 75% Federal funds and 25% State funds, with 100% Federal support for other construction such as administrative, logistics support, and training facilities. The operation and maintenance costs for these facilities are funded as follows:

- Armories located on state-owned land-100% State funds.
- Facilities located on Federal land-100% Federal funds.
- Administrative and logistics support facilities-75% Federal funds and 25% State funds.

- Training facilities-100% Federal funds.

All funding for construction and maintenance of facilities for the USAR is provided by the Federal Government.

TRAINING

The training programs of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are prescribed by the Active Army, both during inactive duty training (IDT), commonly referred to as UTA's, MUTA's, drills, or assembly periods; and during a 15-day period generally known as annual training (AT) or summer camp. The same standards of training are expected and required of ARNG/USAR units as that of their counterparts in the Active Army.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, as elements of the Selected Reserve, are normally authorized 48 drills and a two-week (15 days) annual training period during the training year, which starts on 1 October and terminates on 30 September of the following year. The general trend is to consolidate these unit training assemblies during the year so that four UTA's (16 hours) are accomplished during a single weekend. This MUTA-4 configuration provides continuity for individual and crew training, qualification and familiarization firing, field training, and refresher training.

Annual Training (AT) consists of mission-essential training conducted at the training site, excluding travel time, parades and/or ceremonies, issue and turn-in of equipment, payment of troops, and the like. Individual training and weapons qualification are usually performed during IDT.

READINESS/MOBILIZATION ASSISTANCE

Background.

In 1973 the Army leadership recognized the potential of many types of RC units for early deployment. Accordingly, the Affiliation Program was conceived to improve the mobilization and deployment readiness of selected RC units and provide added combat power earlier in the execution of contingency plans. As part of this program, RC combat battalions and brigades were selected to "round out" Active Component divisions that were understructured due to resource constraints. Roundout units were accorded the same resourcing priority as the parent unit, were scheduled to deploy with the parent unit or as soon as possible thereafter, and entered into close planning and training associations with the parent unit to improve readiness. Other categories of the original Affiliation Program

were resourced to foster close training associations between like AC and RC units to help upgrade the readiness and capabilities of selected other RC units.

As more structure and missions were added to the RC in the mid-to-late 1970's, the Army instituted several other programs to facilitate achievement of higher training readiness levels for the RC. These included the AC/RC Partnership Program which aligned selected major combat and Special Forces Units, the Counterpart Program which aligned ARNG attack helicopter units with AC counterparts, and the Corps and Division Training Coordination Program (CORTRAIN) which associated AC/RC combat units with a CONUS Corps for command post exercises. Together these programs provided resources and opportunities for RC unit leaders and soldiers to work closely with and learn from their AC colleagues who shared with them a common goal of improving unit capability for wartime mission accomplishment.

Capstone.

In 1979, HQDA approved a FORSCOM initiative called Capstone. This program established an organizational structure for managing the Total Force by placing all Active and Reserve Component Units into a wartime organization designed to meet the enemy threat in a European, Southwest Asian, or Pacific contingency. A later update of the structure also included the units assigned to operate the CONUS sustaining base.

Capstone provides the basis for establishing planning and training associations to enable units to focus planning on specific wartime missions and, where feasible, to train in peacetime with the organization they will operate with in wartime. Under Capstone, RC units can concentrate their limited training time on tasks bearing directly on their wartime mission. Units slated for more than one theater are assigned a priority theater and directed to focus training on that contingency.

Army Regulation 11-30, published first in 1983, expanded the Capstone Program to provide a better framework for managing the Affiliation, Partnership, Counterpart, and CORTRAIN Programs already in being. Capstone also provided a more rational basis for participating in the Mutual Support Program (which allows AC and RC units to conduct mutually beneficial activities on their own volition), overseas deployment training, and joint exercises.

Overseas Deployment Training.

The Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) Program provides high priority Reserve Component units the opportunity to train in their contingency areas with their wartime command. Selected units train up to 26 days in JCS exercises working alongside their Active Component counterparts. The ODT Program has increased from 26 units/cells in 1976, the first year of the program, to over 2,600 units/cells and over 36,000 personnel in FY 86. Overseas Deployment Training

(ODT) Programs allow the reserve components to conduct realistic mobilization mission training in peacetime, in many cases with the organization with which they will be associated when mobilized. This training increases awareness of mobilization mission requirements, allows training to be conducted in an overseas environment which reinforces a sense of belonging, and increases units' abilities to mobilize and deploy. The trend in recent years has been toward overseas deployment for larger units with an increased number of individuals having the opportunity for this excellent training. FY 87 projections call for over 47,000 personnel and 2,100 units/cells to participate in ODT.

Full-time Support.

A Full-time Support (FTS) Program has been adopted by the Army to increase the unit readiness of high priority Army National Guard and Army Reserve units by providing them additional full-time personnel. The Full-Time Support Program provides the ARNG and USAR with full-time personnel needed in peacetime to support ARNG and USAR manpower requirements determined by mission, organization, equipment and readiness objectives. This program encompasses Active Army, AGR, military technicians and civilian personnel serving on a full-time basis for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the ARNG and USAR.

In the past, the only full-time unit support available was a small number of technicians who performed essential day-to-day administrative, supply, and maintenance functions. Under the new program, AC and RC soldiers are provided to units on a full-time basis to improve training, mobilization planning, supply, maintenance, and other readiness-related areas.

Active Component soldiers in this program are not advisors, but unit workers. They will deploy with the Guard or Reserve unit to which they are attached. They are rated within the unit rating scheme without regard to component. The tour of duty is three years.

Goals for the Army FTS Program through FY 1990 call for a steady increase in FTS personnel until approximately 16 percent of the ARNG Selected Reserve end strength and 14 percent of the USAR Selected Reserve end strength is achieved.

Reserve Component Assistance.

Technicians. ARNG and USAR technicians provide full-time, day-to-day assistance and support and act as the representative for their commanders during nondrill periods. Technicians insure continuity in administration, supply, maintenance, and training and their services are critical to mobilization preparedness.

Both ARNG and USAR technicians are Federal Civil Service employees. The Army Reserve Technicians (ART) are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service System. ARNG technicians are governed by the same provisions except as modified by Public Law 90-486 (National Guard Technician Act of 1968) as well as

Title 32, USC, Section 709, and regulations prescribed by the National Guard Bureau.

U.S. Army Reserve Forces (USARF) Schools. The USARF school system has 91 school units with a total faculty of approximately 7,300. The schools conduct career enhancement classes for both officer and enlisted personnel in over 900 locations. Upon mobilization, USARF school personnel augment the TRADOC school system, Army Training Centers (ATC), and other activities.

Active Duty Tours. RC personnel increasingly are being integrated into the active structure under the AGR Management Program. These persons serve on full-time active duty in AGR status in support of the RC. The Army Reserve Personnel Center and the National Guard Bureau administer the programs for USAR and ARNG personnel. It is anticipated that this program will continue to grow.

RESERVE COMPONENT PAY, BENEFITS, AND ENTITLEMENTS

In general, Reserve Component pay and allowances are determined on the basis of the individual reservist's status. During inactive duty training periods, members of the Selected Reserve receive one day of basic pay (based upon years of service and grade) for each UTA attended. During active duty for training periods, members receive the same compensation (basic pay, quarters, and subsistence allowances) as their Active Component counterparts.

Depending upon assignment, some reservists may be eligible for additional special pay for aviation duty, medical or dental service or hazardous duty pay, all on a prorata basis.

Eligibility for other service-associated benefits depends upon status of the service member. For example, during inactive duty training, members of the Ready Reserve are entitled to full use of the exchange system based upon the formula of one day of shopping for each UTA (four-hour period). Unaccompanied spouses with proper identification are authorized to use the Post Exchange (PX) at all times and the commissary during Annual Training (AT) and any Active Duty for Training (ADT) of 72 hours duration or longer. Effective in 1987, qualified USAR soldiers and their families will be able to shop in commissaries at any time up to 14 days a year, on days of their choosing. In addition, during IDT, reservists may use military clothing stores, official library services, and some clubs. Ready reservists assigned or attached to units which schedule at least 12 drills yearly and Active Duty for Training also are entitled to receive full-time Servicemen's Group Life Insurance.

While on Full-Time Training Duty or Active Duty for Training, reservists receive basically the same benefits

and privileges as Active Component members. However, they do not receive CHAMPUS coverage or dental care unless the training period exceeds 30 days.

Members of the Retired Reserve under age 60 receive no benefits other than access to military clothing stores, official library services, and a burial flag. Upon reaching age 60, members of the Retired Reserve receive basically the same benefits as retired active counterparts except for military burial assistance and a military death gratuity.

Members of the Reserve Component who accumulate 20 years of creditable service and reach age 60 are entitled to retired pay computed on the basis of retirement points accumulated. In general, a creditable year is one during which a reservist accumulates 50 or more retirement points. Points are awarded on the basis of one point for each four-hour assembly; each day of active duty; and each three credits of correspondence courses completed. Additionally, 15 points are awarded for membership. Not more than 60 points per year may be awarded for IDT activities, however. Retirement pay is computed by totaling all retirement points accumulated and dividing by 360. The quotient is then multiplied by 2½%. The resulting percentage is then applied to active duty basic pay of an individual with the same grade and number of years of service.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was extended to RC members as of 14 November 1986 when President Reagan signed into law the "Military Justice Amendment of 1986" as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987. Under these changes the military can recall a soldier to active duty for trial for crimes committed while performing active duty for training. The decision to activate a soldier for trial must be approved through the Reserve chain of command to the Secretary of the Army.

SUMMARY

Over half of the Army's total deployable forces are in the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. The management of these forces is of paramount importance to the Total Force. The structure for RC Management includes the Congress, DOD, HQDA, MACOM's, States and Units. Two key managers at HQDA are the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve. At the MACOM level, FORSCOM and its subordinate CONUS Armies have a leading role in preparing RC forces for mobilization and deployment.

There are many on-going actions to improve the operational capability of RC forces. Examples from this chapter include Capstone, and Full Time Support. Assistance is provided also by the technician force, USARF schools, and RC officers serving on Active Duty tours in headquarters at various levels.

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- (3) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 140-1: Army Reserve: Mission, Organization, and Training*. Washington: 1 February 1985.
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- (5) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 140-145: Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program*. Washington: 20 June 1985.
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- (9) U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. *United States Code*. 1970 ed. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971. Vol. 2., Title 10.
- (10) U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. *United States Code*. 1970 ed. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971. Vol. 8, Title 32.
- (11) Public Law 90-486. The National Guard Technician Act of 1968.

CHAPTER 14

ARMY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

NOTE: As a result of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (The Packard Commission); National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 which implements virtually all of the recommendations of the Packard Commission to include a two-year defense budget; the Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145); the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433); and Public Law 99-591 (Making Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987) with its SOF provisions, the DOD PPBS/Army PPBES processes are undergoing significant change. Many changes implementing biennial PPBS/PPBES procedures are still being developed and/or refined at the writing of this revision of the text. Changes approved to date are included herein.

The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is a cyclic (biennial) process used to develop a plan, a program, and a budget for the Department of Defense (DOD) as outlined in DOD Instruction 7045.7. It provides a framework for making decisions on current and future programs through three interrelated phases (planning, programming, and budgeting), consistent with national security objectives, policies, and strategies. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) provides centralized policy direction throughout the cycle, while giving the Military Departments (Services) and DOD agencies the authority to execute the program. Participatory management in each phase of the process aims at achieving the best mix of forces, manpower, materiel, equipment, and support within resource constraints.

The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) is the Army component of the DOD PPBS. It is the Army's primary strategic management system used to allocate and manage resources. Its objectives are to: "reflect the national military strategy in sizing, structuring, and manning the Army force; obtain required forces, manpower, materiel, and dollars; allocate forces, manpower, materiel, and dollars among competing demands according to Army resource allocation policy and priorities; and evaluate how well execution of the program and budget applies resources to achieve intended purposes and adjust resource requirements based on execution feedback." The interrelated phases of the PPBES provide for an orderly progression from national security objectives, policies, and strategies to

the development of force requirements, establishment of force structure and programs within resource constraints, and to preparation, execution, and review of the budget. "Execution (E)" emphasizes the Army's accountability and responsibility for day-to-day management of its resources. Before examining the details of the Army PPBES, let us briefly review the DOD PPBS.

DEFENSE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM

The DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System was instituted in the early 1960's to facilitate budgeting in terms of forces, systems and programs rather than resource categories. It is used to determine force, system, and program costs and to compare alternatives in terms of costs and benefits. In effect, it is the decision structure within which DOD determines its requirements and allocates constrained resources. DOD PPBS is the primary formal strategic management system for building and maintaining the Five-Year Defense Program which is the official record of major resource allocation decisions made by the Secretary of Defense. PPBS is simply a way of progressing from the general (the articulation of the national military strategy) to the specific (the organizations, manpower, materiel, training, and support of the forces necessary to carry out that strategy).

PPBS is an evolutionary process. A brief look at the history of its evolution may be useful. The following are seven milestones in the evolution of today's PPBS.

1960—Kennedy/McNamara. President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, brought the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System with him to DOD from Rand Corporation where it had been developed in the 1950's. Before McNamara, each Military Department had prepared its budget following its Service interests with very little guidance. Previous SECDEF involvement was for the most part limited to dividing DOD's budget ceiling between the Services. If the Services exceeded their "share of the pie," the SECDEF would reduce their budget, usually by a percentage cut across the appropriations. Before PPBS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) rarely attempted to review the programmatic aspects of the Services' budget submissions. To provide a programmatic and multi-year focus, which is the heart

of PPBS, the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) was created. The FYDP was and is the central data base underlying PPBS.

1969—Nixon/Laird. The first major change in PPBS occurred under President Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. The Laird management style stressed participatory management. OSD no longer initiated detailed program proposals; they reviewed those put forward by the Services using specific budgetary ceilings.

1976—Carter/Brown. President Carter introduced Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) to the Federal Budget to include the Defense portion of the Budget. It achieved only limited success. The goal of ZBB was to more clearly identify marginal programs. "Decision packages" were arrayed at three different resource levels giving OSD greater opportunity to alter Service program proposals. Each Service developed procedures to array the decision packages. The Army procedure was and still is called the Program Development Increment Package (PDIP) process/Management Decision Package (MDEP). In 1979, as a result of a Rand Corporation study (the Rice Study), SECDEF Brown formed the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to better manage the PPBS process. The DRB consisted of various under and assistant secretaries in OSD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

1981—Reagan/Weinberger. The Reagan administration pledged to revitalize American military strength in the most effective and economical manner. This objective led to significant changes to PPBS known as the Carlucci initiatives (Frank Carlucci was DEPSECDEF and Chairman of the DRB). Initiatives included greater emphasis on long-range planning, greater decentralization of authority to the Services, closer attention to cost savings and efficiencies, refocus of DRB Program Review to review only major issues, and general streamlining of the entire PPBS process. The DRB was restructured to include the Service Secretaries as full members. The DRB would now review and approve policy and strategy in the planning phase (development of Defense Guidance (DG)). Commanders-in-Chief (CINC's) of unified and specified commands would now be invited twice a year to participate (brief) in the initial DRB deliberations of planning and programming phases (DG & DRB Program Review).

1984—Army/Air Force Joint Memorandum of Agreement. In 1984 Army Chief of Staff, General Wickham, and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Gabriel, signed a joint Memorandum of Agreement aimed at better coordination of budget priorities, elimination of duplication of functions, and more efficient joint operations in the "AirLand" battle during war. The Memorandum of Agreement was not a DOD initiative, but has direct impact on DOD PPBS. The memorandum addresses existing Army/Air Force

roles and missions overlap. The memorandum is an effort to reduce resource redundancy and interservice rivalry for limited resources. It stresses Army/Air Force cooperation during program development. Interservice debate over program issues is to be resolved during program development, not during annual DRB Program Review.

1984—Enhancement of CINCs' Role in the PPBS. DEPSECDEF Taft endorsed PPBS procedures to allow the CINC's a greater voice in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process and the DRB Program Review. The procedures include: CINCs' submission of prioritized requirements (via Integrated Priority Lists (IPL's)), tracking CINCs' concerns during POM development, visibility of CINCs' requirements in the POM's, enhanced participation of the CINC's in the DRB Program Review process, and enhanced role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the review and coordination of the CINCs' concerns.

1986—Conversion from Annual to Biennial PPBS Cycle. In response to his Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission) and the DOD Authorization Act of 1986 (PL 99-145), President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 directing that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the DOD produce a two-year budget beginning with the FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget years. In response to this direction, OSD, OJCS, and the Military Departments have implemented a biennial vice annual PPBS process.

PPBS/PPBES Process.

Figure 14-1 provides a schematic representation of the PPBS/PPBES process and its timing (as currently known).

PLANNING


Two very important non-DOD documents that have an impact on the PPBS process are the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) and the National Security Study Directive (NSSD), formal documents used by the National Security Council (NSC) to communicate with departments and agencies. These NSC directives are established in two series to inform departments and agencies of Presidential actions.

A National Security Decision Directive is used to promulgate Presidential decisions implementing national policy and objectives in all areas involving national security. All decision directives in this series are individually identified by number and signed by the President.

A National Security Study Directive is used to direct studies to be undertaken involving national security policy and objectives.

The DOD PPBS Cycle begins with the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) which initiates the planning phase by providing the advice of the JCS to the SECDEF, the NSC, and the President on the national

PPBS/PPBES PROCESS



TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE, NOT EXACT

ACC - ARMY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE
AG - ARMY GUIDANCE
VOL I - THE ARMY PLAN (TAP)
VOL II - PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE
VOL III - SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE
VOL IV - POM WRITING GUIDANCE
BMG - BUDGET MANPOWER GUIDANCE
CINCs - COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF

COB - COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET
DG - DEFENSE GUIDANCE
DRB - DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD
JPAM - JOINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM
JSPD - JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT
JSPDSA - JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT SUPPORTING ANALYSIS
NSDD - NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE

NSDD - NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY DIRECTIVE
PARR - PROGRAM ANALYSIS RESOURCE REVIEW
PBAC - PROGRAM BUDGET ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PBD - PROGRAM BUDGET DECISION
PBG - PROGRAM AND BUDGET GUIDANCE
PDM - PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUM
POM - PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM
PPBES - PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AND BUDGET EXECUTION REVIEW SYSTEM

FIGURE 14-1

military strategy and force structure required to attain the national security objectives of the United States. The JSPD also provides recommendations on DOD force planning guidance and changes to the previous Defense Guidance (DG). The JSPD outlines a planning force which provides "reasonable assurance" of being capable of executing the national military strategy. Experience indicates, however, that the planning force may not be affordable within the midrange period, either in terms of dollars or manpower. The JSPD and DG are now revised on a two-year cycle. The JSPD is normally issued in July of odd-numbered fiscal years; the DG is issued in December of even-numbered fiscal years. Contributing to the development of the JSPD is an internal JCS document called the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA). The JSPDSA currently contains three parts: Part I, "Strategy and Force Planning Guidance"; Part II, "Analysis and Minimum Risk Force Requirements";

and Part III, "Analysis and Planning Force." The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and Army force planning are discussed in detail in Chapter 10.

The DG contains the necessary planning and programming guidance (to include resource guidance) that the Military Departments (Services) need to conduct force planning and develop their programs. The Defense Resources Board meets to review CINCs' recommendations and conflicting OSD and Service positions on the draft DG. Following these meetings, the draft DG is revised and published final in December of even-numbered fiscal years. A summary is sent to the President for his review. The planning phase establishes guidance for force and resource planning in four DOD categories known as the "four pillars of defense." They are: readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure.

Section II, *Strategy Guidance*, outlines the national military strategy for countering the threat during the

FYDP period and beyond. It addresses the deployment and employment of the armed forces in execution of assigned or derived missions in peace, crisis, and war and serves as the basis for development of the Force and Resources planning guidance. The section is based on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Section III, *Force Planning Guidance*, specifies the tasks to be carried out in developing the major combat and defense-wide support forces needed to execute the strategy. It includes criteria against which forces and necessary support are to be sized and structured. Appendix I to this section is a table depicting the major forces expected to be available during the FYDP. It provides a comparison of the current major forces, those expected to be programmed, and the JCS planning force recommended in event of global war or force expansion in crises. Appendix II is an illustrative planning scenario (IPS) included to facilitate coordination of service and agency POM development.

Section IV, *Resources Planning Guidance*, provides programming criteria and priorities for the allocation of defense resources principally in the areas of readiness, sustainability, modernization, and industrial base in order to enhance force capability and achieve requisite responsiveness to crises.

Section V, *Major Issues*, is a statement of those problems affecting the DG which require study or top management attention.

Defense Resources Board (DRB). The DRB is the OSD corporate review board. The DRB membership includes the DEPSECDEF as Chairman, the Under and Assistant Secretaries of Defense, selected OSD special staff and agency heads, the Chairman of the JCS, the Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Service Secretaries. The Service Chiefs of Staff are often invited to participate in DRB meetings. The role of the DRB is intended to help the SECDEF manage the full range of the PPBS. In accomplishing its role, the DRB has scheduled meetings to review proposed planning guidance, manage the summer Program Review, oversee the Budget Review and conduct the off-year Implementation Review. It is the DEPSECDEF's intention that the Implementation Review (scheduled to occur in October of the off-year of the two-year cycle) consider topics of importance such as Congressional actions, major program changes, reports required by Congress and how well DOD is executing the current program. The review will be held in conjunction with the DRB meeting to consider the draft Defense Guidance. The DRB advises the SECDEF on policy, planning, program, and budget issues. The DRB also performs program reviews of high priority programs on a continuing basis and assures that major acquisition systems are closely aligned to the PPBS.

The role played by CINC's in force structuring and resource allocation in PPBS has grown over the past years. CINC's are involved during most major steps in

the development of each year's Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and Defense budget. These steps include: providing detailed comments to update the Defense Guidance; meetings with the Defense Resources Board to review national strategy, policy, and resource guidance; inputting to JCS for the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM); and meeting with the DRB to review the Military Departments POM's where they may present any unfunded requirements (and other concerns) for further consideration.

The OJCS Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) is the office of primary responsibility for CINC participation. CINC warfighting priorities are provided directly to the SECDEF and Chairman, JCS (CJCS) in the form of an Integrated Priority List (IPL). The primary interaction between CINC's and Services is through component commanders who describe the IPL's in programmatic terms in their respective program submissions. Special visibility is given to CINC IPL's while they compete with other requirements during program development. The Services develop separate annexes to their POM's that address CINC IPL's and report how well CINC warfighting needs are met.

PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING

Figure 14-2 is an overview of the programming phase of PPBS. Defense Guidance and Budget Estimates are dashed boxes indicating the transition from planning to budgeting.

The Military Departments (Services) transmit their proposals for resource allocation, based upon the DG, to OSD by publishing a Program Objective Memorandum. Under biennial PPBS procedures, POM's will be submitted in two parts in even-numbered fiscal years—the medical POM in March and the remaining part in April. The POM is reviewed by the JCS which provides its view on the overall balance of the composite force and assesses the impact of cross-Service programs and issues on the national military strategy. The JCS is provided input from the CINC's for its review. This review is published in the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). The JPAM represents a consolidated risk assessment of the combined Service POM's.

OSD reviews the Service POM's and the JPAM, and identifies alternatives for those issues where OSD differs with the Service approach.

These issues are compiled into Issue Books (IB's) which become the bases for intensive DRB Program Review deliberations. There are eight numbered IB's: policy and risk assessment, nuclear forces, conventional forces, modernization and investment, readiness and other logistics, manpower, intelligence, and management initiatives. There is also a Defense Agency memorandum. These books present OSD alternatives for each issue and evaluate the merits of the alternatives

DOD PROGRAMMING




FIGURE 14-2

in terms of their ability, within fiscal and manpower constraints, to implement the missions prescribed in the DG. Unresolved issues are forwarded to the SECDEF for final decision. The Program Review decisions are promulgated in the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The first two program years in the Service POM's as revised by the PDM are then transformed into Service Budget Estimates. Budget issues are identified and resolved in a DRB Budget Review which addresses the various budget levels of the Service budgets. The Budget Review culminates in decisions known as Program Budget Decisions (PBD's) which are incorporated into the Defense Budget and ultimately into the President's Budget which is submitted to Congress (Figure 14-1).

The Five Year Defense Program is the OSD Comptroller-managed data base which contains the resources (manpower and dollars) associated with all the programs of the Services and other DOD agencies. Although called a five-year program, the FYDP actually reflects resources for the prior fiscal year, current fiscal year, two budget years, and three succeeding fiscal years.

The FYDP reflects force levels for the prior fiscal year, current fiscal year, two budget years, and six succeeding fiscal years.

The Five Year Defense Program is structured using the following eleven major defense programs:

- Program 1 Strategic Forces
- Program 2 General Purpose Forces
- Program 3 Intelligence and Communications
- Program 4 Airlift/Sealift
- Program 5 Guard and Reserve Forces
- Program 6 Research and Development
- Program 7 Central Supply and Maintenance
- Program 8 Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities

Program 9 Administration and Associated Activities

Program 10 Support of Other Nations

Program 11 Special Operations Forces

Each of these programs is then subdivided into program elements which represent integrated subprograms combining personnel, equipment, and facilities that together constitute an identifiable military capability.

The budget requests submitted to Congress are structured along the lines of major appropriation categories and not along the lines of the eleven major programs. The major appropriation categories are input oriented. Some of the most significant appropriation categories are:

- Military Personnel (MPA, RPA, NGPA)
- Operations and Maintenance (OMA, OMAR, OMNG)
- Procurement (Aircraft, missiles, weapons & tracked vehicles, ammunition and other)
- Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, (RDTE), Army
- Military Construction (MCA, MCAR, MCNG)
- Family Housing (Construction and Operation)
- Army Stock Fund (ASF)

To meet the needs of OSD (output oriented) and Congress (input oriented), the FYDP has the capability to provide a "crosswalk" between program elements and appropriation categories. This crosswalk requires input from the Service staffs in a format which identifies dollars and manpower in both program element and appropriation category terms.

Under the *annual* PPBS cycle, OSD updated the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) data base three times each year—in January following submission of the

President's Budget to Congress, in May following submission of the POM's to OSD, and in September following submission of Service Budget Estimates to OSD. The January update was the base point for development of the Military Department/Defense agency POM's, the May update expressed the Military Department/Defense Agency proposed programs in response to the Defense Guidance, and the September update reflected SECDEF decisions (PDM) on the Military Department/Defense Agency POM's. Under *biennial* PPBS, FYDP updates will continue to occur after the above described events and otherwise as may be prescribed by OSD.

Joint OSD/OMB budget hearings are the beginning of the "stretch drive" in the budget formulation process. In less than three months, the final reviews must be accomplished and decisions made which will affect the Army's budget request. The hearings conducted by OSD/OMB analysts are detailed and numerous (approximately one hundred separate hearings on parts of the budget estimate submissions (BES)). The level examined is very low (subprogram, program element) and individual examiners are usually concerned with only small portions of the overall budget. The reviews are essentially a budget scrub, theoretically confined to pricing and feasibility adjustments such as, "Are cost estimates correct and can program objectives be accomplished with the resources requested?" The adjustments and reductions an analyst recommends result from taking "fat" out of the program wherever it exists. If, however, the OSD fiscal guidance has not been an accurate forecast of what the final Army Budget total should be, the OSD/OMB budget analysts are forced to look beyond pricing and feasibility. If a specific amount of money is directed to be cut, each analyst must make a reduction in the programs he/she reviews. It is difficult to change or eliminate programs without causing imbalances or being inconsistent with established policies and earlier programming decisions.

Program Budget Decision (PBD). PBD's are issued after the OSD/OMB review, approving or revising specific programs based on their review of budget submissions and the hearings conducted with appropriation directors. (NOTE: Redesignation of Appropriation Directors as Appropriation Sponsors is under consideration.) The Services may reclama a PBD and in each case a revised PBD, reflecting the reclama decision, is then issued. The most difficult PBD's (large cuts, controversial issues) are issued late in the process because these take longer to write and justify, and also require more review at OSD. Unfortunately, because of a shortage of time, the exchange of advance information on budget issues between OSD/OMB analysts and the Service Staffs is not so close and continuous as that which takes place in the identification and resolution of programming issues. The PBD process could be improved by early identification of potential issues, fewer PBD's, and

more time allowed for consideration of alternatives, resolution of issues and determination of program impact. At the end of the process, the Service Chiefs and Secretaries meet with the SECDEF or DEPSECDEF on major unresolved issues. The SECDEF makes the final decisions, if necessary meeting with the President to request fund restoration or recommend other actions. The last PBD is then issued and incorporated into the Service Budget, thus closing the second phase of the budget formulation process.

President's Budget. The last phase of budget formulation occurs in January when OMB transmits to Congress the Service Budget, as finally approved and incorporated into the President's Budget. The Service portion of the President's Budget is accompanied by supporting books (justification books), which contain descriptive summaries and justification documents prepared by appropriation directors.

ARMY PPBES

The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) is the strategic management system employed by the Department of the Army (DA) to ensure effective use of resources to establish and maintain the Army's capabilities to accomplish its roles and missions. Guided by policy and direction from the Secretary of Defense, the Army PPBES is responsive to both the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

Linking to the OSD programming and budgeting processes, the PPBES develops and maintains the Army portion of the FYDP and Defense budget. The PPBES integrates centrally-managed programs for manpower; research, development, and acquisition; and stationing and construction. Concurrently, the PPBES incorporates the operation and maintenance budgets of the Major Army Commands (MACOM's) and field operating agencies and the MACOM needs for manpower, housing, and construction.

The PPBES supports budget preparation from installation to Army Staff level. It reviews execution of the approved program and budget by both headquarters and field organizations. During execution, it provides feedback to the planning, programming, and budgeting processes.

Documents produced within the PPBES support defense decisionmaking, and the review and discussion that attend their development help shape the outcome. Examples follow:

The Army helps prepare the DG and the documents produced by the Joint Strategic Planning System. Army participation influences policy, strategy, and force objectives considered by the SECDEF and the JCS. The same participation bears also on policies for materiel development and acquisition and other issues.

MACOM's influence the positions and decisions taken by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army. MACOM's participate in developing Army Guidance; develop Program Analysis and Resource Reviews (PARR's); submit operating budgets and recommend reprogramming in the investment appropriations to meet identified weapon system requirements; identify problems hindering command missions in the POM assessment letter; and make their views known through periodic commanders' conferences held by the CSA on the proposed Army Plan, Program Objective Memorandum, and budget.

MACOM's serving as an Army component command of a unified or specified combatant command also identify, coordinate, and prioritize CINC requirements and submit them to HQDA as part of the MACOM PARR submission. These requirements have also been identified in more general terms in the CINC IPL's which are submitted to the SECDEF and the CJCS.

Used to administer the resource allocation processes and program approval, the PPBES helps assure Army capabilities needed to accomplish assigned objectives and missions as well as effective and efficient use of available resources. Each PPBES cycle is divided into four distinct phases for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. At a given time, the Army Staff is controlling and reviewing the current year in execution, justifying the next budget years before Congress, developing the next five-year program, and continuing to plan for the future beyond the program years. Feedback between separate cycles and between phases of a single cycle is both complex and continuous.

PPBES Responsibilities.

Responsibilities for Army PPBES are as follows:

Planning—The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) has Army Staff responsibility for planning and for providing resource allocation priorities, with Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army approval, as guidance to the Program and Appropriation Directors (Sponsors) for the other phases of the PPBES.

Programming—The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE), Office of the Chief of Staff, has Army Staff responsibility for programming to include the DRB Program Review; provides the PPBS interface between the Army Staff, the Secretariat, and OSD; and is responsible for the overall discipline of the PPBES within the Army. The responsibilities placed on the DPAE to keep programs up-to-date require that all actions with resource implications be coordinated

through the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate.

Budgeting—Pursuant to PL 99-433, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) (ASA(FM)) has Army Staff responsibility for the budget formulation and justification to all levels of approval authority.

Budget Execution—The ASA(FM) has Army Staff responsibility for budget execution to include fund distribution, fiscal management policy, and budget execution review.

PPBES Committees.

Throughout the PPBES cycle, the CSA and SA review and approve or amend Army plans, programs and budgets. They, the Army Secretariat, and the Army Staff continually reassess decisions that have been made to see the impact on other programs and to update policy and provide planning and programming guidance. In addition to established formal channels of coordination, a great deal of direct communication and informal coordination takes place between PPBES participants at all levels.

Select Committee (SELCOM). Obviously, there must be a corporate body which controls and guides the management of the Army's PPBES process. The Army's resource management "Board of Directors" is the Select Committee, co-chaired by the Under Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff and includes the Army Staff principals and the Secretariat as members (Figure 14-3). The SELCOM is empowered to make decisions on matters relating to planning, programming, budgeting, and budget execution. The SELCOM may dispose of issues outright or make recommendations to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army. There are two other PPBES committees which are subordinate to the SELCOM and which serve as principal forums for integrating PPBES actions.

Strategy and Planning Committee (SPC). The Strategy and Planning Committee is chaired by the Assistant DCSOPS (ADCSOPS) and includes as members those having responsibility for planning. The SPC serves as an integrating forum for Army planning. The purpose of the SPC is to prepare guidance and conduct analyses related to policy, strategy, and force planning matters, and make recommendations to the SELCOM. The SPC is the forum for final review of the structure and content of Army Guidance Volume I, The Army Plan (TAP), and to insure that the TAP provides clear, affordable, consistent planning guidance for programmers in each of the Army's nine programming functional areas. (Figure 14-4)

PPBES COMMITTEES




FIGURE 14-3

9 FUNCTIONAL AREAS

AREA	PROPONENT
STRUCTURING	DCSOPS
MANNING	DCSPER
TRAINING	DCSOPS
MOBILIZING/DEPLOYING	DCSOPS
PROVIDING FACILITIES	COE
MANAGING INFORMATION	TBD
EQUIPPING	TBD
SUSTAINING	DCSLOG
MANAGING	DAS

FIGURE 14-4

NOTES: 1. The number of functional areas is under review and may change.

2. Functional area proponents have changed due to the DOD Reorganization Act, with some to be determined (TBD).

Program Budget Committee (PBC). The Program Budget Committee (PBC) is a combined committee

formed as part of the effort to integrate the programming and budgeting phases of PPBES. It is co-chaired by the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Director of the Army Budget (DAB). The DPAE has staff responsibility for the programming phase and the DAB has staff responsibility for the budgeting phase. Serving both in a coordinating and executive-advisory role, the PBC provides a continuing forum in which program and budget managers review, adjust, and decide issues during the programming, budgeting, and budget execution phases of PPBES to ensure both internal consistency and support of established Army policy and guidance. The results of their deliberations are either returned to the Army Staff or Secretariat for action or passed to the SELCOM for review/approval and subsequent presentation to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army.

A PBC Weapons Systems Subcommittee helps link resource requirements of major weapon systems to the PPBES. The subcommittee consists of general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) representing the Army Staff and Secretariat. Its membership includes a representative of the U.S. Army

Materiel Command (AMC) and is co-chaired by representatives of the DPAE and DAB. The subcommittee serves as the single staff forum to review program, budget, and cost estimates of major weapon systems. It ensures that the PPBES uses estimates consistent with those of the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) process.

Prioritization Steering Group (PSG). The Prioritization Steering Group serves as another key PPBES decisionmaking body. The DCSOPS chairs the PSG. Its members currently consist of the Director of the Army Staff and heads of General Staff agencies, plus the Chief of Engineers (COE) and DPAE. However, due to the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, the membership of the PSG is under review and may change.

The PSG reviews the program established through the POM building deliberations of the PBC; resolves conflicts involving unresourced requirements or issues on which the PBC fails to reach agreement; and produces a prioritized balanced program that meets fiscal and manpower constraints imposed by OSD by making recommendations to the SELCOM.

Data Systems Supporting PPBES.

Army submissions to update the DOD FYDP are provided through the automated Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) Data Management System called PROBE. PROBE is used to support the process of developing the POM and formulating the budget. PROBE is a data gathering, organizing, and translating system. For the most part, PPBES data originate in Major Commands (MACOM) or Army Staff automated systems and are forwarded to the PROBE for collection and manipulation. PROBE uses the same PPBES data, with some modifications, to generate both the POM and the budget, despite the fact that these two documents are presented in dramatically different coding structures. The POM is coded by Army program, MACOM, appropriation, and DOD Program Element (PE), and the budget is coded by MACOM, appropriation, Budget Activity (BA), and DOD Decision Unit (DU).

A control file permits manipulating summary data to develop the program. Once a satisfactory program emerges, various Army Staff resource management systems can post corresponding detail files by breaking the program into greater levels of detail, specifically into the DOD program elements. A frequently used detail file report that is published at scheduled intervals in the PPBES cycle is the Program Development Increment Packages (PDIP's) Dictionary.

Maintenance files in the PROBE data base relate programming and budgeting data common to many transactions and are kept current by Army appropriation directors (sponsors), program directors, and manpower managers. Maintenance file data

provide the base against which all entries in the data files are edited.

The rigid deadlines of the PPBES cycle, coupled with the increasing complexity of the program and budget, result in the Army Staff having little time to perform analyses and recommend alternatives on the myriad issues competing for limited resources. In order to optimize the use of available time, HQDA has established a microcomputer-based decision support system to assist programmers and senior decisionmakers. This microcomputer-based decision support system will have controlled access to the PROBE data base.

ARMY PLANNING

Army planning examines national objectives and enemy capabilities; identifies the military strategy needed to maintain national security and support U.S. foreign policy; determines what integrated and balanced military forces are needed to support that strategy; and establishes a basis for managing DOD resources effectively and efficiently to accomplish its mission, consistent with resource constraints. The planning system is geared to the DOD PPBS and JSPS. It contributes to the military advice the Joint Chiefs of Staff give the SECDEF and the President through the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS).

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans has Army Staff responsibility for Army planning. This includes assigning, reviewing, coordinating, and supervising all actions assigned to the Army Staff; directing the macro analysis effort to support planning decisions; and preparing The Army Plan in coordination with the Army Staff and the Major Army Commands. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence develops the threat estimates.

Army planning is a continuous effort. Planning events recur year after year and their products, revised each year, influence the future while drawing upon substance from preceding years. Three planning phases constitute the Army planning system.

Force requirements planning is the first phase. Army planners translate defense objectives and policies contained in the Defense Guidance, the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), and the Joint Strategic Planning Document. Based on this translation, Army long-range plans, and Army leadership concerns, planners determine force requirements necessary to achieve national objectives in an unconstrained environment. The Army's internal analysis supporting this phase is accomplished through the Mid-Range Force Study (MRFS) Phase I. This analysis aids in developing the Army's planning force data for the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis Part II (Analysis and Force Requirements). The JSPDSA provides the analytical basis to develop the force structure needed to attain national security objectives.

Objective planning is the second phase (MRFS-Phase II). Army planners develop constrained macro force alternatives that are attainable within the program period based on OSD guidance and the force requirements. Preferred force alternatives are developed and presented to the Strategy and Planning Committee for consideration.

Planning decision is the third phase. It ends when The Army Plan is published. The preferred objective force alternatives are presented to the SELCOM and Army leadership for decision. The objective force selected is published in The Army Plan draft and is considered at the fall Army Commanders' Conference. Based on the commanders' views and comments, the objective force and guidance are modified. The objective force provides the Army Staff and MACOM's the optimum mid- and long-range force levels to guide POM and Extended Planning Annex development, given projected resource constraints.

See Chapter 10 for detailed discussion of Army Force Planning.

Force Integration Analysis (FIA).

A new Army PPBES concept, named Force Integration Analysis (FIA), has been developed to determine the executability of all aspects of the Total Army Analysis (TAA) derived Base Force. The transition to a Biennial PPBES provides the time to conduct this analysis, since neither a POM nor a budget will be developed in Calendar Year 1987. FIA supports the intent of recent external reforms—Packard Commission recommendations, the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 and NSDD-219; it also addresses correcting the assessments of the DAIG follow-up inspection of the force integration process. FIA is a continuation of the qualitative phase of TAA and precedes POM development. The Strategy and Planning Committee (SPC), chaired by the ADCSOPS, has oversight of the FIA process.

Overall Thrust of Force Integration Analysis. Force Integration Analysis is intended to answer such executability questions relating to the Base Force as:

- Can the Force be equipped? Is equipment already in the budget and programs correct by Line Item Number (LIN) to support the equipment requirements of the force by year?
- Can the Force be manned? Is the predicted mix of personnel, by component/grade and skill, what is needed for the force?
- Can the Force be provided facilities? Do facilities in current and budget construction programs meet the living, working, and training needs of the force? Are the right facilities in the right places?
- Can the Force be trained? Do ammunition, procurement spares, and stock-funded repair parts in the "pipeline" support the desired unit training levels each year? Do TRADOC and Reserve Component (RC)

schools have capability to support individual training requirements?

- Can the Force be sustained? Are spare parts and depot maintenance output available to support desired operating tempo (OPTEMPO)?

The final output of FIA will result in an executable POM Force to be briefed, for decision, to the SA/CSA.

The Army Plan (TAP).

The Army Plan, published biennially in November of even-numbered fiscal years as Army Guidance Volume I, provides the Army leadership's policy and resource guidance to support the Army's mission. It constitutes the Army planning and programming guidance issued to the Army Staff and MACOM's for developing the POM. The Army Plan is the blueprint of the Army's future. It establishes priorities for allocating both fiscal and manpower resources. It outlines a balanced program linking together the DOD Four-Pillars-of-Defense (Readiness, Modernization, Sustainability and Force Structure), Total Army Goals (Readiness, Human, Leadership, Materiel, Future Development, Strategic Deployment, Management and Training), and the Army's nine functional areas (Structuring, Manning, Training, Mobilizing and Deploying, Providing Facilities, Managing Information, Equipping, Sustaining and Managing). The Army Plan provides the major force alignment for developing specific programs. It establishes force packages for procurement and distribution prioritization using the Army Force Packaging Methodology (FPM). Using this method, those forces that are most critical in the early stages of a conflict are given the highest priority and receive resources at a higher percentage than the later deploying forces. The FPM is a detailed statement of priorities based on the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army guidance.

Operational planning. Operational planning addresses the short-range period (0-3 years from the current year). It uses the current force to carry out assigned tasks and develop contingency plans to meet possible threats. It contributes to the viability of the PPBES by identifying shortfalls and constraining factors in the capabilities established by the PPBES. It is managed through the JOPS. The two basic documents identified with operational planning are the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). See Chapters 10 and 12 for discussion of JSCP and AMOPS.

ARMY PROGRAMMING

The PPBES cycle transitions into the programming phase with the publication of the DG and The Army Plan.

Army programming translates OSD and Army planning and programming guidance, the DG and TAP, into a comprehensive and detailed allocation of forces, manpower, and dollars for a five-year period and general allocation for an additional 10 years. Program development results in the Army's Program Objective Memorandum, and Extended Planning Annex, which presents the Army's proposal for a balanced allocation of its resources within specified constraints. The POM is reviewed by OSD and modified to reflect the Defense Resources Board's Program Review and the SECDEF's decisions relative to the Army POM. The approved Army POM is the basis for developing the Army Budget Estimates Submission (BES).

The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army (OCSA), has Army Staff responsibility for the programming phase to include the Army program review. The DPAE ensures that the Army's program reflects accurately the cost estimates for major weapons systems, as approved by the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council. The DPAE determines affordability by assessing the effects of constrained resources on alternative program options. As cochairperson of the PBC, the DPAE influences debates on programming issues and develops topics for presentation to the SELCOM and CSA/SA.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management (ASA(FM)) monitors the POM development within the Army Secretariat.

Program Guidance.

HQDA provides formal program development guidance as follows:

The Army Guidance (AG). AG is issued to the Army Staff and MACOM's in four volumes. The DCSOPS publishes Volume I (The Army Plan); the DPAE publishes Volumes II-IV. Volume II (Development Guidance) documents the program development procedures and contains administrative instructions MACOM's must follow to prepare their Program Analysis Resource Review (PARR) and Modernization Resource Information Submission (MRIS). Volume III (Supplemental Planning and Program Guidance) provides DA-directed Program Development Increment Packages (PDIP's) costing requirements. Volume IV (POM Writing Guidance) reflects OSD's detailed instructions for writing the POM. The four volumes of Army Guidance are published to correspond to the PPBES cycle as follows: Volume I—November of even-numbered fiscal years, Volume II—June of odd-numbered fiscal years, Volume III—November of even-numbered fiscal years, and Volume IV—February of even-numbered fiscal years.

Program and Budget Guidance (PBG). The Program and Budget Guidance is issued three times per year (February, May, and October) under the staff responsibility of the Director of the Army Budget, who receives input from practically every major Army Staff

agency. The resource information provided by the PBG is based on the regularly scheduled updates of the FYDP. The PBG updates existing programs to reflect the current decisions and includes such things as numbers of units by type in the Active Army and Reserve Components, limitations on military and civilian manpower in headquarters and overseas locations, average salary data for civilians, and total manpower end strengths by quarter. A separate PBG document is tailored to each MACOM and selected operating agencies. The PBG schedule is as follows:

February (President's Budget)—Status of MACOM resources as a result of the OSD/OMB budget review process. This PBG establishes the specific base used for subsequent HQDA POM development plus the "current year program" approved by Congress.

May (POM Submit)—Status of MACOM resources as submitted to OSD in the POM. This report reflects the prioritized ranking of PDIP's in the Army Program. This report constitutes the formal reply to the MACOM's relative to their PARR submission.

October (Budget Submit)—Status of MACOM resources as submitted in the OSD Budget Submit. This PBG reflects the PDM impact on the POM submission and documents the Command Operating Budget (COB). This PBG establishes the base to be used for MACOM PARR development plus the next "current year" initial guidance.

The Long Range Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan (LRRDAP). The LRRDAP describes the strategy for research, development, and acquisition (RDA) for the POM and Extended Planning Annex (EPA). The LRRDAP translates goals and objectives contained in the TAP into specific RDA programs. The LRRDAP serves the Army Staff and MACOM's as the start point for RDA programming and the basic source of Army RDA priorities. The LRRDAP also expresses RDA priorities in terms of responsiveness to the Battlefield Development Plan (BDP) and readiness deficiencies identified through LOG-21.

The Army Materiel Acquisition Guidance (AMAG) provides instructions and resource guidance for developing RDTE and procurement programs.

Army Modernization Information Memorandum (AMIM). The AMIN is published in its entirety biennially (in April of every even-numbered fiscal year) by ODCSOPS. A cost supplement is published in July of the off-year (odd-numbered fiscal year). The AMIN provides all the information required by MACOM's to plan for Force Modernization. Detailed system descriptions are provided for each item being fielded. Updated distribution plans and organization designs are included to reflect the changes from the FMMP. The AMIM also includes OPTEMPO and density data for

systems. This data is used to estimate support costs once the system is fielded. MACOM's use the data provided to prepare their input for the Program Analysis Resource Review (PARR) and Modernization Resource Information Submission (MRIS) which is the documentation used by HQDA to support resourcing the MACOM's for the modernization effort.

Modernization Resource Information Submission (MRIS). In 1981, the Army initiated a modernization program that will affect every organization in the Army. Associated with this modernization effort was the high cost in terms of dollars and manpower (both military and civilian) required to field and sustain the new equipment. In order to resource such an effort properly a system was needed to capture the dollars and manpower necessary to field and sustain the new systems and the associated displaced equipment. Thus, the MRIS process was created which enabled MACOM's to submit operations and support (O&S) requirements (i.e., repair parts, tools, military construction) to HQDA, that support the fielding and sustainment of new and displaced equipment. Because of the large number of systems, the Army elected to manage selected systems having the highest O&S costs—the HQDA Intensively Managed Systems. The remaining systems are managed by the MACOM's at an aggregate level of detail and resourced as a total package. During POM FY88-92, the Top-Down MRIS Model, which greatly reduces the MACOM input requirements, was tested and accepted for use in future POM's. HQDA (ODCSOPS) provides the MACOM's with the top loaded requirements. The MACOM unique costs will be submitted with the MACOM Program Analysis Resource Review (PARR) submit. The total sustainment costs will then be reviewed at HQDA.

Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP). The TAEDP is a program which compares force requirements and priorities against on-hand assets and projected deliveries to produce an equipment distribution program for the current, budget and program years. When necessary, the TAEDP can produce a plan out to ten years. The data source for requirements is the LOGSACS which merges near term authorizations from The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) with planned force structure as depicted in the Force Accounting System (FAS). Requirements are prioritized by ODCSOPS through the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) in conjunction with Equipment Readiness Codes (ERC) as stated in the unit TOE's. Current assets as reported in the Continuing Balance System-Expanded (CBS-X) are used as the base line from which projected distribution of deliveries begins. Deliveries consist of new procurement, Depot Maintenance returns, and redistribution of displaced systems or assets generated through force structure changes.

Total Army Analysis (TAA). The TAA is a four-phased computer-assisted process designed to determine the structure required to support a given combat force; e.g., divisions, separate brigades, ACR's. Its product is the base force structure that is subject to the FIA to determine its affordability and executability prior to beginning the POM process. Included are Active and Reserve Component MTOE units and the TDA Army to include civilian space requirements. It is a biennial process that provides a forum for adjusting the force structure to reflect program constraints like the fixed Active end strength and Total Obligation Authority (TOA) levels. Adjustments to the Active component, which are made in the environment of a fixed end strength are based on decisions as to which new force structure requirements (claimants) will be included in the structure and which (billpayers) must fall out. Other adjustments that can be made include decisions to transfer structure to the RC (less expensive) or to resource units at a lower level to free spaces to allow resourcing of more claimants. Substantial analyses to assess force capabilities and risks are conducted throughout the process. (For a more detailed discussion of TAA, see Chapter 11, Force Development).

Operational Readiness Analysis (OMNIBUS). OMNIBUS is a computer-assisted analysis that defines force capability existing at the end of the prior fiscal year and develops a prioritized list of recommendations to improve force readiness.

HQDA Program Development Documents.

— **Program Objective Memorandum (POM).** The key document in program development is the Program Objective Memorandum. The POM describes all aspects of Army programs which are designed to increase force readiness of the Active and Reserve Components of the Total Army. It highlights the forces, manpower, training, materiel acquisition, and logistics support required to meet the strategy and objectives. It contains tabulated program data and narrative rationale for the various aggregations of programs as well as rationale for some of the strategic management decisions. Publication of the POM formally transmits to OSD the Army's proposal for resource allocation in consonance with the OSD program guidance.

Extended Planning Annex (EPA). The EPA is an annex to the POM. The EPA extends for 10 additional years the five-year program in the POM. It displays the materiel acquisition profile for selected major systems, and it projects operating and support costs for the Total Army in force structure, manpower, and military construction. Since these items may well dictate resource allocation in the outyears, the EPA has assumed increasing importance over the last several years.

Program Development Increment Package (PDIP). A Program Development Increment Package (PDIP) is a document that identifies an individual program or capability. It links a stated individual program or capability to the resources needed to carry it out. PDIP's are the building blocks of the Army POM. They facilitate prioritization of limited resources. PDIP's provide visibility to individual programs allowing decisionmakers to be selective on how to spend the Army's limited force structure, manpower and dollar resources. Army Guidance II & III give MACOM's specific guidance and constraints on submitting new PDIP's in their PARR/MRIS. PDIP's are usually multi-year (five years of POM), multi-appropriation, and multi-command.

MACOM's Input.

MACOM's input into the program development process primarily through their MACOM specific Program Analysis and Resource Review, Modernization Resource Information Submission, and the MACOM Commanders' presentations and participation at the Army Commanders' Conferences.

Program Analysis Resource Review (PARR). The MACOM's submit their PARR to HQDA in November of even-numbered fiscal years. The PARR is the formal means for MACOM and CINC participation in the program development process. MACOM's that support CINC's of unified commands are required to incorporate into their PARR submissions the needs of the CINC(s) they support. The PARR is a request for resources to support new program initiatives and increase/decrease levels of effort for existing programs. Requirements are expressed programmatically in Program Development Increment Package format. The PARR presents the prioritized program of the command by including resource requirements and deficiencies with the focus on the first program year. The actual content of the document depends upon the yearly guidance received in the AG and any other special requirements for data levied by HQDA. The commander's statement that transmits the PARR describes how his PARR supports Army and supported CINC(s) priorities. It is also the means for the commander to express concerns about the resources allocated his command to support the Total Army program. PARR PDIP's compete with all other PDIP's during the prioritization process.

Army Commanders' Conference (ACC). ACC's play an important role in program development. Three conferences were scheduled annually when the *annual* PPBES process was in effect. The number and timing of ACC's to be scheduled under the *biennial* PPBES process is to be determined. Key decisions are made during the ACC's that have resource and force structure impact. The purpose of the Summer ACC (August) was

to present and receive commanders' preliminary views on The Army Plan, review the OSD Program Decision Memorandum, and receive commanders' views on budget preparation. Attendees were the four-star MACOM commanders and Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The purpose of the fall ACC (October) was to set goals, to plan for the future with emphasis on the current and program years, and to receive the commanders' views on The Army Plan. Attendees were all MACOM commanders, Army CINC's, the Secretariat, and the Army Staff principals. The purpose of the Spring ACC (March) was to receive commanders' views, after PARR evaluation, on results of Army programming to date. Attendees were the same as the summer ACC.

Program Development.

Program development may be viewed simplistically as in Figure 14-5. New PDIP's initially compete with existing program PDIP's (within the fiscal and manpower constraints given in Defense Guidance) in a prioritization process. The results of the prioritization process are reviewed and adjusted by the Army leadership through a program functional review process. The result of the process is the new POM.

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS




FIGURE 14-5

PDIP Prioritization Process. DCSOPS has overall responsibility for the prioritization of PDIP's but, DPAE has oversight responsibilities. All competing PDIP's are assigned to one of nine functional areas: structuring, manning, training, mobilizing and deploying, providing facilities, managing information, equipping, sustaining and managing. The Army Staff proponent for each functional area is shown in Figure 14-4. (NOTE: As a result of the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, the number of functional areas is under review. Several alternatives are being considered.)

Functional area proponents have initial responsibility for ranking PDIP's within assigned functional areas except that DCSOPS exercises the responsibility for ranking the programs for managing information and equipping.

The current nine functional areas are described as follows:

- **Structuring.** Relates to TOE or TDA structuring actions to include activations, inactivations, conversions, ALO adjustments, and/or force manning decisions (both military and civilian) for both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) of the Total Army.

- **Manning.** Provision of AC and RC manpower resources: recruiting, retention, improving quality of life, personnel management. Includes requirements for troop housing and occupational safety and health services.

- **Training.** Individual and unit training, training development and support, and the training base.

- **Mobilizing and Deploying.** Preparations prior to M-Day to enable the forces to expand in the event of war or other national emergency. Includes requirements for the mobilized force from receipt of mobilization order until departure from mobilization stations, and for surge requirements of the total force upon mobilization. Movement of personnel, equipment and supplies from present location to theater of operations. Army responsibilities include movement to the air or seaport of embarkation and from the port of debarkation. Also includes POMCUS (less equipment procurement).

- **Providing Facilities.** Construction or improvement of bases, installations, family housing, production facilities, environmental protection, and real property maintenance.

- **Managing Information.** The planning and execution of actions necessary to develop, transmit, use, integrate, and secure information.

- **Equipping.** Includes all research, development, and acquisition activities.

- **Sustaining.** CONUS base support and logistics base in support of the existing force. Includes supply management, troop support, war reserves, maintenance, transportation, storage, and energy management.

- **Managing.** Activities that directly contribute to the effective overall management within the Army. These activities include management education and management systems, establishment of standards, management improvements, productivity improvements and internal controls.

The functional area proponents establish nine prioritization panels which have membership from across the Army Staff to include a representative from each of the other eight panels. DPAE assigns fiscal and manpower ceilings for each functional area.

The proponents/panels rank order all assigned PDIP's. Obviously some PDIP's are unresourced. Others near the top of the resourced list (nearest the margin) are considered at risk (an actual dollar amount is given to each proponent by functional area which defines resources, at risk, and unresourced PDIP bands). Figure 14-6 is an example of fiscal constraints by POM year assigned to each functional panel.




FIGURE 14-6

MACOM's & DA Staff agencies sponsoring specific PDIP's often send persuasive action officers to present arguments for their PDIP's to the prioritization panels.

The prioritization lists of resourced and at risk PDIP's by functional area becomes the first cut of the POM.

PROGRAM FUNCTIONAL REVIEW

Functional proponents present a list of claimants (unresourced PDIP's) and, reluctantly, a list of bill payers (at risk PDIP's) to the Program Budget Committee as the first step in the program functional review.

The Program Budget Committee (PBC) (two star generals from each DA Staff agency and equivalent level representation from the Army Secretariat) listen to the arguments as to why both the claimants and the bill payers must be resourced by functional panels.

Through a decisionmaking process the decisions are made as to which PDIP's are now resourced, which are at risk, and which are unresourced.

A new PBC list of claimants and bill payers (no longer by functional area) is prepared by the Prioritization Steering Group (PSG) for the Select Committee (SELCOM) review.

The same process takes place at the SELCOM. DA Staff principals and the Army Secretariat decide on the final priority of Army programs and for selected programs present their recommendations to the CSA/SA for final approval (Figure 14-7).

PROGRAM FUNCTIONAL REVIEW




FIGURE 14-7

The Chief of Staff and, ultimately, the Secretary of the Army make the final decisions on what programs are or are not resourced based on the recommendations of the SELCOM.

The POM is "locked" in the February-March timeframe and put into a written document based on DOD Program Preparation Instructions (PPI) and Army Guidance Volume IV (POM Writing Guidance).

The POM is submitted to OSD in two parts: the medical POM in March of even-numbered fiscal years and the remainder of the POM in early April of even-numbered fiscal years.

The Secretary of the Army defends the Army Program at the DRB Program Review (Issue Book process) as submitted against modification.

The balance of the PPBES programming phase has been discussed earlier as part of DOD PPBS.

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ARMY BUDGETING

Programming translates planning into a balanced allocation of forces, manpower, materiel, and dollars for a five-year period. Budgeting expresses these resource requirements in terms of manpower and dollars, categorized by congressional appropriation, with emphasis on the first two years of the approved five-year program. Acquiring the necessary funds to carry out the approved plans and programs is accomplished through the Army Budget. The Army Budget also promotes efficient program management and effective financial control. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management has staff responsibility for the budgeting system. He discharges that function through the Director, Army Budget (DAB), who responds to both the Comptroller of the Army and, concurrently, to the CSA.

There are three stages to Army budgeting: budget formulation, justification, and execution. Budget formulation is the development of detailed fund estimates to support plans and programs. It includes a joint analytical review of the Army's Budget Estimate Submissions (BES) by OSD and the OMB and the subsequent Program and Budget Decisions (PBD's) by SECDEF. It concludes with the transmission to Congress of the approved Army Budget, which is part of the President's Budget. The second stage, budget justification, involves Congressional review and approval. The third stage, budget execution, is the adjustment of budgets to approved Congressional funding levels and the development of instructions for execution of the approved programs. It also includes apportionment requests and allocation, obligation, expenditure, and accounting for funds.

Budget Formulation.

This stage constitutes the main budgeting task confronting the Army Staff. It cannot be viewed as a single step coming at a particular time but must be considered as a continuing element of the overall PPBES process. It essentially consists of three increments. The first concerns the actions connected with the development of the BES and their approval by the Army hierarchy. The second increment is concerned with approval by SECDEF and the final increment concerns the transmission of the Army Budget to Congress. Formulation is then complete.

Budget Estimates Guidance. This guidance is prepared by OSD after approval of the POM and is provided for the preparation of the Army Budget

Estimates. This guidance includes: new requirements and changes initiated by Congress, OMB, and OSD; current year guidance including items to be considered in supplemental budget requests; budget year guidance for preparation of budget estimates based on force levels, program decisions, and the Total Obligation Authority (TOA) levels in the POM, as modified subsequently by PDM; authorization estimates guidance; and additional guidance applicable to all sections of the budget (e.g., inflation indices, outlay rates, use of contingency funds). It is important to note that fiscal guidance is received four to five months before the President's Budget is submitted to Congress and more than one year before the start of the first budget fiscal year. Yet, it is important that funding and manpower ceilings provided in this guidance are as close as possible to those that will actually be included in the President's Budget. In budgeting, the reality of resource scarcity and fiscal ceilings must be faced squarely. For this reason, fiscal reality is introduced early in the decisionmaking process of the PPBES by the integration of key programming and budgeting personnel into one committee, the PBC.

CSA and SA guidance is also necessary in the development of the BES. Input from the major commands is reviewed and used by appropriation and budget program directors (sponsors) in preparing their estimates. In order for the MACOM inputs to be timely and impact on budget formulation, guidance to the field must be issued in advance. The PBG issued in May provides this advance guidance.

Budget Estimate Submissions (BES). The Army Staff develops coordinated BES for OSD based on the approved POM as modified by the PDM. The BES also conform to specific budget guidance received from OSD in July of every *even*-numbered fiscal year in the Budget Estimates Guidance. The BES cover the prior year, the current year (FY immediately preceding the budget year), the two budget years, and the three years beyond the budget year. These last five years come from the FYDP.

Program and Budget Guidance (PBG). Programming aspects of the PBG were discussed earlier, but the document is also important in budgeting. As is the case with Army programming, budget guidance is issued to the field before receipt of OSD guidance. This fact does not mean that there is a lack of coordination between the Army and OSD staffs. The ASA(FM) staff maintains close contact with the OSD (Comptroller) staff so that the February and May PBG reflect, as accurately as possible, the resource targets and specific fiscal guidance that will be received from OSD or is contained in the POM as modified by PDM. The PBG is coordinated through staff input and review by the PBC. The MACOM's respond to the PBG with submission of a Command Operating Budget (COB).

Command Operating Budget (COB). The COB is used by the MACOM's to show their command operating program for the prior year, current year, and the requirements for the upcoming fiscal years. It also includes budget and workload data needed by appropriation directors (sponsors) in developing and evaluating their budget estimates. The COB also includes management initiatives taken by the command to reduce costs. It is based on the POM, which is normally submitted in April, and the ensuing May PBG.

During July and August, each appropriation director (sponsor) reviews and marks up the separate estimates for his appropriation (i.e., Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA); Military Personnel, Army (MPA); etc.) and fits them into a single budget. The appropriation/fund directors (sponsors) are further explained in Chapter 15—Resource Management. By early August of the budget preparation year, the appropriation directors (sponsors) submit their budget estimates for review by the PBC, the same forum which reviewed the Army POM. The DAB chairs the PBC while it discusses the issues and alternatives to the proposals of the appropriation directors (sponsors). Following the PBC revision (or "scrub") of the budget estimates for each appropriation, the appropriation directors (sponsors) present the proposed budget estimates to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) for his review. The DAB then presents summary budget estimates to the SELCOM, CSA, and SA for review and decision.

OSD/OMB Reviews. The BES is submitted to OSD by mid-September and then is reviewed by analysts from OSD and OMB in October and November. Army program directors are required to present broad overviews of major programs to the OSD and OMB analysts. After this briefing, the principal budget analyst for the major Army program reviews the BES in whatever level of detail the OSD analyst desires. Based on his review of the BES, the program director's overview, and his detailed discussion with the Army budget analyst, the OSD analyst forwards a Program Budget Decision (PBD) to the DEPSECDEF or ASD(C) in which at least one alternative is offered to the Army estimate.

Approval of the consolidated BES by the SELCOM, CSA, and SA completes the first phase of budget formulation.

Concurrent with the budget formulation, a budget savings display (called a "negative budget") is also developed. This display demonstrates resource management initiatives taken throughout the Army that resulted in savings. This display is used in discussing program adjustments with OSD and Congress. By highlighting which initiatives result in which savings, this display precludes taking the same reduction more than once.

Program Budget Decision (PBD). As mentioned above, the PBD offers an alternative to the Army estimate. These alternatives are usually dollar and manpower decrements or "scrub" based on price changes, inflation changes, errors, quality of justification, policy changes, and/or analytical disagreement. Once a PBD (there may be 100+ for the Army) is issued, the Army is allowed to reclama and the reclama receives the same level of review as the original PBD. Reclamas may only be offered to correct an error in the PBD or to offer new facts which have an impact on the decision. PBD reclamas are reviewed specifically by the ASA(FM).

President's Budget. Normally in late December toward the end of the PBD cycle, the DRB meets to review major budget issues as nominated by the Services. At this meeting the Service Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps make final arguments on important matters. OSD issues DRB decisions on major budget issues as final PBD's. OMB incorporates final budget controls for the current and budget years into printer's galleys of the President's budget used in printing a single budget document for the executive branch —The Budget of the United States Government. The DPAE uses these plus the outyear controls to update the FYDP to reflect the President's budget submission, and appropriation directors (sponsors) use the adjustments to post PDIP's at the program element, Standard Study Number (SSN), or project level of detail.

Budget Justification.

This second stage of budgeting entails the presentation and justification of budget requests before congressional committees (principally the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees) and ends with the passage of the military authorization and follow-on appropriation bills. The justification process proceeds formally and informally under the staff supervision of the DAB.

The Senate and House Armed Services Committees conduct authorization hearings for the various programs and appropriations. Concurrently, these items and the rest of the Army's budget request are referred to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. In some instances then, Army officials will testify before all four committees. During the Congressional hearings, the Army Staff provides additional information and justification, and answers questions resulting from testimony. When the Congressional reviews are completed, the committee bills are then voted upon. Any differences between the House and Senate are resolved in a joint conference. Recent authorization bills have often set maximum dollar levels for amounts to be appropriated each year over a period of years. However, it is the yearly Appropriations Act which actually provides budget authority to incur legal obligations and make payments.

When Congress fails to pass an appropriation by the end of September, it usually passes a continuing resolution. The Continuing Resolution Act (CRA) provides emergency legislation that authorizes the funding of Government operations in the absence of appropriations. A temporary measure, the continuing resolution usually restricts funding to the prior year level and prohibits new initiatives.

Budget Execution.

The last stage of the budgeting process is budget execution and applies to the funds appropriated by Congress. This process entails apportioning, allocating, and allotting funds; obligating and disbursing them; and associated financial reporting during budget execution. Financing unbudgeted requirements caused by changed conditions unforeseen at the time of the budget submission becomes a major managerial consideration. Congress recognizes the need for flexibility during budget execution. It accepts that rigid adherence to program purposes and amounts originally budgeted and approved would jeopardize businesslike performance. To meet these unforeseen conditions, Congress provides departments and agencies with limited transfer authority, and allows them to submit budget amendments, plus requests for supplemental appropriations.

The Service Secretaries are fully accountable for the management of their program execution process, therefore formal performance reviews for designated programs are held on a regular basis. The HQDA-level review is called the Program Performance Budget Execution Review System (PPBERS). This quarterly review evaluates and reports on how well resources are being applied to accomplish these Army goals. Programs selected for review are manpower programs, major materiel systems, or non-materiel programs of special interest to the Army leadership, SECDEF, or Congress.

Output Oriented Resource Management System. In 1984 a new approach to Army budget execution was introduced and is now being implemented.

The Output Oriented Resource Management System (OORMS) tracks financial resources from Army programming, through budgeting, and then budget execution. OORMS was conceived because a formal, systematic feedback loop—the key step necessary to evaluate the quality of decisions made—did not exist within the PPBES process. The Army today did not have an effective means of uniformly capturing and reporting the execution of its programs in the same terms as the Army leadership made resource allocation decisions. Too often, a program was established at HQDA utilizing the PDIP process that when funding was subsequently allocated during the execution year to the appropriate entity, the visibility of whether the funds were actually used as dictated in the program was lost to HQDA, the MACOM, and the subordinate organization. As the Army cycled through the PPBES

process, the continuity necessary to determine success or failure of decisions in earlier phases of the process was not necessarily maintained. There was a lack of linkage throughout the process, particularly during execution of an approved program so that inputs in terms of resources could be identified with quantifiable outputs. The Army programs and budgets for "things or services" but its systems are reporting out only dollars obligated and spent. Useful workload performance factors on which the dollars were spent, and upon those things which the decisionmakers decided to buy or in which to invest, were not reported (Figure 14-8).

Major revisions to the Army Management Structure (AMS) have been underway that will provide horizontal

and vertical management visibility and PPBES linkages. New accounting systems to support the resource management process at all levels are also under development for implementation.

OORMS, then, is to provide the necessary linkages to the phases of the PPBES. The Army resource programs consist of PDIP's covering five years, while the three years covered by budgeting include the Prior Year (last fiscal year), the Current Year (present fiscal year), and the Budget Year (next fiscal year). These three years under the OORMS concept are called a Budget Increment Package (BIP). The total eight years linked together is called a Management Decision Package (MDEP). Illustratively, it appears as in Figure 14-9.

OUTPUT ORIENTED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM




FIGURE 14-8

MANAGEMENT DECISION PACKAGE – MDEP




FIGURE 14-9

Under OORMS the PPBES architecture allocates program and budget resources to MDEP's which collectively establish Army force capability. This architecture distributes the packages among the following five discrete management areas:

- Missions of Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units.
- Acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of systems.
- Activities of the support and mobilization base.
- Operations of Army installations.
- Special functional packages (that cut across two or more other management areas in order to define and protect resources having high-level interest during a specific period).

Linking program support for the full eight-year period and incorporating specific performance factors (relating resources to output), with specific recognition of the resource control differences in the two subsets (PDIP and BIP), will provide the essential element to the PPBES feedback loop. Differing in purpose and fiscal years of application, the PDIP and BIP each requires its own protocol or convention for managing funds. More precisely, the flexibility for managing funds differs greatly between program and budget increments. Before submitting the President's Budget, the Army has wide latitude with the PDIP. As needed, during this time, the Army may realign available TOA among all Army appropriations. After the President's Budget goes to Congress, however, restrictions imposed by the Administration and rulings of Congress severely curtail that ability within the BIP. Hence, the PDIP serves as a flexible in-house tool useful in programming and in formulating the budget. In contrast, the BIP responds to the realities of an exacting budget and execution process governed by fiscal guidance and direction from OMB and Congress expressed in appropriation amounts and, in large part, by line items.

Execution experience, congressional action, and program and budget decisions cause changes in both packages. Execution sometimes results in different rates and quantities of expenditure from those planned. Authorization and appropriation decisions by Congress often change amounts requested in the President's Budget. Decisions during OSD review of the POM and budget affect resources recorded at the budget level of detail. They may even affect requests in the President's Budget already before Congress. Resource managers, therefore, consider how all these actions and experiences affect the PDIP and BIP and how a change in one package may affect the other. Considerable updating is thus required to keep PDIP's and BIP's in balance.

The Army accounting and financial reporting systems are being adapted to provide feedback within the management decision packages architecture. The coding mechanism for reporting MDEP's have been incorporated in the Standard Finance System (STANFINS) and other accounting systems. This automated process is being built to retain the improved focus of decisionmaking at all management levels while still providing the traditional vertical appropriation displays to external Army agencies. To do this, standard data displays will be utilized at all operating levels and passed up and down the management chain on diskettes. The displays will be used with standard software on microcomputers. With them, program package resources (MDEP's), workloads, and projected outputs will be passed from HQDA to MACOM's and from MACOM's to their subordinate activities. The process is displayed graphically in Figure 14-10.

Budget execution is discussed further in the next chapter, Chapter 15—Resource Management.

SUMMARY

The general logic of PPBES has been relatively constant through the years, despite the fact that evolutionary changes have taken place as the system matures. The Army Plan attempts to link the planning and programming phases of PPBES in an analogous way to the DG in the DOD PPBS. The goal is to insure that the program is developed based upon Army goals and objectives designed to best meet the demands of the national military strategy within available resources. In 1984, the CINC's were directed to input their warfighting requirements through their Service components for formal consideration during the POM functional review process and DRB Program Review, thereby linking more closely the distribution of resources with the CINC's charged with execution of national military strategy. It is necessary that the decisions and priorities established during the programming cycle be the foundation for the Army Budget submission. The establishment of a single Program Budget Committee in 1979 was a key improvement to PPBES.

The ASA(FM) provides policy and oversight for PPBS, while the DPAE exercises responsibility for disciplining the PPBES and providing staff interface with the Army leadership during the program development phase. Depending on the particular phase of the PPBES cycle, actions proceed under the direction of different functional proponents: planning under the DCSOPS; programming under the DPAE; and budgeting and budget execution under the ASA(FM). Throughout the cycle, the DCSOPS exercises his Armywide prioritization responsibility, insuring that PPBES decisions are consistent with Army plans and goals.

OUTPUT ORIENTED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION & REPORTING PROCESS




FIGURE 14-10

There are three continuing committees that serve as principal PPBES overview and review committees. The senior committee is the SELCOM, co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff and the Under Secretary of the Army. Two subordinate committees support the PPBES process. They are the SPC, chaired by the Assistant DCSOPS and the PBC, co-chaired by the DPAE and DAB. Each provides a continuing forum in which plans, programs, and budget proponents review, debate, adjust, and decide issues concerning PPBES actions. The results of the SPC and PBC deliberations are passed to the SELCOM for review and subsequent presentation to CSA and SA. The tri-annual (number and timing may change) Army Commanders' Conferences are also important forums for participative management within the PPBES process.

To help manage its programming process, the Army assigns Army Staff agency principals specific program director responsibilities related to the Army functional areas and the eleven major programs of the DOD FYDP. The DPAE, PBC, PBG, and SELCOM provide progressive oversight and review of the program development with all actions culminating in the CSA/SA approval of the Army POM and EPA. The structure and process within the PPBES complement but do not supplant the regular structure and process of the Army Staff. The PDM that results from the DRB Program Review is the basis for preparation of the BES.

The budgeting analogy to programming is that the ASA(FM) designates appropriation and fund directors (sponsors) to coordinate the allocation of funds in support of the functional area programs and the DOD

FYDP. The DAB provides the budgeting oversight while the PBC and SELCOM perform the same corporate functions with all actions ending ultimately in the submission and justification of the annual Army Budget.

The PPBERS quarterly review evaluates and reports on how well resources are being applied to accomplish Army goals.

The PPBES is an extremely important component of the Army's strategic management.

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CHAPTER 15

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Army is vested with the public's trust and confidence for defending our Nation. Its members have a responsibility for the assets with which they have been entrusted by the American people. Resource management is an integral part of the commander's role in fulfilling this responsibility. Responsible resource management is the key to sustaining and modernizing the Army and is essential for the Army's readiness posture.

Resource management at the end of this decade will be marked as an era of declining resources. This has already had a unique impact on the Active Army, and in the future can be expected to have similar ramifications on the reserve components. Specifically, this nation's deficit reduction measures implemented under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Legislation in FY 1986 had the effect of taking the first step in containing the Reagan defense buildup. Since that time, the congressional consensus and public support for defense has been stabilized at a funding plateau of \$280 - 290 billion. For the Army this means approximately \$76- 79 billion per year will be available in the immediate future to sustain and hone current force capabilities, and to forge new, enhanced capabilities. In recognizing that the Army's funding plateau is real, and that lower defense spending levels are with us, key resource management issues emanate from a policy, programmatic, and financial perspective. Foremost among the issues is the generic question of how we as an Army can reign in our appetite, face up to the reality of a reduced standard of living, make tradeoffs and structure our reduced programs to be efficient and effective. In some instances we must squarely face the fact that doing more with less places subordinates into dilemmas and that we may need to STOP DOING selected programs.

From a resource management policy perspective it is clear that the Army's decisions to cap both the military and civilian end strengths have placed the focus on internal "harvesting," vice growth generated from additional external resources. Harvesting has permitted the TOE Army to realign its tooth to tail ratio, revisit manpower allocation rules for combat support/combat service support units, use Host Nation Support (HNS) off sets, slim down the heavy divisions—all to generate new deterrent combat power. Similar efforts have been underway to harvest the TDA Army, in particular civilian spaces. Our efficiency reviews have highlighted that noncompetitive internal scrubs have generated as much as 9% manpower savings, but that those activities

which can be competed externally may generate as much as 25% manpower reductions. There are limits, though, to this kind of internal harvesting to create additional capabilities and then to sustain them. Resource Management at the policy level must question where these limits lie, and what the costs are to achieve them. Resource management policy therefore deals with the larger questions of whether particular programs are needed, how they serve the specific missions the Army has delineated, and whether those missions and the strategies they serve are sensible.

Programmatic and financial resource perspectives examine the efficiency with which funds are allocated and spent, and with how effective particular programs are managed and integrated. Resource management at the programmatic level encompasses the way we integrate soldiers, civilians, facilities, equipment, information, time, and dollars to produce viable combat power. We have created over the years a number of stovepipe systems to efficiently manage vertical stovepipe functional areas. However, maximizing stovepipes may not necessarily optimize capabilities that require horizontal integration from a resource management perspective. The Army's force modernization inspections in 1982 demonstrated only too clearly the resource disconnects of inadequate horizontal programmatic integration. Force Integration Analysis at the Department of the Army level will clearly facilitate these integrative efforts, but it is OORMS, cited in Chapter 14, which will give us the capability to enhance resource management integration throughout the Army to achieve the most effective utilization of our scarce resources. Implicit in this programmatic resource management perspective is the recognition that all of us participate in a resource decision stream that requires some of these decisions, once made, to remain unalterable. Placing a new facility at an installation requires a minimum of four years. Training trainers and then the troops on a new piece of equipment requires three years. Ordering the secondary spares for this new end item requires at least two years. Integrating then all three of these resourcing decisions requires that we consider them to be "irreversible," otherwise we will find new facilities being completed at one installation, while we have resourced new equipment and soldiers trained on that equipment to be serving on another installation. More importantly, this "unalterable decision base," will have created "a receivables stream" such as aircraft, training packages, TAC equipment shops, displaced equipment, etc. of substantial proportion. Reconfiguring these receivables into one's own conception without considering the

previous decision rationale may well create resource management disconnectivity which tends to surface in OSD and Congressional budget hearings.

Financial resource management has its focus on how efficiently we spend our funds and how effectively our programs are managed. This fiduciary responsibility finds its roots in statutes such as 31 USC 1514a, 1517, 1518, 1519; and in the Federal Manager's Accountability Act of 1982. That act in particular requires federal/Army managers to periodically report and monitor on the adequacy of their systems of internal control to provide reasonable assurance that:

- a. all financial commitments and obligations were in compliance with applicable laws.
- b. all funds, property, and other assets were safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use or misappropriation.
- c. all revenues were properly recorded and accounted for.

The net impact of this law and subsequent actions within DA has been an emphasis on internal management controls and improved financial systems to maximize our resources. More recently, as a result of increased congressional emphasis on outlay spend out rates and predictability of what funds the U.S. Treasury must pay out in a given fiscal year, financial management within the Army has taken an outlay

focus. Thus, certain funding decisions may well be "outlay neutral," i.e., not increase or decrease outlay requirements for a specific fiscal year as part of our stewardship of funds.

Stewardship overall is the ability of the Army to get the right resources to the right commands in order for subordinate commands to accomplish their missions in a combat or supportive role. A part of stewardship is to ensure that the outputs from one command are the right inputs for other commands. Army stewardship ties together all phases of PPBES. Stewardship is an essential step for the Output Oriented Resource Management System as it focuses on the interrelationship between "Supplier Commands" and "Consumer Commands."

Stewardship, therefore, focuses on the interdependence among commands. Some MACOM's command TOE combat forces (e.g. FORSCOM, USAREUR, EUSA), and other MACOM's provide products or services (e.g. TRADOC, AMC, HSC) to those consumer MACOM's. The products and services could, for example, be trained soldiers and health services. No single command functions independently. Hence, resource management, and more particularly the stewardship of resources, provides the crucial link among commands to ensure that one command's problem does not unduly affect the present and future operation of another. (See Figure 15-1)




FIGURE 15-1

Because we are provided public resources to perform our mission, every individual and organization has a stewardship role. Quite simply, we are to use the public's resources efficiently and effectively to accomplish the Army's total mission in support of the nation and its people.

Stewardship keeps us focused on the real issues of the Army; use of smaller staffs; appropriate mission transfers to the Reserve Components; better equipment acquisition strategy; innovation of information and resource management; and the rationalization and integration of soldiers, equipment, doctrine, and organizations into effective combat power.

Resource Management Functions.

Resource management then is the direction, guidance, and control of financial and other resources. It involves the application of programming, budgeting, accounting, reporting, auditing, analysis, and evaluation. The functional focus of resource management can be summarized under "Four A's:"

- acquisition of resources.
- allocation of resources according to the priorities, generally considered in terms of dollars and manpower. Note that resource management includes manpower management through the Vertical Force Accounting Structure (VFAS), and Vertical The Army Authorization Documents System (VTAADS).
- accounting for resources with—
 - a system that provides decision support and tracking capability for the program and budget functions.
 - a system that performs accounting for fiscal compliance required by statutes.
- analysis and auditing of the results of the process.

These functions are shown as a simplified closed-loop process in Figure 15-2. It is recognized that there are other models of viewing the functional components of resource management; however, the interrelationships between the four "A's" highlight the preceding discussion of the need to achieve better horizontal and vertical integration of resource management, if we are to be truly effective as stewards of resources.

FUND MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Assistant Secretary of the Army - Financial Management ASA(FM).

Pursuant to the Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 the ASA(FM), subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of the Army, has statutory responsibility for Army budgeting and execution. The ASA(FM) discharges the function through the Director of the Army Budget (DAB) who responds concurrently to the Chief of Staff of the Army. A sponsor for each Congressional appropriation

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS




FIGURE 15-2

assists the ASA (FM)/DAB in discharging his statutory responsibilities relative to fund management. The appropriation sponsors also coordinate the allocation of funds in support of the Army program. A full breakout of the Army budget structure with the corresponding appropriation or fund sponsors is shown in Figure 15-4.


Director of the Army Budget (DAB).

The Director of the Army Budget heads the new Army Budget Office (ABO) and exercises supervision over the formulation, justification, and execution of the Army budget. On one hand, the DAB provides the guidance, direction, and initiative within which the appropriation and fund sponsors perform their respective responsibilities. He does this by insuring that the budget flows from and stays in consonance with the programming actions of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) and the budget guidance from the Office, Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). This interface is very important. On the other hand, the DAB directs the formulation of the Army budget. He leads its presentation before OSD and Congress, and maintains liaison with the appropriations committees of Congress. He also controls the allocation of apportioned funds to commands and agencies, and exercises control over the budget execution review. (See Figure 15-3)

Appropriation/Fund Sponsors.

The appropriation/fund sponsor supervises a designated appropriation. Once a program is defined that provides for force level requirements and program objectives, the appropriation sponsor becomes the Army spokesman on matters dealing with the resource requirement. This involves assisting program sponsors and claimants in solving funding deficiencies during budget formulation, testifying before Congress, and recommending the reprogramming of funds within the appropriation during budget execution. (See Figure 15-4)

ARMY BUDGET OFFICE (ABO)



ABO RESPONSIBILITIES

- BUDGET POLICY
- ACTIVE ARMY BUDGET DEVELOPMENT
- REVIEW AND CONSOLIDATE USAR AND ARMG BUDGETS
- BUDGET PRESENTATION
- LIAISON WITH APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
- LIAISON WITH OSD/OMB, CONGRESS AND TREASURY FOR THE BUDGET
- BUDGET EXECUTION
- FUND RECEIPT AND ALLOCATION
- PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING INTERFACE
- BUDGET SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
- LIAISON WITH FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS
- PROPOSER FOR 500 SERIES
- BCE PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

FIGURE 15-3

Program/Subprogram Sponsor.

Program/subprogram sponsors determine program objectives for Army operation and maintenance and reserve personnel appropriations. The program/subprogram sponsor is the primary Army point of contact on matters related to the requirements of the particular program. In addition to helping justify programs during the budget process, subprogram sponsors assist program sponsors in resolving funding problems. (See Figure 15-4)

Functional Program Sponsor.

A functional program sponsor is responsible for an identifiable aggregation of resources which constitute inputs to combat and supporting tasks. The functional program sponsor is responsible for interrelated programs or parts of programs in several mission areas. One of the functional program sponsor's responsibilities during the programming process is to ensure the existence of an effective and balanced program within assigned fiscal controls. Accordingly, during internal budget review, the functional program sponsor provides assistance when program changes are required to accommodate the fact of life pricing and other funding increases in order to maintain a balanced program. (See Figure 15-4)

Commanders.

Commanders of major commands and commanders and other heads of operating agencies are responsible for developing, justifying, presenting, and defending budget programs supporting their assigned responsibilities, and for insuring approved budget programs are properly executed and certified.

THE EXECUTION PHASE

The Chief of Staff of the Army in 1981 renamed the Army's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), adding Execution to the process title—PPBES. This constituted a marked change from the prior decentralized concept in which PPBS execution responsibility was transferred to the field commanders. He charged the Army's leaders with the responsibility to evaluate and report on the effectiveness of program and budget accomplishment. These evaluations and reports will relate funds and personnel inputs to accomplishment, in output terms, of the Army's goals to organize, man, equip, train, sustain, and deploy our forces. The execution phase formally begins when the President signs into law the necessary appropriation bills. The execution phase encompasses all the actions required to carry out approved programs efficiently and economically. This phase overlaps the formulation and review phases and continues throughout the period of availability of the appropriation for obligation or expenditure. Budget execution must comply with regulations and limitations established by the Congress, the General Accounting Office, the Treasury Department, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Secretary of Defense, as well as those of the Department of the Army.

Program and Budget Guidance (PBG).

When the SECDEF decisions on the Army Budget Estimates Submission (BES) have been finalized, and the President's Budget is in its final stages of preparation, the Army is in the process of revising its Program Budget Guidance. The January PBG

APPROPRIATION AND FUND SPONSORS

<i>Budget Structure</i>	<i>Appropriation or Fund</i>	<i>Sponsor</i>
A. DOD Appropriation Act		
Military Personnel, Army (MPA)		DCSPER ¹
National Guard Personnel, Army (NPGA)		CNGB ¹
Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA)		CAR ¹
Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA)		ABO ¹
Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard (OMNG)		CNGB ¹
Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR)		CAR ¹
Aircraft Procurement, Army (Aircraft)		RDA ¹
Missile Procurement, Army (Missile)		RDA ¹
Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army (WTCV)		RDA ¹
Procurement of Ammunition, Army (Ammo)		RDA ¹
Other Procurement, Army (OPA)		RDA ¹
Procurement Secondary Items		DCSLOG ⁴
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army (RDT&E)		RDA ¹
National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice (NBPRP)		DCM ¹
Claims, Defense		TJAG ³
National Guard and Reserve Equipment		CNGB ³ , CAR ³
Special Foreign Currency		ABO ¹
Environmental Restoration		ACE
Military Assistance Program (MAP)		DCSLOG ¹
International Military Education and Training (IMET)		HQ, TRADOC ¹
B. Military Construction Act		
Military Construction, Army (MCA)		ACE ¹
Military Construction, Army National Guard (MCNG)		CNGB ¹
Military Construction, Army Reserve (MCAR)		CAR ¹
Army Family Housing (AFH)		ACE ¹
Homeowners Assistance Fund, Defense (HOA)		ACE ¹
C. Revolving and Management Funds and Other Accounts		
Defense Production Guarantees, Army (DPG)		USAFAC ¹
Army Stock Fund (ASF)		DCSLOG ¹
Army Industrial Fund (AIF)		DCSLOG ¹
Conventional Ammunition Working Capital Fund (CAWCF)		RDA ¹
Trust Funds		ABO ¹
Deutsche Mark Budget		ABO ¹
Surcharge Collections, Sales of Commissary Stores, Army		DCSLOG ¹
Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund		DCSLOG ¹
Wildlife Conservation, Military Reservation, Army		ACE ¹
Miscellaneous Receipts and Deposits		ABO ¹
Offsetting Receipts, Army		ABO ¹
Offsetting Receipts, Trust		ABO ¹
Retired Pay Trust Fund		DCSPER ¹

¹Appropriation or Fund Sponsor.

²Program, Subprogram, or Budget Activity Sponsor.

³Agent for Army Portion of Defense Appropriation.

⁴Subprogram Sponsor within Procurement Appropriation.

FIGURE 15-4

establishes the dollar amounts and military and civilian personnel strengths, by program, to support the President's Budget and reflects the adjusted budget marks by commands based on the enacted Congressional Appropriations language of the current fiscal year. Armed with this data, the MACOM's update their Budget and Manpower Guidance (BMG) to lower echelons.

Command Operating Budget (COB)/Resource Update.

In the April-June timeframe, the installations and other MACOM activities are developing their Command Operating Budgets, or Resource Updates, which provide budget data to DA. In May, HQDA again updates the PBG in even years, reflecting POM decisions for subsequent years. When the installation COB's are received by the MACOM, adjustments are made based on POM decisions, May PBG guidance, and command desires. The MACOM COB's or Resource Updates are then forwarded to HQDA in July where they support the Apportionment Requests for the upcoming fiscal year and the Budget Estimates Submission (BES) for the following fiscal years.

Apportionment Requests.

To assure that funds are provided when needed, and to facilitate control over their expenditure, the OMB apportions operating funds. In the mid-September timeframe the Army submits through OSD to OMB its justification for funds. The approved apportionment (actually a subapportionment of OSD apportionment) authorizes the Army to obligate specific funds in specific periods, for activities, functions, or projects.

Appropriation Warrants.

After Congress has enacted the appropriation bill and the President has signed it into law, the Treasury Department issues Appropriation Warrants. These warrants establish the appropriations on the books of the Army and simultaneously make funds available for disbursement in payment of obligations incurred against the appropriations.

Distribution, Obligation, and Disbursement of Funds.

After obtaining obligational authority, HQDA directs the major commands to carry out the program—that is, to purchase so many aircraft, to proceed with specific construction projects, and the like. Concurrently, HQDA authorizes commands to obligate funds for these purposes. This authorization is referred to as the allocation process. Major commands in turn suballocate or allot funds to the appropriate levels where programs are to be carried out. As orders are placed or contracts awarded, funds are obligated. Based on these orders and contracts, material is delivered or services are performed which require the disbursement of funds. Obligations and disbursements for each appropriation are reported monthly through the Army accounting system and provide the primary management tool for budget execution. Review and analysis of monthly reports insure the prompt detection of adverse trends that could jeopardize successful budget execution as well as the identification of favorable trends that should be exploited. (As there are a number of terms involved in the execution stage which may tend to be confusing, Figure 15-5 is provided as a summary.)

DELEGATION OF OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY

AGENCY	ACTION	RECIPIENT
Congress	Appropriates	Office of Management and Budget (for Department of Defense)
Office of Management and Budget	Apportions	Department of Defense
Department of Defense	Subapportions	Department of the Army
Department of the Army ASA(FM)	Allocations or Budget Allowances	Special Operating Agencies and those General Operating Agencies which are not subordinate to Special Operating Agencies (e.g. MACOM's)
Special Operating Agencies	Suballocate	Subordinate General Operating Agencies
General Operating Agencies (e.g. MACOM's)	Allotments or Allowances	Installations and Activities
Installation and Activities	May distribute funds by obligation authority, citation of funds, expense ceilings, or funding allowances	Activities

FIGURE 15-5

Program Performance and Budget Execution Review System (PPBERS).

PPBERS is a quarterly management review of Army program accomplishment and is a budget execution function. Feedback from PPBERS is used in all phases of PPBERS, and it is through this system that the achievement of stewardship objectives can be reviewed and assessed.

The PPBERS cycle consists of comparing actual resources and performance with established Army Secretariat and Army Staff program performance objectives and taking corrective action to improve goal accomplishment. The process measures achievement in major projects, systems, and programs of special interest to the Army leadership, DOD, or the Congress. The Army Select Committee (SELCOM), co-chaired by the VCSA and the Under Secretary of the Army, is the forum for the quarterly PPBERS meetings.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF FUNDS

Because funds are provided by Congress in specific amounts for specific purposes through the enactment of public law, the expenditure of those funds must be within the boundaries established by the law. The term "administrative control of funds," as required by law and defined in AR 37-20 of the same title, is used to identify those actions, events or systems which are required to insure essentially three things: (1) the funds are used only for the purposes for which they were provided; (2) that amounts of funds in excess of that available are neither obligated, disbursed nor further distributed; and (3) that the agency head is capable of fixing responsibility in the event of violations of either of the first two. This section will describe the various types and levels of administrative control of funds.

Congressional Controls.

The Constitution forbids the disbursement of funds from the Treasury except by consequence of *appropriations* made by law. In addition, the Constitution requires that a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money be published from time to time. Therefore, the requirement for fund accountability is fundamental to our system of government.

In implementing the requirement, Congress has taken four major actions to control budgetary affairs. These actions are:

1. Requiring budget justification to consist of an *authorization* action to justify selected major facets of the Army's program, and a separate *appropriation* action to subsequently finance the authorized items.

2. Requiring the executive branch to develop procedures to control the flow of funds in a manner that will prevent overspending of the amounts made

available. (The Office of Management and Budget performs this control function by apportioning, or releasing, funds to the agencies as they are required, rather than at the time Congress makes it available.)

3. Requiring each department to establish a resource management organization (ASA(FM)) to provide technical competence on a consistent basis for the management of funds appropriated by Congress.

4. Establishing the General Accounting Office (GAO) to be the watchdog on expenditures and to institute standards for financial and other resource management systems.

Flexibility in Shifting Funds.

The Congressional committees concerned with the DOD have generally accepted the view that rigid adherence to the amounts justified for budget activities, appropriations, or for subsidiary items or purposes may unduly jeopardize the effective accomplishment of planned programs in a businesslike and economical manner. Transfer procedures have been worked out with the DOD to indicate different degrees of interest in the changes; e.g., certain changes require prior approval by the appropriate committees of Congress, while others require advance notification, and still others are provided after the fact.

The FY 86 DOD Authorization Act (Public Law 99-145, November 8, 1985) included this section concerning transfer of funds:

Sec. 1401. (a)(1) Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, the Secretary may transfer amounts of authorizations made available to the Department of Defense in this Act between any such authorizations (or any subdivisions thereof). Amounts of authorizations so transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes as the authorization to which transferred.

(2) The total amount of authorizations that the Secretary of Defense may transfer under the authority of this section may not exceed \$2,000,000,000.

(b) The authority provided by this section to transfer authorizations—

(1) may only be used to provide authority for higher priority items than the items from

which authority is transferred;
and

(2) may not be used to provide authority for an item that has been denied authorization by Congress.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify Congress of transfers made under the authority of this section.

Other flexibility is obtained through additional laws, committee reports, administrative actions such as reprogramming, or by requesting supplemental appropriations. Reprogramming reapplies funds from one project to another or transfers funds from one appropriation to another to resolve financial shortfalls or to adjust programs to meet unforeseen requirements. The process is subject to designated dollar thresholds and congressional requirements for advance approval or notification.

Antideficiency Statutes.

Sections of the United States Code (USC) (known formerly as Section 3679, Revised Statutes) list the prohibitions regarding the use of public funds and establish punitive provisions in the event the prohibitions are violated. The following is a summary of the principal provisions of the law which are of critical concern to any individual, especially a commander, who is responsible for public funds:

1. Forbids any officer or employee of the Government from making or authorizing an expenditure or obligation in excess of the amount available in an appropriation or an apportionment or in excess of the amount permitted by agency regulations. (31 USC 1341(a) and 1517(a).)

2. Forbids involving the Government in any contract or obligation to pay money in advance of appropriations. (31 USC 1341.)

3. Forbids exceeding statutory or administrative limitations on a given transaction.

4. Provides administrative and criminal penalties for a violation. The person who caused the violation may be subject to discipline, to include suspension without pay or removal from office. (31 USC 1349 and 1518. The Army's implementation of these statutes is in AR 37-20.) If action is taken knowingly and willfully, the person may be fined up to \$5000, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. (31 USC 1350 and 1519.)

5. Requires apportionment by months, quarters, or other regular periods; by activities or functions; or combination of both methods. (31 USC 1512 (b)(1).)

The Army Management Structure.

The Army Management Structure is a system of symbols and titles which, when used in conjunction with required Treasury Department coding, identifies the distribution and specific purpose for which the funds, appropriated by Congress, were used. Every dollar spent by the Army carries an Army Management Structure Code to permit this identification and to provide essential management/operational feedback from the transaction based accounting system.

The details for constructing the accounting classification codes for all funds received by the Army are contained in AR 37-100. A major component of this classification is the Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO), contained in AR 37-100-**(the asterisks indicate the fiscal year to which the regulation pertains; i.e., AR 37-100-88 for FY 88). A simple illustration of the AMSCO would be the fund cite on a travel order, such as: 2182020 57-1021 P810000-219C S36004 (814751.20007). Simply stated, this fund cite means Department of the Army (21) provided FY88 (8), Operation and Maintenance, Army (2020) funds to TRADOC (57), which allotted them to Carlisle Barracks (1021) for use in the training program (P810000). They were used for travel (219C) in support of the U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management professional education mission (814751.20007), and will be disbursed by and accounted for at Carlisle Barracks, Fiscal Station (S36004).

Funding Guidance.

Guidance consists of a number of documents designed to give a "complete understanding." One type of guidance is that which is continuing and generally is transmitted through functional channels. Another is the marked-up budget returned to lower levels to indicate approval or suggested changes to the PBG or Budget Manager Guidance.

The PBG is a document issued by a higher headquarters to its subordinate commands to provide information and guidance pertaining to missions, resources, objectives, policies, and related matters upon which the subordinate commands can base their programmed course of action for the fiscal year(s) concerned.

Fund Authorization Document (FAD).

The receipt of the PBG provides the guidance, but does not include the specific authority to obligate funds. The FAD is used to allocate, suballocate, and allot Annual Funding Programs. For the investment and RDTE appropriations, an approved program document accompanies the FAD.

Fund Distribution and Control.

"Pass funds through command channels and make the commander responsible for their control" is the basic tenet of the Army's system.

The use of the term "funds" implies that the authority to create obligations against the U.S. government has been granted. Distribution of funds is any documented action that makes funds available for obligation. This distribution is made in a stated amount for specific purposes and to a specific organization for a specific time period.

The commander's authority to incur obligations will be received on a funding document specifying the appropriation and budget programs for which the funds may be used, and imposing both administrative and legal restrictions and limitations. This process is used to facilitate control over funds and the reporting of violations of laws and directives.

Although distribution of funds is a means of controlling obligations and fixing responsibility, the policy is to minimize the formal distribution and to fund an operation at the highest practical level. As an example, the Military Personnel, Army appropriation is held and controlled centrally at HQDA whereas the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation funds by necessity will be issued as an allocation, allotment, or fund allowance through the major command to the installation and decentralized for control.

Fund Allowance System (FAS).

Major Army Commands have implemented a funding allowance system whereby fund control has been retained at the MACOM level with funding *allowances* being issued to subordinate installation commanders. Exceeding this funding allowance does not constitute a statutory violation but may constitute an administrative violation of AR 37-20. Commanders are still responsible for assuring the execution of their mission remains within the fund allowance provided and violations of that guidance may warrant administrative disciplinary action. The advantages of this system are that it allows more flexibility in fund control and lessens the possibilities of reportable statutory violations.

Delegation of Funding Authority.

Commanders or other heads of organizational units to whom funds are made available may delegate to their respective Directors of Resource Management (Comptrollers), budget officers, or finance and accounting officers authority to establish and maintain such administrative controls as may be necessary to comply with the provisions of laws and directives. This may be done, keeping in mind these key points:

1. Delegation of authority must be in writing. (Verbal or telephonic authorizations will not be recognized except in emergency circumstances—those jeopardizing health and/or safety of the command—and must be confirmed in writing as soon as possible.)

2. Authority may be delegated to a specific individual or a position so long as the authority is vested in a readily identifiable person at all times.

3. Delegation of authority does not relieve commanders of their responsibilities under the law.

Obligation Life. Congress appropriates funds annually. Within the process of developing the appropriation act, a determination of the period in which the appropriation is available for obligation will be made. Congress will state the period in the act and although the different appropriations have assumed a traditional period over time, Congress does have the authority to change the period. The appropriations categorized by obligation life are:

1. Annual appropriations available for incurring obligations during one fiscal year (1 October to 30 September). The OMA and MPA appropriations are examples of annual appropriations.

2. A multiple-year appropriation available for incurring obligations for a definite period in excess of one fiscal year. The RDTE, procurement, and construction appropriations are multiple-year, and their programs may be obligated for two, three and five years, respectively.

3. No year funds available until expended.

Fundamental Principles of Obligation. There are several basic or fundamental principles which must be observed in budgeting and recording obligations. The foundation for these principles is contained in Title 31, United States Code, and is therefore a part of public law. While only the more important principles will be identified here, the entire listing is available in AR 37-21 (Establishing and Recording of Commitment and Obligation).

1. *Bona Fide Need of the Current Fiscal Year.* A determination must be made that supplies or services required pursuant to contracts entered into or orders placed obligating an annual appropriation are intended to fill a bona fide need of the current fiscal year.

2. *Intent of Performance.* Contracts entered into or placed for supplies or services are executed only if there is a bona fide intent on the part of the contractor (or other performing activity) to commence work promptly or to perform the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions (to include beginning date).

3. *Assure Availability.* Before binding the Government in an agreement with a second party which will result in a claim against the Government, the responsible official must insure that proper funds are available.

4. *Charge Immediately.* Obligations, when incurred, must be charged immediately to the applicable funds. The recording of obligations incurred cannot be

deferred until additional funds are received. The obligation must be recorded even if there are insufficient funds to cover it, thereby recording the statutory violation which must then be reported through command channels.

5. *Prompt Adjustment.* Any adjustment to previously recorded obligations, either as an increase or decrease, must be entered in the accounts as soon as the necessity for adjustment is evident and the amount can be determined.

6. *Documentary Evidence.* Each obligation recorded in the official record must be supported by proper documentary evidence. These may be originals, duplicates or copies of appropriate documents so long as signatures are visible. A memorandum of telephone conversation or an electronically received written message may be used temporarily until the actual document is received.

Contingency Funds. Congress also makes available to the Secretary of the Army from the annual appropriations certain small contingency funds entitled .0012, .0014, .0015, and .0017. These are very closely monitored and fall under audit responsibilities of the Army Audit Agency to ensure that such funds are used solely for the purposes intended and approved by the SA. A brief description of these funds follows:

a. *Limitation .0012 (Miscellaneous Expenses, Category A).* For official representation expenses, as authorized by the SA, in connection with official functions at times of national holidays; dedication of facilities; visits of distinguished guests; purchase of floral wreaths, decorations, and awards upon occasions of national holidays and similar observances in foreign countries; and gifts and mementos by the authorized host, costing not more than \$165 each, used in connection with official ceremonies or functions. Commanders of MACOM's, their subordinate commanders, and installation commanders are authorized to present gifts or mementos in circumstances that they personally document as being a necessary part of the event or occasion being observed.

b. *Limitation .0014 (Miscellaneous Expenses, Category B).* For miscellaneous

expenses, other than for official representation, which are not provided for in other appropriations. Examples of these expenses are awards for emergency rescues, witness fees for the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, and settlement of meritorious claims.

c. *Limitation .0015 (Criminal Investigation Activities, AR 195-4).* For emergency and extraordinary expenses in support of the worldwide expenses of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command's activities.

d. *Limitation .0017 (Intelligence Contingency Funds, AR 381-141).* For expenses related to worldwide intelligence activities.

KEY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Standard Finance System (STANFINS).

STANFINS performs "consumer funds" accounting. It records funding authorizations; accumulates and reports on obligations/disbursements against fund authorizations for control purposes; and provides breakout to Installation, MACOM, and HQDA financial managers of funds, obligations/disbursements by appropriation at prescribed levels of detail. STANFINS serves as the Army's primary formal record of account at installation level for installation-level appropriation accounting. It produces the financial reports required by higher authorities. In the future, the Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS) will receive most of its departmental data directly from STANFINS input. Although a standard Army system, STANFINS is not operational at all Army installations.

Program and Budget Accounting System (PBAS).

The Program and Budget Accounting System (PBAS) is a departmental system that provides for direct reporting of data from the program, budgetary, and accounting installation to a centralized data base located at U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC). Through the use of a data base management system, data will be stored and processed to:

a. Control program and fund distribution processes from HQDA, to the Major Commands, to the installations.

b. Produce all departmental reports.

c. Satisfy program, budget, and accounting information requirements for managerial purposes of HQDA and the Major Commands.

Standard Army Financial Inventory Accounting and Reporting System (STARFIARS).

STARFIARS performs "inventory" and "stock fund" accounting for supply transactions. The inventory accounting entails tracking the value of physical inventories at General Support Units. Stock fund accounting relates to recording and processing obligations, receipts, and payments related to inventory transactions financed by the stock fund. STARFIARS provides information to STANFINS for obligations/deobligations of consumer funds. The system also receives billings from the wholesale supply system and processes them through the stock fund accounting function for subsequent payments by STANFINS.

Tactical Unit Financial Management Information System (TUFMIS).

An automated MIS that is operated in Direct Support Units which receives requests for materiel from tactical units. TUFMIS records inputs and outputs to and from DSU's by supported units/organizations. The system produces daily and cumulative-to-date reports on commitments for materiel costs by unit and by weapon system. TUFMIS provides reports and information for resource management at the tactical level; however, it is not a formal accounting system with certifiable records. TUFMIS does provide commanders with the dollar value of supply requisitions by unit and the availability of funds to purchase supplies from a higher echelon source.

YEAR-END CERTIFICATION

Commanders who receive FAD's authorizing them to incur obligations not in excess of certain amounts and for specific purposes have a legal requirement to "certify the status" of those funds as of 30 September (end of fiscal year). Commanders may delegate the authority to certify fiscal year-end reports to the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, or Director of Resource Management. The certification is made on the "accounting reports" and reads substantially as follows:

"I certify that the amounts shown in the report are correct. All known transactions meeting the criteria of 31 USC 1501(a) have been obligated and are so reported."

Certifications are required for all appropriations and for any reimbursable activity performed by the command or agency.

SUMMARY

Resource Management in our Army is undergoing significant changes. Part of these changes are directly attributable to the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, the balance due to pervasive application of technology and to new approaches to resource management. The Goldwater-Nichols Act called for reductions of 15% in the DA staff manning, as well as 10% reductions in subordinate MACOM headquarters. The resource management community was not exempted from these cuts. The new Army Budget Office (ABO) at Department of the Army with its centralized budget formulations, plus reduced staff, clearly is presented a challenge. However, as this year's Resource Updates are converted into Additional Budget Submissions (ABS) to update the FY 1989 column of the President's FY1988/1989 Defense Budget, the internal relationships will crystalize between DA appropriation sponsors and the ABO. It is expected that a more coherent, defensible Army budget will result from this reorganization effort, particularly as the FY1990/1991 budget is prepared in the Fall of 1988.

For the MACOM's, resource management in the near term horizon will also require some organizational realignment, most certainly leading to greater centralization due to mandated manpower cuts. In some instances though these organizational efforts will also have to reconcile the additional workload generated by dealing with CINC's and their increasing role in the programming and budgeting processes.

Application of technology has literally revolutionized the resource management community. The power of the computer and its ever more sophisticated software has provided decisionmakers at all levels powerful tools to maximize the allocation and application of resources. Budgets are now being passed between higher and subordinate commands via diskettes, and even the Program Budget Guidance (PBG) has seen its last hard copy passage from DA to MACOM's. In the not too distant future it can be expected that Command Operating Budgets (COB) and PARR's will be submitted through on line data link transmissions.

The real innovation lies however in the thrust of the entrepreneurial approaches being advocated in the resource management community. The recognition that the Army budget levels are at a plateau has forced us to reexamine how we do business, to integrate in a far more comprehensive manner our programming and budgeting, and to look seriously at ways of enhancing the productivity of our people that constitute our Total Army team. OORMS, MDEP's, BIP's, are but a forerunner of this integration effort. Third-party financing, value engineering, charge back/Direct Customer Payment (selectively implemented for information services in FY 1987), self sufficiency, organizational efficiency reviews, and output focus are some of the concepts that allow us to examine the way we manage our Army in a more productive way to

enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the resources that Congress and the American taxpayer provide to us to forge combat capabilities.

This chapter is intended to summarize the more pertinent features of resource management systems using a minimum of the complex terms associated with the process. We have identified the major players, the major steps they must take, and the various controls which guide their actions in the budget process of resource management, particularly during the execution stage. Chapter 16, Installation Command and Management, will address in more detail the resource management systems and procedures involved at that level of command.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- (1) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 11-2: Internal Control Systems*.
- (2) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 37-2: Distribution of Funds and Fund Documentation*.
- (3) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 37-20: Administrative Control of Appropriated Funds*. 30 May 1985.
- (4) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 37-21: Establishing and Recording of Commitments and Obligations*.
- (5) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 37-47: Contingency Funds of the Secretary of the Army*. 15 May 1987.
- (6) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 37-100 series: The Army Management Structure*.
- (7) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 37-151: Accounting and Reporting for Operating Agencies*.
- (8) U.S. Department of the Army. *Pamphlet 5-9: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System*. 1 August 1986.
- (9) Seelig, Louis C., LTC. "The Changing Role of the Resource Manager," *Resource Management, Vol 7, No 4*. Dec 1986, pp12-16.

CHAPTER 16

INSTALLATION COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Command of an installation and managing its varied activities is indeed a challenge. Installations are the ultimate receiver of resources, guidance, and direction. They are the Military Services "Cities," or "Communities," most of which are self-contained and self-sufficient. In 1986 alone, some 600,000 people and \$35 billion were invested in defense-wide base operation support. Consequently, if productivity of just 5% could be realized through efficiencies, reduced demand of services, or lesser costs, then such savings or cost avoidances would amount to \$1.75 billion and 30,000 less people. It is a small wonder then that our management of installations has received considerable attention and demanding reviews by our board of directors - the Congress. Within the Army, installations may be referred to as a post, camp, station, fort, subpost, depot, arsenal, proving ground, base, and laboratory - all of which support our Total Army and include both TO&E units and TDA organizations. Installations support tenants such as schools, hospitals, RC activities, and divisions, and receive support from stovepipe organizations such as the Troop Support Agency, Health Services Command, Information System Command, etc. Thus, installations reflect tremendous diversity of organizations, tasks, and missions, all of which challenge our abilities to command and manage.

Over the years, because of congressional, OMB, OSD, and DA staff scrutiny, constraints through increasing rules, regulations, and programs have built up. Most intended to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of installation management. More recently though, the search for excellence in improving installation management has called for unfettering installation commanders from restrictive rules and to become entrepreneurial. This was institutionalized through the Installation Management Proclamation issued by Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. and the Chief of Staff, General Wickham, on 1 April 1987. The proclamation called on the Army to adopt the Model Installation Management approach because it offered the opportunity to manage installations creatively, test innovative ideas, remove regulatory impediments, and challenge traditional Army systems and techniques used to manage installations.

It is in this context then that we seek to identify new ways to increase the effectiveness of training, improve methods of developing equipment and forces, reduce

the levels of command and the size and number of headquarters, generate savings and thus improve military readiness and installation management. To this end a number of programs are in effect at the installation level. These include: (1) Model Installation Program, (2) Organizational Efficiency Review Program, (3) Commercial Activities, (4) Terrorism Counteraction, (5) Internal Control, and the (6) Output Oriented Resource Management System. These programs will be highlighted in this chapter.

The management focus at installation level is the directorate staff. In a directorate organization, directors are the key management officials because of the significant responsibility and authority delegated to them, commensurate with assigned duties. Their delegated authority may range from full operational control of functions to supervision of offices that have some autonomy, to little more than providing administrative support. Based on guidance from higher authority and the commander or garrison commander, directors are responsible for programs and budgets. As part of this responsibility, directors must continually review priorities, programs, and budgets to ensure operational effectiveness and efficient use of all resources.

Installation management in today's environment of federal budgetary deficits, competing demands for resources, and reduced resources, presents great challenges; requires in-depth, continuous coordination between all principals involved; and flourishes on careful planning and implementation. This chapter will identify and discuss, in general terms, the multitude of varying activities which are the responsibility of personnel tasked with management of an installation.

INSTALLATION ORGANIZATIONS

Figures 16-1 to 16-4 show the four types of installation organizations that were prescribed for the Army as a result of the 1969 CONUS Army Installation Management Study (CAIMS) and the reorganization of CONUS installations in the early 1970's. The four organizations displayed are shown only for a historical perspective and provide a reference point to track the transition of the Army from these four types of organizations to the Standard Installation Organization (SIO). The model for SIO is shown in Figure 16-5 and this text incorporates HQDA decisions on standard installation organizations which became effective in November 1986 under AR 5-3. The Standardized Installation Organizations were designed to:

TYPE A INSTALLATION




FIGURE 16-1

TYPE B INSTALLATION




FIGURE 16-2

TYPE C INSTALLATION




FIGURE 16-3

- ensure an orderly transition from peace to wartime operations.
- accomplish assigned peacetime missions in the most economical manner.

Standard Installation Organization.

AR 5-3 formalizes the process of standardizing the sustaining base. Intended to provide a maximum structural template for garrison organizations, many of the first year requests to DA for deviation have been to combine operations at those activities where workload and mission do not support the maximum structural template. Early indications are that commanders want additional flexibility to organize at levels below the directorate. This issue will be resolved as other questions regarding training, career development, and selection of civilian leadership and garrison commanders are addressed. However, to the extent possible, the philosophy of managing by function rather than by organization is an important consideration. As

the SIO process becomes more institutionalized, those good ideas developed as a result of local initiatives, studies and various other sources will receive the attention necessary to insure the SIO process remains dynamic and the regulation accurately depicts the most efficient organizations. Further, some adjustments may be necessary as the Army transitions at HQDA and the MACOM's during the next two years as a result of the DOD Reorganization Act and absorbs congressionally-mandated officer reductions in the sustaining base.

While there are certain management advantages to standardizing installations which are organized identically with like job titles and duties, the facts reflect some historical differences among installations. The principal reasons for such historical variations in organizations are attributable to differing missions of major units or activities, size of the installation, and reporting MACOM.

Under SIO the installation directorate staff, responding to the Garrison commander, operates more

TYPE D INSTALLATION

INSTALLATIONS THAT HOUSED A VARIETY
OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH DIFFERENT
MISSIONS




FIGURE 16-4

autonomously than a coordinating staff. Typically a major activity director independently manages his program and budget, supervises a substantial workforce, and coordinates laterally with other major activity directors to facilitate the orderly execution of programs.

Increasing pressure on the availability of funds, the productivity of the work force, and the fact that the actions of one director characteristically impact on other activities, combine to force more coordinated, deliberately planned actions. Thorough understanding of and appreciation for the duties and objectives of all staff members as well as a willingness and ability to communicate are essential qualities of a major activity director. All the conventional tools of staff coordination, principally committees, are needed by the installation management staff. The Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) (or in TRADOC, the Program Resource Advisory Committee (PRAC)) is the commander's key resource management tool and is discussed in some detail later in this chapter.

There is no clear-cut organizational division of duties because installation operating programs are extremely complex with many areas of functional overlap. Moreover, the installation management process is further complicated by the fact that high-level policy and day-to-day operations converge at installation level (witness the decision to levy part of the congressionally-mandated 1% officer cut in FY87 against the TDA Army). Regardless of the inherent organizational difficulties mentioned earlier, a major strength of the installation organization structure is its ability to accommodate change. Changes in mission, in priority, in policy, and in procedure are common.

Garrison Commander.

The Garrison Commander is responsible for all organizations assigned or attached to the U.S. Army Garrison. He accomplishes missions assigned by the Installation Commander and other competent authority. In some MACOM's he is assigned the

STANDARD INSTALLATION ORGANIZATION




FIGURE 16-5

additional duty of Installation Chief of Staff and as such coordinates the activities of the installation's special and personal staff officers and the activities of the installation's tenant organizations. Garrison Commanders perform the day-to-day operations of the installation, head the installation directorate staff, and report directly to the CG/DCG. The Garrison Commander, as the Installation Chief of Staff, improves mobilization capabilities by freeing chiefs of staff of MTOE organizations to concentrate their activities on the MTOE organization (i.e., no supervision of installation directorate staffs). MACOM commanders may approve exceptions to this policy where circumstances warrant. In the past certain TDA and MTOE organizations were integrated; for example, corps G-1 and installation DPCA. Army policy now prohibits this integration and allows only the integration of TDA staffs.

Installation-level management includes officer personnel who serve as key managers in installation organizations. The scope and complexity of the total responsibilities of a major activity director far surpass the specialties envisioned by the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). OPMS specialties exist in the areas of supply, procurement, and maintenance; yet, for example, an installation Director of Logistics (DOL) may supervise all of these functions, and more. It is unlikely that an all-around expert in all these areas exists. The first step in assigning the right officers for key installation management jobs is the identification of those with prior installation management experience and OPMS specialty qualification in the principal area to be supervised. An additional skill identifier (ASI 6Y) is awarded to those officers with prior installation management experience and training to monitor their special qualifications for future reassignment in this

field. A review of the military spaces of most installations, especially AMC organizations, reveals a prime reason for the shortage of officers with installation staff experience. There are few positions for majors or lieutenant colonels and in the future we will have even less. In view of the pressing necessity for the efficient management of resources at the installation, the prudent officer will learn the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES); the functions of administrative services to include records management; contracting; and the operation of the civilian personnel system. Individuals, when slated to serve on an installation staff, should attend the Army Installation Management Course offered at the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee, Virginia.

Rarely is the importance of the role of civilian personnel more striking than in the management of an installation. Civilians provide long-term job continuity and stability and they represent many job skills for which there are no comparable military skills or too few soldiers to fill existing needs. A review of the manning chart of any installation reveals that civilians represent the majority of mid-level staff and supervisory personnel, as well as the blue collar work force. They are technicians upon whom the military manager depends for the accomplishment of installation duties. They represent the core residual work force should deployment be required of a major troop unit based at that installation. Thus, the civilian work force provides geographical stability and the technical expertise for many jobs.

As the Army transitions fully to a standard installation organization, there remain related follow-on actions which include investigation of applying selected "city manager" concepts in the Army, development of entrepreneurial skills, examination of training and assignments to develop garrison commanders and functional organization directors, and implementation of a standard installation information management system.

Since the installation management process cuts across all programs and activities of an installation, any attempt at a detailed discussion of the functions of the Garrison Commanders or the directorate staff would be excessively lengthy and a duplication of previous effort. Some of these areas will be addressed as functional areas which are most applicable to the management of an installation. Many important areas of directorate staff responsibility are omitted, even organizational charts, and others are only touched upon lightly. This treatment, by design, reduces the management process to a discussion of fundamentals most applicable to the installation.

Standard Installation Management System.

Many installations have implemented a standard installation management system (SIMS). The SIMS is driven by goals and objectives and provides the means

by which all functions at an installation are pulled together, documented, and systematically reviewed to ensure goals and objectives are accomplished. The system identifies the decisionmaker for each function and performance standards which must be achieved for effective and efficient management and focuses on both the short term execution of programs, and the development of long range plans.

U.S. Army Materiel Command.

The subject of installation management is normally oriented on the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) as being the most representative MACOM's.

While there are many similarities in the installation management process within the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the other MACOM's, there are also many significant differences. Aside from the fact that AMC installations are typically labeled depots, proving grounds, arsenals, laboratories, ammunition plants, and industrial plants, they also vary in size, complexity, and diversity of mission. It is mission difference which accounts for fundamental organizational variations in installation management between AMC and the other MACOM's. Because of the AMC mission, the major portion of installation support costs are carried by the Army Industrial Fund (AIF) as opposed to the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds which support FORSCOM and TRADOC installation activities. The AIF is best described as a working capital fund similar to the Army Stock Fund (ASF). Customers order services or products from AMC installations; the AIF provides the working capital to produce the services or products ordered; the customer is billed for the costs of services (including a portion of installation overhead); and the AIF is reimbursed by the customer.

AMC installation management fund accounting is different from OMA procedures used by other MACOM's. The AIF system is applicable to AMC activities because the AMC mission is similar to commercial activities, and costs of operations per unit of output may be measured. This ability to apply dollar units of measurement to input, output, and cost per unit permits the adoption of many standard business management techniques. AMC installation management procedures differ somewhat from those of other MACOM's, yet the aim is the same and the problem no less difficult.

OCONUS.

Although it may appear that commands outside the Continental United States have been slighted, the goals of installation management are much the same. There are differences in operational procedures and organizations such as the Military Community, or Theater Support Group. These differences are sufficiently complex not to be addressed in this chapter.

In-country orientation can better serve to articulate these differences. USAREUR for example consists of 40 major communities (equivalent to CONUS installations), 52,000 family housing units, 53 airfields, and 280 schools representing 29 billion dollars in facilities covering 312,000 acres at 811 separate sites. In addition to the 280,585 mission-assigned soldiers and civilians, USAREUR's communities support 232,574 other soldiers (INSCOM, AMC, etc) and civilians, to include family members, DODDS teachers, and NAF employees.

MODEL INSTALLATION PROGRAM

In 1983, DOD began an innovative management experiment to improve the support provided to units, soldiers, civilian employees and families on installations. Under the Model Installation Program (MIP), the local commander is able to try new management methods and retain savings achieved to improve local services and facilities. Perhaps the most important aspect of the program is the emphasis on decentralizing execution to the lowest possible level. The thrust of the program is to remove constraints that unnecessarily limit commanders' freedom and to delegate to them the authority to do their jobs.

Initially there were 15 installations chosen from among all services to participate in the test. By the end of FY86 that number had increased to more than 30, including overseas commands, and were so successful that the Army and the Air Force extended their programs service-wide in FY87. The policy for extending the MIP Army-wide was promulgated by the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff on 1 April 1987.

The Model Installation Program is expected to:

- Examine the effectiveness of new concepts at the installation level and determine the applicability of those concepts for system wide application.
- Identify and eliminate counterproductive or wasteful regulations and procedures.
- Demonstrate the advantages of giving more authority to commanders.
- Create better working and living conditions for Army personnel which should improve morale, performance, recruitment and retention.

The Model Installation Program operates on a simple precept: anyone (military or DA civilian) at an installation may submit a request to simplify procedures or policy. The request is quickly processed to the level that has the authority to approve the request, whether an intermediate HQ's, HQDA or OSD. Experience has shown that the great majority of requests can be approved at the installation level. Model Installation Program (MIP) requests force Commanders and staffs to take a good look at the way they do business. In the process, MIP's constitute a Commander's tool to eliminate barriers to sound management.

By 1 October 1987 the processing of MIP requests will be streamlined through the use of a computer network. The network will link program managers and staff officers at installations, intermediate commands, and HQDA. This system will also have a central data base that can be accessed by any participant, to obtain information about MIP proposals. The network and data base will greatly facilitate the sharing of good ideas between installations and commands.

Model Installation Graduate Program

On 26 March 1986 the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum that called for the Military Departments and Defense agencies to apply not only the Model Installation management approach to all installations, but also initiate a Graduate Program.

He tasked each of the Military Departments to test a budget without subdivisions such as appropriations, accounts, floors, ceilings, etc. This unified budget concept was to be tested at one or two installations. The Army's implementation of the Graduate Program includes a number of key initiatives:

— The unified budget test, which began on 1 October 1986, is being conducted at Fort Riley and Fort Leonard Wood. The funds included in the test are Operation and Maintenance, Army; non-centrally managed Other Procurement, Army; Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve; Military Construction, Army (unspecified portion between \$100K and \$1M); and Family Housing. Each quarter, a team comprised of major Army command and HQDA representatives will evaluate the progress and results of the test. Forts Jackson, Polk, Sill and Stewart have been designated control installations for purposes of comparison in the test evaluation. Further, installations are free to reapply all savings achieved.

— The FY88 DOD Budget submission also includes a provision to raise the threshold from \$5,000 to \$25,000 for using O&M funds to purchase base-level commercial equipment (BCE). This change, if approved, will greatly improve the commander's ability to procure needed equipment.

INSTALLATION ENVIRONMENT

The environment within which the installation operates is characterized by change. Awareness of the external influence on the installation is helpful to the commander and the staff in anticipating change as well as formulating an appropriate response.

The most obvious and pervasive external influence on the Army and the installation commander is the United States Congress. This influence is both direct and indirect through the enactment of specific legislation, Congressional hearings or investigations, or through action or precedent established by a Congressional agency, such as the General Accounting Office (GAO). The Congressional action which has the most direct impact on the Army and the installation is the annual

authorization and appropriation legislation which imposes dollar ceilings on all accounts, and floors or minimum required expenditures on other accounts.

Ultimately all legislation concerning the Defense establishment directly, and often the country at large, converges at installation level. The legislation which discontinued the Draft has had many direct and predictable results within the Army. Tactical units became at one point involved in recruiting, elaborate physical facilities were contracted, and extensive educational programs were introduced at all installations. The demographics of the Army have also changed dramatically over the years. Formerly the Army was postured to provide facilities and support for predominantly single soldiers. Today, 57% of the Army is married. The term "Military Family" has evolved along with the demographic changes. The Military Family is not only the married couple; it is also the single soldier sponsor and all children. More than 700,000 children are family members and nearly 50% are under the age of six years. In many cases both spouses are in the Army; in others, a spouse is in the Army and the other has civilian employment. Accordingly, the installation is challenged to become more family oriented in all planning, programming, and resourcing decisions. Some clear examples of areas requiring emphasis and resourcing are the expanded need for child-care development centers, training and certification of family child-care providers, teen clubs, Army Community Service activities, and, indeed, recreational facilities of all types. These evolving changes impact on virtually every activity on an installation. Currently environmental protection laws are having an immense impact at troop installations and industrial-type installations and the officer reductions mandated for FY87 have caused increased civilianization of Base Operations activities.

Community relations is another area over which the commander exercises limited control, but can influence perceptions. Public confidence and good opinion is essential to the full support of military installations. Solid community support manifests itself in the availability of adequate civilian labor and a community attitude sympathetic to the installation mission.

These then are influences on an installation over which the commander may not have as much control as he would like. The conclusion to be drawn is that the installation commander and his staff operate habitually in an environment of significant uncertainty and change and this contributes to the complexity and difficulty of the installation manager's tasks.

INSTALLATION FUNCTIONS

Personnel and Community Activities.

Figure 16-6 represents a typical Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA). The DPCA is responsible for a wide range of diverse activities which transcend the traditional functions

depicted. The DPCA influences virtually every aspect of the working and living environments on an installation. All aspects of "people programs," to include personnel, Army community services, human resources management, community life support, education, nonappropriated funds (NAF), etc. are the DPCA's domain. These programs and services impact directly on the morale, organizational esprit, and development of individual potential of all military, civilian, family member or retired personnel associated with an installation. Consequently, successful DPCA activities can significantly enhance the attitude, motivation, commitment, and sense of well-being of our soldiers and their families, all of which make a positive contribution to readiness. As CG, 8th ID the current Chief of Staff, General Vuono, used to state, "Quality of life is a readiness issue." Today, this emphasis, which places Commanders and their DPCA's in the forefront of quality of life issues, is still with us.

The community activities functions include the broad scope of Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs, Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities (NAFIs) and private organizations. Military personnel expect a wide range of social, financial, recreational and educational services at an installation. The necessary interrelationship between installations and neighboring civilian communities, however, is not fully appreciated. Recruiting, education and recreation programs, law enforcement, and religious activities, for example, are at times best accomplished in cooperation and coordination with civilian communities. This is especially true when assessing an installation's needs because they are affected by the facilities, services, and programs available to the military population in the civilian communities. In this regard, the DPCA attempts to have the military and civilian communities complement each other. Additionally, there may be funding resources available through local, state or federal programs which could supplement DOD appropriations as well as NAF resources. The greatest challenge a DPCA encounters in the administration and operation of the community activities programs is resource management. The DPCA must pull together a variety of programs which are supported singly or jointly with appropriated or NAF personnel and funds, in varying degrees. The development of community/MWR-related facilities, personnel and financial requirements (NAF and Appropriated Funds (AF)), and their prioritization and funding from the correct type of resources within the established parameters is perhaps the most demanding aspect of a DPCA's responsibilities and has thrust him into an entrepreneurial role, focusing on self-sufficiency and profits.

The basis for a DPCA's efforts to manage and improve MWR and community programs is the five-year MWR plan. The requirement for each installation to develop and maintain such a plan was directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The methodology used to develop the plan is to:

DIRECTORATE OF PERSONNEL AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES




FIGURE 16-6

- Determine installation community MWR goals and objectives.
- Identify shortfalls.
- Assess the capability of existing installation facilities and programs, as well as those off post in civilian communities, to meet goals and objectives.
- Develop facility and program additions and improvements necessary to meet the shortfall, and cost them.
- Identify fund source (AF/NAF) required to pay for facility and program costs. (Note: the pressure to reduce AF Support to MWR activities is increasing due to Congressional language in the FY87 Authorization/Appropriation Acts.)
- Break the tasks necessary to attain objectives into achievable increments and include in each year of the five-year plan as appropriate.

The DPCA MWR management task has been intensified by a series of initiatives by major commands and HQDA. The Army Community and Family

Program Review Committee (CFRC) meets semiannually to review MWR program and NAF budget guidance, determines the use of NAF dividends from AAFES and other sources, approves NAF major construction projects, reviews AF and NAF budget execution, and participates in the formulation of policy and Army MWR programs. The Committee was chartered by the Army Chief of Staff in February 1986. It replaces the Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Committee. It is chaired by the DCSPER and its membership includes the Chiefs of Staff of the four-star MACOM's, General Officer representation from the Army Staff, the Sergeant Major of the Army, and an installation commander (a rotating position).

Plans, Training, and Mobilization.

The Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM). The training functions of DPTM involve coordinating installation support of resident units and activities, managing training facilities, and training

activities of garrison force units, small units, and personnel who are not in trainee or student status. This directorate encompasses normal G-3/S-3 functions. Typical functions are: plans, operations, training, unit readiness objectives and levels, mobilization planning, force integration, range operations, museums, aviation, NBC activities, training aid support (the audiovisual portion of this function will shift over time to the United States Army Information Systems Command), security/counter-terrorism, and establishing command priorities. A typical structure is shown at Figure 16-7. The directorate may provide Reserve Component

support when a separate element is not established. Extensive coordination is also required in conjunction with support of Reserve units within the installation's geographic area of responsibility. Training areas, supply, maintenance, other logistical support, and budgeting require coordination by the DPTM. The initial request for support is provided by the Directorate of Reserve Component Support (DRCS), but the installation managerial responsibilities belong to the DPTM. ROTC support for summer training follows the same pattern with initial requirement input coming from the supported ROTC Region to the DRCS.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS, TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION




FIGURE 16-7

With respect to the mobilization responsibility, the DPTM must: (1) plan for mobilization of units, unit readiness activities, and deployment of units of the total force assigned to/stationed on the installation; (2) plan for administrative, logistical, and movement support of RC units during the alert, home station, and movement phases of mobilization; (3) plan for the reception, administrative processing, logistical support, training, validation for deployment of mobilized RC units; (4) plan for deployment of assigned active and mobilized RC units and support of assigned Aerial Port of Embarkation and Surface Port of Embarkation, and for the support or employment of forces allocated for CONUS contingencies, in accordance with instructions in specific plans.

Security.

Director of Security (DSEC). This directorate encompasses normal "G-2/S-2" functions. Typical functions are: security clearances, access to classified or restricted areas, surveys and inspection, intelligence information, weather services, maps, and aerial photography policy. This directorate does not include physical security of material and facilities which are normal military police activities. Where workload does not warrant a separate DSEC, a security division is established within the DPTM.

Logistical Operations.

The Director of Logistics (DOL), formerly the Director of Industrial Operations (DIO), provides the logistical functions to fulfill the support mission of an installation and to support the installation itself. The functions include logistical support planning, supply, maintenance, laundry, food service, transportation and related activities, and, in some cases, purchases and contracting. The installation is normally the lowest echelon responsible for providing day-to-day logistical support to troop units and other designated customers. Involved in this responsibility are all of the functions of logistics management from obtaining resources to making their timely allocations.

Normally, with the automated assistance of the Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply System (SAILS) at installations where a corps is located, logistics support is provided to subordinate and attached units by Corps Support Commands (COSCOM's). At installations where a division is located, logistics support is provided by Division Support Commands (DISCOM's), normally with the automated assistance of the Direct Support Unit Standard Supply System (DS4). Installations with nondivisional supply and maintenance companies receive day-to-day logistics support through DS4.

Some support, which can be provided more effectively on an area basis, is charged to a single command and is furnished in accordance with intraservice agreements. AR 5-9 designated

coordinating installations and established installation area responsibilities for coordinating intraservice support, by functional type, to AC and RC units, activities, and individuals located outside the real property boundaries of Army installations. In some instances, support may be provided to or from other Services under the Defense Regional Interservice Support (DRIS) Program. This is common when installations of different Services are in the same geographical area. Mission and status of supported units and activities must be evaluated constantly in the allocation of resources.

The DOL is the standardized staff agency established to provide for all logistics operations. A typical structure is shown in Figure 16-8. Regardless of the particular structure employed, the basic areas of responsibility fall within a pattern of these divisions.


The magnitude of the DOL's responsibilities are immense. Functions under his jurisdiction include the consolidated property office, self-service supply center, initial clothing issue point, subsistence, bulk POL, and ammunition. The DOL's close, continuous coordination with the DRM is essential. This coordination and his overall ability to function are greatly enhanced by a variety of standard logistics systems. The DOL possesses no internal capability for reviewing the effectiveness of these systems, and must rely on outside inspections or auditing organizations. Some of the standard Army systems used by the DOL for management purposes are:

Direct Support System (DSS). A distribution system which provides direct delivery of supplies from the wholesale supply system to the direct support level for Supply Classes II, III, IV, VII, and IX.

Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply System (SAILS). A system which standardizes and automates supply management and supply-related financial functions at installations. SAILS interfaces with the Standard Army Financial Inventory Accounting and Reporting System (STARFIARS) for stock fund and financial inventory accounting.

Standard Army Financial Inventory Accounting and Reporting System (STARFIARS). STARFIARS is an automated system designed to accomplish financial inventory accounting and produce financial reports for a retail-level branch office of the Army Stock Fund at Army installations. STARFIARS interfaces with SAILS, MEDSTOC, and STANFINS. The proponent agency for STARFIARS is ASA(FM). The accounting and financial management reports generated by STARFIARS are distributed by the Finance and Accounting Office (Division), Directorate of Resource Management.

DIRECTORATE OF LOGISTICS



1 CONTRACTING DIVISION WILL BE IN THE DOL WHEN A SEPARATE DIRECTORATE OF CONTRACTING IS NOT WARRANTED

FIGURE 16-8

Property Disposal. Classification and demilitarization, required to dispose of government property, are the responsibility of the DOL. However, the ultimate disposal function is performed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), relieving the DOL of the operations function.

The Automated System for Army Commissaries (ASAC). A management system which centralizes management of Army commissaries under the Troop Support Agency. This "stove piping" of management, as occurred with PX's, provides the installation manager with a separate organization which has standardized the mechanics of the operation. The Troop Support Agency has staff responsibility for day-to-day operation of the commissary. ASAC interfaces with STANFINS.

The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS). Maintenance management is currently standardized under this system; however, command-unique systems for installation TDA maintenance operations exist. Both FORSCOM and TRADOC have implemented the Support Maintenance Management System (SMMS). Maintenance management and operational systems will ultimately be replaced by the Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS), which will impact on DOL responsibilities and structure.

Direct Support Unit Standard Supply System (DS4). This system is designed to automate stock control and provide additional asset management capability at the divisional and nondivisional direct support unit level and at selected general support unit sites. When DS4 is completely extended, it will replace both DLOGS and DSU/GSU. The entire Army will have one common functional mode at the desired support level of supply.

Tactical Unit Financial Management Information System (TUFMIS). This system accounts for dollar commitments only (as opposed to obligations). It is an automated system for tactical divisions and separate brigades. Designed to provide commanders with the dollar value of supply requisitions by unit and the availability of funds to purchase supplies from a higher source, TUFMIS interfaces with DS4, DLOGS, and SAILS.

The Standard Finance System (STANFINS). While not primarily a logistics system, STANFINS provides an installation-level system for financial management of consumer funds. STANFINS standardizes and automates financial transactions and major operating requirements of installation and accounting divisions; creates, updates, and maintains base-level financial data banks for preparation of financial and managerial

reports; and produces data required to update higher echelon data banks. Also, STANFINS interfaces with ASAC to perform stock fund accounting for commissaries.

The *Plans and Operations Division* performs the Logistics Readiness function for the installation. This includes the preparation (in coordination with the DPTM) of logistic support plans for mobilization, emergency, disaster, and special plans and exercises. It coordinates logistic aspects for the Force Modernization Program and logistic elements of the Unit Status Reporting System for installation nondivisional units. The division monitors war reserve stockage including requirements determination, stockage, maintenance in storage, usage, and reporting. It plans and supervises (in conjunction with DPTM) logistical training. The division provides technical expertise in the field of Automated Logistics System Design/Analysis. It formulates logistic policy, administers the Supply Discipline Program, and reviews reports of survey inventory adjustment reports.

The *Resource Management Division* supports the logistic goals and objectives by determining the resource requirements for executing installation logistic programs. This division performs industrial engineering services; provides technical supervision; and develops, justifies, and executes budgets and programs. It manages resources for logistic functions and administers Army Stock Fund activities, the logistic aspects of the Organizational Efficiency Review Program, and the Internal Controls Program. The division supervises and coordinates the Defense Regional Interservice Support (DRIS) Program and the Energy Management Program.

The *Supply and Services Division* provides supply and services support to units and individuals including USAR and ROTC units satellited on the installation for logistic support. The division performs management functions for the accountable property officer; is responsible for stock control policies and procedures; and issues and/or sells supplies (less medical, nonappropriated fund activities (NAF), and nonstandard engineer (DEH) unique supplies). The responsibility includes the operation of a Central Issue Facility, and at basic training installations, a Clothing Initial Issue Point. Other activities include the Self-Service Supply Center, laundry, dry cleaning, mortuary services, Food Service Program, Troop Issue Subsistence Activity, and staff supervision of dining facilities. The division operates a repairable exchange activity, a cannibalization point, bulk petroleum facilities, and property book management and administration for installation property. The division conducts inventory management, classification and disposition of excess property, and provides for the reporting of designated equipment through the Continued Balance System Expanded (CBX-X). Other functions include DOD Small Arms Serialization

Program, staff supervision for the operation of POL laboratory, Ammunition Supply Point (ASP), and the Installation Storage Facility.

The *Transportation Division* coordinates movement services (including passenger, personal property and general purpose motor, rail, and watercraft services); the movement of materiel and personnel by commercial carrier and military transportation; and unit movement data and plans for military convoy movements. The division is responsible for the operation of the Transportation Motor Pool (TMP) and TMP vehicles.

The *Maintenance Division* integrates the scheduling of all maintenance operations including installation and tenant units/activities. It provides direct and general support maintenance for tactical and support vehicles, general support equipment, special purpose equipment (less medical and installed building equipment), aircraft, combat vehicles, weapons and fire control, communication and electronic equipment (including IDS, but less COMSEC equipment), furniture, and clothing and textiles. Other functions include managing the Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team (MAIT) Program and the Army Oil Analysis Program. It also is responsible for organizational maintenance for TMP and other units which have no maintenance capability. The division is responsible for the management of the Army Warranty Program (AWP); the Army Modification Work Order Program; and the Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment Calibration Recall System. In addition it monitors the reporting for Material Condition Status for divisional and nondivisional units.

Contracting and Procurement.

Under the Standard Installation Organization, a separate directorate, Directorate of Contracting (DOC), has been established with contracting officers' representatives (COR's) located within functional staff directorates.

The DOC performs the installation contracting functions. When a separate directorate is not warranted based on workload and other factors, the contracting functions will be performed under the DOL. The authority to establish a Contracting Division under the DOL, in lieu of a Directorate of Contracting, rests with HQDA. The standard DOC organization is shown in Figure 16-9.

The *Support Division* provides services required to assure efficient contract execution and administration. Their functions include maintaining records, processing data, and preparing reports of procurement actions as required, status reports, and follow-up data to management. The division also serves as the focal point for operation of the Standard Army Automated Contracting System (SAACONS) and performs Cost and Price Analysis; on-site review of contracting documents; identifies Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Prevention areas; and provides support for property administration matters.

DIRECTORATE OF CONTRACTING




FIGURE 16-9

The *Purchasing Division* performs the functions of planning; soliciting; execution; and administration of supplies, services, and construction procurements using small purchase and other simplified purchase or intragovernmental procedures. The functions include purchase actions for the acquisition of supplies, services, and construction needs; executing purchase programs initiated by higher headquarters including, but not limited to, Small Business and Socioeconomic; Competition; Labor Surplus Area Procurement; and Audit Tracking. The division also provides data for preparing procurement action reports and management reports. It is also responsible for resolving all adverse actions associated with the acquisition requirements.

The *Contracting Division* performs the functions of planning; soliciting; execution; and administration of supplies, services, and construction procurement utilizing other than small purchase and other simplified purchase or intragovernmental procedures. The functions include contracts for the acquisition of supplies, services, and construction needs. The division assists in preparing and executing Advance Acquisition Planning programs, implements and executes established acquisition programs including Small and Disadvantaged Business Program; Increased Competition in Government Acquisition; and Labor

Surplus Area Acquisition. Other functions include assisting in the planning and development of proposed installation commercial activities projects, resolving adverse actions associated with the acquisition requirements, closing out completed contracts, and disposing of contract files.

The *Contract Administration Division* provides an effective and efficient organization for the administration of contracts. All installation contracts, other than small purchases, are candidates for transfer to this division. Service contracts (especially Commercial Activities) require intensified contract administration and will be handled by this division. The functions include administration of contracts awarded by the installation from award to close-out; coordination of technical and administrative efforts to ensure the government's best interest is served in receiving the goods and services established by the contract; and preparing and issuing modifications, administrative changes, and termination agreements. The division also appoints Contracting Officer Representatives and oversees the quality assurance, surveillance, and evaluation of contract performance and the quality assurance, surveillance, and evaluation conducted by functional directorates.

The *Nonappropriated Funds Division* performs the functions of planning, soliciting, execution, and administration of purchases using nonappropriated funds for morale, recreation, and welfare purposes outside of the parameters defined as NAF Small Purchases in accordance with DA Pam 215-4. Purchases for AAFES, Post Restaurants, and Chaplain's Funds are excluded. If the total number of NAF procurements is insufficient to warrant the establishment of a separate division, a NAF Contracting Branch or Section will be established in the Contracting Division; the NAF procurement personnel will be separated from appropriated funds personnel. The functions include initiating and completing purchases for supplies, services, resale items, consumable items, and entertainment where the cost or other criteria exceeds the parameters for NAF Small Purchases in accordance with DA Pam 215-4, assisting activities in preparing requisitions which accurately reflect customer needs, monitoring contractor performance, and resolving all adverse actions associated with the acquisition requirements. The division also closes out completed contracts and disposes of contract files.

Engineering and Housing.

Often the term "city engineer" is applied to the Director of Engineering and Housing (DEH). This term implies some of the duties of a facilities engineer, but it does not begin to describe the full scope or degree of

complexity of normal facilities engineering functions within the Army's Real Property Management System (RPMS). Major components of RPMS are identified in Chapter 23. The accompanying organizational chart (Figure 16-10) is helpful in identifying the numerous functions for which the DEH is responsible.

In the operations and maintenance component of RPMS, the DEH's responsibilities are to:

- Program and budget for real property maintenance activity (RPMA) resources.
- Provide utilities, including operation of installation utilities plants.
- Maintain and repair utility systems, buildings, roads, and grounds.
- Perform minor construction or "new work" funded with OMA funds.
- Furnish services including fire prevention and protection, refuse collection and disposal, entomology, custodial service, packing and crating, and engineer-related functions such as design and contract specification.

The scope of these responsibilities for a particular DEH may be appreciated only through awareness of the size and mission of the installation and the significant portion of the total installation budget allocated to engineering activities. In total, facilities engineering supports roughly \$150 billion (replacement value) in

DIRECTORATE OF ENGINEERING AND HOUSING




FIGURE 16-10

Army facilities, over a billion square feet of building space, and land area equivalent to Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island combined. Utilities cost in excess of one billion dollars annually.

Although the DEH is often thought of only in the context of OMA or RPMA, his responsibilities extend much further. He is, in fact, the hub for all real property management on the installation. The non-OMA functions with significant short-term and long-term cost and installation mission implications involve the DEH in:

- Master planning and analysis of stationing and utilization as part of the identification of RPMS requirements.

- Definition of Military Construction Army (MCA) projects and establishing land requirements as part of RPMS programming.

- Review of designs for MCA projects, acceptance of new facilities, and justification of land acquisition as part of the RPMS acquisition function.

- Determination of facilities and land disposal needs and mothballing standby facilities as part of the RPMS disposal function.

The DEH performs special functions involving two or more of those already noted. He serves as Executive Secretary of the Installation Planning Board for master planning. The DEH's real property office maintains documentary control of all installation real property. He coordinates engineer work on family housing, troop unit construction, and nonappropriated fund construction. He performs maintenance and repair of off-post facilities such as USAR Centers. The DEH identifies and manages the backlog of maintenance and repair (BMAR). Moreover, he maintains a special working relationship with the district engineer who provides the installation with technical engineer support as needed and administers military construction contracts, as well as certain service contracts such as timber harvesting programs, agricultural outleases, and other real estate actions.

The DEH directly expends about half of the BASOPS OMA budget and large amounts of other appropriations. Consequently, his operations are subject to many legal and procedural constraints. While the dollar value of constraint levels changes over time, the key point to remember is that installation commanders and staff representatives must be aware of the numerous statutory and regulatory guidelines within which a DEH is required to work.

Installation responsibilities for the environmental protection program are centralized in the office of DEH. The national concern for the preservation of our environment has had a direct and dramatic impact on the operation of an installation. The similarity between commercial manufacturing challenges in the areas of air, water, and waste pollution and those faced by the Army is apparent. The size of most military reservations

and the similarity of operations in both cities and military installations cause environmental problems to become major and costly considerations in the effective management of installations. Activities involving environmental considerations include helicopter flight routes, isolated maneuver areas, and weapons range firing. Less obvious areas of concern are the environmental impacts of proposed base closures or of new land acquisition. The DEH reviews and approves staff consideration of the environmental consequences of proposed programs, coordinates preparation of the formal Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and subsequently supervises the installation's progress toward operations to accomplish missions without damaging the environment. Each staff element or unit which is the proponent of an action has the responsibility to assess the environmental consequences of the action it is proposing. Hazardous waste management plans for the installation are a significant DEH responsibility that involve many other organizations on the installation.

While the DEH is an indirect user of most installation automated systems, he is a direct user and beneficiary of the Integrated Facilities System (IFS). The IFS is a multi-command, automated information and evaluation system which encompasses the life cycle management of real property resources. It interfaces with SAILS and STANFINS to record facility engineers' financial and cost transactions into the accounting system.

While not exclusively or even predominantly an engineer responsibility, Commercial Activities (CA) deserve mention since many DEH functions lend themselves to commercial contract. The program has received significantly greater emphasis in recent years as many engineer functions may be performed by a commercial contractor, thus permitting a reduction in the size of the permanent installation work force. Some consideration has been given to the concept of extending contractual arrangements to provide complete installation support. Although short-term savings might be realized in some areas through the CA Program, it is difficult to estimate future costs and assure the future availability of engineer technicians. When commercial contracts are used to accomplish engineer tasks, close staff work is necessary to ensure contract input by the using agency and tight control of contract terms through adequate supervision. (A complete discussion of the Commercial Activities Program is covered later in this chapter.)

Housing services affect every installation organizational element. Housing has become a limiting factor in major organizational realignments and restationing activities. Congressional interest and OSD housing management policy require the installation housing manager to be a total resource manager. He must be knowledgeable and skilled in financial management, social services, tenant and community relations, rental and occupancy activities,

administrative services, building maintenance, and general housekeeping.

The mission of the Housing Management Office is to provide adequate and suitable housing for all military and authorized civilian personnel.

To assist the manager, an automated system has been developed. The Housing Operations Management System (HOMES), integrates all aspects of housing at installation, MACOM, and HQDA levels. The system improves management of family housing, unaccompanied personnel housing, transient housing, and off-post referral housing. HOMES provides for planning and programming assignments, tenant referrals, reservations, repair and maintenance, inventory of both housing and furnishings, and for the generation of ad hoc reports. These various programs are financed through three major funding sources:

- The Army Family Housing Appropriation (AFH);
- OMA; and
- Nonappropriated Funds (NAF).

The housing manager is responsible for the centralized management and administration of all housing functions, including:

- Maximum use of all housing resources, including manpower funds, facilities, and other government-owned property.
- Proper and timely coordination of all housing matters and related activities with supporting agencies.
- Determining housing requirements and developing programs for construction, operations, and maintenance in coordination with other responsible staff elements.

Currently there are 174,690 government-owned or controlled family housing units, 658,077 unaccompanied personnel housing units, 49,830 transient units, and 224,000 off-post civilian assets. The owned units have an approximate replacement value of \$35 billion. There are 3,743 appropriated fund employees managing these assets and performing the housing mission. The worldwide housing furnishings inventory is valued at \$1.15 billion. The Army's portion of the AFH is approximately \$1.6 billion, the OMA "H" account \$98 million, and there are plans to spend \$289 million a year for new construction and modernization of unaccompanied personnel housing.

Congressional and OSD policy requires military housing to be provided from available civilian assets first, civilian assets developed through HUD programs (where applicable) second, government-controlled (leased) assets third (if economically feasible), and government-owned assets last.

INTERNAL CONTROL

The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 instituted requirements to establish and maintain effective systems of internal control. These requirements were further amended by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982. Also known as Public Law 97-255, this act mandates that all agency heads must provide reasonable assurance that:

- Obligations and costs comply with applicable law.
- Funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded.
- Revenues and expenditures that apply to agency operations are properly recorded and accounted for.

The act also stipulates that each executive agency's internal accounting and administrative controls be established per the standards prescribed by the Comptroller General.

The Congress enacted the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act as a means to deter fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement within the Federal Government. Public Law 97-255 is seen by the Congress as a means for government agencies to stand accountable and demonstrate financial responsibility to the taxpayer. To this end, the Secretary of Defense must ascertain, through his subordinate secretaries, whether or not existing systems of internal control comply with the requirements of the act. These findings are then reported to the Congress and the President.

Within DA, the policies and guidelines are contained in Army Regulation (AR) 11-2 (Internal Control Systems). This document restates the provisions of Public Law 97-255 and the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123 related to the program. The AR provides guidance for establishing, maintaining, evaluating, and reporting the effectiveness of internal controls. A key element of the program, not presented under the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, is the requirement for performance appraisals (OER's/EER's and Civilian Appraisals) to include standards and to reflect accomplishments related to internal control responsibilities.

All assessable units (determined by commanders and managers) undergo internal control reviews (ICR's). This process is facilitated through the use of ICR checklists developed by departmental-level functional proponents. Internal control reviews of historically-risky functional areas are to be completed at least annually while ICR's of less risky functions will be done at least biennially. Commanders and managers are also required to report the condition of their internal control systems through the chain of command to HQDA. HQDA reports to DOD and DOD, in turn, reports to the President and the Congress.

Although the detailed, specific responsibilities for internal controls within DA are much too numerous to

mention here, one very important generalization will serve to summarize—Commanders, Directors, and managers at all levels are responsible for instituting an effective internal control system within their units/activities.

ORGANIZATION EFFICIENCY REVIEW PROGRAM (OERP)

Policy.

It is the policy of the Federal Government that all agencies of the Executive Branch assess the effectiveness of their programs and the efficiency with which they are conducted and seek improvement on a continuing basis so that federal management will reflect the most cost-effective, progressive practices.

In November 1981, DOD directed the military departments to establish a formal system to conduct efficiency reviews (ER) of all in-house activities, excluding combat-oriented/deployable units. Performance Work Statements (PWS) were to be developed to clearly describe work requirements and standards.

The Army's implementation of the program was with the Army Performance Oriented Review and Standards Program (APORS). The goal, as established by DOD, was to achieve a 1.5 percent savings of authorized manpower spaces studied during each year, or 7600 manpower spaces during the initial six years of the program. These spaces were not lost to the Army, but were to be realigned to meet other critical DA requirements.

The program was redesignated the Organization Efficiency Review Program (OERP), combining the review process of commercial activities (which are addressed later in this chapter) with the review process for non-contractible activities.

Responsibilities.

The Army's Director of Management functions as the DA staff proponent for OERP. Specific responsibilities include the requirement to:

- (a) Function as the Army staff proponent for OERP.
- (b) Coordinate schedules of OERP and similar studies.
- (c) Implement, administer, and oversee the OERP.

The MACOM's/FOA's responsibilities include the requirement to:

- (a) Schedule and conduct efficiency reviews.
- (b) Participate in Army-wide OERP's in accordance with the Draft AR 5-XX, Coordination and Scheduling of Efficiency Related Programs.

The Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command, through the Director, USAMETA and the Director, ALMC:

(a) Provides training for entry level, journeyman level, and supervisory OERP personnel, both on-site and in-residence.

(b) Conducts executive-level training to keep the Army leaders informed on the requirements for and benefits of OERP studies and other applicable publications.

(c) Acts as consultant to the HQDA staff on the continued efforts to develop and refine OERP study policies and procedures.

Efficiency Reviews Documentation.

Army ER's incorporate the disciplines of management analysis, value engineering, capital investment decision procedures, and position management into a single, comprehensive approach that improves the efficiency and effectiveness of operations.

The ER requires the identification of the Most Efficient/Effective Method (MEM) of performing the function and the Most Efficient/Effective Organization (MEO). In addition, a Performance Work Statement (PWS) is required. The minimum acceptable level of quality is documented in an attachment to the PWS referred to as the Performance Requirements Summary (PRS). A description of each follows:

(a) *Most Efficient/Effective Method.* The MEM is established by conducting a careful analysis of the current methods and work processes to identify and recommend better ways of performing the function. The MEM consists of all improvements and they are clearly described in narrative form.

(b) *Most Efficient/Effective Organization.* The MEO identifies and documents the optimum organizational configuration for performing the function under study.

(c) *Performance Work Statement.* The PWS defines and documents the minimum essential work processes required to perform the assigned mission. It validates the mission and is a narrative description of the work flow process required to perform the mission.

(d) *Performance Requirements Summary.* The PRS is an attachment to the PWS which documents the critical tasks and the minimum acceptable quality level and documents allowable deviations.

Scheduling of ER is in accordance with Draft AR 5-XX, Coordination and Scheduling of Efficiency and Efficiency-Related Programs. Army-wide joint ER and Military Staffing Standards System (MS-3) studies are scheduled by the Office, Chief of Staff, Director of Management in coordination with ODCSPER. (Note: The MS-3 program was mandated by Congress and is certified in AR 570-5. Eventually most of the Army's TDA manpower requirements will be evaluated and

justified by MS-3.) All study schedules are coordinated with the appropriate DOD Joint Interservice Resource Group (JIRSG) (part of the Defense Regional Interservice Support (DRIS) Program) prior to submission to the Director of Management in order to avoid unnecessary disruption to organizations under study.

The purpose of an Efficiency Review (ER) is to validate, analyze, and improve work processes and resource utilization to facilitate performance of the installation's missions. ER analysts research missions and functions and conduct on-site reviews to determine the most efficient and effective methods of performing the function under study. Each ER consists of a management study and a Performance Work Statement (PWS).

(a) The PWS is developed to describe the work process required to meet mission requirements. It should be written to give management maximum flexibility in getting the job done. This includes eliminating compliance with regulations and procedures when more efficient and cost-effective ways are known. The PWS clearly states minimum requirements. The management study then develops the most efficient organization, taking into account minimum requirements and the management flexibility provided by the PWS.

(b) The PWS does not have to be completely written before the management study is complete, but the major decisions on how well the job must be done and whether compliance with old procedures is mandatory must be made before the MEM and MEO can be developed. The PWS describes what must be done (tasks to accomplish mission) while the management study documents how the job is currently being done and how it can be done better (methods improvement). A job analysis is conducted early in the process to ensure that the management study establishes the MEM and MEO based on the mission and acceptable minimum levels of performance with maximum flexibility.

(c) Care is taken to consider the mission of the function in the event of mobilization. Although MEM and MEO are not built around mobilization TDA's or missions, it is important that analysis of the mobilization mission be an integral part of the efficiency review process. In cases where the mission of the function merely expands during mobilization, a manpower staffing standards study which follows the ER will surface the staffing changes. However, if new missions are assumed during mobilization, a qualitative statement of the impact on the MEO will be included in the Executive Summary and explained in the final report.

The management study reflects the best efforts to improve operations by providing required products or services at reduced expenditure of Army resources. The best way to accomplish the essential tasks may involve changed procedures, revised paper flow, restructuring

of the organization, reconfiguration of facilities, equipment changes, elimination or upgrade/downgrade of positions, and other techniques. The MEM should provide the required quality and quantity of service with the smallest possible consumption of resources. Determination of needed changes must be made by analysis, relating the work to be done with the processes employed and the resources expended.

(a) The MEO may include a recommendation to reduce staffing requirements through consolidating organizations, activities, or functions; eliminating redundant supervision/functions/tasks; decreasing hierarchical positions; reducing clerical and other support positions; increasing span of control; and eliminating nonessential positions.

(b) The management study, ideally, is a team effort which uses the talents of individuals with expertise in management analysis, staffing, position classification, work measurement, value engineering, industrial engineering, cost analysis, and technical aspects of the functional area under study.

The end product of the management study is a comprehensive assessment which results in a determination of the most efficient/effective work methods, best position structure, and best organization to perform the validated work. The results will be documented in a report which includes the MEM and MEO and describes the difference between the existing methods and organization and the recommended MEM and MEO. The report will list recommended changes to manpower requirements by grade and series. Changes in the cost of an operation which result, or are expected to result, from implementation of recommendations made as a result of the ER will be broken out by manpower and dollars, and will include estimates of elimination or reductions in costs resulting from decreases in the number of work hours required to do a job, the consumption of materials, and similar expenses.

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM

Objective.

The objective of the Army Commercial Activities (CA) Program is to improve performance and management of Army resources. This objective is achieved through the systematic examination of Army commercial activities and contracts to determine if goods and services are being provided effectively and efficiently. More specifically, it provides guidance on Army policies, responsibilities, and procedures for determining whether commercial work should be performed by government personnel or by contractors. This program, however, does not apply to overseas commands.

Commercial Activities Policy.

It is the policy of the Government (OMB Cir. A-76) to rely on competitive private enterprise to supply the products and services it needs. This policy is reaffirmed in DOD Directives which also recognize that some functions must be performed by government personnel to support national defense, that in some instances there may be no satisfactory private commercial source available, and that proper attention must be given to relative cost.

In conformance with this policy, the Department of the Army will depend upon both government and private commercial sources for the provision of products and services with the objective of meeting its military readiness requirements with maximum cost effectiveness. The performance of a CA by Army personnel will not be started or continued unless:

(1) The CA has been reviewed and approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installation and Logistics), or

(2) A cost comparison has shown that the cost of in-house performance is less than the cost of contract performance.

Under the provisions of Section 502, Public Law 96-342, a commercial function that is being performed by DOD civilian personnel may not be converted to contract performance (a) to circumvent any civilian personnel ceiling and (b) unless the conversion is the result of a cost study. This procedure includes Congressional notification prior to initiation of the study if more than 40 civilian employees are involved.

Conversion to contract as the result of a cost study is not circumvention of any civilian personnel ceiling regardless of the disposition of the spaces freed by such conversion. However, conversion to contract without a cost study (direct award) may constitute circumvention if the contracted workload was formerly performed by civilian personnel who were separated or reassigned as the result of a ceiling reduction or if the contracted workload is a backlog resulting from a civilian reduction in force. Functions performed totally by a military work force and that have never employed civilian workers may be contracted without a cost study.

Commercial Activities Responsibilities.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installation and Logistics) (ASA(I&L)) acts as the CA program director and exercises policy approval authority for CA actions. The Director of Management responds to the ASA(I&L) as the CA program proponent and overall program manager for the Army. He is the primary point of contact within the Army staff for CA matters for MACOM's; the Army Secretariat; Office, Secretary of Defense; other Services and Federal agencies; Office of Management and Budget; and Congress. The Director of Management publishes guidance on CA policies and

procedures; designates, in coordination with the functional proponents, lead MACOM's or agencies for cost studies involving more than one MACOM or agency; notifies Congress of decisions to make CA cost studies and decisions resulting from cost studies; develops and maintains Army standard cost factors, costing methods, and procedures for determining costs through Army accounting systems; and develops and maintains procedures for adapting productivity improvement programs and techniques to the CA program. This includes:

(a) Management studies to obtain the most efficient and cost effective in-house organization to compare to contract proposals.

(b) The acquisition of capital equipment to improve productivity.

(c) Application of value engineering to service contracts.

(d) The measurement of the productivity of in-house and contracted commercial activities on a common standard.

Major Army commands and Army staff agencies responsible for HQDA Field Operating Agencies (FOA) and Staff Support Agencies (SSA) direct, manage, and implement the Army CA program.

Commanders of installations and Field Operating Agencies appoint a CA program manager and publish instructions for the identification and inventory of CA, control of new activities and expansions, performance of reviews and cost studies, and preparation and submission of inventory reports. Installation guidance includes provisions for CA in subposts and ensures that all installation actions with CA implications are coordinated with the CA program manager.

Explanation of CA Terms.

Augmentation Contract. A contract that augments an in-house work force. Augmentation contracts are normally for a specific project with a finite lifespan or for continuing services with an annual value of \$100,000 or less.

Capital Investment. The acquisition cost of Government-owned property less accumulated depreciation.

COCO Activity. An activity operated by a contractor in a contractor-owned facility. Material and equipment may be furnished by the contractor or by the government.

Commercial Activity. An activity that provides a product or service that can be obtained from a private source. An activity must be separable from other

activities for performance by a contract or an in-house work force. Commercial activities provide regularly needed goods and services, are not related to support of a specific project, and have a total life span of two years or more. An activity includes personnel, facilities, equipment, and contracts performing commercial functions.

Compelling Reason. A reason that dictates that an activity can only be performed one way. For example, the need to retain the military rotation base may compel the in-house performance of an activity.

Conditioned Award Contract. A contract award made upon the initial decision in a cost study involving a negotiated acquisition. Contractor performance of the contract is conditioned on the final decision being for conversion to contract after resolution of appeals and protests.

Conversion. A change in the method of performance of an activity from in-house to contract.

Contract Administration Cost. The cost incurred by the Government in assuring that a contract is faithfully performed by both the Government and the contractor. Included are all identifiable direct costs for quality assurance evaluation, contract administration, processing payments, and negotiating change orders.

Contracting Officer. An individual who is authorized by written appointment in accordance with procedures prescribed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to enter into and administer contracts and to make determinations and findings with respect to the contract. Contracting officer functions include but are not limited to preparation of the contract, proposal evaluation, negotiation, contract award, contract administration, and contract closeout.

Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). An individual appointed in writing by the contracting officer to act as his authorized representative in administering a specific contract. A COR appointment is not required for functions such as engineering evaluation, testing, and inspection. The authority and limitations of the COR are spelled out in the letter of appointment issued by the contracting officer and without authority to further redelegate. A COR cannot be authorized to award, ratify or obligate payment of money by the government; or involve a change in unit price, total contract price, quantity, quality, or delivery schedule.

Cost Comparison. The completion of the in-house cost estimate when the contract price is known and the comparison of the in-house cost to the cost of contract performance.

Cost Study. The process that determines if it is more economical to acquire products or services from an in-house work force or a commercial source.

Displaced Employee. An employee affected by an adverse action when an in-house activity is converted to contract. Adverse actions include job elimination, grade reduction, or reassignment to another position. Displaced employees include those directly affected by conversion of their jobs to contract and those affected by "bumping" or "retreat rights" related to a reduction-in-force from the conversion.

Exclusion: Determination that an activity is not subject to CA Program requirements. Excluded activities are not listed in the CA inventory or review schedule and are not subjected to review or cost study under the provisions of this regulation. Exclusion may be on the basis that the activities are not commercial activities as defined by OMB and DOD, or that they are commercial activities that must be excluded by statute or by OMB or DOD direction.

Exemption. The exemption of an in-house activity from cost study by ASA (I&L). Exemptions are based on a compelling reason for in-house performance other than relative cost.

Expansion. The modernization replacement, upgrade, or enlargement of an in-house commercial activity involving an increase exceeding 30 percent of the total capital investment or 30 percent of the annual cost of labor and material. A consolidation of two or more activities is not an "expansion" unless the proposed total capital investment or annual cost of labor and material exceeds the total from the individual activities by the amount of the threshold.

Final Decision. The cost study decision is made after the resolution of appeals, conduct of preaward surveys, and resolution of GAO protests. If no valid bids or offers are received on which to make a cost comparison, the final decision is made when it is decided that a solicitation will not be reissued.

Full Time Equivalent (FTE). A position which involves the planned use of 2,087 straight-time paid hours in a fiscal year (to include authorized leave and paid time off for training). For example, two part-time employees, each working 1043.5 straight-time paid hours in a fiscal year equal one FTE.

GOCO Activity. An activity operated by contractor personnel in a Government-owned facility. Materiel and equipment may be furnished by the Government or by the contractor.

Governmental Function. A function which must be performed by Government employees due to a special

relationship in executing Governmental responsibilities. Services or products provided in support of Governmental functions are considered commercial activities and are subject to the policies and requirements of this regulation. Governmental functions can fall into two categories:

(a) *Act of Governing*, as in discretionary application of government authority. Examples include judicial investigations, prosecutions, and other judicial functions; management of government programs requiring value judgments, as in directing the national defense; management and direction of the Armed Services; conduct of foreign relations; selection of program priorities; direction of Federal employees; regulation of the use of space, oceans, navigable rivers, and other natural resources; direction of intelligence and counterintelligence operations; and regulation of industry and commerce, including food and drugs.

(b) *Monetary Transactions and Entitlements*, as in government benefit programs; tax collection and revenue disbursements by the government; control of the public treasury accounts, money supply; and the administration of public trust.

In-House Performance. The performance of functions by Government employees, including military, civilian, and nonappropriated-fund employees (government employees administering a contract or monitoring contractor operation of an activity is not in-house performance).

Initial Decision. The decision made at the time of bid opening or initial preparation of a cost comparison. The initial decision may be affected by actions such as public review of the cost study, determinations of contractor responsibility, and appeal board decisions and cannot be the basis for irrevocable actions.

New Requirement. A newly established need for a commercial product or service.

Review. The examination of an in-house or contracted activity to find out if the current method of performance is proper. The review decision determines whether to conduct a cost study or to continue the current method of performance.

Transfer. A change in the method of performance from contract to in-house.

Commercial Activities Example;

Fort Sill announced in June 1987 the decision to contract out the operation of the Directorate of Logistics. Northrop's World Wide Aircraft Service bid of \$58.7 million was accepted, which was less than the \$61.9 million in-house bid offered by the installation's MEO proposal. Subject to the appeals procedures, the

contract is to become effective on 1 December 1987 and will affect some 472 Government employees. At the start of the initial CA solicitation, seven years ago, some 505 spaces were deemed contractable, of which 73 spaces were military. These military spaces were withdrawn in 1983 and filled with temporary workers. The installation's final MEO organization called for 398 full time equivalent workers, with limited grade reductions among the various work skills. Following this particular contract announcement, extensive congressional involvement by the Oklahoma congressional delegation resulted, both in Oklahoma and in Washington, D.C. Challenges to the contract announcement highlighted not only the extensive management efforts required by commanders and their staffs, but that ultimately such contract awards draw political involvement of substantial proportions, and may receive GAO protests which can further delay the CA award.

TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

Terrorism Counteraction is an umbrella term which encompasses both anti-terrorism (proactive) and counterterrorism (reactive) measures. The installation commander is responsible for the maintenance of law and order on a military reservation and may take such immediate action in response to a terrorist incident as may be necessary to protect life and property. However, the use of military force in domestic terrorist incidents is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The memorandum sets forth responsibilities and procedures to be followed when the use of military force is contemplated in connection with terrorist incidents. The Federal Bureau of Investigation must be promptly notified of all terrorist incidents and will exercise jurisdiction if the Attorney General or his designee determines that such incidents are a matter of federal interest.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The management of resources takes on greater impetus during peacetime due to the national pressure to control growth in government spending, especially in areas of national defense. This pressure is communicated to MACOM's and installation commanders in terms of requirements to accomplish their missions with fewer dollars. This section provides additional detail on the financial element of installation resource management.

Resource Managerial Levels.

The foregoing sections have covered the managerial and resource responsibilities of many offices, individuals, and directorates. This section will

emphasize the players in the financial management arena at installation level.

Top Management. Broad general guidance for the financial management of the installation is provided by the commander and other members of the command group to the staff and subordinate commanders through the PBAC or the PRAC. The PBAC or PRAC is the resource management advisory group to the commander. The committee generally includes the directorate staff of the installation and is normally chaired by the Garrison Commander. The PBAC is not charged formally with being a decisionmaking body; however, its deliberations and recommendations are sent to the installation commander and are a major factor in his final decision. The significance of this body to the total resource management effort of the installation is best described by a summary of its principal functions:

- Interpreting the budget and manpower guidance received from higher authority and integrating this with the local commander's guidance;
- Developing a plan for preparing a budget which will efficiently accomplish the command's mission;
- Applying methods and standards of performance data and other experience factors to specific programs and budget areas;
- Achieving reasonable balance and coordination between proposed missions, activities, and resources assigned to subordinate commands and agencies;
- Presenting a staff-coordinated proposed budget to the commander; and,
- Ensuring budget execution is accomplished with real-time audit to achieve desired cost-effectiveness.

Executive Management. The Director of Resource Management (DRM), formerly Comptroller (under the SIO all comptroller organizations are converted to DRM's), is the staff director charged with the responsibility for implementing the resource management programs of the command. The DRM is responsible for setting policy in the technical aspects of accounting, programming, budgeting, and execution in accordance with regulations and directives from higher headquarters and in consonance with generally accepted professional standards. The DRM is the principal advisor to the Command Group and the PBAC on the allocation and control of all funds of the command. He has primary staff responsibility for obtaining, administratively controlling, and accounting for the funds needed for the command. He is the principal collector and processor of management information for the use of the command, other staff members, and himself. He serves as management consultant to the command. The DRM exercises staff responsibility for finance systems and finance ADP functions.

The DRM has the overall responsibility for budget preparation and execution (both appropriated and

nonappropriated funds), force management, manpower documentation, and analysis. These responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Prepare all budget and financial reports required by higher headquarters.
- Develop adequate systems, procedures, and records which will better assist in the management and control of allocated mission funds.
- Provide expense obligation and listings of obligations.
- Monitor monthly obligations and expenses to determine if prescribed programs and ceilings are being adhered to. Examine high or low expenditure rates and coordinate with major activity directors to determine the cause and recommend action.
- Assist major activity directors by advising on established budgetary and financial systems and by ensuring understanding of authorized expenditures that can be made with appropriated funds.
- Advise the commander and staff on funds utilization.
- Ensure internal control systems are operative.
- Ensure execution review feedback influences subsequent planning, programming, and budgeting.
- Conduct reviews and analyses of operations; advise the Command Group of program slippages and identify revised objectives.
- Ensure the efficiency of operations by conducting management analysis and develop courses of action necessary for improvement.
- Synchronizing and coordinating the preparation of all installation budgets (e.g. appropriated fund and nonappropriated fund).

The basic recommended organization for the DRM is depicted in Figure 16-11.

Operational Management. The Directorate members of the staff exercise operational management of the funds and other resources allocated to the command. The Directors are responsible for the prudent expenditure of funds, and it is at directorate level that the actual certification of funds takes place. To assist the Directors there are specialists who are trained in financial management. These specialists serve on the working PBAC (chaired by the DRM) and attempt to resolve most financial problems at their level.

Installation PPBES.

At installation level, the Planning and Programming steps of PPBES, which are so critical at HQDA and MACOM level, are relatively minor and emphasis is placed on budgeting. (However, many installations input to the MACOM PARR which is solicited through a formal MACOM letter.) Similarly, the stages of budgeting at HQDA level—formulation, justification, execution—are modified at installation level to the three major functions of formulation, execution, and review.

DIRECTORATE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT




FIGURE 16-11

Budget Formulation Stage. The budget formulation concentrates on the development of the Command Operating Budget (COB) which reflects budget data for three fiscal years—current fiscal year (execution year), the next immediate fiscal year (budget year), and the second succeeding future fiscal year (program year). As shown in Figure 16-12, the starting point of the budgetary process at installation level is the receipt of the Budget Manpower Guidance (BMG), or operating program, from the MACOM. The BMG provides the installation with expected dollar and manpower availability for the budget and program years. The completed COB must reflect a program that does not exceed either the dollars or man-years projected in the BMG. The COB process is essentially one of “communicating down” the projected resource availability and “communicating up” the planned use of those resources.

The COB represents the Commander’s financial plan and has as its basic purposes:

1. Providing a record of activities to be conducted and the resources required to support it.
2. Identifying the actions that are to be accomplished by each subordinate element.
3. Establishing a basis (standard) to measure accomplishments and resource utilization.

Various schedules are submitted in support of the COB. Probably the single most important is the Commander’s Narrative which describes the situation at the installation in terms of resources, combat effectiveness, and mission accomplishment. Other schedules address such things as: summary of changes by type of financing/manpower category; special interest items such as ADP, contingency funds,

identification and documentation of all management improvement actions; civilian executive and management development; appropriated and nonappropriated fund synchronization; and issue narratives for each issue in the budget. When the COB and the various required schedules are transmitted from the installation through the MACOM to HQDA, the formulation process for budget year funds is complete. There is normally additional justification required between this point and the beginning of the execution stage, but this is not formally designated a stage at the installation level.

Budget Execution Stage. The budget execution stage of the budget cycle begins on the first day of the execution year and continues until the final day of that same fiscal year. During that period, the programs and tasks are performed and dollar resources are consumed in the process.

Budget execution is fundamentally a continuous event. However, if viewed sequentially, the following steps must occur in relation to the expenditure of government funds: receipt of funding authority; institution of administrative control of funds procedures; transaction identification, accounting, and reporting (includes obligation of funds); reviewing of unliquidated obligations; and year-end activity to purify files, reconcile records, effectively utilize remaining funds, as well as submitting certified year-end financial reports.

Budget Execution Review Stage. Reviewing the execution of the budget is an extremely important function at all managerial levels if effective use of funds is to be achieved. Critical to the review process is the timeliness of the review. The utility of an installation review conducted 30-45 days after the end of a period is

BUDGET FORMULATION CYCLE




FIGURE 16-12

certainly questionable with respect to allowing the commander to identify and react to problems.

The Comptroller of the Army recommends a philosophy of "Real Time Review and Audit" which essentially expresses the need for a day-by-day review of operations to assure effective utilization of available resources.

The control elements of real-time review and audit with the Commander at the center are shown in Figure 16-13. The DRM, in his capacity as comptroller and in most cases as the one responsible for financial systems, is ultimately concerned with the total review process and should be monitoring each element to ensure that a good balanced program is being executed. Thus, the DRM also monitors the various audits, reviews, and inspections that evaluate system weaknesses, program effectiveness, and compliance with standards.

Relatively new to the Budget Execution Review stage is a performance-oriented execution review. This review couples actual performance of major programs (measured by performance indicators) with dollar resource expenditures. The Army Chief of Staff established the requirement for this type of review in 1981 when he added Execution as a step in the Army PPBES. Initially implemented at ARSTAF level by the Program Performance and Budget Execution Review System (PPBERS), performance-oriented execution reviews are now being implemented at MACOM level and will require installation-level input.

Installation Funding.

Congress has passed laws, the Comptroller General has rendered decisions, and Federal agencies have published regulations to ensure that funds provided by

PARTICIPANTS IN THE
REAL TIME REVIEW AND AUDIT PROGRAM




FIGURE 16-13

Congress are expended during the time authorized, for their intended purpose, and in the proper manner. This section will emphasize several elements of Army resource management having particular application at the installation level which are tailored to meet these restraints.

Decentralization of Financial Controls. To achieve at installation level the Army's objective of integrating programming, budgeting, and fund control in one resource management system, the principal responsibilities for financial control must be decentralized to major activity directors.

Some financial restrictions may be established by the installation commander. Expense targets, for example, are dollar amount restrictions placed on fund allowance documents and program objectives prescribed by higher headquarters. The targets are established at the highest functional level practicable, thus allowing maximum flexibility and authority for activity and subactivity directors to administer their portions of the current operating programs.

Typical Installation Funds. As addressed in Chapter 15, Congress appropriates funds principally on a functional basis. Those that are managed at the installation are referred to by the generally accepted terms "operating funds" or "consumer funds." Additionally, many installations will have "revolving funds" available for specific purposes.

Typical of the installation operating funds are the Operations and Maintenance appropriations for Army (OMA), Army National Guard (OMNG), and Army Reserve (OMAR), and the Army Family Housing (AFH) appropriation. The OMA appropriation essentially provides the funding to maintain the installation and the operating costs of units assigned there. The AFH Appropriation is provided to the commander to maintain individual family housing units.

Operation and Maintenance Funds. Operation and Maintenance, Army funds available at installation level are divided into two distinct categories—mission and base operations. Mission funds are used for clearly defined mission purposes (e.g., Program 8T, Training). Base operations funds are provided through a carrier program, Program 8T, in this example, and are used to support all mission activity on the installation. The major mission programs are discussed in Chapter 14, and a complete listing is found in AR 37-100-FY. The major base operations' accounts (activities) are shown in Figure 16-14.

The Army Stock Fund Operation. The most prominent revolving fund at installation level is the Army Stock Fund (ASF). The ASF was chartered by OSD to finance the supply of repair parts and minor items of equipment. The fund, for example, would initially finance the cost of procuring and bringing into inventory such items as tank tracks, carburetors, gun tubes, and other consumable items, but would exclude financing investment items such as tanks, trucks, or artillery. When, for example, the tank track is issued to a using unit, the unit would pay (reimburse) the ASF for the cost.

The initial capital of the fund was provided by both an appropriation and the capitalization of existing inventories. In theory the fund is self-sustaining (whatever is bought is sold!). (See Figure 16-15.)

Stock Fund Inventories are paid for when issued to the consuming activity. The proceeds are deposited in the ASF Treasury account and become available to buy more inventory. This cycle continues for the life of the fund. From these characteristics, the ASF is known as a "revolving" fund.

The ASF contains a Wholesale Division and Retail Division. AMC as a wholesaler is responsible for purchasing from private industry and selling to the Retail Divisions, one of which is located in each Major Army Command. The Retail Divisions, which also buy locally and from DLA and GSA, sell to consumers, mainly OMA customers.

The Director of Logistics prepares the ASF budget, which must be coordinated with the COB to ensure sufficient O&M funds (consumable funds) are available to procure the necessary supplies and repair parts, and preclude disruption of the supply system.

BASE OPERATIONS' ACCOUNTS (ACTIVITIES)

BASOPS(-)

- A. Real Estate Leases
- B. Supply
- C. DS/GS Maintenance
- D. Transportation
- E. Laundry and Dry Cleaning
- F. Food Service
- G. Personnel Support
- H. Unaccompanied Housing
- N. Command Element and
Personal Staff
- P. Automatic Data
Processing
- Q. Reserve Component
Support
- R. Installation Restoration
- S. Community and Morale Support
Activities
- T. Preservation of Order
- U. Resource Management Operations
- V. Plans Training and
Mobilization
- W. Contracting Operations
- X. Security and Counterintelligence
Operations
- Y. Records Management,
Publications

RPMA

- J. Operation of Utilities
- K. Repair and Maintenance
of Real Property
- L. Minor Construction
- M. Other Engineering Support

FIGURE 16-14

Army Family Housing (AFH). AFH is an Army program that provides family housing support to the soldier. The Army Housing Management Division at HQDA administers the AFH program. The operation, maintenance, and leasing portions of the family housing program are the only segments of AFH Funding that are given to the installation commander. Allotment of the AFH operation and maintenance funds is made by the MACOM to the installation in the same manner as OMA funds. The commander is obliged to establish administrative control over these funds through a centralized housing management organization. Because of the visibility of family housing stemming from considerable Congressional interest, severe limitations are imposed on the use of these funds.

Construction, Maintenance, and Repair of Real Property. One area which is regarded as troublesome and requires stringent controls over fund usage is in repairing, maintaining, and constructing real property. These specific dollar limitations require extremely close control to ensure that the limitations are not exceeded. The installation commander becomes involved in basically two types of construction programs—major and minor.

Major construction are those high dollar projects which are developed by the Installation Planning Board and included in the installation construction program. Once developed, the requested projects are passed through command/engineer channels with final project approval embodied in the appropriation of Military Construction, Army funds. These funds are provided to the District Engineer responsible for managing the project and for administrative control of funds. The installation commander may also be allotted funds for minor MCA projects—MCA P6300.3 (Design) and P6600 (Construction).

ARMY STOCK FUND




FIGURE 16-15

Minor construction is a term used to identify those construction projects whose cost is \$1,000,000 or less for the Active Army and \$400,000 or less for Reserve Forces. Most minor construction projects costing between \$200,000 and \$1,000,000 are programmed. An unspecified construction project is one which cannot await the long leadtime required for Congressional approval of construction funds and is separated from the requirements of programming. Dollar limitations and the criteria for delegating approval authority for minor construction projects are contained in public law and restated in Army publications. When minor construction is funded by OMA or OMAR, expenditures are limited by law to \$200,000 and are financed by the L account (See Figure 16-14). The installation commander becomes responsible for project costs for administrative control of these funds.

Maintenance and repair efforts are primarily concentrated on utilities systems, buildings, grounds, and surface areas. To ensure that a minimum level of maintenance is performed, Congress reserves funds known as the Maintenance of Real Property Facilities (MRPF) Floor. The MRPF Floor identifies a minimum amount of funds that must be obligated for that specific purpose. More may be obligated if necessary; but if less is obligated, the difference between the lesser amount and the MRPF Floor must remain unobligated and may not be reprogrammed to other areas at the installation, but must be reported to the major command for withdrawal.

A backlog of facilities engineering maintenance and repair may occur due to lack of funds. This backlog has been formalized as Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) and is defined as the end of fiscal year measurement of unexecuted maintenance and repair work that had been approved in the annual work plan, but could not be accomplished in that fiscal year due to lack of resources. Maintenance and repair requirements must meet the test of backlog criteria before the requirements can be recorded as BMAR.

Reimbursable Programs.

In many cases, the installation commander is required to support other activities on a host-tenant relationship whereby the tenant (an Air Force unit, for example) is separately funded for its own operations. Essentially, the commander is put in the position of selling OMA-procured supplies and services to the tenant. Rather than penalize the commander with these support costs that are not associated with the mission of the installation, an amount of funds equal to these support costs are credited to the installation's available funds through reimbursable procedures.

The authority to provide goods and services on a reimbursable basis must be included on the funding document received at an installation. There are two types of reimbursements—automatic and funded. Automatic reimbursements are payments by a customer to appropriated funds that are budgeted, controlled,

and accounted for at the level of performance—normally the installation. Funded reimbursements are those controlled at higher levels even though the installation provides the support.

Finance and Accounting.

A field finance and accounting officer's primary role is to assist the Director of Resource Management to meet the commander's fiduciary and stewardship responsibilities over the funds and property entrusted to that commander. To accomplish the task, the finance and accounting officer must provide a properly staffed and trained organization that is capable of controlling the installation's funds, paying its bills timely and accurately, maintaining fund accounting records, and accurately reporting the financial status of operations to the next higher echelon.

Additionally, the finance officer is the focal point for revising and effectively implementing operating procedures, methodologies, and policies that accompany system changes of the installation's integrated accounting system, whether those changes result from simple system enhancements or from new and complex legislative requirements.

The Finance and Accounting Officer is also the chief proponent for ensuring that soldiers and civilian employees are provided high quality and timely financial services. The process of providing financial services to soldiers and civilians includes ensuring that soldiers are financially ready to deploy and that financial services are a fundamental part of military and civilian "Quality of Life." Although financial service takes place in an autonomous manner, it is regulated by the accounting process, e.g., payroll, travel services, and banking facilities.

OUTPUT ORIENTED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (OORMS)

Under the Standard Installation Organization, the Director of Resource Management is assigned responsibility for management of the installation's dollars and manpower. The DRM is also responsible for overall coordination and synchronization of all installation budget preparation and execution. With this responsibility, the DRM staff cannot be exclusively or only program or budget analysts, accountants or auditors. They must be resource analysts and integrate all comptroller disciplines in order to provide the best possible support to the installation chain-of-command and directorate managers, as well as implement the new Output Oriented Resource Management System discussed in Chapter 14.

The Finance and Accounting Office (F&AO), a part of the DRM organization, has the requisite data to support the installation's requirement under OORMS. The F&AO can:

(1) Tie resources (dollars and manpower) to installation management functions;

(2) Identify increased resource requirements in the outyears caused by new missions, increased scope of operations, or increased operating costs;

(3) Support organization and installation level linkages between the key activities that make up a planning, programming, budgeting system relevant for management purposes;

(4) Provide data to establish performance parameters for evaluation; and

(5) Provide cost estimating data—to translate requirements of the planning process to dollars for the resource management process.

The Output Oriented Resource Management System being instituted in the near term will permit the control of resources while allowing installation managers to align resources among "management decision packages" (MDEP's) to meet operational requirements. The focus will be on output achieved and resources consumed, rather than what the budget predicted. OORMS incorporates performance measurement and analysis of the installation. Performance factors, when related to resources and workload, can be effective management indicators and allow the building of workable relationships between funding (input) and

performance (output). The relationship is graphically displayed in Figure 16-16. At the installation level the Base Operations' MDEP's will be as shown in Figure 16-17.

SUMMARY

At the outset, the installation management process was identified as a very complicated but essential process with which too few Army officers are familiar. The importance of vigorous, innovative management at the installation level has become more critical as the combined effects of resource limitations and escalating costs squeeze the Army's capability to support existing structure and maintain essential readiness through training. It, therefore, becomes abundantly clear that the challenge of wringing maximum utility, efficiency, and productivity from each available dollar is the professional obligation not only of the Director of Resource Management, but also of the installation commander, his staff, subordinate commanders, and responsible people at all levels. Sound, efficient installation management contributes directly and materially to fundamental mission accomplishment and, therefore, becomes an area of genuine interest to all soldiers.

Installation Management in the Army is a huge operation involving approximately 250,000 personnel, and encompasses annual recurring funding in excess of \$10 Billion. Since 1946, over 1400 Army Regulations

OORMS INPUT-OUTPUT RELATIONSHIP




FIGURE 16-16

BASE OPERATIONS MDEPS			
ORGANIZATION	MDEP	SOURCE	AMS ACCT
DPCA	DPCA	PERSONNEL SUPPORT MORALE, WELFARE, RECREATION	.G .S
DOL	DMNT DLDY DFOD DTRN DSUP	DS/GS MAINTENANCE LAUNDRY & DRY CLEANING FOOD SERVICE TRANSPORTATION SUPPLY	.C .E .F .D .B
DEH	DUPH RPAC BMAC DMAR DHOU	UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING OPERATIONS, REPAIR, & MAINTENANCE BMAR FAMILY HOUSING (DMAR, 1920) HOUSING (OG&M, 1910, 1929, 1940)	.H (1) .J.K.L.M .K
PMO	DPMA	LAW & ORDER	.T
DOIM	DOIM	ADP ONLY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	.P .Y
DRCS	DRCS	RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT	.Q
DRM	ODRM	COMPTROLLER FUNCTIONS	.U
DPTM	DPTM	PLANS, TRAINING, & MOBILIZATION	.V
DOC	ODOC	CONTRACTING	.W
DSEC	DSEC	SECURITY	.X
NGB	RPNG	REAL PROPERTY OPERATIONS, MAINTENANCE & REPAIR OF STATE OPERATED ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FACILITIES	
	BMNG	BMAR REDUCTION AT STATE OPERATED ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FACILITIES	
OTHER (2)	INMG	COMMAND ELEMENT & PERSONAL STAFFS	.N

(1) COE IS THE ARSTAF FUNCTIONAL PROPONENT; ODCSLOG IS THE ARSTAF PROGRAM MANAGER.
(2) GARRISON COMMANDER/CHIEF OF STAFF, COMMANDANT, INSPECTOR GENERAL, STAFF JUDGE
ADVOCATE, CHAPLAIN, EEO, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, INTERNAL REVIEW AND ORGANIZATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS.

FIGURE 16-17

have been published. This fact poses a real challenge for our installation commanders and managers and that is why MIP is so vital. Furthermore, the Army devotes considerable resources in developing doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment for the TOE Army, but little has been done in this regard for the TDA sustaining base. With the establishment of the Army Management Staff College (AMSC), the Army will begin to work on institutional doctrine, training and organizational development for civilian managers in the base operations arena. The first pilot for AMSC will be held in FY87, the second pilot will be held in FY88 and the permanent course will be fielded in FY88. Further, two Installation Management studies scheduled for completion in FY87 will help to determine the direction of installation management through the year 2000. These studies will encompass the full spectrum of installation functions and also take a look at how our sister services (Air Force and Navy), other countries (Great Britain, Canada, and West Germany), and civilian cities manage their installations/bases.

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CHAPTER 17

MATERIEL SYSTEM-RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Army Management System used for the Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) of major materiel items. That system can be viewed simply as a combination of structure and process.

Structure is the sum of the guidance provided by law, policy, regulation or objective, and the organization provided to accomplish the RDA function. Process is the interaction of the various components of the structure in producing the output. For the Army, the focus of the output is producing military units that are adequately equipped to execute national policy effectively.

The RDA process is a critical component of the Army's Force Integration efforts as depicted in Chapter 3 (Figure 3-14). To facilitate an understanding of the process, this chapter will begin by highlighting some of the critical aspects of structure.

STRUCTURE

DOD Policy.

DOD Directive 5000.1, "Major System Acquisitions," 12 March 1986, and DOD Instruction 5000.2, "Major System Acquisition Procedures," 12 March 1986, are, respectively, first and second in order of precedence for providing DOD guidance for major system acquisition policy and procedure.

The basic policy is to ensure that acquisition of major defense systems is conducted efficiently and effectively in order to achieve operational objectives of the U.S. Armed Forces in their support of national policies and objectives within the guidelines of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109, "Major System Acquisitions."

Army Goal.

The overall goal of the Army's RDA system is to deploy effective systems in adequate quantities, on time, and within budget at the least total life cycle cost. Special emphasis is placed on medium and long range materiel planning, product improvement, and life extension programs. Major state-of-the-art advancements are to be sought only in carefully selected areas.

Stability of program acquisition is currently a matter of high policy interest, especially after the system enters the Full-Scale Development phase. Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) goals, MANPRINT, and Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) are given emphasis equal to that placed on obtaining system performance, schedule, and cost objectives. Contractual incentives for the improvement of RAM and ILS are encouraged. Maximum authority is to be delegated to program managers. Program managers are expected to be flexible and innovative in their interpretation of acquisition procedures.

Army Objectives.

The objectives of Research, Development, and Acquisition (AR 70-1) are to:

- Maintain a strong technology base to provide fundamental information in support of materiel system development and production. This includes basic research and exploratory development.

- Assure adequate standardization and interoperability within other Services; and Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) with allies and other friendly nations.

- Achieve appropriate balance between need for low risk, evolutionary development and more visionary, leap-ahead effort required to maintain technological superiority.

- Develop an acquisition strategy (AS) for each materiel system that is tailored to the needs and conditions of the specific materiel alternative and streamlined acquisition objectives. Particular emphasis will be to proceed as rapidly as the development cycle allows, while providing the most effective long term technological baseline or improved product. Every authorized action will be taken to reduce the time required to satisfy a materiel requirement.

- Acquire materiel systems that meet approved materiel requirements within budget, manpower, personnel, training, logistics, and competition requirements to support acquisition necessary for total unit materiel fielding.

- Establish at program initiation a formal and integrated MANPRINT and logistic support program to ensure optimally supportable systems that meet peacetime and wartime readiness objectives.

- Develop effective equipment that interoperates with other battlefield systems, free of health and safety hazards, transportable, and survivable.

- Consider, from the earliest point of deficiency identification and requirements generations, the total threat that will face the materiel system over its anticipated life cycle.

- Integrate Operations Security (OPSEC) requirements into the systems acquisition procedure to protect technical and tactical advantages from disclosure to hostile intelligence services.

- Develop data, techniques, processes, and other nonmateriel items necessary to promote effective worldwide Army operations.

- Acquire items in accordance with the Army Procurement requirements, the Congressionally authorized buy quantity, special authorizations, and interim acquisitions to support readiness.

- Consider the use of the Metric System of measurement as an intrinsic aspect of program development.

- Identify militarily critical technologies associated with R&D program and control the direct and indirect international transfer of the technology.

Organizations.

The managerial process of transforming a concept into a piece of hardware is conducted by individuals in various organizational structures who are responsible for RDA within DOD and the Services. Figure 17-1 shows the primary elements involved, including the linkage between the defense community and universities, laboratories, and private business. The arrows on the figure are used to relate the organizations involved to the input/transformation/output process, i.e., taking an idea and changing it into a piece of hardware for military forces (users).

DOD Acquisition Management

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the acquisition system; research and development;

ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGE FOR MATERIEL ACQUISITION




FIGURE 17-1

production; logistics; command, control, communications, and intelligence activities related to acquisition; military construction, and procurement.

The USD(A) serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) with responsibility for supervising the performance of the entire DOD acquisition system in accordance with the policies, provisions, and authorities contained in DOD Directive 5000.1, "Major System Acquisitions," and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-109.

The DAE chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) assisted by an integrated structure of councils and committees that relate to the acquisition process.

The USD(A) takes precedence in the Department of Defense on acquisition matters after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. On all other matters, the USD(A) shall take precedence after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

The USD(A) directs the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Heads of other DOD Components on policy, procedure, and execution of the acquisition system. This includes responsibility for the development, management, supervision, and evaluation of acquisition systems and processes.

The Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense makes decisions on acquisition milestones and resource matters, based on recommendations by the USD(A). The USD(A) prepares the documentation that reflects the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense milestone decisions. These decisions are executed through the USD(A) for implementation by the Heads of DOD Components.

Where agreement on acquisition matters cannot be reached between the USD(A) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the matter is presented jointly to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for resolution.

The USD(A) exercises direction, authority, and control over activities reporting directly to that official, including:

- The Director of Defense Research and Engineering;

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Technology);

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics);

- Acquisition-related activities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence);

- The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy);

- The Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization;

— The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Mapping Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense Systems Management College.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

The largest agency under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) which receives some fifteen to twenty percent of total Defense Science and Technology (S&T) program resources (a level about equal to the entire Army S&T program).

DARPA is a unique management tool of the Secretary of Defense. DARPA, consisting of a mix of military and civilian scientists and engineers, has a broad charter to conduct advanced research which fills Research and Development (R&D) gaps between Service lines of responsibility or handles high priority problems that cross Service lines. DARPA is charged with the maintenance of leadership in forefront areas of technology so DOD can be aware as soon as possible of developments of potential military significance. Its purpose is to take up a piece of research or development, determine whether or not the concept is feasible, determine its usefulness, and transfer it to the appropriate Service. DARPA does not have its own in-house research facilities and relies on the Services and other Government agencies for technical and administrative support. Once a decision to support a research proposal is made, responsibility for contracting is generally assigned to one of the Services.

ARMY ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

The Secretary of the Army (SA), under Title 10, United States Code, is responsible for DA functions necessary for the research, development, logistical support and maintenance, preparedness, operations, and effectiveness of the Army. Also required is supervision of all matters relating to Army procurement. The SA executes his acquisition management responsibilities primarily through the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) who is responsible for the Army acquisition program and approval of quantitative requirements, production, and acquisition plans. The AAE develops acquisition policies and procedures, and manages the Army's Production Base Support and Industrial Mobilization Programs. The Army DAR Supplement (ADARS), issued by the ASA(RDA), implements and supplements the DAR and establishes uniform policies and procedures for the DA. However, the DAR is the primary DOD acquisition regulation and is the first regulatory source to which DA acquisition personnel refer.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASA(RDA)).

The ASA (RDA) is the Army's Deputy Acquisition Executive, Science Advisor to the SA, and is responsible for:

- Scientific and technical information.
- Materiel systems acquisition policy and procedures.
- Basic and applied research.
- Research, development, and acquisition of materiel.
- Design to cost considerations.
- Acquisition, utilization, and management of research and development (R&D) facilities and equipment.
- U.S. Army Contract Adjustment Board.
- Development test and evaluation.
- Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) policy and procedures.
- Management of the Army Research, Development, Test and Evaluation appropriation.
- Configuration management.
- Type classification of Army materiel.
- Production readiness, to include producibility engineering and planning (PEP).
- Supervision of the integration of MANPRINT and integrated Logistics Support.
- Product improvement of materiel.
- Army industrial preparedness program.
- Army materiel systems reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM).
- Life cycle system management model.
- Nuclear weapons development.
- Source selection and evaluation.
- Value engineering program.
- Preparation and publication of Acquisition Letters and other guidance pertaining to the FAR/DARS/AFARS.

— System/program/project/product management.

— Transition from development to production.

— In coordination with the AAE, selects Program Executive Officers.

The ASA (RDA) is organized into four major functional directorates as shown in Figure 17-2.

Chief of Staff, Army (CSA).

The CSA is responsible by law to the SA for the efficiency of the Army and its preparedness for military operations. He acts as the agent of the SA in carrying out the plans or recommendations submitted by the Army Staff and approved by the Secretary.

The Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA) chairs the Select Committee (SELCOM) and the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS).

The DCSOPS has primary Army Staff responsibility for the validation of materiel requirements. He develops broad force requirements and issues guidance for the combat development programs to include establishing and validating capability goals, materiel objectives and requirements, overall force structure design and Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP). He provides guidance and reviews results of Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), and establishes priorities for materiel development, and for user testing. He has prime responsibility for designating major Army programs, and is a regular member of the ASARC. The Office of the DCSOPS is responsible for those areas which either directly describe materiel requirements or significantly influence the calculation process for war reserve and other requirements (attrition/consumption rates, deployment schedules, Special Stocks and Allied Force data).

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG).

The DCSLOG assesses the logistical supportability of materiel systems during the system acquisition process through management of the Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) program. He participates in all phases of the RDA process to ensure equipment is logistically reliable, supportable, and maintainable. He is also responsible for secondary item requirements to include war reserve requirements.

The Logistics Evaluation Agency (LEA) is the independent logistician for the Army on all systems that are not subject to an ASARC review. LEA is responsible for ensuring ILS considerations are accomplished and for providing the Office of the DCSLOG an ILS assessment on ASARC systems.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER).

The DCSPER has Army General Staff responsibility for personnel management. He monitors planning for

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (RDA)




FIGURE 17-2

the manpower and personnel aspects of new systems. He is responsible for the operations of the Human Resources Research Program which includes R&D in education and training, contemporary personnel problems, and manpower management. Also the DCSPER has primary Army staff responsibility for the MANPRINT (manpower and personnel integration) program. He is a regular member of the ASARC.

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics (ASA(I&L)).

The ASA(I&L) is responsible in materiel acquisition for programming, budgeting, and funding of concepts and systems and for cost and economic analyses. He is also responsible for supply and maintenance management to include logistical support requirements, an important program in the materiel acquisition process. He is also a member of the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).

Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE).

The DPAE is responsible for: reviewing and analyzing requirements and programs in force structure development; providing analytical support to the SELCOM and subordinate committees; developing resource guidance; developing and compiling the Program Objective Memorandum (POM); maintaining the Army portion of the DOD Five Year Defense Program (FYDP); and presenting an affordability analysis to the ASARC.

Other DA Staff Participants.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSI) provides scientific and technical intelligence and threat projections in support of all aspects of the Army research, development, and acquisition programs. He monitors R&D projects associated with intelligence production of denial capability. The Surgeon General (TSG) is responsible for research, development, and acquisition of medical materiel and related items, and for the medical aspects of all other developmental/acquisition programs. The Chief of Engineers (COE) monitors facilities planning for new systems. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) reviews all weapons acquired by the Army to ensure that the potential use is consistent with U.S. treaty obligations and international law. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (USASDC), is the designated single point of contact in the Army for Strategic Defense Initiative matters and will exercise DA executive authority over the Army Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) efforts, the Army Ballistic Missile Defense Program, and the resources made available for their accomplishment.

U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC).

AMC performs assigned materiel and related functions for: research and development, development test and evaluation; acquisition and logistics support of materiel systems; and other techniques required by DA. The Commanding General (CG), AMC, is a regular

member of the ASARC. A major feature of AMC is the establishment of two Deputy Commanding Generals:

— The Deputy Commanding General for Research, Development, and Acquisition assists the CG by exercising, within his mission area, direction over all command activities involving research, development and acquisition of materiel, including corporate laboratories; the Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM); all Army research and standardization offices; and the Foreign Science and Technology Center.

— The Deputy Commanding General for Materiel Readiness assists the CG by exercising, within his mission area, direction over all command activities involving materiel readiness, including the Security Assistance Center; Depot System Command; arsenals; storage activities; logistics management activities; and logistics assistance offices.

U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA).

OTEA is a field operating agency under the Chief of Staff Army. The CG, OTEA is responsible for management of the Army's continuous comprehensive evaluation (C²E), user testing, and Army participation in joint test and evaluation. His evaluations of materiel systems operational effectiveness and suitability are independent of the developer and user and are reported directly to the decision review body. He is a member of the ASARC and Chairman of the Test Schedule and Review Committee (TSARC). He provides advice and assistance to the CSA, the VCSA, other members of the Army Staff and other elements of DA in regard to Army operational testing.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

The CG, TRADOC conducts all combat developments not assigned by HQDA to other commands and agencies and, as the Army's principal combat developer, guides, coordinates, and integrates the total combat development effort of the Army. Combat developments are a major component of the force development and encompass the formulation of concepts, doctrine, organization, materiel objectives, requirements, and test and evaluation. TRADOC is the user representative in the RDA process. The CG, TRADOC is a regular member of the ASARC.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments represents the CG, TRADOC at high-level face-to-face meetings during the development-decisionmaking process, has general staff responsibility for the management of combat developments, and manages the combat development efforts of TRADOC subordinates through the integrating schools and centers.

Other Major Army Commands.

The CG, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, formulates materiel development objectives and requirements used in his assigned mission. The CG, U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC), has prime responsibility for the development of standard Army multi-command information systems and conducts operational test and evaluation of those information systems. The CG, Medical Research and Development Command, reviews nonmedical Army materiel for possible health hazards, conducts limited medical combat developments with TRADOC, and is the designated materiel developer for medical items.

The Program Manager (PM).

The program management approach to weapons systems acquisition is a distinct departure from the services' traditional method of establishing functionally-oriented organizations to carry out well-defined, repetitive or continuous long-term tasks. This approach required the program manager to establish management arrangements among his organizations, other military organizations, and various contractors and to coordinate their efforts—to accomplish program objectives efficiently. A variety of program management organizations has been established. They range from a large, self-sufficient office to an austere-staffed focal point which operates on a matrix principle and which must draw all specialized support from the functional organization to which it is attached.

The criteria established which require a program to be program managed are generally the same as those which designate a program as major: high defense priority, high dollar value, or high Congressional or OSD interest.

In achieving his goal of weapons system development, the PM must plan, direct, and control the allocation and use of all resources—men, money, machines, materiel, information, and time authorized for his project. He is responsible for the definition, development, procurement, production, and distribution of his system. He must achieve the technical performance objectives of his project on a timely basis and at the lowest practicable cost. He must also initiate practical trade-offs among system capabilities, costs, and schedules. He must be knowledgeable of organization and planning, quantitative analysis, programming, budgeting, financial management, procurement, contracting, and human resources management.

The Department of the Army Organizational Integrator (OI).

As the HQDA representative of the combat developer (user representative), the OI provides the continuous coordination necessary to ensure the integration of new hardware items into the Army organization. OIs are appointed by the Director of Force Development, ODCSOPS, during the Concept Exploration Phase of

the Life Cycle System Management Model (DA PAM 11-25).

The OI is the HQDA focal point to integrate operational, training, doctrinal, organizational, personnel, logistical, and operational test aspects to ensure fielding a complete, coordinated, and supportable system. The OI ensures that systems are doctrinally based and that they are properly and completely reflected in Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). The OI's duties include: developing a DA position on proposed materiel requirement documents and Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP); identifying, in coordination with Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA), the required operational and force development tests; recommending ODCSOPS priorities for science and technology objectives, research and development, procurement, and product improvement programs.

The OI monitors the progress of an assigned item throughout its developmental process to ensure that the materiel requirements are staffed, approved, and satisfied. In addition, he ensures necessary logistical support, manpower spaces, and training packages are available at the time the item enters the inventory. The overall objective is to meet the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date with an operationally suitable, reliable, maintainable, and economically obtainable item. The IOC is the date when an item is fielded in operational quantities complete with logistical, manpower, and training base support, generally to a company-size unit.

The OI is also responsible for the management of requirements which result from the introduction of an item. Budget constraints and manpower ceilings make effective management of those requirements imperative. Identifying, monitoring, recording, and coordinating the data connected with force structure requirements is a complex task which requires a thorough understanding of the procedures, techniques, methods, and various management systems used in the requirements process.

The OI works in close cooperation and coordination with his counterparts at TRADOC and on the HQDA Staff.

The Department of the Army Logistics Support Officer (DALSO).

As the HQDA representative of the logistics community, the DALSO provides the logistics coordination. The DALSO monitors the progress of the assigned item and ensures that all elements of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), as outlined in AR 700-127, are satisfactorily completed. Because of the interrelationships of assigned responsibilities in materiel acquisition, close and continuous coordination and cooperation is essential between the DALSO and his counterparts on the HQDA Staff and at AMC.

In addition to new items of equipment, DALSO's also have responsibility for existing weapons and

materiel systems in the Army force structure. This responsibility covers all phases of logistics support to include readiness, redistribution, and disposal.

The DALSO mission is to provide HQDA general staff supervision over the Integrated Logistics Support management of assigned commodity materiel/weapons systems from concept to disposal. The materiel maintenance functions of the DALSO are to monitor materiel readiness, recommend and initiate actions to maintain established materiel readiness standards, review the force structure for asset and maintainability impact, develop data used in support of projected asset posture, and identify readiness problems. The materiel distribution functions of the DALSO are to exercise general staff supervision of the distribution/redistribution of materiel and weapons systems, act as point of contact (POC) for special studies, provide input to Program Budget Guidance, provide answers to Congressional inquiries, supervise worldwide materiel and weapons system asset status, evaluate security assistance programs, monitor depot maintenance programs, and monitor equipment procurement status. The materiel life cycle management functions of the DALSO are: to exercise staff supervision of Army ILS programs for assigned commodity items; act as principal ODCSLOG advisor on ILS assessment; participate in preliminary ASARC and DAP review meetings; develop appropriate Program Development Increment Packages (PDIP); schedule and conduct ILS reviews; and develop the ODCSLOG position on issues such as supportability, requirement, documents, test plans, maintenance engineering, type classification, and initial provisioning.

The Department of the Army Threat Integration Staff Officer (TISO).

A TISO is designated by the DCSI to function as the HQDA threat integration coordinator for designated mission areas, programs, and systems. The TISO represents ODCSI on all aspects of threat support throughout the system life cycle or study process. The TISO system complements the Department of the Army Organizational Integrator and is designed to foster closer coordination among the intelligence community, major Army commands, and Army staff agencies to insure the timely integration of threat into the materiel development and acquisition process. The TISO system supplements existing management procedures but does not relieve Army staff agencies and major Army commands of established responsibilities. The DCSI is the approving authority for either establishing or ending TISO monitorship of systems. Generally all programs designed as Army major or designated acquisition program (DAP) systems will be assigned to TISO. Other nonmajor systems will be assigned TISO monitorship on an as required basis with the approval of the DCSI.

The TRADOC System Manager (TSM).

The TSM is appointed and chartered by the CG, TRADOC to function as focal point for coordination of the combat developer, user, and trainer efforts in the development and acquisition of assigned system(s). TSM's are appointed for selected DOD Major and DAP programs. In some cases, TSM's have been appointed for a family of systems such as special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) systems. TSM's are appointed early in the development cycle, normally at the same time as the PM. He is the TRADOC counterpart of the PM and is usually located at the proponent school. For systems without an assigned TSM, the Director of Combat Developments (DCD) at the proponent school serves as the focal point.

Personnel Staff Officer (PERSSO).

The PERSSO, as the HQDA representative of the personnel community, provides the continuous coordination necessary to ensure the smooth integration of new equipment, materiel systems, and new organizations. The PERSSO is ultimately responsible for monitoring all programs within his functional area. The PERSSO responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

- Preparing and justifying, in conjunction with the OI, force structure requests.
- Ensuring programming and budgeting of manpower spaces.
- Reviewing and coordinating the development of force structure changes, personnel supportability architecture, and officer and enlisted issues related to new organizational concepts and doctrine.
- Involved in the DA Staff position on combat developer proposals for new major systems (mission need determination).
- Involved in the development and coordination of DA recommendations on designation of a proposed system as major or nonmajor.
- Developing the DA position on the elements of system fielding including the proposed Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), the Initial Issues Quantity (IIQ), and the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO).
- Developing the DCSPER position for proposed Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI).
- Representing the DCSPER at force modernization-related, HQDA-sponsored conferences, forums, meetings, on issues of supportability concerning the introduction of new and/or reorganized existing TOE/TDA units.

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DOD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (the Act) constitutes the most important and far-reaching legislation affecting the organization for National Defense enacted in the last three decades. The Act requires integration of the function of acquisition into a single office within the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA). The Act also requires integration into a single office of the function of research and development and allows, but does not mandate, leaving the aspects of research and development relating to military requirements and test and evaluation on the Army Staff. Although the Act does not require both acquisition and research and development to be performed within the same office in OSA, the functions are so intertwined that the two areas had previously been performed together; the Act allows this relationship to continue.

In addition to the Reorganization Act itself, three other major factors affected the Army's reorganization of the acquisition function.

—National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219—The executive directive prescribing implementation of the Packard Commission recommendations.

—Establishment in DOD of the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

—Establishment of a requirement for Defense Enterprise Programs.

NSDD 219 was signed by President Reagan on April 1, 1986, and directed adoption, in large part, of the recommendations of the Packard Commission Report relating to the acquisition of major systems. NSDD 219 required the Service Secretaries to establish Service Acquisition Executives (SAE's) and a new management/reporting chain for major systems acquisitions. The SAE is required to appoint Program Executive Officers (PEO's) to be responsible for a reasonable number of related acquisition programs. Each program itself is managed by a Program Manager (PM). The PM's are required to report solely to the PEO on program matters, and the PEO's, in turn, are required to report solely to the SAE.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)) is required by law to serve as the Senior Procurement Executive for the Department of Defense (DOD) and as the Defense Acquisition Executive. The USD(A) has the statutory functions of establishing policies for acquisition for all elements of DOD, including the Army, and of exercising supervision on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the military services' acquisition systems and processes. OSD has implemented these statutory functions and duties by promulgating DOD Directive 5134.1 on February 10, 1987.

The third factor influencing the Army's organization for acquisition was the enactment of Section 2436, Title 10, United States Code, which codified the SAE-PEO-PM management and reporting chain contained in NSDD 219 for programs designated as Defense Enterprise Programs (DEP's) by the Service Secretary concerned. That section also established a number of special rules relating to acquisition within the DEP system intended to reduce delay and waste, and required the Army to designate three DEP's by Fiscal Year 1988.

Prior to the reorganization, the Army Headquarters officials charged with the overall responsibility of research, development, and acquisition were the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASA(RDA)) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition (DCS(RDA)). The Contracting Director in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG) was responsible for the procurement function.

The ASA(RDA) was primarily responsible for policy approval and oversight, and served as the Army's senior acquisition executive. Within OSA, the Office of the Director, Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU) ensured that programs designed to assist small businesses were appropriately incorporated into Army acquisition programs. As required by Section 644, Title 15, United States Code, the Director, SADBU reported directly to the Secretary of the Army.

The DCSRDA provided the staff assets necessary to represent all the Army's research, development, and acquisition programs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress. DCSRDA and his staff developed, justified, and defended detailed program and budget formulation for the Army's five procurement appropriations and for the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTE) appropriation. Technology base programs and laboratory system management were conducted by the DCSRDA's Director of Army Research and Technology. The DCSRDA was also responsible for conducting an independent review and evaluation of all major Army programs at each program milestone. Research, development, and acquisition policy and procedures were developed and coordinated by the DCSRDA, then provided to the ASA(RDA) for approval.

The ODCSLOG's Director of Contracting developed Army procurement policy for the approval of the ASA(RDA) and promulgated the policy guidance resulting from Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council deliberations. This office also provided the staff assets for the Army's Competition Advocate General (CAG). The CAG was assigned to ODCSLOG but reported directly to the Army's senior procurement executive (ASA(RDA)) on the matters specified by Section 418, Title 41, United States Code, and had direct access to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff.

Pursuant to DOD Directive 4245.1 and NSDD 219, the Under Secretary of the Army has been designated as the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). In this role, the AAE is responsible for the direct supervision of PEO's within the AAE-PEO-PM acquisition structure and the DEP structure, and for performing those functions outlined in other applicable laws and regulations. The AAE serves as a senior official for information resource management (IRM) pursuant to Section 3506, Title 44, United States Code, with responsibility for programs and policies relating to information systems research, development, and acquisition.

The research, development, and acquisition functions at HQDA have been consolidated into OSA by transferring these functions into the Office of the ASA(RDA). The ASA(RDA) provides the staff support to assist the AAE in executing his responsibilities.

The Office of the ASA(RDA), (Figure 17-2), was formed from the consolidation of the Office of the ASA(RDA), the Office of the DCSRDA, and the ODCSLOG Directorate of Contracting. Army Headquarters acquisition responsibilities for ammunition, support systems, and the industrial base have been assumed by the U.S. Army Materiel Command, and the functions for rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) were transferred to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. In addition, some HQDA materiel management functions were transferred to the offices of the PEO's.

The ASA(RDA) has a lieutenant general deputy in his new organization. One of the duties of this deputy is to ensure that the Chief of Staff, Army receives the staff support from the ASA(RDA) that the Chief of Staff determines is necessary for him to perform his functions. With the exception of the aspects of research and development relating to military requirements and user testing and evaluation, which the Act allows to remain on the Army Staff, no research, development, and acquisition functions remain on the Army Staff.

The Competition Advocate General (CAG) was transferred from ODCSLOG to the Office of the ASA(RDA). The CAG will continue to perform those duties specified in section 418, Title 41, United States Code, and will provide reports on Army competition initiatives to the senior procurement executive. This organizational change will enhance the stature of the CAG as an advisor with direct access to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army and will provide the mechanism for more effective steps to ensure full and open competition in Army acquisitions.

The Office of the Director, SADBU was previously organized as an independent office within OSA. Although the FY 1987 National Defense Authorization Act amended Section 644, Title 15, United States Code, to allow the Director of the DOD SADBU office to report to the USD(A) rather than directly to the Secretary of Defense, no such amendment was enacted

as regards the SADBUs of the military departments. Accordingly, the organization and mission of the Army's SADBUs remained unchanged, and the Director, SADBUs will advise the ASA(RDA) and will continue to report directly to the Secretary of the Army.

Program Executive Officer (PEO) Concept

The Secretary of the Army established, in accordance with the GOLDWATER-NICHOLS Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433) and National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219, a three-tier reporting chain within the Army for designated acquisition programs. The three tiers consist of: 1) Army Acquisition Executive (AAE); 2) Program Executive Officers (PEO's); and 3) Program Managers (PM's).

The term "acquisition" is defined as inclusive of all functions listed in paragraph D of DOD Directive 5134.1:

- Acquisition management.
- Basic and applied research of weapon systems.
- Command, control, communications, and intelligence programs and systems.
- Logistics management.
- Procurement activities.
- Scientific and technical information.
- Production and manufacturing.
- Industrial base resources and productivity.
- Force modernization.
- Developmental test and evaluation.
- Environmental services.
- Assignment and reassignment of research and engineering and acquisition responsibility for programs, systems, and activities.
- Codevelopment, coproduction, logistics support, and research interchange with friendly and allied nations.
- Installation management.
- Construction, including construction funded by host nations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Infrastructure program.

The Army Acquisition Executive is responsible for all acquisition matters that are within the jurisdiction and

responsibilities of the Army. The AAE is supported by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASA(RDA)) on matters of research and development, acquisition management policy and procedures, procurement policy and procedures, and competition advocacy. The ASA(RDA) is also responsible for planning and programming, program/contractor reporting and evaluation, technology base strategy, and technology assessment of requirements.

The AAE is supported by the Director of Information Systems, Command, Control, Communications and Computers on systems related to the C4 functional area. Similarly the AAE is supported by the ASA(I&L) concerning military construction, environmental and logistics programs and the ASA(CW) with regard to civil works programs.

The Program Executive Officer (PEO) is an extension of the AAE's management oversight for major programs. He is responsible for a reasonable number (5-7) of similar acquisition programs. Management responsibilities include providing a buffer for the PM by representing the programs to HQDA, Congress and others; coordinating inter-PEO relationships; and interfacing with other Army organizations. The PEO Management interface between the PM and the AAE is shown in Figure 17-3.

The PEO/PM organizations are collocated with supporting functional commands as shown on Figure 17-4. These organizations have only small organic staffs. Mission accomplishment is through the use of the matrix management concept, where functional services and expertise are supplied by supporting functional command(s).

The PEO has a core office of 25-35 senior personnel depending on the types/numbers of PM's under his supervision. A PEO office contains a program/budget office, a system integration office, a Pentagon liaison office, a review and analysis office, an international office if required, and an administrative section.

The Program Manager reports to the PEO and is responsible to the PEO for a portion of the PEO's area of acquisition program activities as assigned by the PEO.

MATERIEL ACQUISITION PROCESS

The materiel acquisition process prescribes a sequence of events and phases of program activities and decisions leading to efficient and effective fielding of fully supportable systems responsive to validated Army requirements. Phases and events are tailored to meet the individual characteristics of each program. The process is initiated with the approval of a need and extends through successful completion of development, production, and deployment of the system.

Before initiating a new development program to satisfy an Army need or deficiency, three alternatives must be considered:

- Change tactical or strategic doctrine, improve training, or improve and expand organization, thus

avoiding acquisition of materiel to correct the deficiency (AR 71-9).

- Improve existing Army materiel.
- Use nondevelopmental items (NDI).

Only if these alternatives will not satisfactorily overcome the deficiency is a new development program initiated.

Materiel improvement is the preferred alternative to new weapon system/equipment development. Materiel improvement can be accomplished by reconfiguring a type-classified item that is in production or by reconfiguring a type-classified fielded item via a Product Improvement Program.

Preplanned Product Improvement (P³I)


P³I is an acquisition concept which programs resources to accomplish the orderly and cost effective phased growth or evolution of a system's capability, utility and operational readiness. Specifically, P³I is planned future evolutionary improvement of systems for which design considerations are effective to enhance future application of projected requirements.

The concept includes three distinct phases which begin in the concept exploration and continue throughout the life cycle of the system. Figure 17-5 provides a brief definition of each phase and shows the interaction of P³I with the system acquisition process.

Army Policy states that principles of P³I shall be considered in planning major system acquisition. Policy encourages program managers to consider P³I in the

ARMY ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE/ PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER CONCEPT

RESPONSIBILITIES



- ESTABLISHES POLICY FOR PROCUREMENT/R&D
- ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AUDIT
- SUPERVISES ACQUISITION SYSTEM
- SUPERVISES ARMY ACQUISITION PROCESS
- ESTABLISHES ACQUISITION POLICY
- APPOINTS PEOs
- APPROVE BASELINES
- OVERSEES PROGRAM EXECUTION
- SCREENS STAFF REVIEWS
- REPORTS ONLY TO AAE FOR PROGRAM MATTERS
- REVIEWS BASELINES
- EXECUTES PROGRAM
- REPORTS ONLY TO PEO FOR PROGRAM MATTERS
- FORMULATES BASELINE

AAE
DAE
PEO

ARMY ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE
DEFENSE ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PM
USD (ACQ)

PROGRAM MANAGER
UNDER SECRETARY DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION)

FIGURE 17-3

THE ARMY'S PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICERS




FIGURE 17-4

SYSTEM ACQUISITION P³I CYCLE




FIGURE 17-5

development of the program acquisition strategy when it is clearly established that its application will reduce risk, acquisition time, and overall cost. P³I should not be used to artificially extend the development effort or correct deficiencies discovered in the development/testing of initially specified system performance.

The objectives of P³I include:

- Introduction of higher technological performance during system lifetime through more rapid fielding of technological advances.

- Shortening of acquisition and deployment times.

- Reduction in system technical, cost, and schedule risk.

- Extension of useful life of a system (before obsolescence).

- Reduction of requirements for major system new starts.

- Improvement of system operational readiness during lifetime.

The P³I concept cannot be applied to all new system developments but should be considered when:

- A near-term need exists to build a system with current technology.

- There is a *high* risk that current technology *will not* meet a projected future threat and a low risk and future technology *will not* meet such a threat.

- The system can be designed to incorporate planned technology development. (The most critical element is the ability to modulate the system to minimize integration and retrofit problems.)

- Analysis shows that P³I is the most effective means of meeting overall long-term program objectives (based on threat, development risk, and total Life Cycle Costs).

- A long-term military need exists for the system. (P³I can shorten the development time for the basic system; however, evolutionary changes will normally lengthen the total development period.)

- The Army, DOD, and the Congress demonstrate a commitment to acquire the system under the P³I concept, including acceptance of initially higher costs.

It must be noted that, when P³I is incorporated, the need for future modification of the system must be recognized early in program development, during

concept exploration, and the acquisition strategy designed to include provisions for the effective integration of these modifications into the system in the future. In order to make P³I effective, design strategy should include a modular design, a carefully designed architectural interface system, and provisions for space, weight, cooling, power, etc. A development process must be established to communicate system growth requirements and identify new technological opportunities.

Nondevelopmental Items (NDI).

Nondevelopmental Items (NDI) are systems available from a variety of sources requiring little or no development effort by the Army. NDI's include materiel developed and in use by other U.S. military services or Government agencies, and materiel developed and in use by other countries, as well as commercially available materiel. The acquisition process for an NDI is not a separate process, but a tailoring of events within the materiel acquisition process and should be one of the first alternatives considered for solution to a materiel need.

There are two general categories of NDI:

(1) Category A — Off-the-shelf items (commercial, foreign, other services) to be used in the same environment for which the items were designed. No development or modification of hardware or operational software required. These are generally products or items in production, available on the public market at established market or catalog prices. Overly restrictive, duplicative, or unnecessary government specification and military standardization are eliminated.

(2) Category B—Off-the-shelf items (commercial, foreign, other services) to be used in an environment different than that for which designed. In this case the commercially available item is ruggedized or militarized to meet Army requirements. Therefore, modification of hardware and/or operational software is usually required. The modification includes those R&D engineering, design, or integration efforts required to modify the product or item to a configuration that satisfies Army peculiar requirements, and/or performance specifications.

There is a third level of effort. This approach emphasizes integration of existing componentry and essential engineering effort to accomplish systems integration. This strategy requires a dedicated R&D effort to allow for system engineering of existing components, for software modification or development, and to ensure the total system meets requirements.

For all types of NDI, the acquisition strategy considers economic and time constraints and realities when determining needs and tradeoffs. No acquisition,

including NDI, is exempt from minimal essential test and evaluation necessary to verify the MANPRINT, quality, safety, reliability, performance, supportability, transportability, and availability characteristics of a system to include life cycle cost (LCC) unless previous test and performance data or market analysis (information) is adequate for verifying operational effectiveness and suitability of the system.

Army requirements may be satisfied by forming a new system assembled from existing and proven components or from a combination of proven components and modified/R&D components. This type of NDI saves the Army from a "scratch" research and development effort. However, due to the amount of R&D effort normally required for systems integration, this type of NDI acquisition effort is closest to that of the developmental type item. Logistics support analysis will usually have to be done on any newly developed components and the hardware/software integration areas. Feasibility testing is required in a military environment, as well as preproduction testing on the complete system. Also, hardware/ADP software integration and user testing is required.

LIFE CYCLE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT MODEL (LCSMM)

In the broad perspective, the acquisition process consists of a series of sequential management decisions made in DOD or the Army as the development of an equipment system progresses from conception to fielding. The framework for this process is the Life Cycle System Management Model (LCSMM) shown in Figure 17-6.

The key aspect of the LCSMM is that it is divided into four distinct phases: Concept Exploration; Demonstration and Validation; Full-Scale Development; and Production and Deployment. Entry into each of these phases is controlled by the four milestone decisions: Program Initiation; Milestone I; Milestone II; and Milestone III.

Additionally, Figure 17-6 provides a depiction of specific processes which are used to support the development of an equipment system as it progresses through the LCSMM. First, there is the sequential characteristics and requirements of the equipment system

LIFE CYCLE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT MODEL (LCSMM)




FIGURE 17-6

being developed; details the progress of development; and records the decisions made at each decision point. The second process is the decision review system which provides recommendations to the appropriate decisionmaker at Milestones I, II, and III. The third process shown is the concurrent test efforts which support the development of the equipment and the decision process. One critical process not developed in Figure 17-6 is the concurrent development of the Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) package which is key to the effective fielding of the system and its integration into the Army force structure.

Before the phases of the LCSMM and its various support processes can be discussed in detail, it is useful to review how the RDA system links initially to the total Army management system as shown in Chapter 3, (Figure 3-14).

Determining and Documenting the Need

The RDA system is initiated as a result of output from the Concept Based Requirements System/Mission Area Analysis (CBRS/MAA) efforts of the Combat Developer (CBTDEV). In theory, that process exhausts all doctrine, training, or organization changes which could be instituted to resolve some deficiency in force capability, before equipment development is pursued as an alternative. When equipment development is required, the combat developer, in coordination with the materiel developer (MATDEV), will prepare either a Justification for Major System New Start (JMSNS) or the Operational and Organizational Plan (O&O Plan). This documentation of need will be the basis for the Program Initiation decision.

The JMSNS is prepared when expected costs exceed \$200 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTE) or \$1 billion in procurement (in FY80 dollars) or as directed. The SECDEF is the approval authority for Program Initiation for JMSNS systems. The JMSNS is submitted with the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) during the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle. The SECDEF's decision is then provided in the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) which is issued during that cycle. The O&O Plan provides the documentation of need for these systems that do not require a JMSNS. The Program Initiation decision will be made for an O&O Plan system as a function of the designated program level of the system.

Program Levels.

The designation of a program level is a critical step in the Army's RDA management process. It will determine the level of review, who will make the Milestone decisions, and what documentation is required at various stages in the development process.

There are three program levels, as shown in Figure 17-7: DOD Major; Designated Acquisition Program (DAP); and In-Process Review (IPR).

The DOD Major level is a JMSNS system. As previously discussed, the need for a JMSNS is determined by either a specific dollar threshold or at the direction of the SECDEF.

Army Regulation 70-1, System Acquisition Policy and Procedures, does not specify dollar thresholds for designating the DAP or IPR levels. ODCSOPS, HQDA makes the final recommendations to the Army leadership for designating those levels. Recommendations are normally based on a qualitative assessment which considers such factors as urgency of need, technical risk, program complexity, and Congressional, DOD or foreign interest.

Major management decisions during the acquisition process are made at Milestones (I, II, III) by review bodies. The type of review body depends on whether the acquisition has been categorized as a major system, a Designated Acquisition Program (DAP), or an In-Process Review (IPR). For the three program management levels, the review bodies are the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC), and the In-Process Review Panel, respectively. For major programs the DAB reviews the recommendations. For DAP's the ASARC provides the Secretary of the Army with its recommendations on the system. For IPR Systems, the IPR Panel provides recommendations to HQDA.

LCSMM Phases

Phase 1—Concept Exploration (CE).

As distinguished from development of hardware, the primary purpose of this phase is to explore potential ideas, concepts, and solutions in a competitive environment and to acquire the information necessary to select the proper alternative(s) for hardware development. Alternative system design concepts are explored within the context of the mission need and program objectives. Emphasis is on generating innovation and conceptual competition from industry. Care must be exercised during the initial steps of the acquisition process not to conform mission needs or program objectives to any known systems or products that might foreclose consideration of alternatives. Specifications stated in detailed or "how to" language should be avoided when possible. Solicitations should not specify or reference government specifications or standards unless such specifications or standards are required by law or justified by health, safety, or similar considerations. Solicitations normally should not specify standard support concepts. Each officer is free to propose his own technical approach, main design features, subsystems, and alternatives to goals for cost, schedule, performance, and supportability. For DOD Major and DAP systems, concept exploration activities will normally be conducted by a Special Task Force (STF) or Special Study Group (SSG) reporting to TRADOC. These activities include the following:

ACQUISITION PROGRAM DECISION LEVELS

PROGRAM TYPE	MILESTONES	REVIEW DOCUMENTS	REVIEWED BY	DECISION DOCUMENT	DECISION AUTHORITY
DOD MAJOR	MISSION NEED	JMSNS O&O PD	DAE AAE	PDM PD	SECDEF
	I	SCP	DAB AAE ASARC	SDDM	
	II & III	DCP, IPS, PD			
DAP	MISSION NEED	O&O PLAN PD	MATDEV/ CBTDEV	**	CBTDEV
	I	SCP	AAE ASARC	SADM PD	AAE
	II & III	DCP, IPS, PD			
IPR	MISSION NEED	O&O PLAN	MATDEV/ CBTDEV	**	CBTDEV
	I	SCP	IPR	SADM	MATDEV
	II & III	DCP & IPS*			

* - ONLY IF REQUESTED BY DECISION AUTHORITY

** - PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF THE O&O PLAN BY THE CBTDEV CONSTITUTES PROGRAM INITIATION FOR DAP, AND IPR PROGRAMS

ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

AAE	ARMY ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE	JMSNS	JUSTIFICATION FOR MAJOR SYSTEM NEW START
ASARC	ARMY SYSTEMS ACQUISITION REVIEW COUNCIL	MATDEV	MATERIEL DEVELOPER
CBTDEV	COMBAT DEVELOPER	O&O PLAN PD	OPERATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN PROGRAM DIRECTIVE
DAB	DEFENSE ACQUISITION BOARD	PDM	PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUM
DAE	DEFENSE ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE	SADM	SYSTEM ACQUISITION DECISION MEMORANDUM
DAP	DESIGNATED ACQUISITION PROGRAM	SCP	SYSTEM CONCEPT PAPER
DCP	DECISION COORDINATING PAPER	SDDM	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION MEMORANDUM
DOD	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	SECDEF	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HQDA	HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY		
IPR	IN-PROCESS REVIEW		
IPS	INTEGRATED PROGRAM SUMMARY		

FIGURE 17-7

— For each system alternative, development of employment concept, training concept, logistics support concept, Army Acquisition Objective (AAO), Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirement Information (QQPRI) data, and alternative production/deployment schedules.

— Development of the acquisition strategy. Projection of evolving threat or evolving technology may support evolutionary development. If so, the acquisition strategy will include a comprehensive program plan encompassing modular development.

— Development of a Baseline Cost Estimate (BCE) and Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) for all of the system and program alternatives. These Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCE) must be developed in parallel with the development activity to preclude lengthening the acquisition cycle.

— Completion of a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) for all system alternatives.

— Cost-benefit analysis of competition in the production phase for the alternative(s) recommended for Demonstration and Validation (D&V).

— Evaluation of production feasibility by identifying production risks and manufacturing technology needed to reduce production risks to acceptable levels.

— Completion of a formal risk analysis for the alternative(s) recommended for Demonstration and Validation.

— Technical and Force Development testing by developer and users, respectively.

— Development of an evaluation program for the alternative(s) recommended for Demonstration and Validation.

— Development of a Standardization and Interoperability (S&I) plan.

— Completion of documentation for Milestone I.

Special Task Force (STF) or Special Study Group (SSG). An STF or SSG is formed to conduct the Concept Exploration phase for systems which have a Justification for Major Systems New Start (JMSNS) requiring Secretary of Defense approval. For systems which require only an O&O plan, the need for a STF or SSG will be decided as part of the O&O Plan approval action.

The STF or SSG conducts analyses, ensures inclusion of all alternatives in the analyses, monitors experimentation, or undertakes other tasks that may require the concentration of special expertise for a short duration.

An STF is chartered by the Chief of Staff of the Army and is under the General Staff supervision of HQDA, DCSOPS. An SSG is chartered by, and under the supervision of the Commanding General, TRADOC. Participating commands and agencies support the STF or SSG in accordance with the approved charter and perform much of the required effort under STF or SSG supervision. The director of the STF or SSG will be the manager of the acquisition program prior to Milestone I or designation of a program manager.

Concept Formulation Package (CFP). The CFP documents studies conducted during the Concept Exploration phase to satisfy the objectives of the JMSNS/O&O Plan.

The CFP consists of four elements:

- Trade-off Determinations (TOD),
- Trade-off Analysis (TOA),
- Best Technical Approach (BTA),
- Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA).

The TOD identifies the apparent technical feasibility of a potential system, including technical risks associated with each approach, estimated RDTE, and procurement costs and schedules. The TOA determines which technical approach(es) offered in the TOD are best. The BTA identifies the best general approach(es) based on the results of the TOD, the TOA and an analysis of trade-offs among ILS concepts, technical concepts, life cycle costs, and schedules.

The CFP compares the estimated cost and operational effectiveness of the proposed system concept with existing systems and competing system concepts. It also examines technical approaches for satisfying the materiel need and alternative logistics support concepts.

When a project manager designee has been selected, the CFP and final report of the Special Task Force (STF) or Special Study Group (SSG) (if convened) will be provided for input to the Program Management Plan (PMP). When a project manager has not been designated, the CFP and final report is provided to the major subordinate command exercising materiel development responsibility.

The CFP is prepared jointly by the CBTDEV and MATDEV as are the TOA and BTA. The COEA is prepared by the CBTDEV; and TOD is prepared by the MATDEV. After either an STF or SSG is chartered, they conduct the Concept Exploration phase of alternative concepts to fulfill the need stated in the JMSNS/O&O Plan. Some of these concepts may result from new developments in the technology base and/or may be proposed by Army laboratories, TRADOC schools, and/or industry. Documentation of the STF/SSG effort results in the CFP. A Study Advisory Group (SAG) under the General Staff responsibility of ODCSOPS generally will be used in conjunction with the STF/SSG.

Acquisition Strategy (AS). The AS is the plan for conducting a materiel acquisition program. It states the concepts and objectives that direct and control overall development, production, and deployment. An AS is required for all Army acquisition programs. The AS documents how the acquisition program will be tailored and identifies risks and plans to reduce or eliminate the risks. The AS, prepared by the MATDEV in coordination with the acquisition team is a living document that matures throughout the program. By

Milestone I it covers ten functional areas including T&E, MANPRINT, supportability, technical risks, manufacturing and production, cost growth and drivers, Human Factors Engineering (HFE) safety and health, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI), survivability and endurance, and electrical power and environmental equipment.

The AS also provides fundamental guidance to the functional elements of the materiel and combat development organizations. Individual strategies leading to the preparation of detailed plans are required to implement the AS. This is depicted in Figure 17-8.

The AS will be one of the most important products of Concept Exploration. When a Special Task Force (STF) or Special Study Group (SSG) has been convened to conduct the Concept Exploration Phase, the program manager designee or the materiel development component of the STF or SSG is responsible for preparation of the AS. Because of its importance, the materiel developer must ensure that the proper expertise is provided so that all components of the AS are correctly and realistically addressed.

Phase 2—Demonstration and Validation (D&V).

The primary purpose of this phase is to identify and substantially reduce program risk before making the crucial decisions on which contractor's system best meets program objectives and whether to enter Full-Scale Development (FSD) with the intent to eventually deploy. This phase also focuses on accomplishing design, producibility, addressing manufacturing technology deficiencies, and assessing production feasibility. Areas of major risk are identified as early as possible. Risk is resolved by such techniques as analysis, simulation, models, or prototypes. When full-scale prototypes are not programmed, consideration is given to using scale models or prototypes of critical subsystems/components. Subsystems are not designed/prototyped independently of the prime system. Mission effectiveness and cost depend upon inseparable system/subsystem relationships and system trade-offs. The overall goal is to optimize the system. Detailed work on the System Support Package (SSP) begins during this phase, so that these activities will not pace fielding. Technical Test (TT) and Early User Test

ACQUISITION STRATEGY




FIGURE 17-8

and Experimentation (EUTE) generally will be conducted in this phase to support a milestone decision. T&E will be conducted, as appropriate, of training simulators, test equipment tools, and other subsystems.

The Baseline Cost Estimate (BCE) will be updated. The COEA will be updated, if required, using updated threat data, test data, and more detailed cost estimates. A formal risk analysis is also completed. The Required Operational Capability (ROC) will be prepared supporting work to be undertaken in Full-Scale Development (FSD). The Program Directive (PD) will be updated to record the decisions and provide an audit trail for future use.

Phase 3—Full-Scale Development (FSD).

The purpose of FSD is to design, fabricate, test, and evaluate a complete system. This includes the principal items necessary for its production, operation, and support. RAM design, testing, and evaluation of components should be integrated into the earliest part of this phase. When making design trade-offs, it is not standard practice to design either to the performance floor or to the cost ceiling. Trade-offs are done in a manner which gives optimal overall system cost effectiveness. Simplicity is emphasized as opposed to sophistication. High priority is placed on ensuring adequate quantities of equipment can be afforded. The project manager has the authority to make trade-offs within the bounds of the ROC, the last decision memo, and any special conditions imposed by the decision authority. Producibility engineering and planning will be completed to include development and validation of a complete Technical Data Package (TDP), and specification and "prove out" of the required production resources. The System Support Package (SSP) is developed and tested to include training materials, training ammunition, training devices, and automated test equipment.

By Policy TT will be conducted, and by Law OT will be conducted before a production decision. The BCE and ICE will be updated. The COEA will be updated, if required, using updated threat data, test data, and more detailed cost estimates. The test plan and S&I plan are updated as necessary. The Program Directive (PD) is updated to reflect decisions that change the baseline. A production readiness review is conducted. The ROC and PMP are updated as necessary. Coordination continues, as appropriate, with TJAG, TSG, and COE.

Phase 4—Production and Deployment.

Successful completion of TT, OT, and Milestone III approval permit production at rates based on manufacturing efficiency, operational demand, and resource availability. Initial production items are used for production test and follow-on evaluation as necessary. Production will not, however, be suppressed to await completion of Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation. Deployment does not await conclusion of this evaluation. A validated Technical Data Package

(TDP) is essential for use in competitive procurement. Therefore, initial production normally will be conducted by the MATDEV. Production rights ordinarily are obtained by the government. Where economies can be achieved, second production sources will be established at the earliest possible date, after a proven TDP is available.

LCSMM Documentation

The JMSNS and O&O Plan are the initiating documents for the LCSMM. Other documentation is designed to support the management process as the life cycle development of an equipment system progresses. The simplest approach to understanding the documentation is to consider three types: requirements documents; review documents; and decision documents. Requirements documents focus on defining the characteristics or specifications of the item to be developed, becoming more specific as development progresses. Review documents provide the necessary data to support a review of progress before Milestone decisions are made. Decision documents record the appropriate decisionmaker's guidance for the Milestone.

Requirements Documents.

Operational and Organizational Plan (O&O Plan).

The O&O Plan states the purpose of the proposed system, where and how it will be used, the organizations that will employ it, and how it will be integrated into the force structure. It establishes readiness objectives and is the basis for Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning. The O&O Plan provides front end agreement between the CBTDEV and the MATDEV on the requirement and, with its preliminary cost estimate, provides the cost basis for determining if a Justification for Major System New Start (JMSNS) is required. The O&O Plan is developed from the operational concept resulting from the Mission Area Analysis (MAA). The O&O Plan is the basis for a JMSNS, if needed, and ultimately for the Required Operational Capability (ROC). The CBTDEV prepares the O&O Plan in coordination with the MATDEV, TNGDEV, and the logistician. Commander, TRADOC, approves all O&O Plans which are then reviewed at the Army staff and secretariat level. The O&O Plan is a living document that is refined and revised throughout the MAP which can support the early identification of test requirements.

Justification for Major System New Start (JMSNS).

The JMSNS contains the basic rationale for the initiation of a major acquisition program (costs exceed \$200 million for RDTE funds or \$1 billion for procurement). When the preliminary cost analysis of the O&O concept reveals that the funding threshold for a major system will be exceeded, a JMSNS is required. The CBTDEV is the proponent for development of the JMSNS. Participants in the process include the

MATDEV, Manpower and Personnel Planner, TNGDEV, and logistician. When the JMSNS is approved by SECDEF and included in the POM by the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) and the DEP SECDEF, it constitutes formal approval for program initiation. The JMSNS is the basis for the initial concepts concerning system design, system support, and Test and Evaluation planning. When appropriate, the JMSNS contains a description of the nuclear threat and environment in which the developing system is expected to operate. The JMSNS is a one time document which is not revised.

Required Operational Capability (ROC). The ROC is the document which supports entry into full-scale engineering development (Milestone II) and describes in narrative form the minimum essential operational, technical, and cost information required for a new or product-improved materiel system. A ROC is prepared by the CBTDEV, coordinated with MATDEV, and submitted to DCSOPS for approval. It is limited to four pages.

The DCSOPS has Army General Staff responsibility to recommend to the SECDEF which systems are to be considered major. The SECDEF makes the formal determination after consultation. Major systems include those which qualify for DAB and others which are critically important to the Service Component, complicated, expensive, controversial, or for any reason should involve top management. For major systems, DCSOPS will process the ROC for approval by CSA. All other ROCs are approved by DCSOPS.

DCSLOG examines the logistics support capabilities to assure that complete Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is in-being or will be available prior to system deployment.

DCSOPS designates an operational unit with which the CBTDEV and MATDEV are to coordinate the activities necessary to familiarize and prepare that unit to accept the system.

Review Documents:

System Concept Paper (SCP). The SCP is the basic supporting document for Milestone I decisions and contains a test and evaluation plan, an assessment of the threat, a description of shortfalls of the existing system, alternatives for consideration, technological risks, the acquisition strategy, known issues, and decisions required from the decision authority at the milestone review. It documents the results of Concept Exploration. The SCP is prepared by the MATDEV, reviewed by the appropriate decision review body, and forwarded for approval to the AAE.

The Decision Coordinating Paper/Integrated Program Summary (DCP/IPS). The DCP/IPS consists of two documents that provide different levels of detail for consideration by the DAB. The DCP is a top-level

summary document that identifies alternatives, goals, thresholds, and threshold ranges, as appropriate. The IPS provides more specific information on the program and is prepared when the DAB chair determines that the DCP lacks information on which to base the requisite decision. When a Milestone III (production decision—by the Secretary of Defense) is required, the DCP/IPS shall be updated to describe program changes since Milestone II and to propose goal and threshold revisions, if appropriate.

Tables I and II show the various features of the DCP and IPS.

DECISION COORDINATING PAPER (MILESTONE II & III)

PRINCIPAL

PURPOSE: PROVIDE INFO FOR ASARC/DAB DECISION

CONTENT: 11 AREAS PRESCRIBED PLUS SIX ANNEXES

- BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM.
- HISTORY.
- MISSION AREA AND ROLE.
- THREAT ASSESSMENT.
- SHORTFALLS OF EXISTING SYSTEMS.
- ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED.
- DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED ALTERNATIVE.
- TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS OF SELECTED ALTERNATIVE.
- ACQUISITION STRATEGY.
- KNOWN ISSUES.
- DECISIONS NEEDED.

LENGTH: - MAX (EXCLUDING ANNEXES): DCP 18 PAGES

TABLE I

INTEGRATED PROGRAM SUMMARY (MILESTONES II & III, WHEN REQUESTED)

PRINCIPAL

PURPOSE: SUMMARY OF ACQUISITION PLAN TO ALLOW INFORMED ANALYSIS BY INTERESTED STAFFS

CONTENT: 10 AREAS PRESCRIBED PLUS DAE ISSUES

- PROGRAM HISTORY
- THREAT ASSESSMENT
- PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES
- COST
- PROCUREMENT
- O&O CONCEPT
- READINESS, R&M, SUPPORT & PERSONNEL
- CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
- TEST & EVALUATION
- QUALITY PROGRAMS & SYSTEMS

LENGTH: - 30 PAGES (EXCLUDING FUNDING PROFILES)

PROCESSING: APPROVED AT HQDA, PROVIDED TO OSD FOR COMMENT, NOT APPROVAL

TABLE II

Decision Documents:

Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum (SDDM)/System Acquisition Decision Memorandum (SADM). The SDDM documents SECDEF milestone decisions for major systems, establishes program goals and thresholds, reaffirms established needs and

program objectives, authorizes exceptions to acquisition policy, and provides direction and guidance for the next phase of the acquisition process. At Milestone Zero, SECDEF guidance is provided in a PDM. This documentation authorizes utilization of funds to initiate the next acquisition phase. SECDEF decisions at Milestone I and II are documented by SDDM. For DAPs, the SADM takes the place of the SDDM. It accomplishes the same purposes and provides the same type of guidance and information. The production decision at Milestone III is delegated to the DOD component concerned, provided the thresholds established at Milestone II were met.

LCSMM DECISION REVIEWS

The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).

The function of the DAB is to review DOD major programs to ensure that they are ready for transition from one program phase to the next. A basic overview of the process is displayed in Figure 17-9. The Council may review programs when a Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) threshold is breached, when there is a major reorientation of the program, or when the threat changes. The DAB provides coordinated advice to the Secretary of Defense on these matters. Members of the DAB include the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (Chairman for Milestone I and II DAB Reviews); Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition and Logistics; Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; Director, Defense Research and Engineering; Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Service Secretary, and Service Chief of Staff. Milestone III decision reviews have been delegated to the Services. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) serves as a DAB member for those DAB milestone reviews concerning C'I systems. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition is the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE).

The Army Systems Acquisitions Review Council (ASARC).

The ASARC is the group of top managers which reviews DOD major programs prior to a DAB and all DAPs. The ASARC recommends appropriate action to the Secretary of the Army for decision or subsequent recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. The effectiveness of the ASARC review process results from presentation of thorough analysis of all relevant issues and face-to-face discussion among the principals from the Army Secretariat, Army Staff, and Major Commands (AMC and TRADOC). The Vice Chief of Staff chairs the ASARC. Membership includes the Under Secretary of the Army; CG, AMC; CG, TRADOC; ASA(RDA); ASA(I&L); ASA(FM);

DAB PROCESS OVERVIEW




FIGURE 17-9

ASA(MRA); DCSOPS; DCSPER; DCSLOG; DCSI; Deputy Assistant Secretary Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition); Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers; Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation; Chief, Army Reserve; Chief, National Guard Bureau; General Counsel; Director, Contracting and Production, ODCSLOG; and Commander, MTMC.

Currently, systems are presented to the ASARC in a fashion which clarifies the mission and shows other developmental or production systems which compete for a portion of that mission. For example, the M1 kills tanks, but other competitors in the arena could include: AAH, COBRA 2000, TOW II, and COPPERHEAD.

Efforts are ongoing to ensure that these issues are scrubbed during the preliminary review process and presented at future ASARCs. ASARC briefings will be expanded to address architectural issues as they relate to the subject system. This type of an approach, coupled with the DCSOPS trade-off analysis currently performed, will help with the complex affordability decisions.

In-Process Review (IPR).

The IPR brings together representatives of the MATDEV, the CBTDEV, the trainer, and the logistician for a joint review and decision on proceeding to the next phase of development. Their purpose is to provide recommendations, with supporting rationale, as a basis for system concept, system development, type classification, and production decisions by the appropriate level of authority. They are intended to be forums where agencies responsible for participating in the materiel acquisition process can present their views and ensure that they are considered during development, test, evaluation, and production. Unless informed otherwise, the MATDEV is delegated IPR authority for the system. Observer status is extended to the appropriate testing agencies, HQDA representatives, and to such others as the IPR Chairman designates.

LCSMM TESTING

The second major thrust through the LCSMM is testing.

Life cycle testing includes Early User Test and Experimentation (EUTE), Development Testing (DT), Operational Testing (OT), Production Testing, Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation (FOTE), and Force Development Testing and Experimentation (FDTE). DOD Directive 5000.3 "Test and Evaluation," establishes the broad policies for the conduct of test and evaluation of defense systems. Planning for T&E is governed by the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).

There are two broad types of testing—technical and user.

— Technical tests are tests of materiel systems conducted by the MATDEV using the principle of a single integrated technical test cycle to demonstrate that the design risks have been minimized, the engineering development process is complete, and the system will meet the specifications. An estimate of the system's military utility will be provided when it is introduced. They include tests such as Development Tests (DT), technical feasibility tests, qualification tests, joint development tests, and contractor/foreign tests.

— User test activities are categorized as Early User Test and Experimentation (EUTE) and Operational Testing (OT). These are field tests, conducted under realistic tactical conditions, to determine the operational effectiveness and suitability of the system for use in combat by typical military users. Concept Evaluation Programs and innovative tests are other types of user tests. TRADOC has initiated a unique process called early and continual user test and experimentation which is in response to lessons learned in the acquisition of previous systems.

Early User Testing and Experimentation (EUTE).

EUTE is a type of testing conducted during the Concept Development and Demonstration/Validation stages of the acquisition process. It may support the combat development, training development, and materiel acquisition process by providing essential information at key decision reviews. EUTE specifically supports the acquisition process by providing data to assist in development of materiel requirements documents and by providing data to operational evaluation in support of the Milestone II decision in lieu of OT. EUTE consists of nonsequential testing (including force development, innovative, and concept evaluation program tests) related to and contributing to the acquisition process, but it is not rigidly scheduled as are other types of testing. EUTE is used to develop the concept of employment, determine operational feasibility, estimate the potential operational advantage of a proposed system, and in the development of materiel requirements documents such as the Required Operational Capability (ROC). The Concept Evaluation Program (CEP) is a specially funded TRADOC innovative testing program. CEPs provide commanders and combat developers a quick reaction and simplified process to resolve combat development, doctrinal, and training issues in addition to solidifying combat development requirements and supporting early milestone decisions. Also, the CEP is used to provide an experimental data base for requirements documents and to expedite the materiel acquisition process; however, CEPs are not to be used as the primary tests to support decision review production decisions. CEP may be conducted at any time. EUTE is an excellent management tool for examining the impact, potential, and effectiveness of selected concepts, tactics, doctrine,

organization, and materiel. Proposals for EUTE may be initiated by any command or agency and are approved by DCSOPS. Once approved, DCSOPS, in coordination with the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA), will designate the DA Staff proponent and test organization.

Development Test and Evaluation (DTE).

Development Testing and Evaluation is planned, conducted, and monitored by the developing agency (normally AMC). Development Testing (DT), as a part of DTE, demonstrates that the engineering design and development process is complete; demonstrates that the design risks have been minimized; demonstrates that the system will meet specifications; and demonstrates, prior to the first major production decision, that all significant design problems (compatibility, interoperability, reliability, availability, maintainability, and supportability considerations) have been identified and that solutions to the known problems are in hand. DT is accomplished in factory, laboratory, and proving ground environments. DT is normally conducted in phases, each keyed to decision points in the cycle. The current philosophy of the single integrated development test policy, use of Test Integration Working Groups (TIWG), and the use of simulation to supplement the tests and expand the scope of evaluation facilitates the integration of test requirements, minimizes costs, and shortens schedules by maximizing the use of test data.

The U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), which reports to the CG, AMC, is the AMC development tester. TECOM operates and maintains nine proving grounds, missile ranges, and environmental test centers, to provide the necessary capability to perform DT on all types of AMC-managed materiel. Independent Evaluation Reports (IER) addressing the critical developmental issues are published at the conclusion of each phase of DT prior to the next decision point. The conducting of the independent development evaluation and publishing IER for AMC materiel are the responsibility of either the U.S. Army Materiel System Analysis Activity (AMSAA) or TECOM as determined by AMC. Normally, AMSAA performs the evaluations on major and some IPR systems, and TECOM performs the evaluation on all others in association with the assigned R&D command.

Operational Test and Evaluation (OTE).

Operational Testing (OT), is the responsibility of OTEA, an organization independent of the developer and user. Usually, OT is conducted by OTEA for major and Designated Army Program (DAP) by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the U.S. Army Information Systems Command, or by other designated operational testers for other nonmajor systems. OT is conducted using typical user operators, crews or units in as realistic an operational environment

as possible to estimate operational effectiveness, operational suitability (including compatibility, interoperability, reliability, availability, maintainability, logistics supportability, and training requirements), and need for modifications. In addition, OT provides information on organization, personnel requirements, doctrine, and tactics. Also, it may provide data to support or verify material in operating instructions, publications, and handbooks. OT is required by Public Law 98-94 for the Milestone decision to enter full scale production.

OT is planned and coordinated with DT but reported and evaluated independently from DT. DT and OT may be combined when clearly identified significant cost/time benefits would result or when separation would cause delay involving an unacceptable military risk or unacceptable increase in acquisition cost. The determination of unacceptable military risk or unacceptable increase in acquisition cost is a function of the decision review.

Production Testing (PT).

Production Testing is accomplished by or for the procuring activity on full-scale initial and follow-on production quantities for the purpose of quality assurance to determine whether the prescribed requirements have been met as stated in the contract specifications. This type of testing includes first article inspection as well as comparison testing and quality conformance inspections resulting in data which provide measurements of adequacy of the materiel and related technical requirements. Testing during production is required to determine the producer's capability to produce an item that meets (and continues to meet) prescribed specifications and requirements, to confirm corrections of deficiencies reported in DT or OT reports, and to verify that reconditioning, repairs, or overhaul by Army depots, intermediate maintenance shops, or contractors result in items being provided for issue or storage which reflect established levels of quality and serviceability. Later production testing includes reconditioning, intermediate maintenance, and surveillance testing.

Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation (FOTE).

FOTE is that OTE conducted as necessary after the full production decision during production and deployment of the system. FOTE is conducted to assess system training and logistics, and to verify correction of deficiencies, if required, and to ensure that initial production items meet operational effectiveness and suitability thresholds. FOTE will be scheduled and programmed as a normal part of an acquisition program. The operational Independent Evaluation (IE) will make maximum use of both production and preproduction qualification tests and other data sources (e.g., sample data collection, field user surveys) to assess FOTE issues minimizing the requirement for follow-on operational testing.

Force Development Test and Experimentation (FDTE).

FDTE is conducted early on to support the force development and materiel development processes by examining the effectiveness of existing or proposed concepts of training, logistics, doctrine, organization, and materiel. FDTE is conducted early and can be scheduled as needed during any phase of the materiel acquisition process. They may be related to, combined with, or used to supplement OT. During the requirement formulation effort, FDTE may be used to determine essential and desirable capabilities or characteristics of proposed systems. When FDTE is conducted prior to Milestone II as a part of a materiel acquisition process, it is referred to as Early User Test and Experimentation (EUTE) and may take form of a Force Development Test (FDT), field experiment, Concept Evaluation Program (CEP), Innovative Test (IT), or User Demonstration. Prior to MS II, FDTE will be used to assist in refining concepts of employment, logistics, training, organization, and personnel, in lieu of OT when operational issues are adequately addressed. FDTE also includes field experiments designed to gather data through instrumentation to address a training development problem or to support simulations, models, wargames, and other analytical studies. Requirements for FDTE may also be generated by the results of combat developments, training developments, or training effectiveness analysis testing and studies.

Continuous Evaluation (CE).

Beginning in 1983, the Army initiated a review to determine how to make testing a more effective contribution to the development process. The result was CE. The basic intent of CE is to move from a series of discrete tests just before milestone decisions to a continuous process linked throughout the entire development cycle. The independent evaluator becomes involved in planning during the Concept Exploration phase. The data thus generated in early development phases becomes visible and is maintained as the system moves into formal DT and OT. Testing can then easily verify that deficiencies found in the development process are, in fact, corrected. The most current information becomes available for subsequent testing. In this manner, testing not only fulfills the function of verifying specifications, it also contributes to system modifications to optimize the effectiveness of the product. This program includes that testing related to evaluating the supportability of the system.

In response to a General Accounting Office study, the Army's systems evaluated by OTEA include a consolidated report of both DTE and OTE to the ASARC; adding this comprehensive combining evaluation report to the CE process is called Continuous Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE).

INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is the third major thrust through the LCSMM. ILS considerations are to be integrated into the design effort. The objective is to ensure that the developed systems are reliable, maintainable, transportable, and supportable. Concurrently, the required support resources must be developed, acquired, tested, and deployed as an integral part of the materiel acquisition process. The principal elements of ILS related to the overall system life cycle include:

- The maintenance plan.
- Support and test equipment.
- Supply support.
- Transportation and handling.
- Technical data.
- Facilities.
- Manpower and Personnel.
- Training and Training Devices.
- Logistics support resource funds.
- Logistics support management information.

Logistics supportability is a design requirement as important as cost, schedule, and performance. A continuous interface between the program management office and the manpower and logistics communities must be maintained throughout the acquisition process. ILS plans and programs, including NATO or bilateral Allied support, must be structured to meet peacetime readiness and wartime employment objectives and tailored to the specific system. Innovative manpower and support concepts are to be considered early in the development process. Alternative maintenance concepts are to be assessed during Concept Development and at other appropriate points of the life cycle.

ILS documentation will consider MANPRINT as specified in AR 700-127. Logistics support analysis tasks may use hardware versus manpower (HARDMAN) and early comparability analysis (ECA) as inputs to the BOIP/QQPRI Process.

RESOURCING RDA

In the program and budget process, fund requests are initiated or reviewed annually. The Congress appropriates funds for RDT&E (Title V) and Procurement (Title IV) as part of the "Defense Appropriation Act." The RDT&E and PROCUREMENT Appropriations must first be approved by DOD, authorized by Congress, and have funds appropriated to specific activities before any money can be spent.

Program Stability.

To be successful, acquisition programs for new systems must be developed and acquired in a timely and

economical manner. To accomplish this, life cycle cost estimates and changes to programs and schedules must be controlled. Changes to programs affecting established goals will be fully documented in the Program Management Documentation (PMD), providing the justification for change (e.g., budget cut, design change). After entering the Full Scale Development phase, design changes in system components that are meeting the approved requirement are discouraged and must be individually justified. The design should be frozen in sufficient time prior to Technical Test/Operational Test (TT/OT) to provide an adequate system support package for testing.

Changes to programs as a result of TT/OT must be of the "required" nature to satisfy the requirement and not a "desired" type of change unless it can be demonstrated that the change will not have a significantly negative impact on the cost, schedule, producibility, and ILS aspects of the program—for instance, a value engineering change which reduces cost while increasing reliability.

Development programs are funded using Total Risk Assessing Cost Estimate (TRACE) (AR 70-6). Cost is controlled by Design to Cost (DTC) principles. Trade-off evaluations are guided by life cycle cost considerations. TRACE and DTC principles are not required for Nondevelopment Items (NDI); however, life cycle cost considerations should be taken into account when evaluating alternatives if objective life cycle cost data is available without undue additional testing.

Research and Development Categories.

To assist in the overall planning, programming, budgeting, and managing of the various R&D activities, the RDT&E program is divided into six R&D categories. These categories are used throughout DOD. The identifiers, 6.1, 6.2, etc., are commonly used for identifying funds; but they are also used as a shorthand technique by members of the R&D community. For example, instead of referring to some project as being "in exploratory development," it is often referred to as being "in 6.2." The 6.1 and 6.2 categories are known as the "tech base." (A JMSNS is not required for these programs, regardless of size.)

— Research (6.1): Research is scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, bio-medical, and behavioral sciences related to long-term national security needs. It provides fundamental knowledge for the solution of identified military problems. (For example: research in materials, night vision, electronics, or cartography.)

— Exploratory development (6.2): Exploratory development includes all efforts directed toward the solution of broadly defined problems short of major development programs with a view to developing and

evaluating technical feasibility. This type of effort may vary from fairly fundamental applied research to major subsystems. (For example: boundary-layer control air vehicles, turbine engines, high-output diesels, inertial guidance components, hull forms.)

— Advanced development (6.3): Includes all projects that have moved into development of hardware for test. The prime result of this type effort is proof-of-design concept rather than the development of hardware for service use. Projects in this category have a potential military application. Advanced development is divided into the following two categories:

- Nonsystem specific advanced development (6.3A), which represents advanced development efforts addressing technological options or uncertainties. These efforts are categorized by the development of component, subsystem, technology demonstrators, or nonmaterial technological demonstrators which have a potential application to a variety of similar generic end products rather than for application to one specific, well-defined system. (For example: fiber optics guidance.)

- System-specific advanced development (6.3B), which includes the design and fabrication of prototype systems being directed toward engineering development of a specific system. (For example: anti-tank missile system.)

— Engineering development (6.4): Engineering development includes programs in which the item is being engineered for service use to meet a specific requirement. (For example: AH 64 helicopter.)

Other RDT&E categories include Management and Support (6.5) and Operational System Development (6.7). Management and Support (6.5) provides for research and development effort directed toward support of installations or operations required for use in general research and development. (For example: operation and support of test ranges, operation and support of management headquarters.) Operational System Development (6.7) includes R&D effort directed toward development, engineering, and test of changes to fielded systems or systems already in procurement which alter the performance envelopes. (For example: CH 47 helicopters.)

Manpower And Personnel Integration (MANPRINT)

MANPRINT is an Army initiative that makes the following considerations imperative in the materiel acquisition process: human factors engineering, manpower, personnel, training, systems safety, and health hazard assessments. MANPRINT is a critical initiative because the Army's ambitious modernization program will put 400 new materiel items in the field; some of them will be weapons and support equipment that rely on increasingly advanced technology. Government and industry have worked together to

produce impressive weapon systems, but there are concerns that new materiel may sometimes be too complex for soldiers to operate and maintain.

The MANPRINT philosophy is that soldiers are the Army's most important resource. Emphasis throughout the Army on MANPRINT will insure that soldiers are considered during materiel development from preconcept exploration to final product improvement.

The Army's goal is to produce capable systems that can be operated, maintained, and supported by soldiers at the lowest overall cost. Future requirements for manpower and training must be kept to a minimum because of the anticipated limits on the number of soldiers who will be available. The MANPRINT initiative attempts to use human factors engineering and system analysis to help soldier-machine systems reach maximum performance within specified constraints. To meet this critical goal, information on human factors engineering, manpower, personnel, training, systems safety, and health hazards must be integrated into the materiel acquisition process from pre-concept to deployment.

TAILORED DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

Each materiel acquisition program is unique. As a result of both internal and external influences, adjustments to schedule, requirements, and cost are necessary to conform to constraints and still provide the user with the most cost effective and timely materiel necessary to satisfy user requirements.

Tailoring an acquisition program provides the MATDEV with the flexibility to not only modify the standard acquisition process as a reactive necessity but also to make proactive planning decisions to significantly alter, combine, or eliminate phases in the process. One basic approach that can be used to simplify or eliminate phases in the acquisition process is the Army Streamlined Acquisition Process (ASAP).

ASAP is essentially a synergistic combination of common sense measures, derived from lessons learned in a variety of acquisition programs, to achieve the "surest and shortest" path for low risk developments while eliminating the need for case-by-case exceptions to the traditional acquisition process. Even though not all ASAP features can be applied to every candidate program, and additional tailoring will be possible for some programs, the ASAP approach should be a primary consideration in developing an acquisition strategy.

Streamlined Requirements

Requirements must be firmed up early, giving proper thought and realistic attention to what the materiel must do and the resources available. The elimination of unnecessary requirements is essential to formulating an acquisition program. At the onset of development, system-level requirements shall be specified in terms of mission-performance, operational effectiveness, and operational suitability. Requirements documents should

be challenged by all activities to ensure that they are executable, responsive to the threat, and realistic.

Circulation of draft requirements documents for industry review and comment has been helpful in the past, and is encouraged. No longer will we tell industry how to manage; rather, better define and state needs, and provide industry proper flexibility. System requirements in an ASAP program are structured to pursue capabilities or parameters that foster a low-risk development for the near term with commensurate visibility and priority for a parallel growth capability under the P³I concept.

Mature Technology/Use of Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P³I)

ASAP calls for near-term concentration on mature technologies, while establishing the requirement for P³I to handle any long term changes in threat scenarios and/or emerging technologies. With this approach, trade-offs can be made to accomplish full-scale development, and production prove-out within the four-year goal is attainable.

Thus, the accelerated cycle establishes an early technology focus on the operational and organizational concept, statement of user needs in flexible terms to allow room for optional approaches, demonstration of concepts and components early in the acquisition process, and production prove-out during system development.

Risk is reduced by bringing to development only mature components and then to pre-plan product improvements for follow-on insertion of those technologies that were not ready at the time of initial development. The engineering development phase then consists primarily of systems integration, integrated logistics support, and production readiness. The streamlined model displayed in Figure 17-10 is representative of the track a program could conceivably take. It is flexible and should be freely adapted as individual circumstances warrant.

Utilization of Troop Demonstrations

The ASAP model combines and simplifies elements of Concept Exploration and Demonstration/Validation into the Proof of Principle phase, collapsing Milestones I and II into a single milestone (Milestone I/II), primarily through the use of troop/tech demonstrations of mature technology prototypes/components. This change permits greater flexibility with Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RTDE) funding because it eliminates the artificial distinction between system and non-system advanced development.

Smoother Transition to Production

A good investment strategy yields a stable program, clearly showing where we are today and where we want to be when we bring on the new system. The Mission Area Materiel Plan (MAMP) is a key element in this planning because it shows how to eliminate or reduce

ACQUISITION PROCESS COMPARISON




FIGURE 17-10

the impact of the most important of the battlefield deficiencies within the allocated resources.

During development, ASAP envisions a solid prove-out of production, including hard-tooled prototypes whenever possible, culminating in early design freeze for baseline control, along with manpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT) and ILS prior to entry into the Production - Deployment Phase.

Test and evaluation strategy places emphasis on an Integrated Technical Test/Operational Test (TT/OT) test approach, Master Evaluation Plan (MEP), wider sharing of test data via a common test data base, exploitation of Test-Analyze-Fix-Test (TAFT) throughout Development-Proveout, including hard-tooled prototypes/low-rate production articles, and continuous evaluation throughout the life cycle. At the onset of production consider the use of low-rate initial production items for operational testing. In addition, recognize the necessity to front-load provisioning and ensure that spares acquisition is fully integrated with production.

Phases of the Process

The requirements phase focuses technology efforts among laboratories, industry Independent Research and Development (IR&D), foreign research, depots/arsenals, and Research, Development and Engineering (RDE) Centers and includes maturation of technology or components and the determination of suitability for Proof of Principle.

Program initiation occurs via O&O Plan or Justification for Major Systems New Start (JMSNS)

approval with essential characteristics and P'I provisions. The Technology Integration Steering Committee (TISC) includes joint Materiel Developer (MATDEV) and Combat Developer (CBTDEV) representation and meets semiannually with a dual focus: TISC-I matches technological opportunities with Army thrusts and emerging mission needs; it triggers the preparation of an O&O Plan or JMSNS; it directs technology maturation actions needed for subsequent steps and also periodically reviews technology maturation actions. TISC-II reviews the match and maturity of TISC-I solutions for suitability to advance to Proof of Principle. TISC findings support MAMP and Long Range Research Development and Acquisition Plan (LRRDAP) prioritization of resources, as well as Materiel Acquisition Review Board (MARB) deliberations and IPRs. A principal thrust is to identify opportunities in the Acquisition Strategy to minimize advanced development (6.3B-type) effort during the Proof of Principle Phase.

Proof of Principle Phase (2 Year Goal)

This phase combines and simplifies traditional Concept Exploration and Demonstration-Validation Phases by providing an early pulse check with senior leadership on the requirement and basic program approach, to strengthen consensus. This phase also employs technical demonstrations and user experimentation using a combination of prototypes, components, and surrogates to prove out significant elements of the operational concept as well as hardware potential before entering full scale development.

Conducting a collapsed Milestone I/II at the entry to full scale development assures a firm "go/no go" commitment to the program.

Development-Prove Out Phase (4 Year Goal)

This phase encompasses full-scale development (primarily systems integration) to include MANPRINT, ILS, and RAM; producibility engineering and planning, to include hard-tooled prototypes and initial production facilitization wherever possible; continued TT/required OT and continuous evaluation.

Perhaps the key element in this phase is the combined Milestone I/II as a "go/no go" decision point. The plan is to proceed, in every possible instance, directly from Proof of Principle to Full-Scale Development, thereby collapsing what was formerly known as the Demonstration/Validation Phase.

When other circumstances preclude achieving full Type Classification - Standard (TC-STD) at Milestone III, limited production measures with options for full-rate production will be exploited to speed up production verification testing and overall lead time to reach First Unit Equipped (FUE).

Production — Deployment (1½-2 Year Goal)

This phase includes low-rate initial production (LRIP), Qualification Test, plus any user test if required to support Defense Office of Test and Evaluation (DOTE) clearance on OT results; full rate production and initial fielding of the equipment.

Planned Concurrency

There are risks inherent in a time-compressed acquisition strategy which must be weighed against the operational capability delay inherent in a prolonged plan. Each program must be tailored to its own unique risks and needs. Commensurate with risk, approaches to be explored include developing separate alternatives in high-risk areas, experimental prototyping of critical components, combining phases, and omitting phases. For major programs, the SECDEF must approve combining or omitting phases. Planned concurrency should be considered when technical, cost, and supportability risks are low or when the urgency to counter a threat transcends high technical, cost, and supportability risks. Planned concurrency may include overlapping, combining, or omitting phases of the acquisition process and overlapping or combining development Test and Evaluation (T&E) with operational T&E. The degree of such concurrency should be based on the savings in acquisition time balanced against technical, cost, supportability risks, and national urgency.

CONTRACTS

One final area as a basis of understanding the acquisition process is contracts. A general understanding of types of contracts, their use and

effectiveness, can be a valuable asset to the acquisition manager.

The ASA(RDA) delegates authority to "contracting activities" to award contracts needed to support and accomplish Army acquisition programs. This is a unique management function in that it bypasses the DA Staff in both management and execution of contracting operations. The Chief, Commander, or other official in charge of a "Contracting Activity" is known as the "Head of Contracting Activity." In the case of AMC, which acquires almost all of the Army's major systems, the subordinate command commanders act as "Head of Contracting Activity" for the commodity category managed. Each "Head of Contracting Activity" ensures that all purchases made within his activity are made in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations and only by duly authorized contracting officers. Contracting officers are authorized to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings. It should be noted, however, that a contracting officer may have specific limits of authority in binding the U.S. If so, these limits will be set forth in his certificate of appointment, SF Form 1402.

The type of contract used to achieve or obtain the service or materiel should reflect the stage of development of the product. The more developed the product, the more definitive the contract becomes and the more the contractor assumes full cost responsibility. At the other end of the development is a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract where the fee, rather than price, is fixed and the contractor's cost responsibility is minimal to nonexistent. In this way, the contract structure also reflects the degree of risk shared by the Government and the contractor. The Federal Acquisition Regulation system provides for a variety of contract types. In selecting the appropriate contract type, the objective is to determine which one includes reasonable contractor risk and provides the contractor with the greatest incentive for efficient and economical performance.

The sealed bid (previously known as formal advertising) method of contracting is used if possible. Otherwise, contracts will be negotiated. In R&D acquisition there are usually no descriptions, drawings, or specifications adequate for use of the sealed bid method. Regardless of whether negotiation or sealed bidding is the method of contracting, competitive procedures must be used to the maximum extent possible. Use of the negotiated procedure does not authorize noncompetitive "sole source" contracting. The final decision on whether a procurement can be made with less than full and open competition rests with the contracting officer subject to higher level approval.

There are two general types of contracts in Government acquisition—fixed-price and cost-reimbursable. A fixed-price contract requires the contractor to provide the product or service at a specified price. A cost-reimbursable contract requires the contractor to try to achieve goals of the contract

within the negotiated schedule and estimated costs. The Government is then required to reimburse the contractor's cost and provide a certain fee. The terms of these two types of contracts are modified to reflect the degree of contractor risk and responsibility.

Fixed-Price Contracts.

There are four kinds of fixed-price contracts which limit the price for the end product but each allocates the risk to the contractor differently.

In the *Firm Fixed-Price* contract, the contractor accepts all risks for the stated price. The contract provides for a price which is not subject to any adjustment by reason of cost experience during contract performance.

The *Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment* provides for the revision of the contract price as stated within the contract. The adjustment in price can be based on (1) published or established prices; (2) labor or material costs (actual cost); or (3) labor or material costs (cost index).

Fixed-Price Incentive contracts can encourage the contractor to reduce the cost of the product or improve the equipment or schedule of delivery, thereby gaining a higher profit under predetermined conditions of the contract.

The *Fixed-Price with Price Redetermination* provides for a firm fixed price for an initial period of contract deliveries or performance and prospective redetermination, at a stated time or times during performance, of the price for subsequent periods of performance.

Cost-Reimbursable Contracts.

Cost-reimbursable contracts are used when the uncertainties involved in contract performance are of such magnitude that the cost of performance cannot be estimated with sufficient reasonableness to permit the use of a fixed-price contract. Because of the uncertainties inherent within R&D work, the nature of research and development contracting dictates that cost-type contracts are appropriate in most cases. Cost Plus Incentive Fee contracts are frequently preferred for both engineering development and operational systems development programs. When risks have been reduced to the extent that realistic pricing can take place, fixed-price contracts should be used. Cost-reimbursable contracts assure the contractor reimbursement for all allowable costs to the extent prescribed in the contract and provide for a profit or fee according to the terms of the contract.

The *Cost* contract (no fee) is used to reimburse the contractor for all allowable costs but does not provide for a fee.

A *Cost-Sharing* contract is used in research or development contracting, under which the contractor is reimbursed only for an agreed portion of his allowable costs.

The *Cost Plus Incentive Fee* contract is a contract with provision for a fee which is adjusted by formula in

accordance with the relationship which total allowable costs bear to target cost.

The *Cost Plus Award Fee* contract has special fee provisions in that it provides a means of applying incentives in contracts which are not susceptible to finite measurements of performance necessary for structuring incentive contracts.

The *Cost Plus Fixed Fee* contract is a straight cost-reimbursement contract which provides payment to the contractor for allowable costs plus a predetermined fee.

To properly award contracts, the Army has a comprehensive source selection structure which engages in the highly-sensitive process of selecting the source whose proposal has the highest degree of realism and credibility and whose performance is expected to best meet Government objectives at an affordable price. A discussion of this structure as well as the intricate procedures involved in solicitation, sealed bid, requests for proposal, negotiation, evaluation of bids, contract modifications, etc., are beyond the scope of this text.

Multiyear Procurement

Multiyear procurement is a commitment in the first year to buy the entire quantity of some weapon system over several years, and to be funded over the same period of time. It differs from annual procurement since the entire quantity is indicated for procurement upfront, even though it is only going to be bought one year at a time. The annual procurement method buys only the number of end-items that are required for that particular year and makes no commitment to buy anything in future years.

Multiyear contracting has been in existence for many years within the DOD for smaller dollar purchases, for some areas of operations and maintenance, and for overseas operations and maintenance contractual requirements. Most other acquisitions for products and services, including procurement of weapons systems, were limited primarily to annual contracting or the exercise of annual options to the basic contract. It was recognized that as a method for improving defense acquisition and increasing economy and efficiency of the acquisition process, the principle of multiyear contracting could be applied to the acquisition of weapon systems. However, a general awareness about this use of multiyear contracts was lacking within DOD.

The fundamental premise of multiyear procurement is "that quantity production contracts should be structured and funded whenever possible to benefit from economies of scale where such economies can be attained at an acceptable level of risk to both the government and the contractor." A DEPSEC DEF memorandum details the criteria by which program managers can determine the appropriateness of their programs for multiyear applications, various funding concepts to be considered when tailoring their multiyear acquisition strategy, and the appropriate control procedure.

The policies regarding the funding of multiyear procurements are stated in the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of 8 Oct 1981. These policies

state in part that contracts awarded under the multiyear procedure shall be firm fixed price or fixed price with provisions for economic adjustment; and that multiyear procurement may be used for the procurement of property including weapons systems, services associated with weapons systems, logistic support systems, subsystems, major equipment, requirements, parts materials, and advance procurement. This policy memorandum addresses specific actions required by the head of the contracting activity in the area of non-competitive contracting and of the specifications and limitations prior to the use of the multiyear method.

The program manager and the program office financial/contracting specialist should be thoroughly familiar with these policies to assist in their determining multiyear procurement candidates.

The advantages of multiyear procurement strongly outweigh merits of the more conservative and traditional approach to weapon systems procurement, which are now employed. The use of multiyear procurement for weapon systems acquisition takes advantage of one or more of the following:

- Lower Costs
- Enhancement of standardization
- Reduction of administrative burden in the placement and administration of contracts
- Substantial continuity of production or performance, thus avoiding annual start-up cost, preproduction testing cost, make-ready expenses, and phase-out cost.
- Stabilization of work forces.
- Broadening the competitive base with opportunity for anticipation by firms not otherwise willing or able to compete for lesser quantities, particularly in cases involving high start-up costs
- Implementation of the industrial preparedness program for planned items with planned producers
- Provide incentives to contractors to improve productivity through investment in capital facilities, equipment, and an advanced technology.

The major disadvantage to using multiyear procurement is in the area of decreased flexibility in the annual budgeting, authorization, and appropriation process. Long-term commitments add to risks assumed by the contractor and the government. However, inherent increased risk associated with inability to conduct annual review and make annual adjustments to the program can be ameliorated by the selective use of multiyear procurements coupled with a thorough benefit/risk analysis.

The benefits derived from multiyear procurement essentially fall into three categories: reduced cost, early deliveries, and program stability. Through the use of economic order quantities and expanded advance buy, the government is able to realize significant savings in the procurement of materials needed for the program. These earlier procurements may allow the defense industry to consolidate the schedules and accelerate

their production deliveries. The final area of program stability comes from the up-front commitment to buy the entire quantity over a 5-year period. It allows the Primary Contracting Officer (PCO) to obtain a negotiated price for the end-item over the 5-year period, and to establish quantity and delivery schedules.

SUMMARY

The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic introduction to the research, development, and acquisition management process, organization and structure. Through the chapter description, the reader should gain an appreciation of the logic of the process, its organization and management, and selected aspects of the industrial production base and contracts.

This chapter also highlights the basic policies for materiel acquisition, the DOD and Army policies for materiel systems, the Army's acquisition objectives, descriptions of acquisition managers, and contract awards.

Difficult decisions, a scarcity of dollar resources, and honest differences of opinion cause disruptions and delays. It is unlikely that there will be total agreement on the best technical approach to satisfy a need—or, indeed, on the need itself. The annual budget cycle and budget constraints almost ensure that some projects will not be funded at the level desired—if at all. Tests are not always successful—at least not to the satisfaction of all. Estimates of time, costs, effectiveness, and technical feasibility are often wide of the mark for complex systems. After all, they are estimates which are projected well into the future based on sketchy data. These real-world problems reinforce the fact that research, development, and acquisition management is a complex task of great importance to national defense. RDA can be a wellspring of new and effective weapon systems where effective management and professionalism can make the difference on any future battlefield. As with any activity involving the use of scarce resources to meet organizational goals and objectives, the people involved constitute the most vital link to mission accomplishment.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- (1) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 15-14: Systems Acquisition Review Council Procedures.*
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- (3) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 70-10: Test and Evaluation During Development and Acquisition of Materiel.*

(4) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 70-15*: Product Improvement of Materiel.

(5) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 70-17*: System/Program/Project/Product Management.

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(7) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 1000-1*: Basic Policies for Systems Acquisition.

(8) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Pamphlet 11-25*: Life Cycle System Management Model for Army Systems.

(9) *DODD 5000.1*: Major System Acquisitions.

(10) *DODI 5000.2*: Major System Acquisition Procedures.

(11) *DODD 5000.3*: Defense Acquisition Execution.

(12) *DODD 5000.43*: Acquisition Streamlining.

CHAPTER 18

MATERIEL SYSTEM—LOGISTICS

POLICY AND PROCEDURE

INTRODUCTION

The basic mission of the logistics system is to support the soldier in the field with what is needed, when, where, and in the condition and quantity required, at minimum expenditure of resources. This is the common thread which connects all logistics activity.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the Army's logistics system from the Department of the Army (DA) and U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) level. This chapter will address:

- logistics tasks and roles of major commands and agencies;
- management, organization and functions of DA DCSLOG and AMC;
- standard systems;
- funding procedures; and
- security assistance.

The following terms are fundamental to the scope of this chapter.

— *Army logistics* includes those activities that support the movement and sustainment of a combat force. The five functional elements of logistics are:

- Supply—the acquisition, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies.
- Maintenance—the function of sustaining materiel in an operational status, restoring it to a serviceable condition, or updating and upgrading its functional utility through modification.
- Transportation—those services related to the movement of persons and things to meet the Army's requirements and commitments and as assigned for the Navy, Air Force, State Department, and other governmental agencies.
- Services—support functions such as food services, commissaries, laundries, dry cleaning, clothing sales stores, fumigation and bath, property disposal, and graves registration.

- Facilities—real property programs and real property maintenance activities pertaining to the operation of utilities, maintenance of real property, minor construction, and other engineering support.

— *The logistics system* is a corporate entity consisting of personnel, procedures, and machines working within established policy toward the mission of planning, moving, and maintaining U.S. Army forces and other military services or allies, as designated.

— *Logistics doctrine* is a body of fundamental principles that guide commanders and logistics staff planners in their support of military forces. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.

— *Levels of logistics* are determined by the type of work accomplished. There are two major levels of logistics support.

- Wholesale—This includes the National Inventory Control Points (NICP's); National Maintenance Points (NMP's); depots, arsenals, data banks, plants and factories associated with AMC activities; and special activities under DA control. Examples of organizations with wholesale responsibilities include: U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), General Services Administration (GSA), and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Wholesale functions are generally performed in CONUS.

- Retail—Includes non-wholesale functions subdivided into two types.

- • Intermediate—This includes MTOE and TDA units in the field which provide direct support (DS) and general support (GS) logistics. Examples of the organizations with an intermediate-type responsibility include: installation supply and maintenance activities, corps and divisional support commands, a Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM), and similar units.

- • User—This includes MTOE and TDA units in the field which perform organizational and operator maintenance on organic equipment, and unit supply functions.

LOGISTICS TASKS AND ROLES

Logistics Tasks.

The Secretary of Defense issues logistics guidance to the Military Services as part of Defense Guidance (DG). Within this broad guidance, the Services develop their own program. The Army's logistics tasks stem from its primary mission, "... to organize, equip, and train Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land." The implied logistics tasks are to:

- equip Army forces;
- sustain combat operations on land;
- establish reserves of equipment and supplies and provide for expansion of peacetime components;
- formulate logistics doctrine and support procedures;
- develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations.

Logistics Roles.

Logistics roles evolve from the organization adopted to perform the tasks at each major level of logistics activity. At Headquarters DA, staff supervision is exercised by:

- Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics);
- Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition);
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG);
- Chief of Engineers;
- The Surgeon General; and,
- Chief, National Guard Bureau.

Below DA, logistics responsibilities are fulfilled by:

- Major Army Commands (MACOM);
- Non-Army Agencies;
- Field Operating Agencies (FOA); and
- U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard Forces.

Role of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. As the Army's principal logistics command, AMC is responsible for the materiel functions of research and development, product improvement, production, test and evaluation, storage, transportation, maintenance, scientific and technical intelligence production, demilitarization and disposal direction. AMC also provides the Army's wholesale level supply and maintenance support for items of materiel used by the Army. AMC serves as the executive agent for Security Assistance, and the Direct Support System-Air Line of Communications (DSS-ALOC) and the Logistics Intelligence File which forms an integral segment of DSS-ALOC. Additionally, AMC develops and promulgates doctrine for these functions.

Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Designated a Major Army Command on 16 June 1979, the Corps of Engineers plays a major role in the Army's overall logistics system. The Chief of Engineers has the Department of Army Staff responsibility for coordination and implementation of Army policy and programs involving all components of the Real Property Management System (RPMS) program. The four major components of the RPMS are:

- Requirements (stationing and master planning);
- Programming (major construction, operation and maintenance);
- Acquisition (real estate and real property—land and facilities); and
- Disposal (closure or mothball).

In 1978, the Office of the Chief of Engineers was reorganized to bring together military construction and real property management responsibilities under a single director—the Director of Military Programs. The goal as stated by the Chief of Engineers was to "integrate programming, acquisition, operation, maintenance, and disposal which comprise the full (life) cycle of Army real property activities."

The Chief of Engineers directs, as a command mission, the execution of the major military construction program and engineering technical support and services to installations throughout the world. This support to installations is provided through the engineer divisions and engineer districts under his command. The Chief of Engineers acts as a systems manager to integrate fully the support rendered by his command and technical organization with the Real Property Management function performed at installation level.

Role of Other Major Army Commands (CONUS).

The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) manages all individual schooling; formulates concepts, doctrine, organization, and materiel objectives and requirements for Army forces in CONUS and overseas; and develops and promulgates doctrine for the intermediate and direct support/user levels of logistics. A subordinate command of TRADOC, the U.S. Army Logistics Center (USALOGC) has the mission to develop, test, integrate, and disseminate logistics doctrine and systems for CONUS Army installations and for forces deployed overseas. There are five major functions performed by USALOGC.

- Develops and evaluates logistics doctrine and concepts, organizations, systems, and materiel concepts and requirements, and planning factors for the Army. Included is the task of insuring that the supply, maintenance, transportation, services, and facilities systems designed for the Army in the field and the CONUS retail logistics systems are compatible with the wholesale logistics system.

- Acts as TRADOC proponent for logistics training. Monitors and evaluates logistics training at all TRADOC schools. Assures that all logistics course content is consistent with approved doctrine. Assesses the training evaluation process at associated schools.

- Serves as a principal advisor to the Department of the Army (DA), TRADOC, and AMC on doctrine and force modernization issues.

- Acts as a consultant on Army logistics to CONUS and overseas commands.

- Provides a member to the Army Logistics Policy Council which determines the course to be taken in the overall development of Army logistics.

The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) commands all operational Army forces in CONUS, and, as such, provides retail level logistics support to all assigned units and to those activities which are tenants of its installations.

The U.S. Army Health Services Command provides a single manager for all medical activities in CONUS.

The U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) commands all assigned communications organizations supporting MACOM's, and, as such, provides intermediate/user level maintenance for communication and electronic equipment in the defense communication system. It provides GS/DS communication security logistics support in a theater of operations to the Army component of unified commands as tasked.

The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) operates assigned military ocean terminals in CONUS and specified overseas terminals and manages the DOD railcar fleet. It controls procurement of commercial transportation in CONUS, movement of cargo into air terminals and through ocean terminals, and provides traffic management support for Army passenger movements worldwide.

Role of Major Army Command (Theater of Operations). Logistics in the theater of operations is tailored to support the combat force requirements for each situation. Consideration is given to the variety of missions which tend to make each logistics requirement different in terms of amounts and types of supplies, maintenance, transportation, and services needed. Consequently, the organizations cover the full spectrum of possibilities from a large theater of operations involving one or more corps to that support required by a division or separate brigade.

The Theater Army commander is responsible for providing logistics support to all Army units in the theater. He executes this responsibility through one or more subordinate Theater Army Area Commands and such functional commands as appropriate; e.g., personnel, transportation, medical, and engineer. He

manages theater logistics support by establishing broad policies, allocating critical supplies, and assigning missions. Additionally, he manages and controls selected items through the Theater Army Materiel Management Center (MMC).

The Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) is an intermediate command under Theater Army and is located in the Communications Zone (COMMZ). During hostilities, the TAACOM provides direct and general supply and maintenance support to units in the communications zone to include non-corps units, joint elements, allied forces, and units passing through the communications zone. The TAACOM MMC manages the supply and maintenance support within the communications zone.

The Corps Support Command (COSCOM) provides maintenance, supply, transportation, medical support services, and other combat services support to an Army corps. Within the corps zone, nondivisional units receive supply and maintenance support from the COSCOM. Additionally, the COSCOM provides backup support to the divisional units. Its functional centers, the Materiel Management Center (MMC) and Movement Control Center (MCC), perform the major tasks of managing the supply, maintenance, and transportation functions.

The Division Support Command (DISCOM) provides direct support maintenance, supply, transportation, medical support services, and other combat service support to an Army division.

Role of Non-Army Agencies. The General Services Administration (GSA) provides general supplies and services that are common to more than one department of the government. The GSA has a multimission responsibility to manage the varied business activities of the Federal Government. GSA provides an extensive amount of supply support to the DOD for such commonly used items as office furniture and supplies, machine and hand tools, photo supplies, etc.

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides logistics support to the Army in three areas.

- **Supply Support.** DLA procures, stores, and distributes nearly two million DLA-managed items in support of the Military Services and other customers. While many of the items may be common to more than one Service, the majority of them are used by a single customer.

- **Logistics Services.** DLA functions include the responsibility for administration and supervision of: the Federal Catalog Program; the Defense Materiel Utilization Program; the Defense Excess, Surplus, and Foreign Excess Personal Property Disposal Program; the DOD Industrial Plant Equipment Program; and the DOD-wide Program for Redistribution/Reutilization of excess Government-Owned and Rented Automatic Data Processing Equipment.

— *Defense Contract Administration Services.* Provides contract administration services in support of all the DOD components, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, other designated Federal and state agencies, and foreign governments. These services include contract management, pre-award surveys, quality assurance, payment to contractors, support to small business and labor surplus areas, transportation and packaging assistance, and surveillance of contractor progress to insure timely delivery of materiel.

MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

As previously stated, the major objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of logistics management from DA DCSLOG and AMC levels. This is best accomplished by beginning with the mission, organization, and management functions of these

activities. Because there are other chapters dealing with the organization of HQDA and its overall management activity, only specific functions of DCSLOG will be highlighted. AMC functions will be covered in some detail to aid in overall understanding of the Army's logistics system.

Mission, Organization, and Functions of DCSLOG.

Mission. The DCSLOG is responsible for the management of DA logistical activities. The mission requirements of the Reserve Components as well as security assistance requirements are considered in equal detail with that of the Active Army.

Organization. An organizational chart for DCSLOG is at Figure 18-1.

Logistics Evaluation Agency. The Logistics Evaluation Agency (LEA), shown as a Field Operating Agency in Figure 18-1, executes policies prescribed by

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS




FIGURE 18-1

the DCSLOG for logistics planning, operations, organization, and systems. LEA is the independent logistician for the Army on all In Process Review (IPR) systems that are not subject to an Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) review. They have responsibility for insuring that Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) considerations are accomplished and for providing DCSLOG an ILS assessment on ASARC systems.

Troop Support Agency. The Troop Support Agency (TSA), shown as a Field Operating Agency in Figure 18-1, receives general staff supervision from the DCSLOG. Under TSA's centralized management, all worldwide Army commissaries are operated by Commissary Regional Offices. Additionally, TSA provides technical guidance, staff supervision, and operational procedures for worldwide operations of the Army Food Service Program, the Army Troop Issue Subsistence Program, all Army laundry and dry cleaning activities, Army clothing sales stores/clothing initial issue points, mobile field bakeries, and field laundry and bath services. A complete list of TSA responsibilities is contained in AR 10-45.

Functions. The DCSLOG has Army Staff responsibility for the management of DA logistical activities. The DCSLOG is responsible for the development and supervision of Army logistics organization, operations, and systems worldwide, including logistics readiness, planning, policies, doctrine, resource determination and allocation, objectives, force structure, and standards. His major functions include supply, maintenance, transportation, the Army energy program, troop support activities, and acting as the principal Army Staff representative and focal point for security assistance matters. The DCSLOG is Director of the Army Stock Fund and Army Industrial Fund (for other resource management functions of DCSLOG—see Chapter 15). The DCSLOG participates in and contributes to all phases of the research, development, and acquisition process (concept through deployment) and is responsible for support of materiel systems from production output through disposal. The DCSLOG exercises General Staff supervision over The Surgeon General as pertains to Army class management for medical materiel, and over the Chief of Engineers as pertains to the logistics portion of contingency plans and base development requirements. A complete list of DCSLOG responsibilities is contained in AR 10-5.

Contracting. Contracting is the process by which the government purchases, rents, leases, or otherwise obtains supplies or services. Contracting includes description (but not determination) of supplies and services required, selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract administration. The focus is on management of the Army-wide contracting program that involves

placement of over \$30 billion dollars and four million contract actions annually.

Logistics Readiness. The basic ingredients of military readiness are adequate, well-trained personnel in particular skills, possessing proper equipment in a combat-ready condition. Logistics readiness deals in large part with equipment and is measured by equipment on hand compared to that which is authorized; and equipment status in terms of serviceability.

The DCSLOG has overall DA Staff responsibility to improve the logistics readiness and sustainability of the Army in the field.

Logistics sustainability projects the future availability and serviceability of equipment by examining: the requirement for, and availability of, repair parts and other supplies; issue/turnaround times; storage and transportation, and related facilities.

The Logistics Evaluation Agency (LEA) is the focal point for the Command Logistics Review Program (CLRP). This is an assessment and assistance visit (not an inspection) during which a MACOM-led review team takes a vertical look at unit and/or installation logistics status. The objective is to identify problems adversely affecting readiness and the command or installation logistics posture, and the activity which can assist in the resolution of these problems. A Command Logistics Review Team-Expanded (CLRT-X) is a team augmented by a tailored group of DA or LEA specialists to evaluate items of special interest to the DA DCSLOG, perform special studies, evaluate force modernization systems, and assess unique problems that correspond to the DCSLOG areas of responsibility. The LEA is responsible to ensure timely follow-up action is taken on those observations requiring resolution above the MACOM level.

Logistics Planning and Operations. Logistics planning focuses on the transition from peacetime to wartime. The Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) is the major tool used by the unified commanders to request forces to support their Operation Plans (OPLAN). In determining the adequacy of the logistics support for the TPFDL, the major factors considered are:

- strategic lift;
- sustainability;
- prepositioned war reserve stocks;
- force shortfalls; and
- warning time.

The U.S. relies on NATO allies in Europe for logistical support, in both peacetime and wartime, primarily for rear area requirements. This Host Nation Support (HNS) supplements the organic support capabilities of U.S. units. HNS capabilities are used in such areas as transportation, maintenance,

construction, civilian labor, communications, facilities, utilities, air/seaport operations, rear areas security, and the movement of U.S. forces and materiel between the ports of debarkation and combat areas. HNS is the preferred means of meeting valid but otherwise unsatisfied support requirements. The objective is to utilize HNS to the maximum extent possible based upon the reasonable assurance of the availability of host nation resources.

Logistics Organizations and Systems. A major DCSLOG concern with respect to organization is the effectiveness of the support structure in wartime and an answer to the question, "Can we support major contingency plans?" Increases in the combat-to-support ratio or "tooth-to-tail" have placed a greater reliance on Reserve Components and Host Nation Support to provide combat service support during an emergency.

The proliferation of ADP systems and the problems of interface between these systems has complicated logistics systems development. Current efforts are aimed at the reduction of the number of logistics systems and a concurrent simplification of new and existing systems and procedures.

Supply. Supplies include all items or materiel necessary for the equipment, maintenance, and operation of a military command. The level of supply requirements, usually expressed in days of supply, is the quantity of materiel authorized or directed to be held in anticipation of future demands. DCSLOG prescribes levels of supply authorized to be on hand or on requisition. Levels are based on usage factors and experience data.

Overseas theater stocks of the Major Commands consist of war reserve materiel (stock for initial wartime consumption, and project stocks to include Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS)) and a theater safety level. Additionally, the theater holds those stocks which are excess to the direct support/user echelon and are within DOD retention criteria.

Stocks held by direct support/general support (DS/GS) units, when consisting of demand-supported items, mission-essential items, and initial provisioning items, are termed to compose an Authorized Stockage List (ASL). Inventory at the DS/GS level is used to support consuming organizations.

A using unit's Prescribed Load List (PLL) consists of demand-supported and mission-essential items to support unit maintenance and initial provisioning items. Materiel authorized for unit stockage (PLL Stocks) must be on hand or on order; i.e., it is replaced as consumed.

The Army is currently converting the peacetime-oriented PLL's to combat PLL's which will include a breadth and depth of stockage to provide for a 90% level of operational availability of selected critical end items. To achieve that goal, AMC developed a Mandatory Parts List (MPL) for deployed and

deployable MTOE forces. The MPL forms the core of the combat PLL. It will be augmented by demand-supported essential items not on the MPL as well as initial provisioning items. Concurrently, the Army is developing combat ASLs using a similar methodology.

DCSLOG goals for the establishment of retail stockage policy consider:

- optimum stockage for each class of supply;
- best trade-off between economics and readiness;
- simplicity in application and accuracy in determination of requirements;
- conformation with automated systems;
- the method of distribution (Air or Surface); and
- essentiality.

Increasing emphasis is being placed on the means to reduce the generation of excess stockage and the reexamination of materiel returns programs which flow the excess materiel from the retail to the wholesale level. The pace of force modernization, continuing changes, ASL turbulence, and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) stockage computations all contribute to the growth of excesses and hamper efforts to keep forward stockages lean and effective. Several actions are underway to reduce the accumulation of serviceable and unserviceable excess and ensure its economical return for repair and reuse. Combat PLL/ASL's described above will limit stockage and reduce turbulence. Automated processes are being changed and expanded to provide better visibility of the materiel returns system. The overall objective is to make the excess returns system as effective and efficient as the distribution system.

Also included in the description of supplies are the following troop support managed items:

- Rations and Water Distribution/Supply
- Personal and Organization Clothing
- Individual Equipment
- Food Service Equipment
- Laundry Equipment
- Graves Registration Support Items
- Mobile Field Bakery Plants

The Director for Plans and Operations, ODCSLOG, serves as the Army representative on the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB). A separate entity under the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JMPAB is charged to establish materiel priorities and the allocation of resources in those instances when such issues cannot be resolved by the Services. The Army member, along with the flag/general officer members from the other Services and the Joint Staff, functions to:

- establish, modify, or recommend priorities or allocation of materiel assets for the fulfillment of logistics requirements of U.S. and allied forces;

- review and act upon requests for modifications in force/activity designators;

- review the Master Urgency List (MUL), as requested by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), and review and act on other recommendations to establish or change the priorities in the MUL;

- prepare recommendations for approval for the JCS on priorities and allocation matters that must be referred to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

Maintenance. Materiel maintenance is all required actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition, restore it to serviceability, or upgrade its functional utility through modification. As a general policy, maintenance is performed at the location of the equipment operation or failure to the maximum extent consistent with the tactical situation and the cost-effective use of maintenance resources.

The current framework within which maintenance (less aviation) is performed falls into four broad categories or levels of progressive complexity: organizational, intermediate direct support (DS), intermediate general support (GS), and depot. Aviation maintenance, however, is performed at three levels: Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM) is a combination of organizational and limited DS maintenance; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) is a combination of the remaining DS and limited GS maintenance capabilities. The third level is depot and this includes some maintenance previously performed at GS level.

The present four categories of maintenance (less aviation) do not provide responsive support to the user and are not well suited to the future battlefield. To meet emerging needs of the field user, a revised maintenance structure has been developed which complements forward support maintenance operations, and integrates a vertical maintenance management system to streamline and discipline the maintenance structure. This revised structure establishes unit, intermediate, and depot levels similar to that currently used in aviation and strategic communications maintenance. Each level is described below.

- *Unit.* User maintenance, which is characterized by quick turnaround based on repair by replacement and minor repair (adjust, clean, lubricate, and tighten).

- *Intermediate.* This level is organized with direct support and general support units. The first is characterized by high mobility, a forward orientation, and repair by replacement. Divisional maintenance units will support maneuver elements while nondivisional units will provide area support and backup support to the division. Intermediate direct support units will be able to organize teams to support specific systems and their auxiliary equipment, e.g., Tank Battalion Team, Engineer Battalion Team. Battle

Damage Assessment (BDA) teams will be assigned to the nondivisional maintenance units.

Intermediate general support maintenance will be characterized by semifixed facilities. Its fundamental purpose is to support the theater supply system through repair of components and direct exchange items. Maintenance at this level will be job or production line operations as appropriate, and will be performed by modular units composed of commodity-oriented platoons. These units will be able to organize teams to perform an area support role.

- *Depot.* Maintenance at this level will support the supply system. It will be production-line oriented, and will be performed by select commodity-oriented units, special repair activities, AMC depots, and contractor personnel.

The structure described above does not represent revolutionary change but rather a natural evolution based upon past studies and experiences in both peace and war. The structure will support both conventional and unconventional warfare on any continent, in multiple scenarios, with both Active Army and Reserve Component participation. The desirability of this approach has been proven by its application to the aviation and strategic communication commodities as well as select Communications/Electronics (COMMEL) and missile equipment. The tri-level maintenance structure recognizes that all equipment does not need all the levels all of the time. Use of two or even one level is permitted, indeed encouraged, if it will provide the necessary support at the best life cycle cost. The geographic positioning of units in the theater can also be altered to meet operational needs.

The maintenance allocation chart (MAC) remains the primary tool for assigning tasks. Equipment design will support our maintenance priorities which are: first, discard; second, repair forward; and third, evacuate. This will allow greater use of Built-In Test/Built-In Test Equipment (BIT/BITE), modularity, and discard of components and selected small end items to provide improved forward maintenance to the user.

Other major policies (principles) are:

- maintenance is a command responsibility;
- unserviceable materiel that cannot be repaired because of the authorized level of repair assigned is to be promptly evacuated and a replacement item issued; and
- unserviceable materiel being evacuated should have the same movement priority as serviceable materiel.

Vertical maintenance management in the Army is functionalized with a commodity/weapons systems-oriented structure. It provides a direct link from HQDA to the ultimate user through the commodity management chain. Wholesale support responsibility is centralized at AMC. Vertical management techniques

are used to obtain cost-effective operation and responsive improvements. The Army approach to vertical management relies on standardization of management systems, improvement of asset reporting and control for better asset knowledge and visibility, and streamlining of the Army logistics support structure to conserve resources.

Maintenance management within the Army is organized by commodity groups; e.g., missiles or aircraft. Within commodity groups, management effort is predicated upon cost and item essentiality. High cost and high demand results in a greater degree of management, although management by exception is made when deviations from normal occur.

Currently, the Army's key maintenance management thrusts are to:

- assure that logistics policies and doctrine support warfighting doctrine;
- execute the Maintenance Management Improvement Program (MMIP) to correct maintenance problems;
- implement an improved concept for Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) calibration and repair;
- develop and improve maintenance float policies and procedures;
- improve retail/wholesale maintenance support of repairable secondary items;
- improve wholesale maintenance management;
- modernize the Army's worldwide maintenance facilities;
- develop and implement the Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS); and
- establish vertical maintenance management as Army policy.

Transportation. The primary DCSLOG transportation functions are strategic movement and mobility, ship modernization, transportation force structure development, transportation programs, and internal distribution systems.

Management of the transportation program centers upon the maintenance of a wartime capability in a peacetime environment to ensure strategic mobility and a continuous movement of supplies to deployed forces.

Strategic mobility is defined as the capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. The DOD concept for strategic mobility includes airlift, sealift, and overseas prepositioning of materiel.

The Director of Transportation, Energy and Troop Support, ODCSLOG, is the Army member of the Joint Transportation Board (JTB). The JTB is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the effective employment of common-user transportation resources assigned or available to DOD. The JTB continuously monitors the existing and forecast balance between requirements and capabilities in the air, sea, and surface modes.

The development of containerized shipping techniques permits the rapid surface movement of materiel. The Direct Support System (DSS), a standard system, is designed to take advantage of this capability and to deliver materiel directly to the user. Although airlift capabilities have increased, the Army still relies on surface movement for the bulk of its cargo.

The Air Line of Communications (ALOC) concept provides for the rapid movement of Army repair parts by air and is designed to capitalize on technological advances in communications and transportation systems permitting rapid movement of materiel. This concept is designed to conserve resources, reduce inventories, improve management, and increase responsiveness. The U.S. Army Logistics Control Activity, Presidio of San Francisco, is the Army airlift clearance authority, with responsibility for validating and controlling the flow of Army air eligible cargo into the airlift system.

Energy Management. Staff responsibility for Army energy management resides with the DCSLOG. The Army Energy Office (AEO) in the Directorate for Transportation, Energy and Troop Support, supported by the U.S. Army Logistics Evaluation Agency (LEA), is charged with overall responsibility for supervising and coordinating the Army Energy Program. Assisting the DCSLOG in his energy responsibility is the Army Advisory Group on Energy composed of general officers or civilian equivalent representatives from the Army Staff agencies. The Secretary of the Army has appointed a Special Assistant for Energy on his staff to represent him on energy matters. The Special Assistant is the Deputy for Logistics in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics) (ASA(I&L)).

The cost of energy makes energy management one of the foremost challenges for commanders and staff personnel at all levels. In order to meet this challenge effectively, the AEO manages a comprehensive energy program which addresses both facilities and mobility energy usage. The program is implemented by the Army Energy Plan which provides the necessary direction and guidance to meet National, DOD, and Army goals and objectives through the year 2000. The purpose of the Army Energy Plan is to ensure that the Army maintains a high state of readiness in an uncertain energy environment. The plan anticipates the energy future and is designed to incorporate newly developed technologies into the program.

Because facilities energy use represents more than 80 percent of total Army consumption, projects related to reducing energy consumption comprise a significant portion of the program dollars. In order to insure the most efficient expenditure of these dollars, the AEO works in close coordination with the Office of the Chief of Engineers which publishes the Army Facilities Energy Plan. This plan provides the methodology and specific information required by MACOM's and installations to develop comprehensive and consistent programs.

Given the total Army energy goals, MACOM's are to set their individual goals within that framework. The recommended MACOM goals are based on past performance and the ability of the MACOM to reduce energy consumption while maintaining the requisite state of readiness.

Mission, Organization, and Functions of the Army Materiel Command (AMC).

Mission. AMC is the principal Army wholesale logistics command. AMC is responsible for: research; development; configuration management; product assurance; test and evaluation (except user test and evaluation); scientific and technical information; integrated logistics support planning and execution; rationalization; standardization; and interoperability; acquisition; product improvement; industrial preparedness; production; new materiel training and fielding; distribution; security assistance and other international programs; wholesale materiel requirements determination; maintenance; packaging; storage; and disposal of all materiel systems as assigned for the U.S. Army and DOD agencies. AMC's mission can be summarized this way: first, the acquisition of materiel; and second, the responsibility for supporting the readiness of that materiel while in the user's hands.

Organizations. The present AMC organization includes ten major subordinate commands (MSC's) and twenty-nine separate reporting activities (SRA's). The MSC's include the U.S. Army Laboratory Command, primarily concerned with research and development

missions; the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, primarily supporting developmental missions; the U.S. Army Depot System Command, primarily supporting readiness missions; the U.S. Army Security Affairs Command, primarily concerned with security assistance and other international programs; and the six remaining MSC's who are commodity oriented and perform life-cycle management over the accomplishment of research, development, engineering, initial and follow-on procurement, and materiel readiness functions for items and weapon systems in support of the Army in the field.

The AMC Commander has three principal assistants: the Deputy Commander for Research, Development, and Acquisition, the Deputy Commander for Materiel Readiness, and the Deputy for Management and Analysis. Figure 18-2 shows the major elements of AMC.

— Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM), with headquarters at Rock Island, Illinois, performs research, development, engineering, procurement, and materiel readiness functions for: conventional and nuclear weapons; ammunition (artillery, infantry, gun-type air defense and surface vehicle, and aircraft mounted); fire control systems; chemical warfare and chemical biological defensive systems/materiel; Ammunition Peculiar Equipment (APE); and tools and maintenance equipment. AMCCOM is also the single manager for the




FIGURE 18-2

procurement, production, storage, supply, maintenance, and transportation of conventional ammunition for the Department of Defense. The AMCCOM includes the headquarters, two research and development centers, three project managers, four arsenals, 28 ammunition plants and activities, the Defense Ammunition Center and School, and various other field and support activities. The two research and development centers (chemical and armament) are located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Dover, New Jersey, respectively. The AMCCOM Research and Development centers are responsible for research, design, development, and life cycle engineering for assigned materiel.

— Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM), with headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, is responsible for: Army aviation systems, subsystems, and equipment; avionics; aircraft survivability; and aviation life support equipment research, development, and/or systems integration. Assigned materiel includes: fixed wing, rotary wing, vertical/short takeoff and ground support, survivability and aviation life support equipment; training devices; external stores racks; and aircraft systems related test, measurement, diagnostic, and automatic test equipment.

— Troop Support Command (TROSCOM), with headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, is responsible for marine, amphibious, and rail equipment; engine generators; camouflage and deception equipment; barrier equipment; bridging and stream crossing equipment; industrial engines; intrusion detection and physical security equipment; environmental control equipment; utilities and field support equipment; textiles, clothing, body armor, and footwear; and aerial delivery equipment.

— Communications/Electronics Command (CECOM), with headquarters at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, is responsible for items associated with communications, avionics, radar, radiac, automatic data processing, meteorology, night vision, combat surveillance, target acquisition, air traffic management, navigation, electronic warfare, and Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE).

— Tank Automotive Command (TACOM), with headquarters at Warren, Michigan, is responsible for research, development, and materiel readiness for wheeled and tracked vehicles and construction equipment.

— Missile Command (MICOM), with headquarters at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is responsible for research, development, and materiel readiness for Army missile systems.

— Depot System Command (DESCOM), with headquarters at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, is

responsible for command, control, and central workloading of the 19 Army depots/depot activities (remote storage activities with reduced missions assigned to one of the depots) worldwide. These depots are divided into the following categories:

- Area-Oriented Distribution (AOD) Depots;
- Ammunition/Special Weapons Depots; and
- Maintenance Depots.

A single depot may have one or more of these missions. The AOD depots receive, store, and distribute secondary items (about 90% of which are repair parts) for Army units and other customers within their assigned geographical support area. In addition to items managed by the commodity-oriented MSC's, the AOD depots also store common-user DLA and GSA items. Major end items may also be stored at AOD depots, but, in actual practice, they are generally stored at the maintenance depots responsible for overhauling them. The materiel at the AOD depots should accommodate 85% of the demands placed on the distribution system for customers located in their support areas.

Ammunition/Special Weapons Depots receive, store, renovate, issue, and demilitarize munitions of all types.

Maintenance Depots overhaul major items and repairable components on an assembly line basis and, as necessary, they can do limited fabrication and manufacturing. Overhauled assets are stored at the maintenance depots until the National Inventory Control Point (NICP), at the appropriate commodity-oriented MSC, furnishes disposition instructions.

— Laboratory Command (LABCOM), with headquarters at Adelphi, Maryland, is responsible for the management of the AMC technology base to ensure responsiveness to present and future Army materiel needs and to manage the AMC corporate laboratories.

— Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), with headquarters at Aberdeen, Maryland, is responsible for the testing of all weapon systems and developmental items in the AMC inventory.

— Security Affairs Command (USASAC), with headquarters collocated with AMC headquarters, performs AMC's role as the Army's executive agent for security assistance. As such, USASAC is responsible for the execution of the Army's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, exercising direction over the International Logistics Directorates at the AMC commodity MSC's. USASAC also manages the Army's participation in international programs concerning cooperative research and development, coproduction and other industrial cooperative efforts. Thus, USASAC serves as the single focal point for interface of U.S. Army security affairs activities with U.S. and foreign industry, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign governments.

Functions. AMC functions include development of equipment, wholesale maintenance and supply, and operation of wholesale depots. AMC also provides management of operational policies, programs, objectives, and resources associated with its worldwide Logistics Assistance Program. An overview of these functions follows. Emphasis is placed on wholesale supply since this function has great impact on the units and activities supported by AMC.

National Maintenance Point Functions. The maintenance functions of the Commodity Commands are accomplished by a National Maintenance Point (NMP). Each Commodity Command has a NMP for maintenance management of those items in its commodity grouping. The functions of the NMP are:

- technical control of depot overhaul and repair programs;
- configuration management including equipment configuration baseline (specifications), management of techniques for changing the baseline (engineering change proposals), and configuration status reporting (modifications applied);
- development of maintenance publications such as technical manuals, modification work orders, technical bulletins, maintenance digests, etc;
- determination of repair parts to be provisioned as items are initially issued to troop units;
- evaluation of equipment improvement recommendations; and
- new equipment training.

National Inventory Control Point Functions. The supply functions of the Commodity Commands are accomplished by a National Inventory Control Point (NICP). Each Commodity Command has an NICP to manage those items in a commodity grouping. The functions of the NICP are:

- cataloging direction;
- requirements computation;
- procurement direction;
- distribution management;
- establish overhaul/rebuild direction; and
- materiel disposal direction.

An explanation of these functions will provide a better understanding of AMC's supply responsibility. The procedures that follow are applicable to most items. You should be aware that procedures used for the management of specialized commodities like ammunition are similar, but not identical. Because of their use or unique characteristics, other management procedures may be used instead of, or in addition to, those described here.

Cataloging Direction. Within disciplines established by the Federal Catalog System (a Defense Logistics

Agency (DLA) administered system), this process develops a Federal Item Identification to describe an item-of-supply and acquires a National Stock Number (NSN) to establish and fix the unique identity of the item.

The NSN is a 13-digit number used in all materiel management functions. The first four digits are the Federal Supply Classification Class (FSC) Code. The FSC relates like items of supply and, conversely, separates unlike items of supply. For example, in the FSC 5305, the 53 indicates that the item falls within the group "Hardware and Abrasives," and the 05 indicates that the item falls within the class of screws. The last nine digits of the NSN are called the National Item Identification Number (NIIN). Each NIIN is permanently assigned to only one item-of-supply and remains with the item as long as it is used in the government supply system. The first two digits of the NIIN also identify the country of origin; 00 and 01 indicate the United States.

The AMC Catalog Data Activity maintains a consolidated Army Master Data File of all National Stock Numbers the Army uses or manages. This file contains coded item management data, nomenclature, packaging, freight classification information, interchangeable/substitute data, component references, and historical records on stock numbers. This information is disseminated throughout the Army with changes made monthly.

Requirements Computation. In computing requirements, materiel is separated into major and secondary items. A major item is a final combination of parts and/or materials ready for its intended use and of such importance that it is subject to continuing, centralized, individual item authorization and management throughout all command and support echelons. For major items, the Army Materiel Plan (AMP) process is used to compare the total requirements needed by the force structure and the Army's on-hand inventory, both in storage and in the hands of troops, to determine the shortage or net requirements (also considering due-in assets and projected losses). The resulting procurement program is developed on a commodity approach and reflects the various line items of equipment that are to be purchased. The basic source calculations identifying overall procurement requirements are derived from the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) concept.

The AAO is the quantity of an item of equipment or ammunition required to equip the approved U.S. Army force and sustain that force, together with specified allies, in wartime from D-Day through the period prescribed in the latest OSD Defense Guidance. The AAO is made up of several components as shown in Figure 18-3. On the left side of the figure are the components that contribute to computing the AAO for any particular item of equipment. Where the Army

stands in relation to achievement of the AAO is illustrated on the right side of the figure. Adjustment of asset data to accommodate projected losses, followed by a comparison to the AAO, defines the quantity that remains to be procured.

ARMY ACQUISITION OBJECTIVE (HARDWARE)




FIGURE 18-3

- Initial Issue Quantity (IIQ) is derived from the Logistic Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS) and is computed based on the Master(M) Force of the Force Accounting System (FAS), as developed through the Total Army Analysis (TAA) and MACOM command plans (see Chapter 11). It contains all of the TOE/MTOE/TDA requirements for each item as modified by Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP) and as adjusted by ODCSOPS using the Short Hand Note (SHN) procedure. The IIQ is a tabulation of all of the TOE/TDA requirements for that item in the Army's force structure.

- Maintenance float—the maintenance system requires that additional equipment be available for issue while repair and maintenance on unit equipment is being performed. Two types of floats are included in this component of the gross requirement—Operational Readiness Float (ORF) for unit and intermediate levels and Repair Cycle Float (RCF) for depot maintenance.

- Operational projects—the Force has contingency missions other than the general wartime scenarios provided in the OSD guidance. Equipment stocks to support these missions are approved at Department of Army (DA) and become a specific component of the total requirement.

- Post D-day consumption—this component of the gross requirement is normally the second largest and defines the unadjusted amount of war reserve stocks necessary for execution of the OSD wartime scenarios. This requirement is arrived at by use of a computer model that deploys forces on a time-phased deployment schedule, utilizing a specified scenario length and applying predetermined inter-theater and intra-theater attrition factors. If the OSD scenarios involve allied

forces that the Army must be prepared to support, their estimated losses are computed and included in this component of the gross requirement. It should be noted that post D + 30 consumption is reduced by an amount equal to IIQ left behind by units that deploy overseas and draw POMCUS stocks.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition ASA(RDA) is responsible for the system used to calculate AAO's, the administration associated with the process, and follow-on acquisition guidance to the field. However, the ASA(RDA) must rely on other agencies for the majority of data used in the AAO calculation process. The computer program to support the AAO calculation process is designed and maintained for the ASA(RDA) by the Research, Development, and Acquisition Information Systems Agency (RDAISA).

The ASA(RDA) is also the proponent for the Standard Study Numbering (SSN) system which groups similar items into levels of aggregation (e.g., 5 ton trucks, all body types) suitable for DA Staff analysis of requirements and formulation of program/budget requests. The SSN system enables ASA(RDA) to generate IIQ requirements for components of major equipment assemblies which are major items in their own right (e.g., radios). The SSN system is actually maintained and operated by Headquarters, U.S. Army Depot System Command (DESCOM).

When ASA(RDA) has completed computation of the Army's equipment and ammunition AAO's, the data, together with time schedules and guidance, are provided to AMC to analyze the requirements and develop a recommended Army Materiel Plan (AMP). Careful attention is paid to factors such as:

- fiscal guidance;
- DA, OSD, OMB, Congressional Decisions;
- user (ODCSOPS, TRADOC) priorities;
- current asset positions/projected loss data including Foreign Military Sales (FMS);
- product improvement programs;
- secondary item requirements (those procured within procurement appropriations—engines, transmissions, etc.);
- production base status and capabilities; and
- interface of modernization programs (new products) with current procurement programs.

Development of the AMP requires attention to these and other factors while attempting to achieve the AAO's in a balanced and progressive manner that will enhance Army readiness at the end of each Funded Delivery Period (FDP). The AMP is reviewed and adjusted by the Army Staff in terms of overall Army requirements and changed to accommodate new guidance and/or priorities and to assure the materiel program is fully integrated into, and supported by, other appropriations. Articulation of Army requirements and recommended procurement programs

and budget are the responsibility of the ASA(RDA) in coordination with the DCSOPS and DCSLOG.

The AAO is, in the final analysis, the Army's stated requirement for an item of materiel and is used to justify budgets and programs submitted to OSD/OMB and Congress in order to obtain funding. The component parts of the AAO computation system are clearly definable and aid in the explanation of the total requirement. Tentative conclusions can be drawn about Army readiness by comparing current asset data to the AAO. AAO data are used repeatedly by the leadership of the Army in explaining the Army's need for procurement funds.

Responsibility for maintaining the reporting system and the data base from which the AMP is developed rests with the Headquarters, U.S. Army Depot System Command.

There are about 307,700 secondary items, about 90% of which have an annual demand value of \$5,000 or less. Because of the large number and dollar value, it is not feasible to manage each item separately using the IIQ, AAO, AMP concept. Secondary items are classified in four categories for application of varying degrees of management. These categories are based on the annual dollar value of demands, not the unit cost of the item. The higher the dollar value, the greater the management application. These categories are:

- low dollar value (up to \$25,000);
- medium dollar value (up to \$100,000);
- high dollar value (up to \$1,000,000); and
- very high dollar value (over \$1,000,000).

Computers are used extensively to assist in the management of these items. At least monthly, each item is reviewed to determine if the item's inventory has reached either a reorder point or a maximum retention level. As the reorder point is reached, the computer produces a supply control study which recomputes recommended stockage levels. Based upon controls set in the computer, these new levels may be automatically accepted or reviewed by the item manager and modified. When an item becomes critical, either in short supply or affecting mission-essential end items, management is modified. This takes the form of moving the item from the low dollar value category to medium or high dollar so that it receives more frequent and thorough analysis or direct management by the item manager.

The key to requirements computation is a good knowledge of future needs. For secondary items, there are two methods used to estimate future requirements. The first is to project historical trends into the future. Past demands are recorded automatically by the computer and are projected into the future by a variety of mathematical means. The second method, while preferred, is more difficult. This method uses planned activities of the supported forces and their equipment; e.g., major exercises, changes in end item density, and applied consumption and failure rates to project future

needs. Normally the first method is used and program change factors are applied to combine human judgment with historical trends. The computer constantly measures trends and alerts the item manager to trend changes. Once future requirements are determined, the next step is to obtain the required items.

Procurement Direction. Much of the administrative burden of initiating a purchase request is done by computer. As a by-product of the supply control study, the computer provides a Procurement Work Directive (PWD) containing available technical specification data needed for the pre-award phase of a procurement contract. Depending upon a variety of factors including the dollar value of the procurement, this request may be reviewed by the item manager or it may be forwarded for procurement without review. Secondary items are procured on an economic order quantity basis. Typically, secondary items are procured in quantities ranging from three month's to five year's supply depending on the cost to buy versus the cost to hold the item in storage. When procurement is solicited, the prospective contractors are told where the item is to be delivered. This decision is made based on transportation costs, storage requirements, and the geographical location of the ultimate user.

Distribution Management of Major Items. Distribution Management is primarily a three-fold process: accounting for existing assets through the Continuing Balance System—Expanded (CBS-X), projecting the distribution of equipment against planned force structure utilizing the Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP), and executing the equipment distribution program through the use of the Requisition Validation Report (REQVAL) and the Equipment Release Priority System (ERPS).

- **Accounting for Assets.** CBS-X is a transaction accounting system operated and maintained by HQ DESCOM that provides worldwide asset visibility for the Army's reportable items. It covers approximately 14,500 National Stock Numbers which are primarily major end items, but also includes other selected items (medical and secondary) on which worldwide visibility is required. CBS-X is updated monthly to reflect on-hand assets in units, storage, and in transit. The system is reconciled with property books and stock record accounts at least annually. CBS-X data is used by MACOM's, AMC, and HQDA to assess the overall preparedness of the force, as the source for on-hand asset data in the Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP) and, when merged with unit equipment authorization data, the determinant in honoring requisitions.

- **Projecting Equipment Distribution.** TAEDP is a program which compares force requirements and priorities against on-hand assets and projected deliveries

to produce an equipment distribution program for the current, budget, and program years. The data source for requirements is the LOGSACS which merges near-term authorizations from The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) with planned force structure as depicted in the Force Accounting System (FAS). Requirements are prioritized by ODCSOPS through the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) in conjunction with Equipment Readiness Codes (ERC) as stated in TOE's. Current assets as reported in CBS-X are used as the base-line from which projected distribution of deliveries begins. Deliveries consist of new procurement, depot maintenance returns, and redistribution of displaced systems or assets generated through force structure changes. Figure 18-4 depicts the merging of the inputs in order to create the projected distribution plan.




FIGURE 18-4

The distribution is generally accomplished in ERC-A/DAMPL sequence which maximizes our distribution to readiness policy. TAEDP can, and does, reflect directed priorities, like Light Infantry Divisions, as determined by ODCSOPS. TAEDP projects distribution to all claimants including TOE, TDA, POMCUS, Operational Projects (OP PROJECTS), Operational Readiness Flow (ORF), War Reserves, etc. The TAEDP is normally processed to align with the PPBS process.

- *Executing the Distribution Plan.* The REQVAL and ERPS reports are used to validate requisitions and release equipment. The REQVAL matches current equipment authorizations as stated in TAADS against assets reported in CBS-X in order to validate requisitions (See Figure 18-5).

ERPS takes the process one step further and overlays out-of-DAMPL or special initiative priorities in conjunction with the ERC-A/DAMPL priority as reflected in the planning system (TAEDP). ERPS tells the NICP item manager which units are to receive equipment and in what order (See Figure 18-6).

EXECUTING DISTRIBUTION

REQUISITION VALIDATION (REQVAL)




FIGURE 18-5

EXECUTING DISTRIBUTION

EQUIPMENT RELEASE PRIORITY SYSTEM (ERPS)




FIGURE 18-6

The management of equipment distribution is a complicated process primarily used for allocating equipment, analyzing force capability, programming, budgeting, and as the link to correctly "growing" Army documentation.

Overhaul Direction. Overhaul of existing unserviceable stocks is the most economical method of supplying equipment to the field. In computing requirements for overhaul of major items, the NICP, in coordination with the NMP, considers those unserviceable items that are available for overhaul and required for issue. In forecasting overhaul requirements, consideration is given to unserviceable, economically repairable equipment that has been turned in and is on hand at the depots, and to equipment that is expected to become unserviceable based on engineering factors such as operating or flying hours constraints or shelf life limitations. The quantity that can be scheduled and accomplished is determined considering the

availability of repairable items and repair parts, capability of the maintenance depots and contractors, funding guidance for that category of equipment, and priority of the items.

Materiel Disposal Direction. Ideally, each item has a computed retention level which is the total quantity that is authorized to be held in stock. The retention level includes war reserves, quantities to support on-going operations, and safety levels. Any stock over the sum of these quantities is Army excess. Such excesses occur as a result of demand forecasts that do not fully materialize and equipment obsolescence. Prior to identifying an item as excess, efforts are made to fill all possible needs. For example, assemblies may be disassembled to generate repair parts that are in short supply or excesses may be provided to a contractor as government-furnished equipment, e.g., excess engines to be installed in vehicles being procured.

The actual physical disposal of property is handled for the military services by the Defense Logistics Agency through their Defense Property Disposal Offices (DPDO). Items that are worn to the point that their repair would be uneconomical, items damaged beyond repair, and excess serviceable items are turned over to DPDO. The DLA screens other military and government agencies to include Security Assistance requirements prior to offering serviceable items for bid by prospective commercial civilian purchasers. Prior to a serviceable item being turned in to DPDO, the same intensive screening must occur.

Depot Operations. The NICP determines the inventory quantity, procures items, and distributes them among depots. The NICP also orders the shipment of supplies in response to requisitions received from customers. Depots support the NICP's by responding to their direction. Distribution depot operations include receiving, storing, and shipping.

As shipments arrive at the depot, they are inventoried and placed in storage. The storage location is recorded and the receipt is reported to the NICP. The depot inspects, maintains and preserves items in storage to prevent deterioration. The Army program to preserve items in storage and to prevent deterioration is commonly referred to as Care Of Supplies In Storage (COSIS). Items in storage are inventoried based on two primary criteria. The first is the order of merit list. This is a computerized process which lists items according to the frequency of demand during the fiscal year. Those items with the highest frequency of demand are inventoried first because the probability of error in records increases in direct proportion to the activity on the item. The second method is based on mismatches in comparison of NICP and depot records. This comparison is performed twice a year. If the two records do not quantitatively agree, the item is inventoried.

When a Materiel Release Order (MRO) is received from the NICP, the depot determines the storage location, picks the item from storage, consolidates

supplies by requisitioner, and packs and ships them by the mode of transportation that will meet the required delivery date and the requisition priority time frame.

AMC has designated three supply depots as Area-Oriented Distribution (AOD) Depots:

- New Cumberland Army Depot, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for support of the eastern United States, Europe, Central and South America;

- Sharpe Army Depot, near Stockton, California, for support of the western United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific;

- Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas, for support of the central United States.

Maintenance depots execute the overhaul/rebuild program developed by the NICP and NMP. When the overhaul program is finalized, the NMP transmits it to DESCOM which is responsible for workloading each depot to include the allocation of funds. DESCOM advises each depot of the items and quantities that it will overhaul during the fiscal year. Overhaul is normally accomplished on an assembly line basis. Rebuilt items are issued or placed in depot stock as directed by the NICP.

The commodity-oriented AMC Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) maintain a large number of field maintenance technicians and other personnel to assure the continued serviceability of equipment in the hands of the troops. As directed by the MSC, DESCOM maintenance depots supplement these efforts by providing technical assistance and training. To facilitate provision of this assistance, 24-hour maintenance "hotlines" have been set up at all maintenance depots. In addition, the three Area Oriented Distribution Depots are responsible for advising and assisting units on storage and materiel processing procedures.

To insure that new equipment is properly supported and turned over to the user, AMC initiates a tailored Materiel Fielding Plan (MFP) with one or more Major Army Commands for each new item of equipment to be fielded. The MFP contains the plans, schedules, procedures, and command actions necessary to successfully deprocess, deploy, and sustain the new equipment. The Total Package/Unit Materiel Fielding (TP/UMF) concept, when utilized, is to be covered in the MFP.

The TP/UMF method provides gaining commands significant relief from much of the initial burden associated with force modernization fielding. Under the total package concept, AMC fielding commands provide the user with AMC-prepared, free-issue materiel packages.

STANDARD SYSTEMS

Defense Standard Systems.

There are a number of defense standard systems necessitated by the ever-increasing language of codes

and formats readable by the computer, the supporting communications equipment and the human operator. Items requisitioned by a single Army unit may be supplied by GSA, DLA, the Commodity Commands of AMC or any of the other military departments, thus the need for standard codes and formats. DLA has been assigned the responsibility for administering the 10 DOD Standard Systems generally referred to as the Military Standard Logistics System (MILS).

Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP). These procedures prescribe the uniform code and data elements to be used in requisitioning and issuing supplies. Within the Department of Defense, a single line item requisition is used. Each requisition is for one specific item. The form and format are fixed, but some of the data elements may be manipulated and other data elements added to produce a variety of documents essential to supply operations. Common documents thus produced are requisitions, cancellations, supply status, shipment status, follow-up answers, materiel release orders, confirmations, and denials. Much of the information contained in these documents is the same. For example, each document contains the National Stock Number, quantity, requisitioner, priority, funding data, etc. These procedures permit the requisitioner to say what he wants, and provides the supply system with the necessary documents for processing the request.

Uniform Movement and Materiel Issue Priority System (UMMIPS). In the issue and movement of supplies, it is necessary to determine the relative importance of competing requisitions. Two factors play a part in determining the priority: the Force Activity Designator and the Urgency of Need. Each unit in the Army is assigned a Force Activity Designator based upon its relative position on the Department of the Army Master Priority List and its present deployment, i.e., positioned for combat, in combat, in support of troops in combat, etc. The Urgency of Need refers to the unit's need for the particular item being requisitioned, i.e., a repair part to get equipment off deadline, stock replenishment, etc. The application of these two factors produces a total of 15 priorities. UMMIPS establishes time standards based on priority. From requisition to receipt, the standards are:

Requisitioning Unit Location

Priority	United States	Overseas
01-03	7 days	11-12 days
04-08	11 days	15-16 days
09-15	28 days	67-82 days

These time standards are further subdivided for each activity involved in the supply and movement of materiel, i.e, NICP, depot, transportation agencies, etc.

Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP). This system is designed to manage, control, and document materiel (including personal property, exchange, and commissary) moving in the Defense Transportation System and clearly define the responsibilities of shipping, clearance, terminal, and receiving activities. MILSTAMP is structured to interface directly with MILSTRIP and to support the movement criteria prescribed by UMMIPS. It functions through a discipline of uniform documentation procedures, formats, data elements and codes, and data transmission time standards. It also supports the performance assessment requirements of MILSTEP through in-transit data collection and the inventory visibility requirements of the Services and agencies.

Military Supply and Transportation Evaluation Procedures (MILSTEP). The basic tools for evaluating the wholesale system are the MILSTEP reports. This system of reporting uses the uniform data elements produced by MILSTRIP and MILSTAMP as a data base to produce the various MILSTEP supply and transportation reports. To produce these reports, a reduced version of the computer history file for each Commodity Command is extracted onto tape and forwarded to the Logistics System Support Activity (LSSA). These tapes, along with in-transit data tapes from the Central Data Collection Point at Defense Depot, Tracy, California, are used by LSSA to produce a series of monthly supply and transportation pipeline reports using UMMIPS standards which indicate where delays in the pipeline are occurring. The supply effectiveness reports display such things as: the percentages of requisitions on which stock was available; the number and age of back ordered requisitions; and the number of stock numbers causing back orders. Using this same data base, other reports are generated to evaluate depots, NICP's, and AMC's overall performance in key functional areas.

Department of the Army Standard Systems.

Just as it is necessary for Department of Defense to establish military standard systems to be used by all of the military departments, the Army establishes standard systems for use by its various elements.

The overall concept for Standard Army Logistics Systems (SALS) embodies standard systems in every functional area. Many systems that will be included under the SALS concept are currently being developed and tested. There are two standard systems developed and used by AMC that are a part of SALS. They are the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS), which is used to support the NICP's, and the Standard Depot System (SDS) used to support depot operations.

Direct Support System (DSS). AMC serves as executive agent for the Direct Support System (DSS). The Air Line of Communication (ALOC) is a refinement of DSS and is used to airlift selected repair parts to designated overseas units. DSS was developed with the following objectives:

- reduce intermediate stock levels overseas and at CONUS installations;
- reduce the value of stock in the pipeline;
- maintain or improve supply responsiveness and expend fewer resources through use of improved computer, communications and container technology;
- change existing procedures as little as possible;
- maintain readiness.

DSS-ALOC provides for direct supply of materiel from the wholesale distribution depot to the DSU, bypassing overseas general support and break-bulk points and CONUS installation supply activities. The DSU requisition is passed to the wholesale supplier through the intermediate level and the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS).

DAAS is a worldwide computerized activity that acts as a message center. It automatically routes supply documents between requisitioners and the various supply activities. This routing is done on a near real-time basis and rarely is a supply document delayed more than a few minutes. The requisition is routed to the NICP who orders the appropriate distribution depot to ship the item. The distribution depot moves the item to the Consolidation/Containerization Point (CCP), located at the distribution depot, for consolidation with other supplies destined for the same DSU. Depending on volume, consolidation point personnel load a container for one unit or a number of units situated in the same geographical area. The container is loaded for ease of unloading and once closed at the CCP is not opened until it arrives at its destination. If all supplies in the container are for one DSU, the destination is that DSU. If the supplies are for multiple DSU's, the destination is a drop point (a designated unit) within the geographical area and the other units come to this point and pick up their supplies.

Continuing Balance System—Expanded (CBS-X).

The CBS-X is the official Army asset position for selected Army equipment. The objective is to provide accurate, timely, and auditable worldwide asset positions at property book level for major end items of equipment and furnish the Army with an official inventory figure for equipment procurement and distribution decisions.

Logistics Intelligence File (LIF). The LIF, maintained by the Logistics Control Activity (LCA) at the Presidio of San Francisco, is used to monitor the performance of DSS-ALOC. The LIF is the Army's centralized data bank of requisition, supply, and movement information. It provides visibility of individual requisitions and shipments as they move through the logistics pipeline. All Army requisitions placed on the wholesale system (AMC, DLA, GSA, and other military departments) are recorded in the LIF with the exception of:

- bulk petroleum products;
- ammunition; and
- security assistance requirements.

In addition to requisitions, all other supply documentation that flows through the DAAS is routed to the Logistics Control Activity for posting to the LIF. This includes status documents, materiel release orders, confirmations, and back orders, etc. Transportation information is posted to the file. Each month a complete performance evaluation of DSS-ALOC is prepared and distributed worldwide. It contains individual unit activity performance reports as well as summary data for overseas commands, CONUS MACOM's, and selected weapons systems.

FUNDING

The intent of this section is to provide a brief overview of selected funding procedures used within the logistics system. Congressionally-approved funds and the Army budget structure are divided into appropriations which support both the active Army and Reserve Components.

For logistics management purposes, these appropriations can be addressed in two categories: Procurement Appropriations and Operations and Maintenance Appropriations.

Procurement Appropriations are used to buy all major items, other selected end items and depot-level repairable spares. Selected end items with a unit price of \$5,000 or more are purchased with Procurement Appropriations; items with a unit price less than \$5,000 are purchased with the Army Stock Fund. Procurement Appropriations funds are centrally controlled and expended to support the materiel plans of the Army.

The Operations and Maintenance appropriation supports day-to-day operations. It pays for such things as training; repair parts; selected end items with a unit value of less than \$5,000; unit and depot maintenance; and administrative and associated activities. This appropriation is allocated by Department of the Army to Army commands based upon their mission and the importance of that mission to the Army. These funds are referred to as consumer funds. Between consumer funds and the procurement appropriations, the field commander purchases most of his secondary items and has the balance, plus his major items, issued free.

The Army Stock Fund is used to purchase those items from industry that ultimately will be purchased with consumer funds by the field commanders. On a fiscal year basis, the stock fund has a total obligation authority which limits the total amount of supplies and equipment that can be purchased. The purpose of the stock fund is to provide interim financing for all the costs of consumable-type materiel acquired for inventory purposes. The stock fund incorporates the

funding procedures needed to purchase supplies in advance from industry for stockage so that items are available upon requisition. The stock fund is composed of supplies and working capital. It is a revolving fund, buying supplies from commercial sources and selling them to customers.

There are ten divisions of the Army Stock Fund. The wholesale division is the responsibility of AMC. Each Major Army Command is responsible for its retail division. DCSLOG has overall responsibility for the Army Stock Fund.

To illustrate the operation of the stock fund, let us follow the funding of a requisition from an Army unit through the system. The unit, the 1st Infantry Division, submits a requisition to Fort Riley. This requisition contains a fund code which indicates that consumer funds are available to pay for the item requested. When the item is issued, the consumer funds cited are transferred to the Retail Stock Fund Division and the Retail Stock Fund Division reimburses the Wholesale Stock Fund Division.

The Army's major industrial type activities (including depots) operate with a revolving fund—the Army Industrial Fund (AIF)—which is designed to provide a more effective means for controlling the costs of goods and services and a more flexible way of financing and accounting for those costs; to create and recognize contractual relationships between the activity and its customers; to enhance the effective acquisition and use of manpower, materials, and other resources; and to support the performance budgeting concept by facilitating budgeting, reporting, and control of the costs of end products. Simply, this means that the cost of providing a product or service—the cost of materials, production processing, administration, and base operations—is passed on to the service customer in the same way as in private industry. The payments by Army and other DOD customers (and other government agencies and private concerns as authorized) provide the capital to replenish the revolving fund.

The Ammunition Working Capital Fund (AWCF), like the Army Stock Fund (ASF) and the Army Industrial Fund (AIF), is a working capital fund. The operators of the AWCF purchase stocks of ammunition components for eventual assembly into complete rounds. Upon receipt of payments from Service customers, funds are returned to the AWCF to replenish the fund. The AWCF has features of the ASF and the AIF. It relates to the AIF primarily in that it offers a stabilized price to the customer, and to the ASF in that customer ammunition demands are anticipated and aggregated, components are acquired, and ammunition items assembled in advance of required delivery.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The Secretary of State is responsible for the overall supervision and general direction of both economic and military assistance. The Secretary of Defense has responsibility for the determination of military

equipment requirements and assuring compliance with the country-to-country agreements on the use of this equipment. The military departments provide guidance and information for use in those negotiations that will ultimately affect that military department.

Under the Arms Export Control Act, the President publishes a list of those foreign countries eligible to purchase defense articles and services from the United States along with the approval authority for sales to each country, i.e., Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, or Military Departments. Purchase requests from foreign countries are sent to the Military Departments with copies to the Departments of State and Defense. Congress must be notified of any proposed U.S. offer to sell defense articles or services valued at \$50,000,000 or more, design and construction services valued at \$200,000,000 or more or major defense equipment valued at \$14,000,000 or more.

The security assistance responsibilities of the various DA Staff elements are focused on overall program guidance with coordination of the various functional areas a prime responsibility of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for Security Assistance (ADCSLOG-SA). The operational aspects of the Security Assistance Program, including management of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), and the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), are assigned to MACOM's. AMC, as the Army's Executive Agent, is responsible for the operational aspects of approved FMS (except training and design and construction services) and MAP programs. TRADOC manages the operational aspects of FMS training at CONUS/OCOUS schools, and IMET programs.

The ADCSLOG-SA is the Army Staff focal point for security assistance activities. He reports to the Chief of Staff, through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and is responsive to the Army Secretariat and OSD on significant matters pertaining to security assistance. The ADCSLOG-SA is authorized direct access to and interacts with the VCSA, the CSA, and other military departments, agencies, commands, and activities on security assistance matters. As the DA Staff spokesman for Security Assistance, he is responsible for providing policy and guidance to the Army Executive Agent and other agencies/MACOM's for security assistance where required.

AMC is the Army's principal agent for supplying FMS materiel requirements, fulfilling its responsibilities through the U.S. Army Security Affairs Command (USASAC). USASAC, working with other AMC elements, develops the necessary data to consummate sales and supervise their execution. In addition, USASAC serves as the focal point in integrating traditional security assistance sales with other international programs to the reciprocal benefit of both. This responsibility includes overseeing AMC's participation in industrial cooperation programs, the munitions control program and foreign materiel evaluation programs to support Army requirements.

USASAC's involvement in international cooperative research and development activities, standardization programs (RSI) and international staff talks provide an additional baseline of technical data for U.S. and allied forces that enhances the interoperability of military equipment in common areas of military operations.

Another facet of USASAC's Security Assistance responsibilities is coproduction, which encompasses any program which enables an eligible foreign governmental organization, or designated commercial producer to acquire substantial "know-how" to manufacture or assemble, repair, maintain, and operate a specific system or individual military item. The "know-how" furnished by the U.S. is on a reimbursable basis and may include research, development, production data, and/or subassemblies, managerial skills, procurement assistance, or quality control procedures. Coproduction may be limited to the assembly of a few end items with a small input of in-country produced parts, or it may extend to a major manufacturing effort requiring the build-up of capital industries. As in the case of conventional military sales and associated supply support arrangements, the coproduction programs perpetuate utilization of items common to U.S. forces, thereby promoting rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

SUMMARY

This chapter addressed the nature and structure of the Army logistics system. It is a large, complex system that must be properly orchestrated if it is to perform to expectations. The DCSLOG is the conductor, with overall responsibility to assure that the individual pieces fit together and operate in harmony one with the other. To do this, the DCSLOG establishes broad policies and procedures and monitors and guides the development of standard logistics systems for use at all echelons.

The Army's wholesale logistics system is operated by the AMC through its MSC's to fulfill the Army's need for wholesale support. The Army's materiel requirements are divided into commodity groupings with each Commodity Command assigned one or more of these groupings. The Commodity Commands collectively determine the Army's requirement, procure or overhaul necessary assets, position them in the appropriate depots, and issue in response to the Army's needs. Their principal organizational elements for accomplishing these tasks are the NICP's and NMP's.

Because of the complexity of the logistics system and the opportunity presented by computer technology, the Department of Defense has adopted many standard logistics management information systems to provide standard language for use by all military departments. The Army's systems include standard equipment, computer programs and procedures. The extensive use of computers provides an abundance of information which permits evaluation, in varying levels of detail, of the total system or any of its parts. MILSTEP is the DOD system for evaluating the wholesale system. The Army has developed the Logistics Intelligence File to better evaluate the support received by units in the field.

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CHAPTER 19

MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

Scope.

Personnel management is an extremely dynamic arena. We are implementing the Army's Unit Manning System, with its emphasis on unit, not individual replacements, home basing of units, and the designation of parent regiments to which soldiers, NCO's, and officers will belong.

Further, the process of Force Integration with its mandate to provide soldiers with the proper skills and experience to operate the hundreds of new systems coming on board will continue throughout the decade of the 1980's and possibly beyond. Some of the variables that the personnel management system must be capable of dealing with are: the changing needs of the Army; women in the Army; changing demographics; changing attitudes within the market place and within our institutions concerning how best to attract, motivate and retain good soldiers.

With change so pervasive and policies for the future just evolving, no attempt will be made here to examine the issues within the personnel management area. Rather, the focus will be on the system as it is now constituted and its component parts.

While the personnel management system can be directly related to most of the functions described in the Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army, the key functions are *Acquisition*, *Distribution* and the interface with *Training*. (Training is covered in Chapter 21, Army Training.) The focus of this chapter is designed to concentrate on these key areas plus that of Separation.

Definition of Terms.

The following technical terms are used, but not defined elsewhere in this chapter:

Enlisted Master File (EMF). Automated data centrally maintained at MILPERCEN containing information on enlisted personnel.

Officer Master File (OMF). Automated data centrally maintained at MILPERCEN containing information on commissioned and warrant officers.

Living Personnel Management Authorization Document (LPMAD). The Living PMAD utilizes the ODCSOPS DA Master Force and TAADS files to announce the results of force structure changes to authorizations on a monthly basis. In the fast-breaking arena of force modernization, decisions are made on

new authorizations not captured in the semi-annual PERSACS. The LPMAD is the sole source of Active Army authorizations at UIC, MOS Branch and Functional area and grade level of detail for the current, budget and program years. It is used in the personnel community as the basis for determining the Army's accessions, training, force alignment, promotions, and distributions of personnel.

MOS Level System (MOSLS). HQDA decision support system personnel planning optimization model which computes recommended MOS and grade mix for LPMAD target authorization, enlisted accessions, training to support accessions and in-service reclassification/reenlistment, and promotions to maintain force alignment through the POM cycle.

Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS). This automated personnel information system is the Army's primary personnel strength management system. SIDPERS provides commanders with management information reports; performs automated field records maintenance; and provides automated personnel information to the DA Officer Master File (OMF) and Enlisted Master File (EMF). In fulfilling these functions, SIDPERS acts as a decentralized extension of the DA OMF/EMF.

The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP). The manpower program is produced as monthly updates and as decision programs for the POM, OSD Budget, and President's Budget. Its inputs are the latest available strength, gains, and losses. Using a linear program, the AAMMP operates within constraints such as end strength, man years, and recruiting capability to get as close as possible to the force structure allowance and, as such, produces the source document which records and projects: strength of the Army, losses, gains, force structure allowance, training inputs and training base utilization, officer program, cadet program, female program, and the individuals accounts.

Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS). PERSACS is produced semi-annually by ODCSOPS. It contains both current and projected authorizations and is used by ODCSPER as the budget-constrained start point for Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)/Branch and Functional Area and grade authorizations.

The Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT) Process. The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) is an automated information system that provides training management information to HQDA, MACOM, schools, and training centers. The system contains information at the course level of detail on all courses taught by and for the Army. A major product of ATRRS is the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT). The ARPRINT is a mission document that provides officer and enlisted training requirements, objectives, and programs for the Active Army, Army Reserve Components, other U.S. services, and foreign military. Training is planned and executed on a fiscal year basis and the goal is to train sufficient numbers in each MOS/Branch and Functional Area so that the total trained personnel in each MOS/Branch and Functional Area equals the projected authorization as of the end of the fiscal year.

Focus: Manpower vs Personnel Management.

Chapter 11 addresses unit structure and force planning. It describes how the force is sized and configured and how that force is accounted for in the documentation system. This chapter, which should be viewed as an extension of Chapter 11, will focus on how the Army manages manpower and personnel once the force is configured and sized.

Manpower management is the function of determining the requirements for, and allocating the resources of, manpower. It includes the determination of minimum essential requirements, the evaluation of alternative means of providing the resource, and the policies to be followed in utilization of manpower assets. It involves development and evaluation of organizational structure and the review of utilization. It includes Active Army manpower, manpower for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserves, Army civilian manpower assets, and certain contractor assets when a requirement is satisfied by contractual services rather than by Army military or civilian personnel.

Manpower managers focus upon human resource requirements, specifically including the organization structure in which they will be most efficiently and economically used. ("Spaces" or positions as distinguished from "faces" or personnel.) That is, the requirement to fill one or more positions ("spaces") demanding explicit grades and skills to perform specific tasks. Then they focus on determination of which requirements will be supported with authorizations ("spaces") and finally what the personnel demand associated with personnel authorizations will be by grade and skill. Personnel managers, on the other hand, focus on supporting the personnel demands through the acquisition, training and assignment of personnel ("faces") to those positions.

Manpower management and personnel management interface and overlap at many points. The former deals with "spaces" while the latter deals with "faces." Figure 19-1 portrays this interface and overlap.

MANPOWER/PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT




FIGURE 19-1

The Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Secretary of the Army are not directly involved in the management of people. They do, however, establish policies that restrict the availability of the resource or limit the management latitude available to those involved in personnel management. For example, policies which limit Permanent Change of Station (PCS), establish tour lengths, set officer grade limitations, or place a ceiling on the hire of local national personnel, can severely limit the flexibility of the personnel managers. OSD, and to a more limited extent, OMB, are involved in the force structuring process. At the Federal level, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is totally immersed and a driving force in civilian personnel management. The curved line used to portray the degree of involvement is arbitrary. It serves only to illustrate the fact that managers above the DA level are concerned primarily with the management of spaces, while at descending levels below HQDA, they are concerned increasingly with the management of people. Whenever the force structure changes, or TOE/TDA are altered to meet changing missions, ripples are made in personnel management subsystems—in recruiting goals, classification, force alignment, training, distribution, and utilization plans.

Manpower/Personnel Interface.

In managing the interface between Manpower (authorized spaces) and Personnel (on-hand faces) the key measurement used by the personnel manager is called the Operating Strength Deviation (OSD). OSD is a measurement of how much the actual strength (faces) is deviating from the authorized strength (spaces). Throughout a year there can be many causes for these deviations, such as unpredicted changes in retention rates and seasonal surges in acquisitions. Personnel managers must constantly monitor the OSD and adjust personnel policies to insure the Army complies with the Congressional mandate to be at or below the authorized end strength on the last day of each fiscal year.

At any one point in time, the total manpower spaces allocated to the Army are filled by personnel in units and organizations or by personnel who for some reason are not available for unit assignment. The latter are called the "individual accounts" or TTHS (Transients, Trainees, Holding, and Students). The former comprise the spaces left for the manpower planners to allocate in structuring the various units and organizations of the Army and in total are called the Force Structure Allowance (FSA). To the degree that authorizations exceed FSA, a Force Structure Deviation exists. See Figure 19-2.




FIGURE 19-2

The total number of personnel in TTHS will fluctuate considerably throughout the year due to a variety of reasons such as the seasonal increase in trainees and transients in the summer months. Based on past experience and estimates of the effect of policy changes, the number of personnel who will be in the TTHS is fairly predictable. It will normally average about 100,000 +/- 5000.

By knowing the projections of personnel in the TTHS, the manpower planners can then project the FSA and use that to build authorized units. The projections for TTHS and FSA as well as OSD are all contained in the Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP) which is driven by a computer model called ELIM-COMPLIP (Enlisted Loss Inventory Model—Computation of Manpower Program Using Linear Programming).

The number of personnel in the TTHS is often directly attributable to the personnel policies in effect. Professional development decisions, tour length decisions, and training policies are but a few examples of policies which affect the size of TTHS. Since TTHS has a direct affect on the spaces available for FSA, then it can be seen that these same policies have a direct impact on the number of units and organizations which the Army can field. Thus, the personnel manager faces the constant challenge to insure a balance exists between the use of authorized spaces and the acquisition,

training, and distribution of personnel assets to meet the needs of the Army. It must be recognized that the stated personnel need of the Army as expressed in its various organizational documents changes on a daily basis as different units and organizations are activated, deactivated, or changed. However, the process of procuring and/or training/retraining personnel to meet these needs is a much slower process.

Military Force Alignment.

Force alignment is "managing changing faces and spaces" simultaneously at grade level Career Field (CF/MOS)—reshaping a force today which also meets tomorrow's needs. Always changing AAMMP, LPMAD, and budget are intensively managed monthly for the PPBES 5-year cycle (See Chapter 14), ensuring military personnel strength is skill qualified and available for distribution. Force alignment business synchronizes military personnel programs—promotions, recruiting, accession and in-service training, reclassification, and special and incentive discretionary pays. Simultaneously, every effort is made to provide professional career development consistent with Army force manning levels for qualified soldiers. Management forums are the Functional Area Assessment (FAA), Functional Review (FR), Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR), and quarterly Career Management Field (CMF) Reviews. Representation in shaping the officer and enlisted forces involves the entire personnel community in varying degrees of programming and executing. MOSLS is a major planning tool for enlisted force alignment analysis. The goal—achieve LPMAD grade CF/MOS match to operating strength now and projected over the programming years within budget.

THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

Determining Requirements.

Based on input from the LPMAD (authorization by skill and grade), the EMF (skills and grades on hand), and the AAMMP (projected accessions in the aggregate), the MOSLS (Military Occupational Specialty Leveling System) projects the numbers and training requirements for the various MOS. See Figure 19-3.

Enlisted Procurement.

The objective of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is to obtain the quantity and quality of volunteers to meet both Active Army and USAR requirements. Enlistment options provide the vehicle by which Army applicants are attracted. The option packages are variable and contain such incentives for applicants as training guarantees, unit/station of choice assignments, guaranteed periods of stabilization in a specific unit or area, and payment of bonuses for




FIGURE 19-3

enlisting for a particular skill. Additionally, the length of the enlisted period can be varied for certain options and skills.

Quality Constraints. The recruiter is constrained in his efforts by quality standards which must be met. A potential enlistee is categorized as a result of an Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) which has ten aptitude area scores. This test is used also to categorize individuals into mental groups and set enlistment standards. The recruiter is constrained by numerical limits on certain mental groups. However, quality standards can be changed according to Army needs. The Army Non-prior Service (NPS) accession quality program is designed to achieve the maximum number of high school diploma graduates and those in the upper mental categories, with a ceiling established for the lower mental categories.

Management of Recruiting Objectives. The Recruit Quota System (REQUEST) is an enlistment and training space management system designed to support the Army's recruiting mission. The system is a worldwide, real time, interactive system using a worldwide telecommunications network with remote data terminals accessing a common data bank containing the Army's training requirements as determined by the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT). The system provides reservations for enlistment options and management information reports from remote data terminals. REQUEST, designed to enhance the efficiency of Army recruiting, provides the Army with a means of allocating training resources to accessions. Classification during the period of non-mobilization results from a review of the individual's qualifications as evaluated through the Military Entrance Processing

Command's (MEPCOM) mental and physical testing, individual preference, and Army MOS requirements. An automated matching algorithm is designed to align the applicant's aptitudes to the Army's needs. Qualification checks and other features of the system preclude erroneous enlistments into skills for which the applicant is not qualified.

The REQUEST Unit Distribution Program (RUDIST) adds a unit vacancy and distribution guidance file to the REQUEST System. Training spaces for those MOS available under an enlistment option that guarantees a first assignment are allocated to specific units and stations. Allocations of training spaces is based upon projected unit requirements and distribution policies. The REQUEST System is the controlling element for recruiters in translating aggregate recruiting objectives to the MOS needs of the Army.

Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). Once the recruiter has determined the applicant's desire to enlist and his areas of interest, he can administer an Enlistment Screening Test which gives an informal indication of how the applicant might fare on the ASVAB. If the applicant continues his interest, he is then sent to a MEPS for further processing.

The MEPS is a jointly-staffed service facility charged with aptitude testing, medical examination, moral evaluation, physical strength testing (Army and Air Force only), and administrative processing of applicants for the Armed Forces. DA is the DOD Executive Agent for the MEPS. The Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) commands and controls the MEPS.

Warrant Officer Procurement.

In the Active Component warrant officer candidates are procured by two methods— through individual application or through recruitment by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). Individual applications are solicited by publication of an annual circular entitled "Warrant Officer Procurement Program— FY XX". It outlines the Fiscal Year procurement program listing the military occupational specialties (MOS) open for procurement, mandatory and preferred eligibility prerequisites, and gives instructions for processing applications. USAREC uses this circular, along with an internally created lead refinement list, to direct a recruiting effort targeted toward accessing applications, especially for hard-skill MOS in which critical shortages exist or are projected to exist. The procurement effort is guided by an objective force model which will transition procurement, over time, to a steady-state status in which all MOS will be open for appointment on an annual basis.

Applications of all eligible individuals are evaluated by an HQDA selection board, chaired by a member of USAREC. Those recommended by the board will be slated to attend, in a candidate status, the Warrant

Officer Entry Course and the appropriate Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course (WOTTCS) as quotas become available throughout the fiscal year. Appointment as a warrant officer follows successful completion of WOTTCS.

Currently within the Army Reserve, individual applications are solicited by a circular. In the future USAREC will perform a recruiting mission within USAR similar to that being conducted within the active component. The Army National Guard solicits applications through announcement of vacancies and through an internal recruiting effort. The boarding and school-slating procedures within the Reserve Components are similar to that used by the Active Component.

Commissioned Officer Procurement.

The LPMAD is the basis for projecting officer requirements while the ARPRINT projects the FY officer training needs of the Army by career field. This projection is based on an analysis of the current inventory and the known losses as determined by the Military Personnel Center and the Special Branches (Chaplain, Judge Advocate General, and Army Medical Department). The purpose of the officer procurement system is to minimize the difference between the spaces in the force structure and the operating strength by grade and career field. There are some very important constraints associated with the management of the officer end strength. First, DOD, with the consent of Congress, mandates officer strength ceilings. Second, only a certain proportion of the officer corps may be in the grade of major or higher. Third, enough new officers must be brought into the Army each year to insure an adequate number of trained individuals by grade for the future, assuming attrition due to resignations, retirements, or promotion selection rates, etc. There is a definite floor below which a failure to procure enough officers in a given year will result in a future shortage by grade. Enactment in December 1980 of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), effective 15 September 1981, amended Title 10, USC. It raised the authorized strength of Regular Army officers to 63,000.

Once the FY requirements have been determined, ODCSPER informs USMA, OCS, and the special branches (Army Medical Department, Judge Advocate General Corps, and the Chaplain Corps) how many officers they may procure through their individual programs. To supplement the above pre-commissioning programs, a few officers are accessed each year through direct appointments, recalls of reserve officers and the reinstatement of temporary disability retirees. Branching is accomplished via a DA board (Figure 19-4). The military service obligation of USMA graduates is five years while the service obligation of active OCS graduates is three years. ROTC produces commissioned officers for the Active, Reserve and National Guard

OFFICER ACQUISITION




FIGURE 19-4

components. Officers selected for active duty incur a four or three year obligation dependent upon their scholarship or non-scholarship status, respectively.

DISTRIBUTION AND ASSIGNMENT

Enlisted.

Assignment of Newly Trained Personnel. Permanent unit assignments are made based on input to MILPERCEN from basic and advanced training centers via the Automated Control of Trainees System (ACT). If an individual has an enlistment agreement for a unit or an area, he/she is assigned according to the enlistment contract on satisfactorily completing training. If the soldier has no unit/area options, he/she is assigned against requirements in accordance with distribution priorities. In the absence of a requisition, soldiers are assigned in accordance with a distribution plan prepared by MILPERCEN. Assignment instructions are sent directly to losing and gaining commands via AUTODIN and the transaction is posted to the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) and the EMF.

Distribution Planning and Priorities. The basic document which defines priorities for the distribution of enlisted personnel to all units/activities is the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) developed by ODCSOPS. It contains the Personnel Priority Group (PPG) for each activity and serves as the basis for distributing enlisted personnel. The "single statement of authorizations" for the DCSPER community is the Personnel Management Authorizations Document (LPMAD).

Specific Distribution Guidance.

To meet National Security and preeminent Army objectives, forward deployed forces and specific early deploying forces are manned at near steady-state levels, between 98 and 100 percent. Since authorizations vary through the year, these levels are verified monthly and adjustments made. MILPERCEN loads training seats to emphasize fill of MACOM/location options with priority to forward deployed forces, Special Operations, and Airborne training.

Requisitions Versus Assignment Strength. A unit's package or soldier requirements for any given month are conveyed to MILPERCEN by way of requisitions submitted to arrive, in general, 8 to 10 months prior to the month replacements are required. The requisition represents a requirement for a package or soldier of a particular grade possessing a specific qualification for assignment to a particular unit. Requisitions are derived from a unit's evaluation of its current status—authorized strength versus assigned strength and a compilation of its known and projected gains and losses. The resultant vacancies by MOS and grade are the basis for requisitions. Upon receipt of the requisitions at MILPERCEN, the command/installation managers edit the requisitions for errors in format which may preclude their future processing in EDAS, correct the errors, or refer them back to the command/installation for correction.

The second effort of these managers is validation—comparing their own projection of the command/installation MOS status in the requirement month against the submitted requisitions. If an apparent over or under requisitioning exists, the manager attempts to resolve the discrepancy with the command/installation prior to making a decision not to validate the requisition. Discrepancies in the two projections may be caused by a proponent-approved authorization change at the unit level not yet recorded in PERSACS, or by more current authorizations data available to MILPERCEN through the use of the LPMAD which is updated monthly or by more current gain and loss data. The problem is resolved prior to the submission of the validated requisitions for assignment processing in the EDAS.

EDAS is an automated nomination/assignment system which compares the qualitative requirements as recorded on requisitions against a multitude of variables for each soldier recorded on the EMF or for each package capable of being assigned to a unit. The output of EDAS is a nomination listing of optimum matches of qualified and available soldiers or packages against valid requisitions in the system (Figure 19-5). The EDAS has four basic subsystems:

a. Requisitioning subsystem—this subsystem receives requisitions from distribution managers after they have been manually edited and validated. The system subjects those requisitions to an extensive machine edit and prioritization procedure.

b. Parameter Deck, Personnel Assignment Policy Subsystem—this subsystem is the control mechanism for EDAS. It determines the order in which requisitions will be processed, the personnel eligible for reassignment consideration, and their degrees of eligibility as constrained by ODCSPER assignment policies, and finally, how the processing will be done. It uses output from the Unit Identification System (UIS) furnished by ODCSOPS and active MOS listings from MILPERCEN.




FIGURE 19-5

c. Assignment Subsystem—This system is used to assign all enlisted soldiers except those completing Initial Entry Training. It is an automated nomination/assignment procedure that compares the qualitative requirements recorded on requisitions against selected qualification factors for each soldier or package. For individual requisitions, each soldier is compared to each requisition and given a numeric score for every one for which he/she can be nominated. The scores are derived from the comparison described above. Once every soldier's EMF record has been reviewed and awarded points for a qualitative match to each requisition, the system then selects that group of nominations which provides the best overall requisition fill in terms of quantity and quality. The nomination process has three basic goals:

(1) Each valid requisition will have at least one soldier nominated to it, provided sufficient soldiers are available for assignment in the requisitioned MOS and grade.

(2) Requisitions will be filled by relative priority. When a shortage of soldiers exists, the shortage will be shared proportionately by all requisitioning activities according to priority.

(3) A soldier will be nominated to an assignment for which he or she is qualified.

The output of the Assignment Subsystem is a list of "nominees" for requisition fill which is forwarded to individual assignment managers for review. Based on personnel file data available to them, assignment managers either accept or reject. Even though the nominations are matched by a computer, human judgment is used to make the final decision for each

assignment. For package replacements, procedures will include COHORT policies as guidelines.

d. Output Subsystem—this program receives accepted nominations from assignment managers, consummates the assignment, issues assignment instructions to both the losing and gaining commands, and updates the EMF and management reports.

The RETAIN System. RETAIN (Reenlistment, Reclassification and Assignment System) is a real-time automated system that identifies and reserves training spaces or assignment vacancies for potential reenlistees and determines MOS available for soldiers undergoing reclassification based upon the individual's qualification and the needs of the Army. It is also used by all assignment managers within MILPERCEN to process enlisted soldiers for assignments. Soldier's preferences are considered only within the Army's priorities and needs.

Assignment managers at MILPERCEN process EDAS nominations and accomplish other assignment transactions on the system. The distribution managers utilize the system to add, delete, or modify requisitions and/or to delete or defer soldiers on orders. Reenlistment NCO's throughout CONUS, Europe, Hawaii, Alaska, Japan, and Korea utilize the system to process requests for extension over 12 months and reenlistment actions. If the reenlistee is requesting an MOS training space, the RETAIN system accesses the REQUEST system to determine if there are any Active Army inservice quotas available for the school the soldier desires. If the seat is available, it allows the Reenlistment NCO to make a reservation and puts the reenlistee's record on the RETAIN Wait List for an ultimate assignment in the new MOS upon completion of training. One hundred twenty days prior to the start date of the school the assignment manager is required to give the soldier an ultimate assignment. RETAIN is also used to process potential reenlistees for assignments. RETAIN will determine if there are any vacancies available for the installation/overseas area the soldier desires. If a vacancy exists, it will be offered to the soldier. If a vacancy does not exist, the soldier may elect to be put on the RETAIN Wait List.

The RETAIN Wait List is for those soldiers desiring an installation/overseas area which was not available and no other area/location was available at time of entry into RETAIN. Each week, after update from EDAS, the RETAIN system attempts to match soldiers on the Wait List to the place they desire to go. After this process, the Wait List is printed with the remaining soldiers. The printed Wait List is given to the assignment manager for processing.

RETAIN is a valuable tool that commanders, personnel service centers, and Reclassification Boards utilize in counseling and reclassifying their soldiers. Since RETAIN is a real-time automated system it can provide valuable, accurate information to the potential reenlistee or soldier involved in reclassification.

Comments about the Enlisted Distribution System. In theory, the distribution planning and assignment processes just described place the right soldier in the right skill at the right place at the right time. In fact, the system does a very creditable job for those MOS and grades which are nearly balanced, those for which the overseas-to-sustaining base ratio is supportable, and for those in which there is a high density of personnel in substitutable skills. The problem arises in the MOS where these conditions do not exist, and a sharing of shortages is required for all commands. Here lies the beginning of crisis management which eventually creates adverse impacts, sometimes even hardships, on soldiers. It is quite common that decisions are made at the national, DOD, or DA level to support worldwide requirements that upset the basic theory, practice, and application of the DA priority system. When certain commands, or organizations, are exempted from the "shortage sharing" requirements based upon special guidance, it causes compounded shortages to be shared by the organizations lower in priority than the exempted one. One is tempted to observe logically that we must suffer through that shortage until personnel are available. However, now we must introduce a pressure which is characteristic of a mission-oriented organization—the monthly Unit Status Report (USR).

The USR displays an objective and subjective evaluation by the commander as to what degree of readiness his unit has achieved for the past month. To provide documented backup to his evaluation, the commander begins the manipulation of personnel: cross-leveling of unit strengths by MOS, filling critical vacancies with qualified personnel despite the MOS considerations, and beginning, where appropriate, reclassification actions for individuals. The resultant impacts are MOS mismatch, misuse, and turbulence for the people involved—all adverse impacts in the areas of promotion, specialty pay, and career development. Granted many of these moves are mission essential, but many are precipitated solely by the pressures of monthly status reporting. The distributor in EPMD, in addition to bearing the brunt of complaints from the field concerning the shortage, contends with the problem of validating requisitions for MOS perceived as needed by the field units, while the inventory in those MOS shows no requirement. His attempts to assign people in the MOS which are short in the unit tend to compound the MOS mismatch, misuse, and turbulence.

In summary, enlisted personnel distribution is a very complex business, replete with pitfalls and shortcomings because of the rapidly changing variables which exist—force structure changes, recruiting success, training attrition rates, retention rates, and most of all, the unpredictability of the individual soldier, his health, and his family. All of these variables point up the really critical factors which govern successful distribution—the accuracy and timeliness of the data bases being used for analysis. Authorizations not approved and posted expeditiously to LPMAD and individual change data not properly reported for posting on the EMF make the already complicated distribution system less responsive.

Equally important to the matching of soldiers to requirements by MOS is a match of an additional skill identifier (ASI). ASI's identify soldiers with special skills, and they identify TO&E and TDA positions requiring those skills. The ASI extends the basic MOS. MILPERCEN fills requisitions for special skills by selecting soldiers who already possess the ASI or by scheduling soldiers for training en route to their new assignment.

Officer Distribution and Assignment.

The Army is rarely in a position where its officer assets by career field and grade equal the sum total found in authorization documents. This is because commanders must constantly review these documents and amend them to reflect changes in mission requirements. At the same time, the officer corps remains fairly constant with a predictable content by branch, functional area, and grade.

Distribution Planning. The officer distribution planners and managers at MILPERCEN are influenced by three principal factors in doing their job: officer assets, authorizations, and priorities. All three are in a constant state of change. Therefore, there is a need for a master distribution plan which will insure that all commands, agencies, and activities receive, according to priority, an appropriate share of the available officer assets/inventory. The foundation of this master plan is a management tool known as the Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). The ODP brings assets/inventory, authorizations and priorities into balance and is one of the Army's most important documents for officer distribution planning.

The ODP Process. The ODP is developed based on a projected inventory of officers at the end of the budget year, and the LPMAD authorizations projected to the end of the budget year. If the available officer assets match, by branch, functional area, and grade the requirements identified through the LPMAD, officers would simply be assigned against authorizations. However, this is never the case. As with most resources, particularly in peacetime, there is always a greater demand than there is a supply, and officer shortages result. Some system of priorities is needed to help manage these shortages. That system is the Personnel Priority Group (PPG) portion of the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). After the officer inventory has been compared with the authorizations in the LPMAD, a computer system called the Personnel Priority Model (PPM) is used to resolve the differences identified. By use of the PPM, officer assets are apportioned out to the appropriate commands based on the DAMPL and any special distribution guidance as determined by HQDA. (Figure 19-6)




FIGURE 19-6

Officer Requisition System. The Officer Requisition System is a system to meet the officer requirements of all major commands and activities. The system consists of two parts:

a. **Officer Requisition Generator (REQ-GEN).** An automated system which MILPERCEN and the requisitioning activities jointly use to maintain the activity's officer strength. The system uses the OMF, the Current Requisition File (CRF) and the ODP to generate requisitions based on computed projected vacancies for a specific period. Strength reports and requisitions are transmitted to requisitioning activities by electronic mail. These activities return their annotated requisition files to MILPERCEN by electronic mail, thereby completing that portion of the requisition cycle. Specific procedures for this system are contained in Chapter 5, AR 614-185.

b. **Requisition activities not linked to MILPERCEN** by electronic mail forward their requisitions to MILPERCEN through AUTODIN. This method lacks the ability of the requisitioning activity to interact with MILPERCEN during that portion of the requisition cycle in which the requisitions are developed. Officer requisitions are generated on an alternating bi-monthly basis for either overseas or CONUS. Overseas requisitions are validated so that officers will arrive nine or ten months after validation; CONUS officers arrive five to six months after validation.

As a normal rule, overseas returnees and school requirements drive the assignment system because these officers must move on time. This is largely due to tour length policies and graduation dates. Others are assigned to replace these personnel and the cycle continues.

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM

The Unit Manning System is an innovative management process designed to increase combat effectiveness in the Army by enhancing cohesion in combat units and developing a greater sense of esprit and belonging among all soldiers.

COHORT Unit Replacement System. The COHORT (COHesion, Operational Readiness and Training) concept provides for the transition of the MTOE combat arms Army from an individual replacement system to a unit manning system. COHORT increases horizontal (peer) and vertical (chain of command) bonding within Army units and gives commanders time to develop long-range training objectives for obtaining higher performance standards than currently attainable with an individual replacement system. The COHORT Unit Replacement program is expanding to all active divisions so that by the year 2000, 71 percent of the active infantry, armor and divisional field artillery units could be involved in the program. A key part of this expansion is the use of a package replacement system that provides periodic packages of initial term soldiers to sustain COHORT units after their formation.

The package replacement system will significantly change the way soldiers are assigned to units. The Army will assign soldiers to units in small cohesive groups (4 or more) rather than as individuals. Package sustainment of units focuses on the replacement of initial term soldier losses with squad and platoon size One Station Unit Training (OSUT) packages and assignment of individual NCOs and officers at predetermined replacement points (commander's assignment windows). This system will transition much of the Army from an individual replacement system to a unit package replacement system—a new way of doing business. The key to successful implementation of a package replacement system is a shift in the mindset of commanders and staffs. They must understand that replacement by team, squad, platoon, or company size packages establishes a common approach for personnel replacement operations in peacetime and wartime. Commanders and personnel managers must resist the temptation to break up a package in order to achieve higher personnel status ratings on the Unit Status Report (USR). To capitalize on the readiness advantages resulting from package replacement, the emphasis must be to maintain the integrity of the package as much as possible.

U.S. Army Regimental System (USARS). The U.S. Army Regimental System provides for affiliation of a combat arms soldier with a specific regiment and a combat support or combat service support soldier with a specific corps.

The Regimental System began with 15 combat arms regiments being implemented in 1983. The entire Army will be under USARS at the end of FY92, totaling approximately 190 Active Component (AC) regiments/corps.

Combat Arms: All career combat arms soldiers are required to affiliate with a regiment of their choice, regardless of the regimental implementation schedule. Soldiers are permitted to change affiliation at any time. Combat arms initial term soldiers will be permitted to voluntarily affiliate with any of the regiments, or they

may elect to delay their affiliation until reenlistment. Regimental affiliation for enlisted soldiers will become a primary assignment consideration.

CS/CSS/Special Branches/Corps of Engineer: Soldiers holding branch specific MOS's have been affiliated with that corps, under the whole branch concept.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND MOTIVATION

There must be a way of developing leadership, evaluating and rewarding those who do well, and eliminating those who do not measure up. This section will address some of the programs designed to accomplish these tasks and to create an environment which will motivate men and women to become career officers and NCO's.

Enlisted.

Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS). The Enlisted Personnel Management System provides a logical career path from grade E1 to E9, career-long training, performance-oriented evaluation and a greater job challenge. Additionally, it should eliminate promotion bottlenecks, provide all soldiers of the same grade with equal promotion opportunities, make assignments more flexible, and provide greater challenge by decreasing the number of MOS's.

A key feature of EPMS is to associate five standardized skill levels for the enlisted grades, with E-1 through E-4 having Skill Level 1 and E-8 and E-9 having Skill Level 5.

Another major feature of EPMS is the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) which is discussed in detail in Chapter 21 of this text. EPMS and NCOES are part of the same continuum. EPMS skill levels were selected so that the vital middle-grade NCO's would be distinct and visible for management purposes.

Enlisted Evaluation System (EES). At the heart of EPMS is the Enlisted Evaluation System. It is used to assist in the identification of soldiers who warrant consideration for promotion, reenlistment, reclassification, special training, elimination, and other personnel management actions.

The EES consists of Skill Qualification Tests (SQTs), Academic Evaluation Reports and an Enlisted Evaluation Report (EER) for those in grades E-5 and above. The EER is important in that it impacts on the Army's ability to maintain a career enlisted force of high quality. It is the official evaluation of duty performance and an estimate of the enlisted careerist's potential.

Promotions. The objectives of the enlisted promotion system are to insure advancement of the best qualified soldiers, to provide career incentive, to promote soldiers

based on potential rather than as a reward for past service, and to identify and preclude promotion of soldiers who are nonproductive and ineffective. Three programs make up the promotion system. They include: the decentralized program which controls advancements to grade E-2 and E-3 and promotions to E-4; the semi-centralized program which controls promotions to grades E-5 and E-6; and the centralized program which controls promotions to grades E-7 through E-9.

Under the decentralized program, authority to appoint and promote soldiers is delegated to local commanders but there must be compliance with standard policies and procedures established by HQDA. Promotion boards are not required. Authority to promote soldiers under the semi-centralized program is delegated to field commanders who are serving in an authorized LTC or above command position in accordance with guidance from HQDA. In this case, eligible soldiers compete Armywide on the basis of relative standings by points attained on a standardized point system. Soldiers recommended for promotion are required to appear in person for evaluation by a selection board. Names of soldiers selected for promotion by the board are placed on a locally maintained recommended list and grouped by MOS in an order of merit based on the total points attained under the point system. HQDA controls the number of soldiers who can be promoted in each MOS by establishing cut-off scores according to the needs of the Army. Soldiers whose scores equal or exceed the announced cut-off scores are promoted without regard to assignment. Those not immediately promoted remain on the recommended list until promoted unless they are removed for administrative reasons or for cause. Soldiers on a recommended list may request reevaluation to improve their standing.

Promotions to grades E-7 through E-9 are controlled by HQDA and selections are made by a board convened by HQDA. Primary and secondary zones of consideration are determined and announced, and selections are based on the "Whole Person Concept." No one single factor should be considered disqualifying but rather an individual's entire record is given careful consideration. Selections are made on a best-qualified basis in conjunction with Military Occupational Specialty needs.

Reenlistment Program. The purpose of this program is to assist in achieving and maintaining a balanced career content of the total enlisted force; improve the quality of the Army by retaining trained, qualified, and experienced soldiers and leaders; and assist in attaining MOS and grade balance. A careerist is a soldier serving his/her second or subsequent term of Active Federal Service. Because of budgetary restrictions and other force structure and management considerations, only a percentage of the enlisted force can be in the career category. ODCSPER, therefore, determines reenlistment objectives and provides goals to the major

commands. The thrust of the reenlistment program managed by MILPERCEN is to control reenlistments in order to provide sufficient soldiers to support the structure of the MOS and provide the soldier adequate career opportunity.

Command Sergeants Major Program. The objective of this program is to insure the selection and assignment of the best-qualified sergeants major, first sergeants and master sergeants for command sergeant major positions. These positions are designated as the principal enlisted assistant to commanders of an organization with enlisted troop strength equivalent to a battalion or higher level and commanded by a lieutenant colonel or above. This is the final step on the enlisted career progression ladder and it should be the goal of every career soldier. Selections are made by boards convened by HQDA. A list of those selected is published and maintained within MILPERCEN for use in appointing personnel to fill vacancies. Command sergeants major are assigned only to positions which have been designated by the DCSPER.

Qualitative Management Program (QMP). This program was developed as a means of improving the enlisted career force and consists of two subprograms—Qualitative Retention and Qualitative Screening.

The Qualitative Retention subprogram specifies that a soldier must be granted a waiver by the General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) to reenlist beyond the time-in-service limits established for the soldier's grade.

The Qualitative Screening subprogram is the DA bar to reenlistment aspect of the QMP. Regularly scheduled, centralized promotion/selection boards for E-7, E-8, E-9 and the CSM Selection Board select individuals for promotion or retention in grade, as well as those soldiers to be barred. The E-8 promotion boards identify E-5 soldiers with over 11 years of service whose record of service warrants a DA bar to reenlistment. These boards consider the soldier's entire record using the "Whole Person Concept," not just his/her current job or term of service. Soldier's separated with a DA bar receive a reenlistment eligibility code of 4 (no further military service authorized, any branch of service). Policy requires the initiation of separation processing on soldiers who have been DA barred for 18 months; however, the decision as to whether or not the soldier will actually be separated must still be made in accordance with the policies and procedures defined in AR 635-200.

Major chain of command actions include: request for removal of the bar if material error existed in the record considered by the board; 05 commanders (or above) personally present the bar and formally counsel the soldier on the impact of the bar, to include the mandatory initiation of separation action after 18 months; counsel on options available; appeal in the behalf of the soldier (if warranted) after the soldier's appeal has been denied.

Major actions by the soldier include: selection of the appropriate option to retire, if eligible; request for extension to reach retirement eligibility, if over 18 years of service at the date of the bar; request for immediate separation; elect to take no action (even though mandatory separation processing may occur prior to ETS); or appeal the bar. Soldiers receive personally addressed bar notification letters with a copy of his/her Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) performance fiche and a list of documents which were most significant in the board's decision to impose the bar. Appeals of the bar must address, as a minimum, the performance and/or conduct manifested in the record and are required to be submitted for adjudication for the DA Reenlistment Appeals Board by a specific timeframe. Soldiers with less than 18 months from the date of the bar to ETS, may request extension of service to allow 18 months of service after the date of the bar. The GCMCA may approve or disapprove all or part of the extension.

Warrant Officer Development.

The implementation of the Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS) in 1986 will have a major impact on the management and professional development of warrant officers. Under TWOS the Army will recruit warrant officers earlier in their careers, train them better, and retain them longer.

Every warrant officer position in the active Army has been classified by rank based on the skills, knowledge, abilities, and experience needed in that position. Formerly there was no rank differentiation in warrant officer positions. When the review of warrant officer positions in the Reserve Components is completed, all position requirements will be ranked into one of three levels. The levels are warrant officer, which includes W1 and W2; senior warrant officer, W3 and W4; and master warrant officer, W5. Pending Congressional authority for W5, senior W4s will be selected, trained, and utilized in master warrant officer positions. Personnel documents should reflect the new coding in mid-1987.

Warrant officer recruiting, education, and training will change to support this new requirements-based system of warrant officer management. Each year about 1500 soldiers are selected for appointment as warrant officers. Some come directly from civilian life into warrant officer candidate training, but most come from the NCO ranks and already have several years of military service.

In the past, this enlisted service was included in personnel management decisions affecting warrant officer careers. About half of all warrants retired after 20 years of combined (enlisted and warrant officer) active federal service.

Under TWOS, decisions on promotions, training, and assignments will be based on years of warrant officer service. A careerist will have an opportunity to serve 30 years as a warrant officer.

The revised training system will require warrant officer candidates to attend leadership and technical training prior to appointment. This will qualify W1s for service at the first level of warrant officer.

The next level is senior warrant officer training during the 8th-12th year of warrant service. This training will be required for W2s when they are selected for promotion to W3.

The Warrant Officer Senior Course will be redesigned to provide master warrant officer training. Senior warrant officers selected for promotion will normally attend training between the 20th and 24th year of warrant officer service.

Under TWOS, warrant officers will complete civil schooling and MOS functional training as required.

In addition to the new grade W5, two other TWOS initiatives require Congressional approval. The first is establishment of a single promotion list with policy developed to require integration into the Regular Army upon promotion to W3.

The single promotion list for warrants will eliminate the dual Army of the United States and permanent Regular Army/United States Army Reserve promotion systems.

The second proposal is for a selective retirement system to review retirement-eligible warrant officers for continuation on active duty. Selective retirement will be necessary to control overstrengths by MOS in order to retain the most qualified warrants on active duty.

These proposals are being staffed with the other services before submission to Congress.

Officer Development.

Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). OPMS provides a framework within which the careers of all officers, except those assigned to the Surgeon General, Chief of Chaplains, and the Judge Advocate General, are managed. OPMS consists of three major and interrelated subsystems: strength management, professional development, and evaluation (Figure 19-7).

To insure that the Army develops the required number of officers with the necessary skills, a framework for professional development has been established. This framework consists of all OPMS career fields, with each one being a grouping of duty positions whose skill, knowledge, and job requirements are mutually supporting in the development of officers to successfully perform in the career field. Each career field contains sufficient duty positions to support progression to the grade of colonel. Military and civilian educational opportunities are also geared to the officer's career field. Army requirements and an individual's qualifications and preference are the major considerations in determining the designation of career fields.

In late 1984 the CSA approved implementation of several changes in OPMS as a result of the recommendations of the OPMS Study Group. Major changes include the following:

OPMS




FIGURE 19-7

Single Branch Development. Single Branch Development Officers are being developed in only one branch and the branch will remain primary for most officers. Officers will be designated in only one branch at a time. However, some officers have been "grandfathered" as a result of a dual designation board conducted in the Summer/Fall 1986 and will continue to be managed and developed with two branches or two functional areas. The term specialty has been eliminated. Each branch now has only one numerical designation.

Functional Areas. Additional Specialties (ADSPECs) will be replaced by functional areas to meet current and future Army needs. Incorporating what are now called Nonaccession Specialties, functional areas will provide a management and development system to utilize effectively the vast talents of a diverse officer corps. Functional areas are not related to any branch.

Multiple Career Tracks. There will be a variety of career patterns (dual and single tracking) available to the officer corps to provide the flexibility to develop individual officers with different abilities based upon Army needs. Officers will be managed, developed, and promoted by branch and/or functional area.

Branch Transfers. Branch transfers at the third and eighth year of service will be encouraged for officers in overstrength branches. Some officers will be asked to move to branches that have expanding requirements at the captain and field grade levels.

Document Coding. A total review of all authorization documents was conducted to accurately code all commissioned officer positions in accordance with the revised classification system and to incorporate the four immaterial codes (01A-branch immaterial; 02A-combat arms immaterial; 03A-logistics immaterial; and 04A-personnel immaterial). Centralized approval at HQDA is required on document coding changes to control the amount and frequency of changes.

A Revised Officer Classification System. Officers will no longer be classified by specialties currently called INSPECs and ADSPECs but will be classified by branch, functional area, area of concentration, and skill.

Force Alignment Plan III (FAP III). A program designed to accommodate a revised accession methodology, centralize the CVI process, consolidate the Captain promotion and CVI boards, and realign branch content. FAP III calls for accessing new lieutenants to meet the combat arms requirements. There are, however, more combat arms lieutenants than there are requirements for captains. In the combat support and service support branches, the captain requirements exceed the lieutenant population significantly. This necessitates the realignment of OTRA officers from the combat arms to combat support and service support branches. This is all accomplished in conjunction with the captain promotion board and CVI boards. Beginning with YG 87, the branch detail program will begin. Officers will receive a basic branch (usually a shortage branch in CS or CSS) and be detailed in a combat arms; serve in the detailed branch until promoted to captain and revert to the basic branch at that time.

Centralized Selection for Command Positions. As a part of OPMS, a centralized command selection system was designed to identify the officers best qualified to command Army troop units, logistics organizations, and engineer districts. The system determines which officers within a career field will serve in the command positions. Officers considered for colonel and lieutenant colonel command-designated positions must be in the appropriate grade or on a current promotion list. Prior service as a product or project manager does not preclude eligibility for command.

HQDA Command Selection Boards normally convene annually to consider those officers eligible for command vacancies projected during a FY period. Separate selection boards are convened for combat arms, combat support, and combat service support positions. Officers will be considered for command in the category for which they are eligible based on the career fields they hold and may request to be considered in a previously held career field. The DA command Selection system applies only to specifically designated positions and does not encompass all colonel and lieutenant colonel command positions.

Materiel Acquisition Management Program. The purpose of the Materiel Acquisition Management Program (MAM) is to identify and develop qualified commissioned officers to support future requirements for project managers and other senior officers within materiel acquisition activities in DOD. Chapter 101, *DA Pamphlet 600-3*, prescribes MAM policies and procedures. Positions for the development of officers in the MAM are found in project manager offices; Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command and its subordinate commands; DA Staff; and other activities involved in materiel acquisition management. The MAM is applicable to all commissioned officers serving in the grade of captain through colonel except officers of the JAG, CH and AMEDD.

At the grade of colonel, project managers are selected by DA board action based on their qualification and demonstrated performance. The normal tour is a minimum of three years, with a goal of four years whenever possible. Changes of project managers will normally occur near major program milestones and will be scheduled to provide an overlap between incoming and outgoing project managers. Duties include exercising full line authority and responsibility over all planned direction and control of tasks and associated resources involved in providing a designated weapon or equipment system. This authority includes all phases of research, development, procurement, production, distribution, and logistics support to accomplish stated objectives. At the grade of lieutenant colonel, members are considered for project manager positions within the acquisition community.

Officer Evaluation System. The Officer Evaluation System is the Army's method of identifying those officers most qualified for advancement and assignment to positions of increased responsibility. The system includes assessments of officer performance and potential accomplished in the organizational duty environment; in an academic environment, both military and civilian; and at Department of the Army.

The Department of the Army potential assessment of an officer is a subjective judgment as to the officer's capability to perform at a specified level of responsibility, authority or sensitivity. Although potential is normally associated with the capability to perform at a higher grade, judgments are also made by DA on retention and increased responsibility within a specified grade. The assessment is based on three major factors: the Army's officer requirements, the individual officer's qualifications, and a summation of the individual officer's performance.

The performance assessment by DA differs significantly from that accomplished in the organizational duty environment. Whereas the organizational duty assessment involves a personal knowledge of the situations surrounding a specific period of time, DA assessment is accomplished by an

after-the-fact assessment of a series of reports on performance over a variety of duty positions and covering the officer's entire career.

Officer Evaluation Reporting System. The Officer Evaluation Reporting System is a subsystem of the Officer Evaluation System. It includes the methods and procedures for organizational evaluation and assessment of an officer's performance and an estimation of potential for future service based on the manner of that performance. The official documentation of these assessments is the Officer Evaluation Report.

The primary function of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System is to provide information from the organizational chain to be used by DA for officer personnel decisions. The information contained in the Officer Evaluation Report is correlated with the Army's needs and individual officer qualifications in order to provide the basis for officer personnel actions such as promotion, elimination, retention in grade, retention on active duty, reduction in force, command designation, school selection, assignment, career field designation, and RA integration.

A secondary function of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System is to encourage the professional development of the officer corps. To enhance accomplishment of this secondary function, emphasis is placed on the responsibility of senior officers to counsel their subordinates. While this has always been a major aspect of leadership, continual reemphasis is necessary. The Officer Evaluation Reporting System contributes significantly by providing a natural impetus to continual two-way communication between senior and subordinate. It is through this communication that the rated officer is made aware of the specific nature of his duties and is provided an opportunity to participate in the organizational planning process. The rater uses the communication to give direction to and develop his subordinates, to obtain information as to the status and progress of his organization, and to plan systematically for the accomplishment of the mission. The senior/subordinate communication process also facilitates the dissemination of career development information, advice, and guidance to the rated officer. This enables the rated officer to take advantage of the superior's experience when making career field or assignment-related decisions.

Promotions. As of 15 September 1981, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) amended Title 10, United States Code, for officer promotions. DOPMA, as implemented, is applicable to all officers except warrant officers. The act provides for a single active duty promotion system for all officers (RA and Other than RA), thus eliminating the previous dual (AUS/RA or AUS/USAR) system of promotions. The intent is for promotions to be made within fairly uniform promotion timing and opportunity goals, as

vacancies occur. Eligibility for consideration for promotions based on minimum time in grade (TIG) and time in service (TIS) with the below the zone selection rate established at a maximum of 15% of the list for any grade above captain. The impact of these changes has been to provide promotion opportunities of 90% to captain, 80% to major, 70% to lieutenant colonel, 50% to colonel; with promotions to 1st lieutenant being on a fully qualified basis. Promotions to 1st lieutenant occur at the minimum TIS (18 months active duty service or three years Federal commissioned service, whichever comes first); subsequent promotions to captain, major, lieutenant colonel and colonel occur as vacancies permit. Promotion opportunity and phase point (i.e. time in service when most officers are promoted) are listed below. The former dual promotion system still applies to warrant officers.

CAREER PROGRESSION PATTERN

Promotion		
TO GRADE	CUMULATIVE OPPORTUNITY	PHASE POINT
1st Lieutenant	Fully Qualified	18 MOS TIS MIN
Captain	90%	4 YOS & 2 YEARS TIG
Major	80%	10 ± 1 YEAR
Lieutenant Colonel	70%	16 ± 1 YEAR
Colonel	50%	22 ± 1 YEAR

Opportunity and TIS are set by policy. TIG for promotion to 1LT and CPT is set by law.

FIGURE 19-8

Officer Quality Management. The goal of the Officer Management Program is to ensure that only those individuals demonstrating satisfactory performance and possessing acceptable moral and professional traits be allowed to serve on active duty and retain appointments as officers. Commanders and DA agencies are continually striving to maintain the quality of the officer corps by identifying and processing for involuntary separation those officers whose performance or professional or moral traits are deficient.

The records of Other than Regular Army officers (OTRA) are screened continually to identify those officers whose degree of efficiency and manner of performance and/or misconduct, moral or professional dereliction require separation. Records selected under this program are referred to the DA Active Duty Board (DAADB) and selection by this board results in release

from active duty. On occasion, the Army has been required to undergo a Reduction-In-Force (RIF) because of manpower cuts resulting from Congressional budget constraints or mandated strength ceilings. When a RIF has been directed, selection of officers for release has been based upon the officer's year group and his entire file.

The promotion system also serves as a qualitative management tool through the mandatory separation from active duty of officers who fail to be selected for promotion to certain grade levels. Additionally, reserve officers serving under an initial service obligation must demonstrate acceptable performance, professional and moral traits in order to qualify for voluntary indefinite status.

Any officer may be eliminated under the provisions outlined in Chapter 5, AR 635-100, for substandard performance of duty and/or misconduct, moral or professional dereliction or in the interest of national security.

No person has an inherent right to continue service as an officer. The privilege of service is his/hers only as long as he/she performs in a satisfactory manner. Responsibility for leadership and example requires that an officer accomplish his/her duties effectively and conduct himself/herself in an exemplary manner at all times.

Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). DOPMA evolved from the continued inability of the Officer Personnel Act (OPA) of 1947, as changed by the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) of 1954, to solve the active duty officer management problem. The intent of DOPMA was to provide all services with an equitable, effective, and efficient system to manage their officer corps below the brigadier general level through revision of Title 10, United States Code.

The management objective is to provide consistent career and promotion opportunities across all services in order to attract and retain high caliber officers, and promote them at a point in service conducive to effective performance. The integration into a single promotion and grade authorization system of the old dual-track RA/Reserve system mandated by OGLA and OPA provides a favorable environment in which to achieve this goal. DOPMA does not provide, per se, the creation of a regular force at the 11th year of TIS. It merely enlarges the RA officer corps. The current policy is to tender an RA appointment to all active duty captains selected for promotion to major; however, this policy is subject to review.

The provisions for selective continuation of captains and majors, combined with the capability to instruct promotion boards on service skill needs, provides the service and the service secretary a mechanism through which specialty needs can be filled, while enhancing an officer's opportunity to stay on active duty until retirement. Under DOPMA a 1st lieutenant who twice

fails to be selected for promotion to captain is mandatorily released from active duty. Captains and majors with selected continuation may remain on active duty until 20 and 24 years respectively; however, current army policy and strength constraints limit the number of captains who are continued and restrict continuation of majors to their retirement eligibility date (e.g. 20 years of service). Officers not promoted and not selected for continuation will be retired or separated as appropriate. Lieutenant colonels and colonels may remain until 28 and 30 years respectively, unless involuntarily retired through the selective early retirement process.

DOPMA insures equal treatment for female officers by eliminating the separate management practices provided for in Title 10, while adhering to the combat exclusion principle. Additionally, DOPMA establishes uniform, general constructive provisions for all services, thus recognizing that special skills acquired prior to service are essential for effective performance in special branches. This provision impacts most on AMEDD, Chaplain, and the JAG Corps accessed after the effective date of the act.

SEPARATION

Separation includes release from active duty, discharge, nondisability retirement, physical disability separation, and resignation.

Because the type of discharge and character of service are of such great significance to the service member, it must accurately reflect the nature of service performed. Eligibility for veterans benefits provided by law, eligibility for reentry into service, and acceptability for employment in the civilian community may be affected by these determinations.

Enlisted Separation.

An enlisted soldier may be separated upon expiration of term of service (ETS), by sentence of General or Special Court-Martial or prior to ETS under one of the separation programs in the administrative discharge system as prescribed by the Secretary of the Army in AR 635-200. There are two types of separation actions outlined in this regulation: voluntary and involuntary.

Voluntary separations are initiated by the soldier. Reasons include hardship/dependency, sole surviving family member, acceptance into an ROTC program, ordered to active duty for training as an officer/warrant officer, and early separation when denied reenlistment. Soldiers who have tested positive for the HTLV-III antibody may request discharge under secretarial authority.

Commanders may initiate involuntary separations for parenthood, personality disorder, concealment of an arrest record, fraudulent entry, alcohol or drug abuse, entry level performance, unsatisfactory performance (to include failure to maintain weight control standards), misconduct, and homosexuality. To separate a soldier involuntarily, the unit commander must notify the

soldier in writing. Any involuntary separation in which the soldier has six or more years of AFS or reserve military service entitles the soldier to a hearing by an administrative board of officers. If the soldier has 18 or more years, the board is mandatory and cannot be waived. Administrative discharges of soldiers with 18 to 20 years AFS must be approved by HQDA. Additionally, unit commanders are required to initiate separation action on a soldier with a DA bar to reenlistment if it is not removed within 18 months of imposition; however, the decision to actually separate a barred soldier must still be made in accordance with the policy and procedures described in AR 635-200.

Discharge certificates are furnished only to soldiers when they are honorably discharged or are discharged under honorable conditions. All soldiers leaving active duty are issued a DD form 214, Certificate of Release of Discharge from active duty. The DD Form 214 documents the characterization of service, except when a soldier is separated while in an entry level status. Entry level separations always have a characterization of service of "uncharacterized." Honorable, general and other than honorable conditions discharges may be issued administratively. Bad conduct and dishonorable discharges may be issued upon conviction by a court martial.

Enlisted Nondisability Retirement System.

To qualify for voluntary retirement, an enlisted member must be on active duty and have completed 20 years active Federal service on the retirement date. A soldier who has completed 20 years, but less than 30 years AFS and who has completed all required service obligations may, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Army, be retired at his or her request. Enlisted members who have completed 30 years active Federal service have the vested right under law to retire and may not be denied. DA policy requires that all service obligations incurred by promotion, schooling, or PCS be completed prior to approval of voluntary retirement of individuals with less than 30 years' service. However, a service member may request waiver of a service obligation, and approval would depend upon whether the best interests of the service are involved or whether a substantial hardship might exist should retirement be denied. Enlisted retirements are approved by field commanders of general officer rank or commanders having general court-martial authority. Enlisted members retire in the grade they hold on the date of retirement unless they have 10 years active commissioned service and hold commissioned status in the USAR or hold USAR warrant officer status. Additionally, enlisted members who have completed 30 years active Federal service and have previously served satisfactorily on active duty in either a commissioned grade for 185 days or a warrant officer grade for 31 days may be eligible for concurrent advancement on the retired list to that higher grade. Requests for grade determination must be acted upon by HQDA.

Officer Nondisability Retirement System.

There are two types of retirements—voluntary and mandatory. To qualify for voluntary retirement, an officer must have completed at least 20 years' active Federal service on his retirement date. All service obligations incurred must be completed unless waived by HQDA. Mandatory retirement dates are established by law and only in very rare cases are individuals retained on active duty beyond these dates.

Physical Disability Separation.

The laws governing physical disability separation from a military service provide for the retirement or separation of a member who is determined to be unfit by reason of physical disability to perform the duties of his office, grade, rank, or rating. When a member, at the time of separation, is considered fit to perform his duties, he must be separated or retired under programs already discussed. It is possible, of course, to receive a nondisability separation and still have physical disabilities which could affect potential for civilian employment. In this instance, one may qualify for compensation for those disabilities from the Veterans Administration.

ARMY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

The thrust of the Army Equal Opportunity Program is to embed firmly the equal opportunity function within the Army's leadership framework. Fairness, justice and equity for all soldiers, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or religion, are responsibilities of leadership and functions of command. A leadership climate in which all soldiers perceive they are treated with fairness, justice, and equity is crucial to development of the necessary confidence within soldiers.

The key to maintaining an effective Equal Opportunity Program at the brigade level and above is the unit Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA). The EOA is a specially trained, carefully screened, outstanding officer or NCO whose primary function is to provide assistance and advice to commanders on all aspects of human resources. Since the Army leadership must assume full responsibility for ensuring fairness, justice, and equity for all soldiers, the EOA serves as the leaders' technical expert and subject matter resource. NCO's from across the MOS spectrum are detailed for one tour as an EOA after receiving training at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. Their primary MOS is the same as the majority of enlisted soldiers in the unit to which they are assigned. After their tours, advisors will return to duties normally associated with their primary MOS. This program of one-tour advisors provides leaders with credible EO assistants as well as weaving into the force an increased sensitivity for EO when the NCO's return to their normal duties.

SUMMARY

This chapter presented a broad overview of the Military Personnel Management System. A tremendous state of flux exists as the Army transitions to a new manning system and provides soldiers with the proper skills and experience to support a rapidly changing Army. The tools and processes that enable managers to acquire, train, distribute, develop, and separate soldiers must continue to be evaluated and refined to support the future Army programs.

LIST OF REFERENCES

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- (2) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 611-101: Commissioned Officer Classification System.*
- (3) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 611-201: Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupation Specialties.*
- (4) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 614-30: Oversea Service.*
- (5) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 614-185: Requisition and Assignment Instructions for Officers.*
- (6) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 614-200: Selection of Enlisted Soldiers for Training and Assignment.*
- (7) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 623-105: Officer Evaluation Reporting System.*
- (8) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 623-205: Enlisted Evaluation Reporting System.*
- (9) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 624-100: Promotion of Officers on Active Duty.*
- (10) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 635-100: Officer Personnel.*
- (11) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 635-200: Enlisted Personnel.*
- (12) U.S. Department of the Army. *DA Circular 600-82-2: The New Manning System.*
- (13) U.S. Department of the Army. *DA Pamphlet 600-3: Officer Professional Development and Utilization.*

- (14) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 600-21*: Equal Opportunity Program in the Army.
- (15) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 600-82*: The U.S. Army Regimental System.
- (16) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 600-83*: The New Manning System-COHORT Replacement System.
- (17) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 600-200*: Enlisted Personnel Management System.
- (18) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 601-280*: Army Reenlistment Program.
- (19) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 611-112*: Manual of Warrant Officer Military Occupational Specialties.

CHAPTER 20

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Approximately one-third of the Army's personnel resources are civilians employed in support roles throughout the world (Figures 20-1 and 20-2). The civilian component of the total Army team is obviously essential to mission accomplishment. Civilian personnel management is thus an integral part of the Army's efforts to manage itself. This chapter will introduce civilian personnel management and equal employment opportunity and discuss how the overall system works.

THE CIVILIAN WORK FORCE

The Army has employed civilians in relatively large numbers since the Revolutionary War. Over 369,000 U.S. citizens and 75,000 foreign nationals are employed and paid from appropriated funds, including civil functions. Nonappropriated fund organizations employ 39,000 employees, 4,000 of whom are part-time military.

In the early days, civilians served as clerks, teamsters, scouts, doctors, leather craftsmen, repairmen, and laborers. Professional and technical employees now support the Army in making the transition to the use of high technology and modern arms, and in accomplishing major engineering and construction projects. There are over 1,000 civilian occupations with the highest concentration of civilian employees in logistics, research and development, base operations, construction, and civil functions. The civilian work force supports military missions in peace and in war and shares fully in carrying out mission responsibilities as an integral part of the Army team.

In a typical field activity, the distinctions between military and civilian activities appear to be clear-cut. Department of the Army policy is to use military only in Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) positions which require military incumbents by reasons of law, security, maintenance of morale and discipline, rotation, combat readiness, and training; or which require military background for successful performance of the duties involved; or which are traditionally occupied by military personnel. All other positions are normally delineated for civilian occupancy. Although substantial differences exist between these two manpower categories, work locations and assignments sometime overlap. For example, maintenance of weapon systems is often the responsibility of civilian technicians, either contract or direct hire. Where weapons are committed to action on a battlefield, the

Army requires qualified military personnel to carry out such responsibilities in the field.

Four considerations are generally applied in delineating civilian assignments. Civilian employees are used when they:

- (1) Possess skills not otherwise available.
- (2) Assure continuity of administration and operations.
- (3) Release military personnel for duties which are primarily military.
- (4) Provide a nucleus of trained personnel to expand support forces of newly established or enlarged activities.

FEDERAL STRUCTURE FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

It is impossible to discuss the Army's system of civilian personnel management without first discussing the Federal organization for personnel management, since it is Federal civil service laws which govern the employment of Army civilians paid from funds appropriated by the Congress of the United States.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the central personnel agency of the Executive Branch. OPM, by delegation of the President, administers many Federal laws and Executive Orders dealing with all aspects of personnel administration and related subjects. The OPM is also affected by decisions of the General Accounting Office and the Office of Management and Budget.

Within this environment, OPM:

- (1) Develops proposals for Federal personnel legislation and Executive Orders.
- (2) Develops and publishes specific policies, procedures, and regulations implementing Federal personnel laws and Presidential Directives.
- (3) Provides testing, evaluation, and referral of job applicants to agencies.
- (4) Evaluates agency personnel management systems; provides advice and assistance to agencies in developing effective personnel management programs.
- (5) Develops standards by which jobs are classified.
- (6) Administers retirement, health, and life insurance programs.

Some laws and Executive Orders place certain personnel management responsibilities directly on

DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY MANPOWER

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


FIGURE 20-1

agency heads, subject to OPM policy and review. In other cases, OPM has been given either authority by statute or by delegation to establish specific program standards and to regulate and control the means of carrying out major aspects of agency personnel management.

OPM has responsibility for executing, administering, and enforcing civil service rules and regulations. This responsibility is exercised through audits, reviews, and inspections. Failure to observe the prescribed standards, requirements, and instructions may result in the withdrawal of personnel management authority delegated to agencies.

The principle of merit guides the OPM in policy development and operational support within the personnel system. Nine merit principles governing all personnel practices are in the law. They require:

(1) Recruitment from all segments of society, and selection and advancement determined solely on the basis of ability, knowledge, and skills, after fair and open competition.

(2) Fair and equitable treatment for all employees and applicants for employment without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicapping condition, and with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights.

(3) Equal pay for work of equal value and appropriate incentives and recognition for excellence in performance.

(4) High standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest.

(5) Efficient and effective use of the Federal work force.

(6) Retention of employees based on the adequacy of their performance, correction of inadequate performance, and separation of those who cannot or will not improve their performance to meet required standards.

(7) Effective education and training when it would result in better organizational and individual performance.

ARMY APPROPRIATED FUND CIVILIAN STRENGTH WORLD-WIDE

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


FIGURE 20-2

(8) Protection against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes. Prohibition against employees using their employment status to interfere with elections or nominations for election.

(9) Protection against reprisal for lawful disclosures of information ("whistleblower" protection).

The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) monitors the civil service system. The MSPB hears and decides allegations of merit principle abuses and other civil service appeals. It can order corrective and disciplinary actions against an employee or an agency when it finds abuse or unfair personnel practices.

The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The Federal Labor Relations Authority administers the Federal service labor-management relations program. It resolves questions of union representation of employees; prosecutes and adjudicates allegations of unfair labor practices; decides questions of what is or is not negotiable; and on appeal, reviews decisions of arbitrators.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

OPM has delegated to the Secretary of the Army authority to act in civilian personnel matters in accordance with policies, program requirements, standards, and instructions. The authority originating with Executive Order (EO) 9830 to conduct all aspects of the civilian personnel management program, including but not limited to: appointment, placement and promotion, separation, performance appraisal, position management and classification, training and development, conduct and discipline, grievances, leave, relationships with employee organizations, employee services and working conditions, incentive awards, career management, equal employment opportunity, and mobilization planning.

Within this framework and Army regulations, the Secretary of the Army has delegated similar authority to major commanders, with authority to redelegate this authority through channels to commanders of independent field activities. AR 10-20 sets forth the

delegation pattern. Thus, the actual management of the work force is decentralized to installation/activity commanders and local managers.

Responsibility for implementing and developing civilian personnel policy and program guidance is assigned to the Director of Civilian Personnel who reports to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQDA, and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, HQDA. Responsibilities and authority for implementing and tailoring the regulatory and program guidance material to meet local needs are delegated, with limitations, through command channels to field activities.

The Army's civilian personnel management program is based upon the principle that personnel management is a function of line supervision and that authority fully adequate to perform this function should be delegated to the lowest operating echelon which is consistent with efficient administration and effective control. Ordinarily, authority to take final action on any matter pertaining to a civilian employee's assignment, pay, separation, etc., is delegated to each installation/activity commander.

U.S. Army Civilian Personnel Center (CIVPERCEN). CIVPERCEN is a field operating agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) that:

a. Evaluates the effectiveness of civilian personnel management through on-site surveys, directs corrective actions, recommends program improvements, and conducts civilian personnel administration training and special studies.

b. Develops policy and guidance for all Army civilian training ranging from the career intern program to technical and professional development. Budgets, administers, and allocates resources for DA centrally administered programs, including career interns, long-term training, and management development.

c. Administers portions of the DA Affirmative Action Program, and recruits non-Army status candidates.

d. Serves as classification appellate authority for the classification of civilian positions.

e. Plans, develops, executes, and evaluates an Army-wide program for the design and maintenance of civilian personnel management information systems and serves as the proponent agent for the development of Automated Management Support Systems.

f. Provides interpretation of and guidance on the application of laws, Executive Orders, regulations, directives, etc. dealing with position and pay

management, staffing, training and development, and technical services.

g. Administers and provides guidance on the Army civilian career management system, which provides for the intake, development, and referral of employees in designated career fields, such as ADP, Manpower, Comptroller, Civilian Personnel, and EEO. Administers the operational aspects of the DOD-wide Intelligence civilian career program.

U.S. Army Civilian Appellate Review Agency (USACARA). USACARA is a field operating agency under the staff supervision of the Director of Civilian Personnel. It is the agency responsible for investigating EEO complaints which have not been resolved by commanders and recommending resolutions to such complaints. The Agency investigates and recommends settlement or resolution of formal employee grievances which have not been resolved at the installation/activity level and serves as the Army's appellate-level authority for the consideration of nonappropriated fund employees' appeals regarding adverse action.

U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center (CFSC). The U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center is a field operating agency of the DCSPER, HQDA. The CFSC's mission is to develop and administer systems and programs for the Army family and community activities, including morale, welfare, and recreation activities; nonappropriated funds; and child development centers. The CFSC develops, issues, and interprets NAF personnel policies, regulations, and procedures, and provides advice and assistance to commanders on their proper applications. CFSC also administers a central referral program for specified Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) managerial jobs (both appropriated fund and nonappropriated fund).

While the NAF Office in the CFSC administers the NAF program and develops policy, NAF policy is approved and issued by the Director of Civilian Personnel.

MACOM Commanders. MACOM commanders plan, coordinate, supervise, and evaluate the civilian personnel management functions of their subordinate activities and provide leadership of the civilians under their commands.

ARMY CIVILIAN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

Figure 20-1 shows all civilians employed by Army commands, installations, and activities. Within this arena, the installation commander's primary manpower source is his or her share of the military functions civilians. Civil functions civilians are assigned

exclusively to the Army Corps of Engineers which performs the Army's civil works mission. Nonappropriated fund (NAF) personnel are employed by individual NAF activities at each installation and are subject to special rules prescribed by AR 215-3.

The Congress, OMB, OSD, and HQDA establish and change manpower controls relating to the military functions civilians. The type of control used at a given time is dictated by legislation or administrative directive. Prior to FY 85, Congress assigned Army an end strength ceiling which limited the number of military function civilians that could be employed on the last day of the fiscal year. The most significant problem inherent in end strength management was that it led to the inefficient practice of firing employees near the end of one fiscal year and rehiring them at the beginning of the new fiscal year. To eliminate this practice, Congress prohibited end strength ceiling management in FY 85, but was quite clear in stating its desire that Army manage closely the number of civilians employed.

To comply with the desire of Congress and to meet the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff's desires to maintain a relatively stable civilian strength level, Army now manages civilian manpower on the basis of a Civilian Employment Level Plan (CELP). The CELP is the commander's projection of monthly employment levels during the fiscal year. At installation level the Resource Manager with assistance from the Civilian Personnel Officer builds the CELP based on instructions received through command channels from HQDA. These instructions normally advise the commander to prepare and submit the CELP within a specified Annual Financial Target (AFT) which establishes that portion of the installation operating budget that may be spent on civilian pay. Instructions also provide parameters for monthly employment levels to include the targeted average monthly strength level. The objective of this guidance is to insure that the CELP ties in to Army's budget estimate for civilian employment and pay. In building the CELP the commander must account for seasonal variations in employment requirements such as grounds maintenance.

Once the installation CELP is approved by headquarters, it represents the installation's approved civilian employment plan for the remainder of the applicable fiscal year. Actual monthly employment levels may deviate from the plan by no more than 5% in a given month or 1% of the average monthly strength level. CELP management requires commanders to plan monthly civilian employment well in advance and to manage actual employment closely throughout the year. For this reason, CELP management is similar to workyear limitations issued to nondefense federal agencies. Workyear limitations essentially limit the number of paid hours that are worked by all civilians on a cumulative basis throughout a fiscal year. Employment must be carefully planned on a continual

basis to insure that the workyear limitation is not exceeded. While workyear limitations are currently prohibited for all CONUS activities in DOD, Congress has recently imposed workyear controls in overseas activities as a means of limiting growth in civilian employment outside the U.S.

CELP management reflects continued interest by both Congress and the Army leadership in managing the number of civilians employed in Army military functions activities.

Types of Civilian Manpower

In developing the CELP, commanders have broad choices in determining the types of civilian employees that will be hired. Commanders may specify that an employee be hired on a permanent appointment that leads to civil service tenure or a temporary appointment which may be terminated at any time or extended in one year increments up to four years depending on workload requirements. Permanent or temporary employees may be hired on work schedules ranging from full-time (40 hours per week), part-time (16-32 hours per week), or intermittent (as needed). While the majority of civilians are full-time employees with permanent appointments, the wide variety of combinations of appointments and work schedules enables the commander to tailor the civilian work force to unique workload requirements. These schedules also help the commander to make optimum use of his assigned CELP discussed above. Additional information on appointments and work schedules may be obtained from the servicing civilian personnel office.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AT INSTALLATION/ACTIVITY LEVEL

The Department of the Army operates a decentralized civilian personnel system. Within this system are approximately 170 operating Civilian Personnel Offices located at Army activities throughout the world. In addition, there are about 40 staff personnel offices. Some managers may work for one command but receive their personnel services from another command through a common-servicing arrangement with the host activity. This basic principle of decentralized management of the civilian work force is unlike that of the centrally managed military personnel management system. Since installation/activity commanders and managers are directly responsible for the leadership and management of civilian employees, they are accountable through the chain of command for the effective management of the civilian component. Commanders of installations/activities are responsible for effective implementation and evaluation of the civilian personnel management programs within their organizations. They are expected to develop and effectively utilize subordinate supervisors and managers and to establish a work environment which provides for positive employee motivation and high performance. The activity civilian

personnel officer (CPO) and his/her staff assist management officials in carrying out assigned personnel management responsibilities.

Commanders are also responsible for the leadership and management of nonappropriated fund (NAF) employees in accordance with AR 215-3. The NAF system is administered concurrently but separately by the Director of Civilian Personnel, with personnel services provided to field commanders by their servicing civilian personnel office.

The CPO is the designee of the installation/activity commander and, as such, is responsible for discharging the civilian personnel administrative authority delegated to the commander. This does not include the commander's responsibility for leadership of civilians. The CPO can serve as the designee for several different commanders and activity chiefs, receiving a written designation from each. It is Army policy that there be only one CPO at each activity. The CPO reports to the DPCA (G1) (see Figure 20-3).

The Civilian Personnel Officer is expected to have direct access to the commander and to work directly with key staff officials in dealing with personnel problems. Except for those cases which must be handled through Army channels, the Civilian Personnel Officer is authorized to deal directly with the Office of Personnel Management on an as-needed basis on employment issues. As a representative of the commander, the Civilian Personnel Officer is responsible for interpreting personnel policies and regulations and for providing leadership and problem solving in his/her assigned responsibilities. He/she seeks to assure that management actions affecting

civilian employees are taken in such a manner as to enhance the activity's reputation as a good and fair employer, to assure employee productivity, support equal opportunity objectives, and maintain effective community relations.

Supervisors and managers have delegated authority for the leadership and management of subordinate civilian employees. This carries with it certain inherent responsibilities in planning and directing their work. The concept of the "supervisor as the personnel manager" is a basic feature in the Army's system of civilian personnel management. The civilian personnel officer, however, is expected to play an important role in assisting and supporting supervisors in the effective discharge of their civilian personnel management responsibilities.

The Department of the Army has identified the following civilian personnel management responsibilities of managers.

These responsibilities are:

Managing positions by structure and work assignments.

Selecting and assigning employees.

Evaluating employee performance.

Training and developing employees.

Using incentives.

Maintaining management-employee communications.

Administering constructive discipline.

ACTIVITY ORGANIZATION FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT




FIGURE 20-3

Civilian Personnel Management Program Responsibilities.

Position Management. The policy and objective of the Department of the Army is to design position structures that provide the most economical and effective mix of skills and grade levels necessary to accomplish the assigned mission and functions. The process used to achieve this objective is position management. Position management is a chain of command responsibility and involves selectively assigning the most economical and effective mix of duties to positions.

Supervisors and managers are responsible for position management decisions. In designing the position structure of their organizations, supervisors are expected to consider and implement viable economies. Examples include concentrating higher-level duties in the fewest possible positions or establishing a proper ratio of support positions to professional positions. The concern for economy, however, must also be balanced with concern for employee motivation, job satisfaction, career development, and progression. Position classification specialists from the civilian personnel office are responsible for providing staff assistance in identifying potential position structure improvements, but only management officials can weigh these recommendations and make final decisions on position design. Attaining effective position management requires the coordinated efforts of both line and staff elements; therefore, the early involvement of the classifier in position and organization planning is essential. While position structure improvements may be implemented at any time, ideal opportunities for changes occur when positions become vacant or during cyclic classification and position management surveys.

Army policy and regulations also require that a commander with delegated authority for civilian personnel administration serve as the position management officer (PMO) or delegate PMO responsibilities to a senior member of the staff. The PMO is the final arbiter on job structure or position management issues when line managers and classifiers disagree or when other significant questions arise from surveys, special studies, manpower or organization reviews. The PMO must decide which course of action is best from an overall standpoint including mission accomplishment and economy.

Position management is an integral part of management studies conducted under the Organization Efficiency Review Program (a program responsibility of the Comptroller).

The efficiency reviews identify specific improvements required to enhance operations by improving performance, increasing readiness, achieving efficiencies, and measuring productivity. The review has five elements:

- Development of a performance work statement which validates work being performed;

- Conduct of an efficiency review which evaluates the mission/function activity and determines the most efficient manner and best organization to perform required work;

- Implementation of improvements identified in the first two phases;

- Conduct of a work measurement study;

- Implementation of a review and analysis effort to verify that savings and increased efficiency have resulted.

Job Classification. The process of evaluating positions by determining the proper occupation series, title, and grade for a position, is called job classification.

This determination is based on an assessment of the nature and difficulty of the position's duties, responsibilities, and other important factors in the job (for example, skill and knowledge required, complexity of the work) which must be recorded in a job description. The pay range for the position depends on the grade assigned. The range of pay for each grade level is based on comparability with the private sector unless the President and Congress decide it should be less (which frequently occurs).

Individual positions are classified by comparison with the appropriate classification standards or guides. The standards used in this process are developed by OPM based upon comprehensive occupational studies of representative work found in the Federal service. The general principle underlying the standards system and classification is that of "equal pay for substantially equal work." Accordingly, differences in pay must be attributable to substantial differences in the difficulty, responsibility, and skill requirements of the job. Comparisons with other positions are not permitted as this is not a valid or reliable method of job evaluation.

Within DA, the authority to classify positions is delegated only to qualified personnel specialists at staff and operating levels. However, commanders can ask that a higher echelon review local determinations with which they disagree.

Most positions are covered by either the General Schedule (GS) or the Federal Wage System (FWS). The General Schedule, with 18 grades, covers white-collar workers in professional, administrative, technical, clerical, and protective occupations. The Senior Executive Service now includes most positions that were formerly graded at GS-16, 17, and 18 or equivalent. FWS covers blue-collar workers in trades, crafts, laboring, and similar occupations. The FWS has 15 nonsupervisory and leader grades, and 17 supervisory grades for supervisors.

The salary rates for the GS grades are based on nationwide comparability surveys conducted by the Department of Labor and the recommendation of the President to the Congress. Federal Wage System rates are established based on locality wage surveys of private industry conducted by Federal agencies in accordance

with OPM policies and regulations. For positions with unusual recruitment and retention problems, OPM can authorize special salary rates.

Merit Promotions. Agencies are required to adopt and administer a merit promotion program designed to ensure the systematic selection of candidates for promotion according to merit. Within the Army, installation/activity commanders are afforded generally the flexibility to develop, negotiate, and manage their own merit promotion programs.

There are five basic principles, or requirements, upon which all merit promotion programs must be based. First, all procedures must be based on merit and must be available in writing to candidates. All actions taken, from the identification through the evaluation and final selection of candidates, must be made without regard to political, religious, or labor organization affiliations; marital status; race; color; sex; national origin; nondisqualifying physical handicap; or age. All decisions will be based solely on job-related criteria, which are identified through a process known as job analysis. This process requires that managers filling the jobs identify the criteria or knowledges, skills, and abilities which candidates must possess at the time of placement into the position.

Second, the area of consideration—the area in which the agency makes an intensive search for eligible candidates in a specific promotion action—must be sufficiently broad to ensure the availability of high-quality candidates. Thus, areas of consideration may vary with the nature, grade, and tenure of the position. For example, an Army-wide search is required in filling certain high-level vacancies in career program positions.

The third requirement is to ensure that all eligible candidates meet the minimum qualification standards prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management. In the evaluation process, all methods established by agencies must comply with additional instructions issued by OPM. Consideration must be given to performance appraisals and incentive awards.

Fourth, all selection procedures must reserve management's ultimate right to select or not select from among a group of the best-qualified candidates. In addition to using the merit promotion program for filling vacancies, management has the right to select from other appropriate sources of candidates, including reinstatement and transfer eligibles, the severely physically or mentally handicapped, Vietnam-era veterans, and others who are certified as eligible for appointment by OPM. In deciding which sources of applicants to tap, consideration should be given to those sources which are expected to produce candidates who will meet the agency's mission requirements, contribute new ideas and viewpoints, and meet the agency's affirmative action goals.

Last, promotion systems are required to provide for recordkeeping and furnishing necessary information to employees and the public, while protecting the

individual's right to privacy. Within the Army, records of each promotion action, sufficient to permit total reconstruction of the action if necessary, are maintained for five years. These records often form the basis for MACOM, HQDA, or OPM evaluation of activity promotion programs, and are vital elements in the investigation of grievances/EEO complaints, the analysis of an activity's workforce, and the evaluation of progress toward affirmative action goals.

Career Management. The Army civilian career management system establishes basic policies and program requirements for the intake, assignment, training, and development of employees in designated occupations (see AR 690-950-1). This system promotes recruiting candidates interested in long-term opportunities and development plus career planning and development of employees to ensure a steady flow of capable, fully-qualified and trained personnel for Army positions (see AR 690-950-3). The career management system is designed to meet the Army's staffing needs in more than twenty different civilian career professional, technical, and administrative occupations (Figure 20-4).

The career management system provides clear lines of progression to successively more responsible positions and a coordinated training and development program for occupational specialties, using both Army and outside facilities. Procedures are provided for counseling employees; planning individual development; and for appraising employee knowledge, skills and abilities for advancement. There are provisions for annual intake at the entry level to ensure a continued flow of applicants into the system. New employees participate in planned work or rotational assignments designed to develop technical competence and to prepare for future managerial responsibilities.

A central inventory of career program registrants is maintained at HQDA and specified MACOM to provide referral consideration to employees at the DA-wide mandatory referral level (generally for vacancies at grades GS/GM-13 through GM-15). Inventories for vacancies below the DA-wide mandatory referral level are also maintained at designated MACOM headquarters (generally for GS-12 vacancies). A central inventory is maintained at the DOD-wide level for several career fields. The central referral system provides selecting officials with the names and necessary information about employees who can be considered for selection to fill a career program position. The referral system is supported by methods of career appraisal, maintenance of rosters of candidates available for promotion or reassignment, and procedures for executing and documenting the central referral process.

Functional career program managers at HQDA, MACOM, and activity levels provide administrative support and technical assistance for each career program in the Army career management system. Career program managers at all levels are responsible for necessary preemergency mobilization planning.

CIVILIAN CAREER PROGRAM STRENGTHS

26 SEPTEMBER 1986

ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS (NONCONSTRUCTION):

20431

ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS
(RESOURCES AND
CONSTRUCTION): 11838

COMPTROLLER: 12823

AUTOMATIC DATA
PROCESSING: 8110

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT: 7626

6918: MATERIEL MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT

220: AMMUNITION SPECIALIST
248: RECORDS MANAGEMENT
360: HOUSING MANAGEMENT
437: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
408: COMMISSARY MANAGEMENT
524: LIBRARIAN
753: AMMUNITION SURVEILLANCE
878: SAFETY MANAGEMENT
936: TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT
1096: EDUCATION SERVICES
1445: COMMUNICATIONS
1754: MANPOWER & FORCE MANAGEMENT
1861: QUALITY & RELIABILITY ASSURANCE

2085: INTELLIGENCE

2988: PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

3386: TRAINING

3749: CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
ADMINISTRATION

6589: CONTRACTING AND ACQUISITION

97463

FIGURE 20-4

Requirements and procedures for mobilization planning are in AR 690-11.

Performance Management. Performance management is a systematic process by which managers and supervisors at all levels of an organization integrate performance, pay and awards systems with its basic management functions. The purpose of performance management is to improve individual and organizational effectiveness in the accomplishment of mission and goals. The Department of the Army Performance Management Plan has five components:

- A performance appraisal plan for GM, GS, and Wage Grade employees (AR 690-400, Chapter 430);
- A performance appraisal plan for Senior Executive Service employees (AR 690-900, Chapter 920);
- A plan for making base pay adjustments for GM employees (AR 690-500, Chapter 540);

— A plan for providing awards and recognition for significant employee performance (AR 672-20); and

— A plan for within-grade increases (AR 690-990-2, Book 531, Subchapter 4).

Performance Appraisal. The law requires the use of performance appraisal results as a basis for adjusting base pay, training, rewarding, reassigning, promoting, reducing in grade, retaining, and removing employees. The two DA civilian performance appraisal systems for appropriated fund employees (set forth in the above-mentioned Chapters 430 and 920) require: (1) job performance planning at the beginning of employee rating periods (i.e., by supervisors, (in consultation with employees) identifying critical and non-critical job elements and establishing related measurable performance standards); (2) progress reviews during rating periods to provide feedback and to review and revise performance elements and standards, and (3) annual appraisal at the end of rating periods to provide information for counseling and for making other personnel decisions. Elements and standards should be

consistent with the duties and responsibilities in employee job descriptions and organizational goals and objectives. The performance appraisal process is designed to enhance supervisor-employee communications and day-to-day relationships, thereby paving the way for more productive, efficient performance management. Supervisors should recognize and reward employees whose performance warrants, and assist employees to improve unacceptable performance.

Communication and Counseling. Day-to-day observations of an employee's performance and conduct as well as progress reviews during performance appraisals facilitate identification of conduct and performance deficiencies. This, in turn, should trigger counseling sessions and improved supervisor-employee relationships. Some MACOM's have formalized policies and procedures for identifying and assisting employees with medical, behavioral, or emotional problems when such problems impact on job performance.

Incentives. Through a wide range of honorary and monetary awards, the Army Incentive Awards Program provides managers and supervisors with a means for recognizing the superior performance and outstanding contributions or achievements of civilian employees. Honorary awards include the following:

- (1) Army awards, such as the Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service, Meritorious Civilian Service Award, and Commander's Award for Civilian Service.
- (2) Department of Defense awards, such as the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award.
- (3) Presidential awards, such as the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service, and the Presidential Management Improvement Award.
- (4) Other Federal and non-Federal awards.

Monetary awards include Presidential Rank Awards for career Senior Executive Service members, Special Act or Service Awards, performance awards, and suggestion and invention awards. Approval levels for the honorary and monetary awards are specified in AR 672-20.

Employee Relations. Supervisors at all organizational levels are a part of the Army's management team. As members of this team, they are responsible for participating fully in the development and implementation of policy; for contributing to the negotiation and administration of labor-management agreements; for the communication of management objectives, decisions, and viewpoints to their subordinates; and for communicating their

subordinates' views to higher-level management. In order to participate effectively in these responsibilities, all supervisors must be included in the processes of management which affect them and their subordinates. They must be participants in analyzing problems, developing solutions, and evaluating the results of decisions. The basic purposes of establishing intra-management communication systems are to provide a framework for the expression of ideas and opinions of all levels of management on policies, objectives, and problems affecting them, and to develop an integrated management team capable of timely reaction to the needs of the organization and its members. The primary goal of each intra-management communication system developed should be the recognition by all supervisors in the organization that they are members of this management team.

Administering Constructive Discipline. The broad objective of discipline is to help train and motivate employees in the maintenance of reasonable standards of conduct and performance. Disciplinary actions range from oral warnings and admonishments to written reprimands, suspensions, and removals. Disciplinary actions must be timely, reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and provide like penalties for like offenses (The DA Table of Penalties is set forth in AR 690-700, Chapter 751).

Managers and supervisors have the authority to effect adverse actions for unacceptable conduct or performance. Adverse actions include suspension, reduction in grade or pay, furlough for 30 days or less, and removal from the Federal service. Because of the severe consequences which may result from adverse actions against employees (loss of pay, separation, and possibly denial of future employment), managers and supervisors should exercise great care and judgment to assure that the action is warranted on its own merits and applied in accordance with fair and uniform procedures.

The laws and regulations governing adverse actions confer basic rights and protection to employees and prescribe certain procedural requirements to be observed by managers and supervisors when taking adverse actions. Employees who believe their rights have been denied, improper procedures have been followed, or that an action is unwarranted are entitled to present the adverse action (except a short suspension, i.e. 14 days or less) to the Merit Systems Protection Board for independent third-party review, and subsequently to the Courts. Short suspensions may be contested through the Army or negotiated grievance procedures.

Grievances and Appeals. The Army grievance procedure in Army Regulation 690-700 is established in accordance with Federal regulations to provide a forum for employee complaints and grievances. The grievance procedure sets forth specific steps to be followed for

resolving employee dissatisfaction with any aspect of working conditions, working relationships, or employment status. Army policy encourages timely resolution locally; however, grievances can be escalated to the U.S. Army Civilian Appellate Review Agency or to arbitration under a negotiated procedure for adjudication. Employees who are members of an exclusive bargaining unit may grieve through a negotiated grievance procedure.

Training and Development. AR 690-400, Chapter 410, outlines the Army's employee training and development program. It requires an annual review of training needs to be conducted by supervisors and preparation of an Individual Development Plan (IDP) for each employee. These plans are consolidated at activity level and provide the basis for fund allocations by commanders.

The nine general categories of training are outlined in the regulation. These training categories cover a very broad field from "executive and management" to "adult basic education." Within these, training can be classified as either short or long-term (120 days or more). The training needs identified and the IDP can be met in a variety of ways to include the use of on-the-job training at local activities, DOD schools, interagency schools, formal (private) schools, and a host of other Government and non-government sources. DA Pam 690-23 provides information about training programs, e.g., senior service colleges and other managerial and executive programs, which are centrally administered by HQDA.

In September 1983, the DCSPER approved in concept a plan to strengthen and improve the training and development process for the Army's civilian employees in career programs. This project, the Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System (ACTEDS), is a new approach to assuring effective training and development of the Army's career program employees. ACTEDS provides a framework for developing the technical, managerial, and leadership competence required. The system is a competency-based approach to providing technical and managerial employees the right kinds of training at the right points in their careers. In many respects it resembles the system used to train Army officers and in fact was modelled after that system. It blends formal training with on-the-job development; provides for the identification and accomplishment of specific functional development requirements tailored to each career program or "cluster" of related career programs; and includes prescribed leadership, managerial, and technical core curricula, sequentially and progressively patterned to "grow" employees throughout their careers. A high degree of involvement in career planning by managers at all levels is the catalyst that will make ACTEDS work.

The ACTEDS program is evolutionary. It will not cover all career programs until well into the 1990's.

Nonappropriated Funds Personnel Management. Army clubs and messes, guest houses, child care centers, visiting officers' quarters, bowling centers, and other Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities (NAFI) employ a considerable number of employees at most Army activities. Many of these employees are paid from funds that are generated through the sale of goods and services, i.e., Nonappropriated Funds (NAF), rather than from funds that are appropriated by the Congress.

AR 215-3, Nonappropriated Fund-Personnel Policies and Procedures, establishes policies and procedures for administering the total personnel program for NAFI employees of the Department of the Army. The Army's NAFI civilian personnel policies are designed to maintain uniform, fair, and equitable employment practices in keeping with the Army's traditional concept of being a good employer. Activity civilian personnel officers and their staffs provide guidance and personnel support to NAFI personnel managers who are charged with the responsibility for administering the NAFI personnel program on the activity.

Army NAFI employees usually are civilians from the local labor market or off-duty U.S. military personnel, both of whom compete for such employment on the basis of merit. These employees are an integral part of the Army team and play an important role in providing morale and recreation services to military personnel and their dependents.

Nonappropriated fund employment is distinct from appropriated fund employment (usually referred to as civil service employment) and from contractor employment. NAF employment is not governed by most laws and regulations which are administered by the Office of Personnel Management.

In view of the difference in fund sources, laws, regulations, and employee benefits, it is not intended that identical personnel policies and practices be used in administering both appropriated and nonappropriated fund personnel programs. However, it is Army's policy that within prescribed requirements, maximum comparability of treatment be afforded these two types of Army employees.

Employment of Foreign National Civilians. In foreign countries, Federal law and DOD policy require that employment systems for foreign national employees of the Army be set based on the requirements of the prevailing practices, local laws and customs of the host country. (Note: Such practices, laws and customs cannot be in conflict with U.S. law and must be compatible with the basic management needs of the Army.) Also, the terms and conditions of employment for foreign national employees must be in accordance with provisions of controlling treaties and agreements between the United States and the host country. Foreign national employment systems in foreign countries fall into two general systems: direct hire systems where the employees are hired directly by the Army as employees of the U.S. Government; and indirect hire systems

where the employees are employees of the host government and assigned to work with the Army on a reimbursable cost or other financial basis. Two of the countries in which indirect hire systems have been established are Japan and Germany.

Mobilization Planning. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the civilian component of the Total Army team is essential to mission accomplishment. When we consider the ultimate Army Mission—readiness—it becomes obvious that plans for military readiness must be matched with equally well-developed plans for civilian readiness. With this goal in mind, the Army includes mobilization planning as an essential element of the total civilian personnel program.

AR 690-11 provides the guidelines for civilian personnel mobilization planning and management. Based on this regulation, managers, with the assistance of CPO staffs, develop and maintain appropriate emergency plans, procedures, standby emergency implementation documents, and organizational and staffing arrangements required to plan, mobilize, and manage their civilian work force.

Installation/Activity CPO Organization.

Generally, an installation/activity civilian personnel organization consists of: Civilian Personnel Officer (Assistant Director for Civilian Personnel); the Technical Services Division; and four functional divisions—Position Management and Classification, Recruitment and Placement, Labor-Management-Employee Relations, and Training and Development.

Technical Services Division. The Technical Services Division accomplishes legal and regulatory reviews, advises management and employees on employee benefit programs (i.e., health insurance, life insurance, retirement); processes personnel actions, maintains personnel records, prepares reports, provides information support, interprets the Federal Employees Compensation Act, and is responsible for the employee compensation program.

Position Management and Classification Division. The major functions of this division are to:

- Assist supervisors to maintain a position structure which achieves the optimum balance between economy, efficiency, skills utilization, and employee development; and

- Finalize and evaluate position descriptions, assuring position classification accuracy and consistency with established position management and classification regulations, standards, principles, and practices.

Recruitment and Placement Division. The overall responsibility of this division is to provide well-qualified candidates and applicants for competitive selection by

supervisors, consistent with merit principles and the equal employment opportunity program.

Specialists in this division estimate future manpower requirements in terms of expected missions and future workload, availability of in-service manpower skills, potential of individual employees, and statistical analyses of employee movement (such as promotions, reassignments, and losses). The result is staff planning to determine potential outside intake versus in-service training and progression.

In conjunction with managers, they develop intern and other intake requirements for career programs, cooperative education programs, college recruitment where pertinent, apprentice selection and training, and upward mobility.

Labor-Management-Employee Relations Division.

The overall responsibility of this division is to assist management in day-to-day relations with regard to employee's performance, discipline, personal adverse actions, effective use of recognition and awards, management-employee communications, administration of leave, hours of work, and monitoring of health and safety conditions. Their purpose is to provide a positive work atmosphere leading to optimum employee productivity and employee motivation. This division is also responsible for labor relations and union negotiations.

Training and Development Division. This division is responsible for administration and management of all types of training activities in support of employee skills development and productivity, upward mobility, managerial capability, and career development.

Specialists in this division develop, coordinate, and administer training and development programs responsive to immediate and long-range needs and goals of the activity, the major command, and the Department of the Army.

Labor-Management Relations Program.

Legal Basis. The legal basis for the labor-management relations program for Federal employees is Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (U.S.C. 7101 et seq.). This title provides that labor organizations (unions) and collective bargaining are in the public interest and establishes the rights and obligations of employees, unions, and agency management.

Army Policy. The Army will maintain an affirmative willingness to bargain collectively with labor organizations. Commanders should strive to ensure that mission accomplishment is enhanced by the labor relations process and that the management rights discussed below are retained.

Management Rights. By law, certain matters are excluded from the duty to bargain. These are the

reserved rights, on which management may not negotiate, and the permissive rights, on which management may, but is not required to, negotiate. In either case, commanders have an obligation to negotiate on the impact and implementation of the exercise of any management right, even though the substance of the management action is not itself negotiable. Each of these categories is addressed in the following paragraphs.

— *Reserved Rights* are the rights to:

a. Determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and internal security practices of the agency.

b. In accordance with applicable laws, to hire, assign, direct, lay off, and retain employees in the agency, or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such employees; to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted; to make selections for appointments from among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion or from any other appropriate source; and to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency's mission during emergencies.

— *Permissive Rights*. These comprise the rights to:

a. Determine the numbers, types, and grades of employees or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of duty.

b. Determine the technology, methods, and means of performing work.

— *Impact and Implementation Bargaining*. This means the obligation to negotiate on:

a. Procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising any management right.

b. Appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any management right.

For example, management has the right to select employees for promotion, but merit promotion procedures are negotiable under the requirement for impact and implementation bargaining. Similarly, management has the unilateral right to conduct a reduction in force, but it must give the union the opportunity to negotiate regarding arrangements (e.g., retraining programs) for employees affected by that reduction in force.

Collective Bargaining Agreements. The law requires that, if requested by either party, a written collective

bargaining agreement be executed, embodying the terms agreed to by the parties. In the Army, collective bargaining agreements must be signed by the installation/activity commander (this authority may not be redelegated); they are then reviewed for legal and regulatory compliance and approved by the major command or Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Negotiated Grievance Procedures. By law, each collective bargaining agreement must contain a negotiated grievance procedure for resolving disputes. Negotiated grievance procedures must, with the limited exemption of issues covered by certain statutory appeal and complaint procedures, be the exclusive means of resolving the matter they cover. Negotiated grievance procedures may be used to resolve nearly any dispute between the agency and employees or between the agency and the unions. The law requires that the grievances not resolved be subject to binding arbitration. The arbitrator is a neutral third party retained by the agency and the union to resolve their dispute. Only the agency or the union (not the employee) may invoke arbitration.

Unfair Labor Practices. The law specifies certain prohibited practices called Unfair Labor Practices (ULP's). These include interfering with employee's union rights, discriminating against employees because of union activity, and failure or refusal to negotiate in good faith. Certain union activities may be ULP's, including engaging in or failing to take action to prevent or stop a strike. ULP's are prosecuted before an administrative law judge by the General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Ultimately, the Authority decides whether a ULP has been committed and what the remedy shall be. The Authority's orders may be reviewed in and enforced by a Circuit Court of Appeal.

Commander's Responsibilities.

Negotiate in Good Faith. The law requires that commanders negotiate in good faith with unions regarding conditions of employment (i.e., personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions). Union proposals, however, which are inconsistent with a Federal statute or Government-wide regulation or, initially, with a DOD regulation or Army regulation are not negotiable. Negotiations may involve an entire collective bargaining agreement, specified limited issues, or the impact and implementation of management-initiated changes which are not themselves negotiable, but which affect conditions of employment.

Official Time. Commanders are required by law to furnish official time to union representatives (not to exceed the number of representatives on the management negotiating team) for negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Official time for such

purposes as preparing for negotiations and representing employees is negotiable.

Dues Allotments. Commanders are required by law to deduct union dues from the pay of employees who authorize such deductions and to allot those deductions to recognized unions. Employees who authorize such deductions must, at least annually, be allowed to revoke their authorization, but no authorization may be withdrawn prior to the end of an initial one-year period.

Union Representation in Formal Discussions. Commanders are required to notify recognized unions and give them the opportunity to be present at formal discussions between management and one or more employees or their representatives regarding any grievance or any personnel policy or practice or other general condition of employment. Formal discussions are not defined in the statute. However, the following factors tend to indicate a formal discussion: (1) more than one management official is present; (2) higher-level management officials are present; (3) personnel, legal, or other staff officials are present; (4) meeting is scheduled in advance; (5) meeting has an agenda; (6) minutes or other records are maintained; (7) a formal grievance is discussed.

It is not necessary that all of these elements be present for a discussion to be considered formal. Routine work-site discussions and performance counseling sessions are not considered formal discussion.

Investigations. Commanders are required to allow the union the opportunity to be represented at any examination of an employee pursuant to an investigation if the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action and if the employee requests representation. This requirement is commonly referred to as the Weingarten Right and only applies in situations where an employee is being questioned under circumstances in which a reasonable person would foresee the possibility of consequent disciplinary action. The law does not require that employees be "read their rights" before questioning. Commanders are required to inform employees annually of their Weingarten Rights.

Third Parties.

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services (FMCS) is an agency which attempts to assist unions and agencies to reach voluntary agreement on negotiation impasses. It has no directive authority.

The Federal Service Impasses Panel. The Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) is a semi-autonomous organization within the Federal Labor Relations Authority which resolves negotiation impasses which agencies and unions have been unable to resolve

through voluntary means, including mediation by FMCS. The FSIP is empowered to impose a settlement on the parties, although it prefers to encourage them to settle voluntarily. It is an ULP to refuse to cooperate in FSIP proceedings or to refuse to comply with an FSIP order.

The Federal Labor Relations Authority. The Federal Labor Relations Authority is an independent regulatory agency headed by three members appointed by the President. The authority is the central policymaking body of the Federal labor-management relations program. It decides representation questions (whether unions should represent certain groups of employees), hears negotiability appeals (whether there is an obligation to negotiate on certain matters), adjudicates ULP's, and hears appeals of arbitrators' awards.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MODERNIZATION PROJECT

During 1985 the Army Inspector General conducted a review of the civilian personnel management system for the Chief of Staff. The IG identified two systemic and interrelated problems: leadership of the civilian component and complexity of the civilian personnel system. In response to the DAIG report, the Chief of Staff chartered the Civilian Personnel Modernization Project as the focal point for review and analysis of the civilian personnel management system. The mission of the project has been to define a civilian personnel system which optimally supports the Army mission; and develop and implement a transition plan to achieve that system. The first year of this effort resulted in a road map for introducing changes to the Army civilian personnel system. The thrust of these changes is to give managers the flexibility, authority, accountability and responsibility they require to provide more effective leadership to the civilian work force. The Chief of Staff, Army approved the general recommendations of the project of 13 April 1987. Additionally, he approved establishment of an office to oversee implementation of these recommendations. Changes in the system will be introduced as appropriate approvals of specific initiatives are obtained.

The challenge to Army leaders is to focus on leading the civilian work force effectively under the current system and to lead the way in guiding the total Army team as it moves to a modernized system.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM

Equal Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government.

While it has long been the policy of the Federal Government to provide equal opportunity in employment on the basis of merit and fitness, the Equal

Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, as amended, placed Federal employees and agencies under the equal employment provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 made it unlawful to discriminate in Federal employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 made it unlawful to pay a different rate to members of the other sex for equal work on jobs that require substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination based on age. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, amended in 1974, prohibits discrimination based on mental or physical handicap in an employment situation.

The enactment of equal employment opportunity legislation has resulted in a Government-wide comprehensive program with legal requirements to insure: that all Federal personnel actions are free of discrimination, that training is provided to enable employees to work at their highest potential, that plans are developed and carried out to provide affirmative action, and that officials are appointed and trained for equal employment opportunity work.

The *Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)*, in administration of this legislation, has responsibility for developing guidance for and monitoring Federal agencies in the development and implementation of affirmative employment programs to increase the representation of minorities, women, and handicapped individuals in the civilian work force; developing policy and providing guidance to Federal agencies on the processing of EEO complaints; conducting hearings on complaints of discrimination; issuing recommended decisions to agencies, and evaluating program effectiveness.

Department of the Army Equal Employment Opportunity Program Management. The authority for equal employment opportunity in the Army is delegated the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary has designated the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) as the Director of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO). On the staff of the Assistant Secretary are two agencies responsible for the separate aspects of the EEO program. The Equal Employment Opportunity Agency (EEOA) is responsible for developing DA policy, guidance, and management of the affirmative action programs, including Special Emphasis Programs (the Federal Women's Program, the Hispanic Employment Program and the Handicapped Individuals Program). The Federal Women Program Manager (FWPM) and the Hispanic Employment Program Manager (HEPM) address the special employment problems and concerns of civilian women and Hispanics. The FWPM and the HEPM establish and implement procedures which identify and resolve actual and perceived system inequities which

adversely affect women and Hispanic employees and identify and resolve underrepresentation and underutilization of women and Hispanics. The Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance and Complaints Review Agency develops and administers DA EEO complaints policy and regulations, prepares final DA complaints decisions and ensures compliance with DA complaints policy and regulations as well as DA and EEOC complaints decisions. Commanders are provided advice and assistance for program implementation by an Equal Employment Opportunity Officer.

Affirmative Action Program. Army activities are responsible for development of Affirmative Action Program Plans (AAPP) for minorities, women, and handicapped individuals in accordance with guidance provided by the EEOC and DA. Within the Army, the EEO Officer (EEOO) takes the lead in the development of the Affirmative Action Program Plan for Minorities and Women. The Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO) normally takes the lead in development of the Affirmative Action Plan for Handicapped Individuals. However, effective plan development and implementation requires the leadership and cooperation of the EEOO, CPO, and managers and supervisors at all levels. Affirmative action planning includes conducting detailed work force utilization analysis to identify occupational groupings and grade levels with underrepresentation, establishing goals and timetables for hiring and advancement, and barrier analyses (see Figure 20-5). This barrier analysis is an assessment of personnel policies, practices, and procedures which may serve as impediments to full representation of minorities, women, and handicapped individuals. Each specific barrier should be identified in the affirmative action plan together with specific steps planned to eliminate or diminish the barrier, with targeted completion dates. Barriers should be examined in the context of the total personnel management process and alternative procedures should provide DA managers with opportunities to exercise discretion in elimination of these barriers. Examples of internally controlled barriers which could be examined are:

- a. Use of civil service status requirements on all job announcements.
- b. Failure to develop "bridge" positions and upward mobility programs.
- c. Use of educational requirements which exceed those required in Office of Personnel Management qualifications standards.

The Discrimination Complaint Process. Complaints may be filed by any civilian employee, applicant for employment, or former employee who believes he or she has been discriminated against because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, physical or mental handicap, age, and/or reprisal in an employment matter subject to control of DA. Complaints may also be filed

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANNING PROCESS




FIGURE 20-5

INDIVIDUAL DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROCEDURES




FIGURE 20-6

in DA by employees from other Federal agencies receiving Army support through a servicing agreement. The procedure does not apply to employees or applicants of the Army and Air Force Exchange System or to non-United States citizens employed by DA outside the United States. Specific procedures are described in AR 690-600, Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints.

In order to minimize the number of complaints, it is necessary to create a management environment characterized by good communications and fair and equitable personnel practices. In creating this environment and in settlements and formal decisions on complaints, activity commanders and their key leaders should play a central role with advice and coordination of the EEO officer, civilian personnel officer, and labor counselor. The DA objective is to achieve resolution of complaints at the lowest organizational level possible in order to minimize costs and possible adverse effects on morale, cohesiveness, and productivity. The complaint process consists of informal counseling and a formal complaint procedure. The formal process provides for a determination to accept or reject the formal complaint, the referral of an accepted formal complaint to the U.S. Army Civilian Appellate Review Agency for investigation, an attempt at informal adjustment and issuance of a proposed disposition upon completion of the investigation, notification to the complainant of a right to request an EEOC hearing, and a final Army decision, with or without an EEOC hearing, with further rights to appeal to EEOC or file suit in Federal court. Specific time frames are outlined in Figure 20-6. Modified procedures for class action complaints are described in AR 690-600.

Activity EEO Program. Commanders are responsible for leadership of affirmative action programs for minorities, women, and handicapped individuals and for the discrimination complaint system for all serviced and tenant organizations. To meet these responsibilities, commanders will, among other efforts:

a. Provide sufficient resources to EEO and civilian personnel officials to administer and operate an effective affirmative action and discrimination complaint program.

b. Ensure that EEO officers are authorized direct and frequent access to the commander to maintain program viability and visibility.

c. Create an environment in which managers and supervisors fully understand and carry out their responsibilities in the discrimination complaint system and the Affirmative Action Program.

d. Ensure that an internal evaluation system is in place to monitor the timeliness and adequacy of the complaint process and the achievement of affirmative action progress.

e. Ensure that higher level command is kept informed of program status and operations.

SUMMARY

This chapter presented a broad overview of the Army's civilian personnel management system and the equal employment opportunity programs and the commanders' responsibilities for civilian leadership and management. It also addressed the legal basis for the Federal Civil Service; reviewed the organization of the Federal Government for the administration and management of the Civil Service; and examined the Department of the Army policies and programs for civilian personnel management, including the Federal labor-management relations program and the equal employment opportunity program.

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CHAPTER 21

ARMY TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

The Training Goal.

The mission of the Total Army is to deter any attack upon U.S. national interests and, if deterrence fails, to engage and defeat any enemy in any environment.

In 1984 "Training" was approved as a new Total Army Goal. That decision highlighted Army leadership's commitment to quality training and its contribution to the accomplishment of the Total Army mission. The training goal is:

TRAINING GOAL

TO PRODUCE A FORCE TRAINED TO MOBILIZE, DEPLOY, FIGHT, AND WIN ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD.

Six supporting objectives were established to provide a structure for developing the Training Goal. The objectives are defined here:

- Institutional Training. Develop institutional centers of excellence in military knowledge and progressive resident training and education to challenge individual potential, initiative, and competence in warfighting skills.

- Active Component Training. Develop Active Component individual and collective training to ensure the tactical and technical expertise necessary for success on a modern battlefield.

- Reserve Component Training. Develop Reserve Component individual and collective training to ensure the tactical and technical expertise necessary for success on a modern battlefield.

- Civilian Component Training. Develop Civilian Component Training to ensure technical, managerial, and professional skills and competencies necessary for Army mission accomplishment.

- Training Support. Provide the training support necessary for the development of individual and collective competence in warfighting skills.

- Training Research and Development. Develop more efficient and effective training methods and management through research and development of emerging science and engineering technology.

Chapter Organization.

This chapter examines Total Army training by subsystems. The discussion is presented in seven sections:

- The Army Training System. An overview.
- The Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing Subsystem.
- The Training Doctrine and Training Development Subsystems.
- The Institutional Training Subsystem.
- Forces Training Subsystem.
- The Training Support Subsystem.
- Training Issues.

THE ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM

Overview.

The Army Training System is shown in Figure 21-1. Over the years there has been little change in the input or the desired output, but the basic concepts and methods of measuring and evaluating training have changed. The scope of the system is wide-ranging since almost everything the Army does impacts either directly or indirectly on training.

The three major components of the training system— institutional training, forces training, and training support—also reflect the mutually supporting role and close balance needed within the system. Because the Army's ultimate purpose is to prepare combat ready units that can, and will, mobilize, deploy, fight, and win, the goals and standards incorporated in the Army Training System apply equally to the Active and Reserve Components of the Total Army.

This chapter will look further into the inputs, organizations, processes, outputs, and issues of the system and its subsystems.

Training does not operate in a vacuum. It interrelates with other management systems, mainly personnel, research and development, and logistics. References will be made to the appropriate chapters that describe these systems and to how the systems interface.

ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM




FIGURE 21-1

THE POLICY, REQUIREMENTS, AND RESOURCING SUBSYSTEM

General.

The Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing Subsystem is displayed in Figure 21-2. Input is provided by manpower programs (Chapter 11), force structure changes (Chapters 10, 12, and 13), and resourcing actions (Chapters 14, 15, and 16). Training activities draw funds from Program 8T (Training), Program 2 (General Purpose Forces), Program 5 (Reserve Components), and base operations.

Organization.

For many years on the DA staff, functional responsibilities for training were intertwined between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). There was no single manager for training in the aggregate at DA. An analysis of the environment projected for the 1980's made it evident that the training function at HQDA had to be more sharply focused and centralized. So, in October, 1978, the Training Directorate was formed in ODCSOPS. The Training Directorate combined the once disparate functions of institutional and unit training and training support. It provides the Army a single point of contact for all issues which have training impact. Other DA staff elements which have a direct or indirect impact on the training systems are:

— *Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (OASA(MRA))*. OASA(MRA) has established a training division to assist in the development, implementation, and review of policies and programs related to achieving the Army goal of effective and efficient training and education for the Total Army.

— *Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER)*. Responsible for administering precommissioning programs for officers (USMA, ROTC and OCS); civilian personnel training; and training for equal opportunity, organizational effectiveness, and alcohol and drug abuse (Chapters 19 and 20). ODCSPER is the single DA manager for inputs to training which include managing the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT).

— *U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC)*. Objective is to obtain the quantity and quality of volunteers to meet Army requirements (Chapter 19).

— *U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN)*. Projects training requirements for Active Army, both officer and enlisted, by fiscal year. Allocates training spaces for Active Army officer and enlisted based on projected unit requirements and distribution policies.

— *Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN)*. Commands and controls all Individual Ready Reserve

THE POLICY, REQUIREMENTS, AND RESOURCING SUBSYSTEM




FIGURE 21-2

(IRR) members. Provides individual training management to the IRR, both officer and enlisted (Chapter 13). Responsible for OPMS-USAR and EPMS-USAR.

— *Comptroller of the Army (COA)*. Formulates the Army budget, issues manpower and dollar guidance, distributes funds to commands and agencies, and monitors obligation rates and reprogramming actions (Chapter 14).

— *Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition (DCSRDA)*. Manages the life cycle of materiel and non-materiel items used by individuals and units in mission performance (Chapter 17).

— *Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG)*. Responsible for logistics readiness of Army forces, to include supportability/maintainability of equipment in troop units (Chapter 18).

— *Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI)*. Responsible for Opposing Force program and assisting ODCSOPS on intelligence training policy (Chapter 24).

— *Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB)*. The National Guard Bureau promulgates training policy for Army National Guard units through National Guard Regulation (NGR) 350-1. CNGB also programs the resources for NG training and allocates training spaces to the states. National Guard unit commanders are responsible for their unit's training. FORSCOM establishes training criteria and supervises training of Army National Guard (ARNG) units. Policy and

guidance are contained in FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 (Chapter 13).

— *Chief, Army Reserve (CAR)*. The CAR programs training resources for the Army Reserve and monitors USAR training activities. The CAR manages professional development training for USAR officers and senior Noncommissioned Officers through ARPERCEN (Chapter 13).

Policy.

DA training management guidance defines policy and provides a detailed discussion on topics such as training responsibilities, resources, evaluations, literature, aids, devices, and simulations. Emphasis on training-for-results is highlighted, with performance-oriented training stressed as the best approach. DA source documents are *The Army Plan*; AR 34-4; AR 350-1; AR 350-10; AR 350-41; AR 351-1; and DA Circular 350-85-4. They provide policy guidance for Army training and are the bases for development of appropriate Field Manuals which implement those policies. Training regulations at all levels include objectives, policies, guidance, and general responsibilities for the conduct and management of training.

ARMY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES SYSTEM (ATRRS) FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING

The ATRRS process consists of three major steps. They are: (1) development of individual training requirements, (2) resourcing courses, and (3) executing training programs. Each step will be discussed in detail.

Development of Individual Training Requirements.

The development of individual training requirements (Figure 21-3) begins with the identification of force structure authorizations from the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) and Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP). PERSACS is produced semiannually, usually in April and November. The PERSACS contains the force structure of the Active Army, USAR, and ARNG at the MOS and grade level. The AAMMP is produced as required, but at least monthly; and contains manning data such as Active Army end strength, monthly recruiting requirements, and inputs to training by components for seven fiscal years. ODCSPER designates the AAMMP to be used in developing training requirements.


The Active Army PERSACS is provided to MILPERCEN. A review for completeness is conducted with assistance from Soldier Support Center—National Capitol Region (SSC-NCR) to insure all unit activations/inactivations, conversions, known modernization impacts, or other changes are properly considered. The authorization file from PERSACS is adjusted as warranted. The product is the Personnel

Management Authorization Document (PMAD). Currently there is not a similar review of the Reserve Component.

Using the PMAD, the Military Occupational Specialty Level System (MOSLS) process determines Active Army skill requirements. MOSLS compares MOS and grade authorizations with the current MOS and grade inventory, aged to the fiscal year under consideration by applying gain, loss, and promotion factors. The difference between the authorizations and the aged inventory constitutes the number of trained soldiers, by skill, that must be produced from the training base (output). Applying training attrition rates at the skill level to that number provides the number required to begin training (input).

While MILPERCEN, through the use of MOSLS, is developing Active Army training requirements, the Reserve Components develop their skill requirements using similar automated systems. USAR uses the Training Requirements Generator (TRG) and the ARNG uses their Automated Program to Project AIT Training Spaces (APPATS). TRG and APPATS compute training requirements using their

DEVELOPING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCING THE TRAINING BASE



AAMMP – ACTIVE ARMY MILITARY MANPOWER PROGRAM
 APPATS – AUTOMATED PROGRAM TO PROJECT AIT TRAINING SPACES
 ARPRINT – ARMY PROGRAM FOR INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
 ATRRS – ARMY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES SYSTEM
 ELIM-COMPLIP – ENLISTED LOSS INVENTORY MODEL – COMPUTATION OF MANPOWER PROGRAMS BY LINEAR PROGRAMMING
 MOSLS – MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY LEVEL SYSTEM
 REQUEST – RECRUIT QUOTA SYSTEM
 SMDR – STRUCTURE/MANNING DECISION REVIEW
 TRG – TRAINING REQUIREMENTS GENERATOR

FIGURE 21-3

authorizations and current inventory. The inputs to training by skill produced by MOSLS, TRG, and APPATS are the Total Army accession-driven training requirements and are provided to ODCSPER for inclusion in the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT). Officer accession-driven training requirements and NCO training requirements are also provided.

Other training requirements are identified by MILPERCEN for officer and enlisted in-service personnel who require training to support professional development, reenlistment or reclassification programs, and mission requirements. Additionally, TRADOC solicits in-service training requirements from other MACOM's, State Adjutants General, and other services and agencies.

The accession-driven, in-service, and other skill training requirements are combined as total raw training requirements within the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). The ATRRS' automated data base includes a list of Army skill training courses to include length, capacity, frequency, and location. It also includes other Services' courses attended by Army personnel. The skill requirements are translated into course requirements and become the total raw training requirements at the course level of detail by component and fiscal year.

Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT).

A major ATRRS output is the ARPRINT. It identifies by fiscal year projected individual training requirements for established courses and for skills where new courses are required. Based upon identified training requirements, subsequent actions are taken to provide resources (manpower, money, facilities, ammunition, and equipment) to train the required number of soldiers.

The flow of trainees into the training base, termed seasonality, varies by component. By applying those seasonality factors, the flow of input can be shown in a seasonalized ARPRINT reflecting weekly inputs by course and component.

Resourcing Required Courses.

After the training requirements are developed, the next major task in the process is the development of the training program for each MOS.

The first step in establishing a training program is the Structure/Manning Decision Review (SMDR), co-chaired by ODCSPER and ODCSOPS. It includes representatives from ODCSPER, ODCSOPS, OTSG, TRADOC, AMC, Academy of Health Sciences, MILPERCEN, Soldier Support Center-National Capitol Region, NGB, OCAR, USAREC, ODCSLOG, OCE, and the individual proponent schools. The purpose of the SMDR (Figure 21-4) is to validate training requirements, compare training requirements with training resources, and adjust training requirements or training resources to form

recommended training programs. Normally the SMDR focuses on a fiscal year 28 months prior to execution (e.g. SMDR May '87 looked at FY 90 requirements and relooked FY 89 requirements).

STRUCTURE/MANNING DECISION REVIEW (SMDR)




FIGURE 21-4

The SMDR categorizes each course. The first category is composed of those courses where the total training requirement can be trained with available resources. The second category consists of courses where the requirements exceed the resourced capability of the training base, but either resources can be provided or the requirements reduced to the resourced level without significant impact on the manning program. The third category are those courses where the requirement exceeds the capacity, requires significant resources, and cannot be reduced without significant impact on the manning program. These courses are termed "constrained." The results of the SMDR are briefed to a "Council of Colonels" which attempts to confirm category two adjustments/resources and move as many courses as possible from category three to category two.

All courses in categories two and three are then referred to a general officer-level Manning/Training Review. At that review, the general officers review and approve the actions taken by the "Council of Colonels." Each course remaining constrained is reviewed to include current authorizations, projected operating strength, training requirements, training capability, source of constraint, resources required to eliminate the constraint, availability of required resources, and a recommended course of action. That review results in a resourced training requirement which is termed an approved training *program* for each course for that fiscal year.

After the General Officer Manning/Training Review is completed, both the training requirement and the training program are published by ODCSPER in the ARPRINT. That ARPRINT is a mission document for the training base. The individual schools and training

centers then develop class schedules to support the established training *program* for each course. The class schedules then are loaded into ATRRS. When all class schedules are loaded, they are transmitted electronically by ODCSPER to MILPERCEN for loading on REQUEST and RETAIN as scheduled training seats.

Training Program Execution.

MILPERCEN initially allocates training seats by MOS and class to those agencies having training requirements in the MOS and who exercise quota control for ARNG/USAR Active Duty for Training (ADT)/Full Time Training Duty (FTTD), other services/agencies, and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Program. The remaining class seats are then loaded on the REQUEST System and become available seats for filling by REQUEST users.

Drawing from allocated seats on REQUEST, USAREC guidance counselors reserve seats needed to support Active Army accession and USAR inputs to training. The ARNG guidance counselors also reserve seats. Additionally, Active Army in-service and reenlistment/reclassification managers fill their allocated seats.

The entire process from the loading of REQUEST through inputs to training is monitored by the Training Requirements Arbitration Panel (TRAP). The panel is chaired by ODCSPER and has representatives from ODCSOPS, MILPERCEN, NGB, OCAR, ARPERCEN, TRADOC, OTSG, and USAREC. The TRAP meets monthly to manage changes to training requirements and class schedules during the execution training year. The TRAP considers policy changes that affect training seat allocations and fill. It defines problem areas and recommends solutions with the objectives of achieving optimum use of the training base and meeting the changing skilled manpower needs of the Army. The TRAP insures any changes are supportable within allocated training seats or elevates the problem to the "Council of Colonels" and general officer level as warranted.

Although the proponent schools know how many seats per class they have submitted, they need to know the number of soldiers with valid reservations for classes. Currently they do not receive accurate, timely, and complete information. ODCSPER is implementing the Personnel Training Management System (PTMS) as the single management information system monitoring the flow of trainees through the accession, training, and distribution process.

Conceptually, PTMS will function similar to an airline ticket reservation system. When class schedules are loaded and provided to the quota control agencies, class seats will be allocated to the input agencies. The input agencies will make by-name reservations for training seats. For IET courses on REQUEST, projected ATRRS interfaces with REQUEST, and System 80 will provide reservation data for loading on PTMS. This will then permit the schools to monitor the

individual class fill and have by-name information to update PTMS with enrollees, "no shows" and attritions during the course.

Upon graduation, the school uses a code to designate the soldier as a graduate. Weekly graduate tapes are produced from PTMS and provided to MILPERCEN for updating the Enlisted Master File (EMF) and Officer Master File (OMF). This procedure is currently in use for selected courses and will be used as the number of courses on PTMS is expanded.

Mobilization Training Management System (MTMS).

MTMS is a subsystem of ATRRS and is completely compatible with the peacetime system. It is a planning system in peacetime which becomes a management system upon mobilization. It is designed to give training managers at installation level and above prompt access to information necessary to plan and to implement mobilization of the Army training base. MTMS produces the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOB ARPRINT) which provides data for trainee and student inputs by skill course to satisfy post-mobilization requirements for trained manpower as determined by MOB-PERSACS. Once mobilization is initiated, data from the MOB ARPRINT is used to produce class schedules within ATRRS which in turn are placed on REQUEST Mobilization Subsystem (RMS) as training seats. RMS uses those seats to control the flow by skill into the training base. A capability to compute mobilization resources needed to support the input requirement is under development.

THE TRAINING DOCTRINE AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SUBSYSTEMS

General.

The Training Doctrine and Training Development Subsystems are displayed in Figure 21-5. Input is provided by the Training Policy, Requirements and Resourcing Subsystem, force development programs (Chapter 11), the PPBES (Chapter 14) and materiel-related actions (Chapters 17 and 18).

Organization.

TRADOC is responsible for developing training doctrine and providing support for institutional and unit training which includes determining requirements for training and doctrine literature, range, ammunition and target guidance, training devices, and facilities.

The single manager for training in TRADOC is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST). He interfaces with: TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Administration, and Logistics (DCSPAL) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments (DCSCD) in the EPMS/OPMS areas and with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM) in the resource validation and

THE TRAINING DOCTRINE AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SUBSYSTEMS




FIGURE 21-5

Management Information System areas. The DCST coordinates with MILPERCEN for management of trainee accessions. The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine (DCSDOC) is the program manager for the Armywide Doctrinal and Training Literature Program (TRADOC Pamphlet 310-6).

The DCST has general staff supervision of several TRADOC subelements which have a growing impact on training:

— *Training Technology Agency (TTA)*. TTA's mission is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Army training through the testing and application of training technology (techniques, strategies, methods, hardware, and software). Through a cooperative working partnership with the Army Research Institute and selected TRADOC service schools, TTA develops, tests, and implements a wide variety of training technology to solve training problems in the training base and exports successful results Armywide.

— *Army Training Support Center (ATSC)*. ATSC is a field operating agency of TRADOC. It standardizes, publishes, and distributes the bulk of training support products which the service schools develop. The training support system on page 21-29 further explains the role of ATSC.

HQDA authorizes direct communication between MACOM's on matters of mutual interest; moreover, TRADOC is authorized to task non-TRADOC commands, schools, and agencies, except the Academy

of Health Sciences, to provide specialized subject materials for instruction in the Army School System.

— Three integrating centers are directly under the Commanding General, TRADOC. They are: the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), the U.S. Army Logistics Center, and the U.S. Army Soldier Support Center. They integrate doctrine, combat developments, training developments, institutional training, and support of training within their associated schools. CAC insures integration of combined arms and support between integrating centers.

— Other subelements of TRADOC associated with training analysis and development are the Combat Developments Experimentation Center (CDEC) at Fort Ord, California; TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and subordinate centers; and the TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity (TCATA) at Fort Hood, Texas.

The TRADOC service schools (proponents) have a central role in the Training System. They are the primary source of doctrine and develop training materials used Armywide. A standard organization is geared to the school functions. The school directorates are: Combat Developments, Training and Doctrine, and Evaluation and Standardization. The schools are the starting point for any examination of the system, and their primacy will be pointed out throughout the chapter.

Training Development.

Systems Approach to Training (SAT). The SAT (TRADOC Regulation 350-7) disciplines thinking and

leads to better decisions on what to train, how to train, and how to assess training effectiveness. It requires thought and application of judgment and is not a mechanical production process. This approach ensures valid, reliable results which are recorded for review in future deliberations as in an audit trail. It prevents viewing components and decisions in isolation. The systems approach makes certain that critical performance requirements of the Army establish the content of training. The equivalent "how to" for the unit setting is provided in TRADOC Reg 310-2 and the FM 25 series of documents. TRADOC Regulation 351-6, 1 December 1982, provides guidance to TRADOC school commandants and training developers. As long as the minimum requirements outlined in these regulations are met, training managers have the latitude to tailor the "how to" procedures to their individual organizational needs and available resources, and to the needs of the units which they support.

The SAT consists of five interrelated processes:

1. Evaluate: Evaluation encompasses both internal and external aspects of the training system. Internal evaluations determine if students can perform tasks to training standards and if training is consistent with decisions made within a Systems Approach to Training. External evaluations determine the effectiveness of graduates and exported training materials in meeting the needs of units in the total force.

2. Analyze: A systematic top-down process of identifying specific training needs from performance requirements. The analysis process, sequentially assesses unit missions, mission critical collective tasks, leadership tasks, and critical individual tasks.

3. Design: Conversion of critical tasks into learning objectives, performance measures, sequential training steps, and performance-oriented tests.

4. Develop: The production of resident and nonresident training programs and support materials that insure the attainment of training objectives.

5. Implement: Train the trainers and conduct the training.

Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS).

TRADOC Regulation 351-1, TRAS, describes a systematic management process used to facilitate the timely development and implementation of training by documenting the plans and supporting requirements. Although TRAS addresses both institutional and forces training, the emphasis is on institutional training. TRAS integrates the training development and implementation process with external resource acquisition systems (e.g., personnel, construction, training equipment, new systems, ammunition, and resource management) which provide support for the training to be developed. The TRAS process is supported by three documents. They

are the Individual Training Plan (ITP), the Course Administrative Data (CAD), and the Program of Instruction (POI).

— ***ITP.*** This document describes the training proponent's (TRADOC schools) overall plan to satisfy training requirements for the AC and RC during peacetime and mobilization. The need for a new or revised ITP can be generated from materiel acquisition, Military Occupational Specialty restructuring, field performance discrepancies, training methodology or strategy changes, and changes in doctrine and organization. In general, the ITP is prepared for each enlisted Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), commissioned officer branch, warrant officer MOS, or separate functional training program. It is prepared after identification of a requirement for new or revised training and consists of a narrative description of the training strategy, a milestone schedule, and a resource estimate. Ideally, the ITP is submitted 30-36 months prior to the fiscal year of training implementation and generally covers an 8-year period to ensure the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) process is integrated with the Life Cycle System Management Model (LCSMM) and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). The ITP is updated any time the proponent determines there are significant changes or when more accurate estimates are available.

— ***CAD.*** This document, prepared for each resident course within an ITP and a POI, provides critical planning information. The CAD is used for development of individual training (student input) requirements for new or revised courses, as well as establishment or update of a course file in the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). This information permits student loads to be programmed and school manpower authorization documents to be revised to authorize the necessary instructors.

— ***POI.*** The POI, submitted 6 months prior to course implementation, is a formal course document which contains or updates the previously approved CAD and describes the training content, hours and types of instruction, and resources required to conduct peacetime and mobilization training in an institutional setting (resident training). More than one course may be included in a single POI.

Once the training proponent develops an ITP, generally at the beginning of the SAT Analysis phase, it is used as a source of information for the Military Construction, Army (MCA) Command Priorities List, Training Ammunition Management System (TAMS), Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR), Modernization Resource Information Submission (MRIS), Letter Requests (LR), TRADOC Review of Manpower (TRM), the Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) updates during Management of Change (MOC) cycles, personnel and equipment

requisitions, Command Operating Budget (COB), and Installation Contracts. The CAD and supporting resource data, normally developed during the SAT design phase, are used to develop information for the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR), Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT), TRM, TAADS updates, requisitions, and COB. The POI is prepared during the SAT development phase and provides detailed course information and specific resource requirements. In order for TRADOC to obtain resources from HQDA to support training implementation, training development (analysis, design, and development), and training evaluation supporting a new training requirement, the ITP needs to be submitted approximately three years prior to the fiscal year in which the resources are required.

The TRAS documents identify the training and resource requirements (who, what, when, where, why, and how) and are used as the sources of information to support a training requirement. However, the proponents must program and initiate requests for the needed resource support. The proponent must also ensure timely interface with critical PPBES events in order to develop training products and implement a training strategy. The result, if all related inputs and management systems function properly, is the arrival of instructors, students, training materials, equipment, ammunition, and facilities at the appropriate place, in the proper configuration, at the time required, in order to implement the training strategy.

THE INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING SYSTEM

General.

Institutional training is individual or collective training in the training base which uses approved programs of instruction and includes a curriculum which is structured, developed, and supported by a service school, service training center, or any educational institution under DOD sanction.

The Institutional Training System (Figure 21-6), through centers and schools, must provide recruits, noncommissioned officers, and officers with a solid foundation of individual skills and standards with which they can become fully effective members of crews, platoons, and companies. The peacetime and mobilization training base is part of an overall system that produces a well-trained, modern, mission-capable Army.

Input.

The Institutional Training System uses input from the Training Doctrine and Training Development Subsystems, and the Training Policy, Requirements and Resourcing Subsystem.

Output.

The output of the Institutional Training System is trained soldiers.

THE INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING SYSTEM




FIGURE 21-6

The Process.

The SAT process helps identify training tasks and assists training developers to decide where the tasks should be taught. Generally, most critical combat tasks are taught within the training base but there are not enough time or resources to teach all the tasks. Forces training expands on training received in the training base.

Enlisted Initial Entry Training.

The Concept. Initial Entry Training (IET) is the introductory training given to all personnel on initial entry into the Army. It provides an orderly transition from civilian to military life, motivation to become a dedicated and productive member of the Army, introduction to the basic skills required by all members of the Army, and training to the apprentice level in those critical skills taught in the training base at Skill Level 1.

At Department of the Army, the DCSOPS exercises general staff supervision of initial entry level training except for AMEDD personnel. The CG, TRADOC is responsible for conducting initial entry training. He accomplishes that task through the Commandants of the TRADOC schools and Commanders of the U.S. Army Training Centers (USATC). Field units are encouraged to provide feedback and subject matter expertise to assist the schools and ATC's in continuing ITP development. AHS performs this function for AMEDD personnel.

Pre-Initial Entry Training. The Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC), Lackland AFB, TX, operates the Pre-BCT English-as-a-Second Language Program. U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) identifies nonnative English speaking

accessions and the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) administers the English Comprehensive Level Test (ECLT). Those individuals scoring below 70 attend DLIELC for 14-24 weeks prior to BCT. USAREC contracts the exact training time based on ECLT scores. The Army discharges anyone not achieving a 70 ECLT score within the contracted stay at DLIELC.

IET Modes (Figure 21-7).

— *Basic Combat Training (BCT).* BCT is eight weeks of training in basic military skills given to all newly enlisted Active and Reserve Component personnel who have no prior military service. BCT transitions civilians to soldiers. It develops discipline, commitment, and spirit; and teaches basic combat survival skills while toughening soldiers mentally and physically. To successfully complete BCT, a soldier must qualify with the M-16A1 and the grenade, and pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) and end-of-course test.

— *Advanced Individual Training (AIT).* Advanced Individual Training occurs after completion of BCT. AIT builds on the soldierization skills acquired in BCT while developing each soldier to the level of proficiency required for the award of an MOS.

Soldiers take one of three AIT paths: MOS training at a USATC, MOS training at a school, or MOS training through supervised on-the-job training at their units. Supervised OJT programs provide for training in a small number of very low density MOS's for which formal courses of instruction would not be cost effective. A formal training and testing plan and school-trained tutors are required.

In addition to the BCT/AIT modes of training described, soldiers can take one of the following paths to complete initial entry training (Figure 21-7):




FIGURE 21-7

— **One Station Unit Training (OSUT).** OSUT training is conducted at one installation, in the same company-size unit, with the same cadre, and one program of instruction. The OSUT mode is used for all combat arms MOS (except Aviation) and selected combat support MOS.

— **The Split Training Option (STO).** STO permits selected individuals to enlist in the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve and complete Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) in two phases separated by a period of not more than 12 months. The program is designed to attract students and seasonal workers to enlist in the ARNG or USAR by minimizing the training time impact on education or employment endeavors. Upon successful completion of Phase I of the STO program, the member is released from IADT and returns to his ARNG or USAR unit to participate in unit training between STO phases. STO members are in a paid status while attending unit training assemblies between phases of IADT. Within one year of release from Phase I, the member must reenter training to complete MOS qualification during Phase II of the STO program. During Phase II members are in an IADT status to comply with statutory training requirements.

The Initial Entry Training System.

— **Entry.** After enlistment, the enlistee is sent to a Reception Battalion at a USATC. When possible, the USATC is one which will provide the enlistee with his or her MOS training. Reserve Component enlistees process through a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) to a USATC the same as Active Component personnel.

— **The Reception Battalion.** Reception Stations (REC STA) were redesignated Reception Battalions in May 1986. The first contact the enlistee has with the Army is the Reception Battalion. The mission of the Reception Battalion is to receive and process all enlistees and certain categories of prior service personnel reporting for active duty in the United States Army. At present, there are eight active Reception Battalions, (Forts Benning, Dix, Jackson, McClellan, Sill, Bliss, Knox, Leonard Wood). Reception battalions process a normal weekly input based on the staffing and facilities capacity of the training center.

Any personnel found to have a disqualifying defect are immediately processed for discharge. Initial immunizations and eyeglasses for those personnel who require them are also provided during processing. Each receptee is given an advance payment to provide for initial health and comfort items. Trainees also receive a Phase I issue of clothing during processing. Phase I clothing consists of the duty uniforms required for the first four weeks of training. Trainees may return to the clothing issue facility for exchange of clothing which no longer fits because of weight loss or gain. A Phase II issue of clothing is conducted about the fourth week of training. The Reception Battalion also verifies the

validity and appropriateness of the enlistment contract and explains the significance of the programmed MOS to the receptees. A USAR liaison NCO from Recruiting Command and an ARNG Liason NCO are available at each battalion to assist in resolving enlistment contract problems. Processing normally is completed in three working days. Upon completion of processing, trainees report to a training company to begin IET. The training cycle for the company begins when sufficient personnel have been received by the units.

— **Training Center Organization.** Each USATC has one or more BCT and/or OSUT or AIT brigades. The mission of the brigade is to provide the prescribed training for personnel entering the U.S. Army. The brigade provides command and control over four or more training battalions. The majority of staff functions are consolidated at the brigade level, permitting austere manning of the training battalions. The staff of the training brigade is similar in size and composition to the traditional brigade structure except for the maintenance and communications spaces which are not required. The brigade commander usually has special and summary courts-martial authority to discharge soldiers (AR 635-200). The Commanding General of the USATC acts on all appeals.

The training battalions in BCT, OSUT, and AIT brigades provide command, control, and administration for both permanent party and trainee personnel in four or more training companies. The battalion coordinates, supervises, and directs training, administration, and housekeeping and provides limited logistical support including food service. The headquarters consists of a Commander (LTC), Executive Officer (MAJ), Operations Officer (CPT), Sergeant Major, and eight personnel in the Personnel Administration Center (PAC). The dining facility normally is operated via contract.

The heart of the training center organization is the training company. The company (battery) receives, equips, quarters, trains, and provides limited administration for approximately 200 trainees. It conducts a substantial portion of the total training with major emphasis on drill, physical training, and other subjects applicable to basic soldiering. The company also assists in the conduct of committee group instruction. The training company consists of a Company Commander (CPT), Training Officer (LT), First Sergeant (E-8), Training NCO (E-7), Supply Sergeant (E-6), Armorer (E-4), and 12 Drill Sergeants (E-7s and E-6s).

The persons having the greatest influence on the new soldiers are the Drill Sergeants. They establish the soldiers' initial impression of the Army and its leadership. NCO's assigned to Drill Sergeant duty attend a nine-week group paced course, and are awarded the skill qualification indicator "X" and campaign hat (males) or bush hat (females). Additionally, they receive special duty assignment

proficiency pay (minimum \$110.00, maximum \$165.00 per month, depending on time as a Drill Sergeant), and special uniform issue. Because of the long duty hours, repetitious-type training, and family and job pressures, Drill Sergeants are closely monitored to insure that their attitude and duty performance are in concert with established standards. A Drill Sergeant's tour of duty is 24 months; however, he can request one 12-month extension which must be approved by MILPERCEN. Section XV of AR 611-200 defines the policies with respect to the selection, assignment, control, and transfer of Drill Sergeants.

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

NCOES is an integrated system of resident training in service schools, NCO academies, ARNG military academies, and RF schools. NCOES provides continuous training from Skill Level 2 through Skill Level 5. It is an integral part of the enlisted personnel management system. NCOES should be fully developed by 1987 for the Active Component (AC) and by 1990 for the Reserve Component (RC).

The objectives of the NCOES are to train NCO's to be trainers and leaders of soldiers, provide necessary job proficiency training, and to improve unit readiness through individual proficiency of the NCO and subordinate soldier.

NCOES begins after a soldier gains proficiency at Skill Level 1 through IET and individual training in his unit. NCOES training is linked to the remaining skill levels, i.e., primary—Skill Level 2; basic—Skill Level 3; advanced—Skill Level 4; and senior—Skill Level 5. Figure 21-8 displays the Noncommissioned Officer Education System skill levels and courses.

ENLISTED TRAINING PROGRAM			
GRADE	SKILL LEVEL	COURSES	TRAINING LEVEL AND LOCATION
E-9	5	SGTS MAJOR ACADEMY	SENIOR (SERV SCHOOLS)
E-8*	5	1 SGTS COURSE	
E-7	4	ANCOC	ADVANCED (SERV SCHOOLS)
E-6	3	BNCOC	BASIC (NCOA & SERV SCHOOLS)
E-5	2	PLDC	PRIMARY (NCOA & SERV SCHOOLS)
E-1-E-4	1	OSUT (CA) OR BCT/AIT (CS/CSS)	INITIAL ENTRY (ATC & SERV SCHOOLS)
NOTE: PLDC, BNCOC, AND ANCOC RC CONFIGURED COURSES TAUGHT AT ARNG ACADEMIES/RF SCHOOLS			
* FUNCTIONAL COURSE TAUGHT AT FORT BLISS/USAREUR			

FIGURE 21-8

— Primary Level. Primary level instruction prepares soldiers to perform Skill Level 2 tasks and is the first developmental training given to E4 (P)s/E5s who have entered or exhibited qualifications to enter the career force. Leadership, supervisory, and technical training is given through the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) conducted as a resident course at Active Component and ARNG NCO academies and RF schools.

— Basic Level. This training prepares soldiers to perform Skill Level 3 tasks. The Basic Noncommissioned Officer's Course (BNCOC) prepares E5(P)s/E6s to conduct individual and collective training and to participate in platoon-level Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tasks. BNCOC is conducted at NCO academies and service schools and RF schools.

— Advanced Level. The Advanced Level Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) broadens the skills and knowledge required at Skill Level 4. ANCOC also provides merger training where several MOS's converge at grade E7. DA selection boards select people to attend resident courses in the Service Schools. RC selectees attend NCO academies and RF schools.

— Senior Level. Senior Level Noncommissioned Officer Courses (SNCOC) provide training to support duty positions found at grades E8 and E9; examples, First Sergeant Course and Operations/Intelligence NCO Course are conducted at the Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss. Many SNCOC are offered only through the extension mode.

— The Sergeants Major Course (SMC), taught at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), is the capstone course for all NCOES training. It is available to all eligible soldiers through both the resident mode and the corresponding studies program administered by USASMA.

The Reserve Component Noncommissioned Officer Education System (RC-NCOES).

Recognizing the need to standardize Army NCO training systems as much as possible and considering the time and money constraints affecting the RC, the 1985 Noncommissioned Officers Professional Development Study (NCOPDS) recommended implementation of an RC-NCOES to mirror its AC counterpart. RC-NCOES now provides leader and MOS skill training modeled after AC-NCOES. The training strategy adds MOS specific training in the form of RC configured courses, exportable for instruction at U.S. Army Reserve Forces (USARF) Schools and ARNG NCO Academies, with either component sending students to the courses in their geographical area. RC configured courses are to be concurrently developed and updated with the AC versions. RC-NCOES courses are now mandatory for

promotion to the grades of SSG (PLDC), SFC (BNCOC), and MSG (ANCOC), respectively. BNCOC and ANCOC courses are taught in two phases: Phase I common core during weekend Inactive Duty for Training (IDT), and Phase II hands-on MOS-specific tasks during a single two-week Active Duty for Training (ADT)/Full Time Training Duty (FTTD). Both phases will be completed within one training year.

Warrant Officer Training.

Concept. Warrant Officers are officers appointed by warrant by the Secretary of the Army based on technical and tactical competence. The warrant officer is the highly-specialized expert and trainer, who, by gaining progressive levels of expertise and leadership, operates, maintains, administers, and manages the Army's equipment, support activities, or technical systems for an entire career. Warrant officers exercise leadership and managerial skills in specific technical areas. They lead enlisted and civilian personnel in the technical and

tactical aspects of operations and organizations related to their own specialties. Their schooling is directed primarily toward specialty training in depth.

Warrant Officer Training. The Chief of Staff, Army approved a recent Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS) recommendation, and the Warrant Officer Training System (WOTS) is being modified as shown in Figure 21-9. In FY 87, the Army will complete coding all warrant officer positions by rank. This will eliminate the current system of assigning any grade warrant officer to any position without regard to rank, position requirements for training, experience, or expertise. The WOTS is a three-level training system that will train to meet specific requirements at each rank level: entry, senior, and master. WOTS is in a transition to the TWOS approved format, and the training levels are currently called entry, advanced, and senior, respectively.

WARRANT OFFICER TRAINING SYSTEM 1988

PREAPPOINTMENT 0		YEARS OF 5		WARRANT OFFICER 11		SERVICE 30	
ENTRY LEVEL				SENIOR LEVEL		MASTER LEVEL	
WARRANT OFFICER CANDIDATES		WARRANT OFFICERS WO1/CW2		CHIEF WARRANT OFFICERS CW3/CW4		MASTER WARRANT OFFICERS SELECT CW4 OR CW5	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• TRIPLE CHECK ACCESSION PROCEDURES<ul style="list-style-type: none">(1) CANDIDATE SELECTION(2) WARRANT OFFICER ENTRY COURSE(3) TECHNICAL CERTIFICATION BY MOS PROPONENT• TENDERED WARRANT OFFICER APPOINTMENT		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OR FUNCTIONAL TRAINING REQUIRED<ul style="list-style-type: none">- ACCP AVAILABLE• UNIT TRAINING		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SENIOR WARRANT OFFICER TRAINING COURSE (SWOT)*<ul style="list-style-type: none">- TRADOC COMMON CORE MODULE- PROPONENT COMMON CORE MODULE- MOS SPECIFIC MODULE• FUNCTIONAL TRAINING AS REQUIRED<ul style="list-style-type: none">- AWARD OF ASI/SOI- PREASSIGNMENT- TRAINING WITH INDUSTRY• UNIT TRAINING• CURRENTLY WO ADVANCED COURSE (WOAC)		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• MASTER WARRANT OFFICER TRAINING COURSE (MWOT)**<ul style="list-style-type: none">- TRADOC COMMON CORE MODULE<ul style="list-style-type: none">-NONRESIDENT DO-AHEAD PACKAGE-RESIDENT COMMON CORE TRAINING- PROPONENT COMMON CORE MODULE- MOS-SPECIFIC MODULE• FUNCTIONAL TRAINING AS REQUIRED<ul style="list-style-type: none">- AWARD OF ASI/SOI- PREASSIGNMENT- TRAINING WITH INDUSTRY• UNIT TRAINING• • CURRENTLY WO SENIOR SENIOR COURSE (WOSC)	
CIVIL SCHOOLS PROGRAM							
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• AVAILABLE TO ALL WO IN SUPPORT OF MOS RELATED ASSOCIATE DEGREE GOAL		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• AVAILABLE TO ALL SWO IN SUPPORT OF MOS• MOS RELATED DEGREE GOAL• AVAILABLE TO SELECTED SWO IN SUPPORT OF PENDING AERB ASSIGNMENTS		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• AVAILABLE TO SELECTED MWO IN SUPPORT OF PENDING AERB ASSIGNMENTS			

FIGURE 21-9

At the entry level, a "triple check" preappointment evaluation/training process requires (1) selection by a centralized board (MILPERCEN, ARPERCEN, States Adjutants General), (2) successful completion of a Warrant Officer Entry Course (WOEC), and (3) technical certification by the TRADOC MOS proponent. The WOEC is a 6-week, 4-day course which provides standardized training to warrant officer candidates. Content includes leadership and ethics, communicative arts, military history, structure of the Army, land navigation, support functions, and other common military subjects required by all warrant officer MOS. The WOEC is taught in a high-stress environment where candidates are subjectively evaluated by Training, Advising, and Counseling (TAC) officers and academically evaluated through administration of written examinations. All Active Component (AC) candidates will attend a WOEC in residence at a TRADOC service school. For Reserve Component (RC) candidates, resident attendance at a TRADOC school is the preferred option. Acknowledging that it is difficult for some RC personnel to attend many consecutive weeks of resident training, a modified WOEC is available for the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. WOEC-RC provides two-week resident and nonresident modules for the RC. Entry-level MOS certification will be accomplished through (1) administration of diagnostic examinations (written and hands-on) with passing scores equating to certification and/or (2) successful completion of a resident technical certification course or resident and nonresident technical certification course modules as appropriate. The TRADOC MOS proponents are responsible for WOEC-RC development and the content of technical certification task lists, tests, and training to include determination of RC resident training requirements. Active duty enlisted personnel recruited upon ETS as RC warrant officer candidates will be accessed utilizing AC methodology.

At the senior level (currently advanced courses), Senior Warrant Officer Training (SWOT) courses will prepare individuals to perform in their MOS at the next higher level. SWOT consists of three training modules: (1) an MOS immaterial common module, (2) a proponent module (common to all MOS managed by the proponent), and (3) an MOS specific module to provide technical skills or training required for performance in senior warrant officer-level positions and for the award of Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) or Special Qualification Identifiers (SQI), as needed. By January 1988, modular SWOT packages will be available to RC soldiers. This RC-tailored training will qualify RC warrant officers to occupy senior warrant officer positions in their units.

At the master level (currently the Warrant Officer Senior Course (WOSC)), Department of the Army centrally selected CW3(P) and CW4 will attend Master Warrant Officer Training (MWOT). If CSA-approved recommendations to establish master warrant officer

CW5 are approved by Congress, then CW4 selected for CW5 will attend MWOT. MWOT will be fully developed and on-line for all components by January 1988. HQ TRADOC will modify the WOSC into MWOT that will consist of three modules: (1) a master warrant officer common task module, the preponderance of which will likely be available through the Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP), (2) a branch/MOS specific module conducted by the proponent school, and (3) functional training tailored to meet the requirements of a specific master warrant officer position.

The WOTS is a requirements-based, three-level training system for warrant officers designed to support the Army's 30-year warrant officer career program. TRADOC is proceeding with modification of the existing training, and the new system will be fully on line, for all components, in January 1988. This milestone is concurrent with full implementation of the CSA-approved TWOS initiatives to enhance the combat effectiveness of the warrant officer force.

Warrant Officer Career Development. Warrant officer career development involves the systematic application of training and utilization in progressively more responsible and challenging assignments. It provides the Army with the opportunity to effectively use warrant officer leadership and expertise for a full 30-year career *as a warrant officer*. It allows each individual the chance for full career and professional development in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and complexity up to maximum potential. An important feature to note is that it does not *require* a 30-year warrant officer career. A full spectrum of personnel management tools and voluntary separation procedures (to include retirement at 20 years total active federal service) provide for career satisfaction and changing Army requirements. In operation, the 30-year career plan will provide entry level (WO1/CW2) training to meet first level requirements. Senior-level training prepares an individual for positions of increased requirements for leadership and technical expertise as chief warrant officers (CW3/CW4). The third and last level, master warrant officer, provides training to meet utilization requirements in the most demanding and complex positions in the MOS. MWO will be technical systems (within MOS) experts and integrators. They will be the true system experts, advisors to commanders, and trainers in their areas of expertise. Master-level training will be utilized to meet master level (CW4/CW5) documented requirements. Full implementation of the 30-year career plan requires Congress to approve several legislative changes. The major changes needed are: (1) paygrade W-5, (2) mandatory RA integration for the Active Army force, (3) selective career extension for warrant officers with more than 20 years service, and (4) provisions to continue service in current permanent grade. The Army goal for full implementation, subject to Congressional approval, is FY 1988.

Commissioned Officer Training.

Concept. Officer training is in transition as a result of three initiatives: the adoption of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), the FY 79 Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO), and the 1985 Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS). OPMS provided a significant change in officer training philosophy. Officers are to be prepared specifically for their branches and duty positions they will occupy. This is a departure from the pre-OPMS view that officers should be prepared to serve immediately two grades higher as cadre for expanding force structure upon mobilization. RETO identified the training implications of OPMS and emphasized task or performance orientation for officer training. These changes in philosophy caused changes in officer courses and career development.

The officer training program is depicted in Figure 21-10, and described below.

Military Qualification Standards (MQS). The goal of company-grade officer education is to produce a corps of broadly based professionals who are fully competent in technical, tactical, leadership, and training skills; are knowledgeable of "how the Army runs"; and demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility. The vehicle used for achieving this goal is the MQS system. MQS is based on a detailed analysis of training requirements within each branch. It provides a blueprint to integrate training efforts of proponent service schools, the unit commander, and the individual officer. It documents the training strategy of the proponent, provides a detailed list of resident and unit training requirements, and serves as a professional development and continuing education system for

individual officer training. The CSA approved, on 15 July 1985, the revision of MQS I manual (precommissioning) and the implementation of the MQS II (lieutenants) system. The CSA will review recommendations to approve MQS III (captains). MQS manuals and training support packages for common tasks are required at levels I, II, and III. MQS I is branch-immaterial and implemented in ROTC, USMA, and OCS (including ARNG State OCS). MQS II and III are branch specific, but each will also have a common task manual which describes common core tasks. MQS-RC is focused primarily on functional requirements of mobilization duty positions. No certification will be used in the MQS system. Pilot programs to evaluate MQS manual format, administration, and certification procedures were conducted in active, guard, and reserve units in FY 83 for MQS II and in FY 85/86 for MQS III. Full implementation for MQS II is scheduled in January, FY 87. A later date, pending CSA approval, is expected for MQS III.

Lieutenants' Training. Lieutenants' training consists of the Officer Basic Course (OBC) conducted by the officer's basic branch school and other required resident or nonresident functional training. OBC is attended in a temporary duty status (TDY). MQS I will be a prerequisite and common entry level for all branch OBC. OBC will focus on the lieutenant's first assignment and will prepare him or her to lead, train, and fight units. POI's will be structured to provide a mix of training and education in leadership and ethics, AirLand Battle tactics, training the soldier, equipment maintenance, unit logistics, and specialty-unique subjects. OBC students will be trained to supervise enlisted soldiers through Skill Level 4 and warrant

OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM




FIGURE 21-10

officers, as applicable. Graduation will require certification of in-resident MQS II requirements. The Army was concerned about the number of Reserve Component lieutenants who have received OBC training through correspondence courses. The Army now requires all newly commissioned officers to attend resident course instruction at their branch school or take a pre-course instruction phase, attend an 8-week resident training phase, and complete a take-home correspondence package.

A lieutenant is best developed in units under the supervision, guidance, and example of his commander by being assigned leadership responsibility, and authority and being required to adhere to high unit standards. Instruction in units is provided by a variety of options (e.g., field exercises, correspondence courses, unit schools, or instruction by the commander) supported by training materials produced by the service school. All lieutenants' tasks will be included in MQS II manuals, including those taught in OBC, other resident courses, and those to be learned in units.

Captains' Training. Training for captains will include Officer Advanced Course (OAC); resident and nonresident functional training, as required; skill training; and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³). Resident and nonresident captains' tasks will be documented in MQS III.

The mission of OAC is to produce technically and tactically competent officers who are professionally qualified for their next assignment and prepared for future development.

The CSA approved a revised OAC which will contain a core of common and branch-specific tasks which all students will take and a series of modules which will be individually selected for each student based on his area of concentration, experience, or professional development requirements. Additional modules of up to 6 weeks will be available to provide training for the next assignment.

The common component of the OAC core consists of five weeks of leadership training, combined arms, combat service support, and other mandatory instructions directed by HQDA and HQ TRADOC. The branch component of the core consists of those tasks required by all captains in the branch. Length and content is determined by each commandant and varies by branch. Commandants also determine the number and length of modules within the 20-week OAC and the number and type of add-on modules which provides intensive training for the next assignment.

The revised OAC began in calendar year 1985. Students are assigned to the service school on a PCS basis for a period of 20 weeks with the option to remain for an additional period of up to 6 weeks if required for assignment-specific training. Prior to the 10th week of the 20-week OAC, MILPERCEN will determine the student's assignment. Based on this assignment, the student may remain at the service school to attend an

add-on module, be sent to a course at another school TDY en route, or go directly to his next assignment if no assignment-specific training is required. The OAC is also conducted by RF schools in four phases. Phase I is the common core and Phases II, III, and IV are branch-specific. Phases II and IV must be completed in residence at the proponent service school. Phase III is a correspondence course. Although the RF schools incorporate OAC correspondence instruction, the OAC may no longer be completed in the pure correspondence mode.

The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) provides training for captains in staff skills required at brigade, division, and installation level and serves as a transition to field grade responsibilities. It emphasizes staff interaction and develops skills in thinking, analyzing, decisionmaking, and defending decisions in an intense small group environment. Subject matter will include logistics, training management, budget, mobilization, deployment, and combat operations. A nonresident phase and exam are prerequisite for entering the resident phase of CAS³. All OPMD officers will attend, and selected special branch officers (e.g., JAG, CH, AMEDD) may attend CAS³. ARNG and USAR officers (including IRR) are encouraged to attend the course. CAS³ was fully implemented FY 87, with year group 79 the first fully trained. ARNG and USAR officers (including IRR) are encouraged to attend the course. A USRF School version of CAS³ has been developed and is being tested.

Field Grade Training. Training for field grade officers consists of Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) or equivalent, Battalion and Brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC), Senior Service College (SSC), and other resident and nonresident functional training, as required.

The CGSOC mission is to prepare officers for field grade command and principal staff positions. It concentrates instruction on command and staff skills required to plan and conduct the AirLand Battle at division level and above in the field Army and on skills needed for high-level TDA assignments. The POI will be revised to eliminate redundancy between CGSOC and CAS³. Material deleted from CGSOC will be available in correspondence mode for Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and other service and allied officers.

The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), an additional year of CGSOC, was piloted in Academic Year (AY) 83-84 to provide selected officers enhanced professional development in higher order staff skills required in the tactical and operational employment of combined arms formations on the AirLand battlefield. In a rigorous learning experience, this course will provide enrichment, depth, and broadening education in tactical judgment and develop analytical and conceptual skills, communicative arts, and innovative thinking. Currently, five areas of concentration are planned: maneuver, planning, command and control,

close support, and logistics at the division and corps level. Forty-eight students are selected for the AMSP annually. The program may be expanded to 96 in the future.

Battalion and Brigade PCC will continue to provide instruction on leadership, tactics, logistics, and training to command designees. A special module will address problems peculiar to guard and reserve command.

Requirements for other field grade functional training may emerge. First priority will go to branch technical training required for fighting the AirLand Battle. The resident mode will be used where necessary for highly technical or low density skills, but maximum use will be made of exported and extension training. As required, functional training for field grade officers will be implemented on a phased, functional area basis.

The Army War College prepares officers for senior leadership in the Army, Defense, and related departments and agencies by professional military education in how the Army runs and national security affairs, with emphasis on the development and employment of military forces in land warfare. The resident course lasts 44 weeks. Its parallel is a corresponding studies version which takes two years and includes two two-week resident phases. General officer training consists of various functional and assignment-specific courses.

Commissioned Officer Career Development. The typical Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD)-managed career development pattern is at Figure 21-11.

Mobilization Training Base.

The mobilization training base is tasked to ensure that soldiers arrive in-theater, ready-to-fight as teams or individual replacements. It must provide combat-ready soldiers who are proficient in those skills that ensure their immediate contribution and survival as members of teams/crews/units in a theater of operations.

The training base will accomplish its task by planned expansion geared to varying levels of mobilization. Currently there are no training base expansion units in the 200K call-up because of structure constraints. During a partial mobilization, existing United States Army Training Centers (USATC's) are augmented by brigade-sized slices from several United States Army Reserve (USAR) Training Divisions. At full mobilization, these USATC's are further augmented by the remainder of the USAR Training Divisions and new USATC's are established by the remaining Training Divisions at FORSCOM installations. Reserve Reception Battalions are also activated during phased mobilization to either augment or establish new reception stations. The Five year USAR Training Division Plan includes testing of unit readiness. These

COMMISSIONED OFFICER CAREER PATTERN




FIGURE 21-11

activities, called Mobilization Army Training Center (MATC) exercises allow the USAR Training Divisions to move to, establish and or augment a USATC and actually train new soldiers. USAR Reception Battalions conduct similar activities called Express Exercises.

During mobilization, Mobilization Programs of Instruction (MOBPOI) replace the Peacetime POI. MOBPOI are geared, generally, to a 10-12 hour day, six-day training week and, in many cases, differ significantly from peacetime POI. Personnel from the 90 Reserve Forces schools will report to existing TRADOC schools to help expand or augment their capabilities.

The expanded mobilization training base will be severely constrained in equipment, qualified cadre, and facilities. Student-to-equipment and student-to-instructor ratios will increase. Training devices, simulators, mock-ups, and commercial substitute items will be used to the maximum extent feasible. Equipment will be pooled, and course scheduling will use multiple shift operations. Most Initial Entry Training companies will increase their capacity to 275 and eliminate administrative breaks between cycles.

The Army tested and is studying using nonindustrial facilities for billeting, training, and messing to augment installation assets. Motels, hotels, community colleges, and vocational training centers which are close by are ideal candidates for local commanders to incorporate into mobilization master plans.

Expansion of new training sites to underused Active Army and Reserve Component facilities is planned for Total Mobilization. In addition to BCT, AIT, OSUT, and other functional courses, a Mobilization Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course (MOBBNCOC) is planned for Skill Levels 2 and 3. Commissioned leadership training will be provided by OBC, Branch Officer Candidate Course (BOCC), and Branch Immaterial Officer Candidate Course (BIOCC). Warrant Officer Basic and follow-on Technical Certification Courses are also planned. The War College and the National Defense University will continue to function.

The wartime personnel replacement system is a new concept being studied by the Army in response to COHORT initiatives. Training programs are being studied which will support team/crew-level tasks in the training base. Where feasible, trainees will remain in a unit nucleus from entry into the training base to arrival in theater replacement centers. Conceptually, officer and NCO leadership will be infused in the latter phases of IET and will integrate unit training tasks.

The Army tests its capability to mobilize by conducting periodic mobilization exercises (MOBEX). These exercises provide a means of validating mobilization plans and of identifying shortfalls (Chapter 12).

Detailed planning guidance for mobilization is contained in the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) and TRADOC's Mobilization and Planning System (TMOPS). In

particular, TMOPS VOL III, Training Base Expansion, gives detailed guidance on the establishment or augmentation of USATC's.

USAR assets scheduled to expand or augment the training base which are under the peacetime control of FORSCOM, are placed under the command of TRADOC during the establishment and execution of the mobilization training base.

FORCES TRAINING SYSTEM

General.

The Forces Training System includes individual and collective systems-oriented training in units; combined arms and support training; joint and combined operations and interoperability training; and training in the TDA Army. A model of the system is at Figure 21-12.

Input.

Forces training uses input from the Training Doctrine and Training Development Systems and the Training Support System.

Organization for Forces Training.

Major Command Level


— Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC is responsible for conducting institutional training, developing training, and providing support for unit training and doctrine literature, range, ammunition and target guidance, and training devices. Under broad guidelines from DA, TRADOC creates specific programs which affect nearly every unit.

The Army Training Support Center (ATSC), a field operating agency of TRADOC located at Fort Eustis, Virginia, is the Army's headquarters for the management and distribution of training support products. The mission of ATSC is to manage the production, procurement, warehousing, and delivery of training support products in support of individual and collective training in both Active and Reserve Components.

The U.S. Army Training Board (USATB), located at Fort Monroe, Virginia, is under the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The mission of the USATB is to facilitate excellence in training throughout the Army. Responsibilities include:

- Establish and maintain links with TRADOC integrating centers, service schools, training activities, and Active and Reserve Components units.
- Foster communication and exchange of information pertaining to development and use of service school training materials and initiatives.
- Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information on successful new training methods, management practices, and materials.

THE FORCES TRAINING SYSTEM



ARTEP – ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM
CTF – COMBAT TRAINING FACILITIES
ITEP – INDIVIDUAL TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM
MQS – MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS
TEA – TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
NCODP – NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
NCOES – NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM
NET – NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING
RCNCOES – RESERVE COMPONENT NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM
TMACS – TRAINING MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM

FIGURE 21-12

- Sponsor research, studies, and tests to improve training development and conduct of training in units.

- Provide feedback to TRADOC for the development of improved training materials and techniques.

- Coordinate with major Army commands (MACOM's) worldwide, USAMC, DARPA, ADEA, ARI, and other military and civilian agencies on training technology/educational development.

- Coordinate directly with other U.S. military services on collective training initiatives.

- Provide feedback to TRADOC and other Army activities in the education and training of senior managers associated with training and doctrine development.

— Other Major Commands (MACOM's).

Forces Command (FORSCOM) is tasked to organize, equip, station, train, and maintain the readiness of assigned units (in CONUS, Alaska, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and Panama). FORSCOM programs and schedules individuals and units for specialized training in Alaska (Northern Warfare Training Center), Panama (Jungle Operations Training Center), and programs unit rotations through the National Training Center (NTC)

at Fort Irwin, California. Training management in FORSCOM is under the purview of FORSCOM DCSOPS. The FORSCOM DCSPER is primarily concerned with development of individual proficiency as it relates to EPMS/OPMS. The FORSCOM DCSLOG is concerned primarily with logistical training of individuals and units. The foregoing discussion of FORSCOM also applies in general to Army forces in Europe and the Pacific.

The training mission for the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) is directed toward specialized training of personnel in the materiel area, to include New Equipment Training (NET) in coordination with FORSCOM, TRADOC, and other field commands. AMC is further tasked to assist TRADOC and FORSCOM on matters associated with supply and maintenance concepts, doctrine, and training. AMC operates the Army Logistics Management Center (ALMC) at Fort Lee, Virginia; the Joint Military Packaging Training Center (JMPTC) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; the Army Management Engineering Training Activity (AMETA) at Rock Island, Illinois; the Ammunition School at Savanna, Illinois; and the Intern Training Center at Redstone Arsenal. AMC is also responsible for wholesale logistics doctrine and literature as prescribed in AR 310-3. Currently underway is a joint TRADOC/AMC program for developing technical manuals and companion training materials. The program utilizes

logistics support analysis (LSA) data to prepare operator and maintenance manuals and to determine the need for Extension Training Material (ETM). ETM is developed to be used with technical manuals in a unit environment.

The U.S. Army Health Services Command (HSC) provides health services for the Army in CONUS, Panama, Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories in the Pacific and professional education and training for Army Medical Department (AMEDD) and other personnel as directed. The Academy of Health Sciences, U.S. Army (AHS), a major subordinate element of HSC, is responsible for the execution of the training management function for the AMEDD. The AHS training development is tailored to the TRADOC model of training analysis and design. AHS determines and develops training and educational requirements and develops both resident and nonresident courses, devices, literature, and associated material to support unit, soldier, combat, and peacetime skill proficiency. It provides training and education to all AMEDD personnel, both AC and RC, on a worldwide basis. Additionally, AHS performs worldwide evaluation of the effectiveness of its training and education programs as they impact on the training development and support cycle.

In addition to the training conducted at the AHS, HSC conducts formal MOS/ASI-producing training at 10 medical centers and hospitals. Additionally, HSC provides continuing training for medical personnel assigned to TOE units under the MOS Proficiency Training (MPT) program, a joint FORSCOM/TRADOC/HSC program. Under this program, TOE medical unit commanders will integrate MPT into their long- and short-range training plans and schedule soldiers or sections for approximately a 90-day training period. As agreed by a memorandum of understanding between the local TOE unit commander and the medical and/or dental treatment facility commander, soldiers will be trained in specific critical MOS tasks which are normally impractical to train in the parent unit. As an adjunct to the MPT program, many activities have coordinated with FORSCOM and TRADOC units for assistance in training HSC personnel in combat-related tasks and skills.

Individual Training in Units.

Concept. Enlisted members learn common tasks and a selected portion of their MOS critical tasks in the school and are then transferred to field units. Unit commanders are responsible for integration of training tasks.

The goal of unit training is to develop and sustain capability to deploy rapidly and fight effectively in a variety of environments as combined arms teams. Unit training includes the requirement to teach those tasks not trained in IET as well as sustaining tasks that were taught. Also included in unit training is the development of unit leaders as well as the development of the

interdependencies and teamwork that make up team performance (collective training).

Individual training gives the soldiers the skills and knowledge they need to do their job. The current situation of constrained resources, complexity of required skills, etc., has resulted in the training base being unable to provide training in all skills needed for individuals in their initial duty assignment. Unit commanders have the responsibility, as stated in the Trainer's Guide for each MOS, for training large numbers of mission-related skills which cannot be trained in a TRADOC school or Noncommissioned Officers academy. The unit's individual training program is a major portion of daily training and must be intensely managed.

The system for individual training in units is depicted at Figure 21-13. Individual training in units depends on qualified trainers—the noncommissioned officers. NCO's have the task of continuing the training new soldiers began in the training base. Soldier Training Publications (STP) consisting of Soldier's Manuals (SM), Trainer's Guides (TG), and Job Books (JB) support this training in units.


— **Soldier's Manual (SM).** The Soldier's Manual is the foundation for individual training in the unit. Soldier's Manuals are being written for Skill Levels 1-5 of most MOS by the service schools. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT) has been written for Skill Levels 1-4 to complement the MOS specific SM's. Each manual will outline specific tasks each soldier must perform, the minimum acceptable standard of performance, and under what conditions these tasks must be performed. In addition, a list of references provides the soldier with the information he needs to master critical tasks. As they are revised, Soldier's Manuals will also contain a guide to evaluate hands-on performance.

The basic format for each Soldier's Manual consists of two or three chapters. The first chapter is an introduction which explains in simple terms the ITEP and how to use the manual and may explain EPMS, the Army Training System, and the MOS progression pattern. The second chapter contains the basic tasks for all personnel at the specific skill level and MOS. The third chapter is used if the MOS contains more than one duty position. It contains tasks unique to specific duty positions in addition to the basic tasks outlined in Chapter 2.

Soldier's Manuals also contain a guide to evaluate soldiers' hands-on performance for each critical task.

— **Trainer's Guide (TG).** The Trainer's Guide is a tool to guide the unit trainers in establishing an individual training plan for the soldier. The TG for each MOS identifies tasks which should be trained or sustained in the unit. The TG suggests training support materials to be used for each task. TG may be published separately or incorporated within SM.

SYSTEM FOR INDIVIDUAL TRAINING IN UNITS



FEEDBACK

AMTP – ARTEP MISSION TRAINING PLAN
 ITEP – INDIVIDUAL TRAINING EVALUATION PROGRAM
 MQS – MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS SYSTEM
 NCODP – NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

FIGURE 21-13

— A Field Expedient Squad Book (DA Form 5165-R) is provided in Change 1 to AR 350-37, Army Individual Training Evaluation Program, and may be used to record training evaluation results of soldiers from the same MOS and SL who operate in squads, sections, teams, etc. Results from the Field Expedient Squad Book are transferred to the soldier's individual Job Book prior to his or her leaving the unit to report to another unit. The Job Book is a training record for SL-1 and SL-2 soldiers.

Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP).

NCODP is a CSA-directed initiative to foster NCO professionalism. The NCODP is the responsibility of the chain of command, but relies essentially on the NCO advisory channels for implementation. Programs are conducted in units to strengthen NCO capabilities and performance in the following areas: leadership, professional skill development, training, counseling; care of the soldier, and military conduct and discipline.

NCODP objectives are to:

- Strengthen and enhance leadership development of the first-line NCO supervisor.
- Assist and provide guidance in the continuing development of noncommissioned officers.
- Increase the confidence of the NCO as a leader.

— Realize the full potential of the NCO support channel for the chain of command.

— Improve unit effectiveness.

NCODP builds upon the contributions of the Army's Enlisted Personnel Management System and the Noncommissioned Officer Education System. These two systems provide a valuable foundation for the development of noncommissioned officers; however, it is through the practical application of skills in the individual unit that soldiers achieve their goal of becoming a truly professional noncommissioned officer.

a. NCODP is a leadership tool to be used at the battalion or equivalent level. It is equally applicable to TDA and TOE structures.

b. NCO professional development training will be scheduled and reflected on unit/organization master training programs and schedules. Such training will be appropriately structured to the needs of the unit and noncommissioned officers as assessed by the commander.

c. All soldiers who demonstrate the potential for or are performing duty in a leadership position or are designated as an acting noncommissioned officer will participate in NCODP.

d. Separate classes may be conducted for SFC through CSM's.

e. NCOBP (and NCOES) must stress the role of NCO's in assuming fuller responsibility for the individual training of junior soldiers and fellow NCO's.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) exercises general staff supervision over policies, regulations, initiatives, and programs relating to NCOBP.

Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP).

The Army Individual Training Evaluation Program has been established to formalize the role of individual evaluation in units and organizations throughout the Army. Training of a soldier follows a specific process for each MOS. Following training, an evaluation is conducted to determine training effectiveness. Those soldiers found deficient in some area are retrained as necessary on those tasks critical to the unit mission. Evaluation of the individual soldier is a critical part of the training process. It provides feedback which is essential to the effective management of training.

The ITEP has three parts, each designed to evaluate individual tasks. These are a Common Task Test, commanders' evaluations, and the Skill Qualification Test (SQT).

— Common Task Test (CTT). The CTT is a hands-on test of basic critical combat and survival skills. The CTT is given to all soldiers in Skill Levels 1 through 4 annually, regardless of MOS and duty assignment. CTT is given every two years in the Reserve Component. The CTT allows for testing each task in a hands-on or written mode. However, the hands-on evaluation mode is preferred. Procedures and evaluation guides for hands-on evaluations are contained in the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks and the manual for the administration of the CTT. The written alternate is contained in a written test booklet.

The CTT Notice contains a list of the tasks to be tested. The CTT may be administered any time during the year and it may be in conjunction with other training and competitive events such as stations in a battlefield course, military stakes, drill evaluations, ARTEP, or other collective training.

CTT are scored locally for rapid feedback to individual soldiers and transcribed to machine scoring forms so feedback can be provided to TRADOC training institutions. Unit commanders are provided summary reports.

Unit commanders are directed to use test results in preparing enlisted evaluation reports and in making recommendations for promotions and other career decisions.

— Commander's Evaluations. Commander's evaluations provide the commander with an assessment of unit proficiency on individual tasks critical to the unit mission. Using procedures and guides contained in Soldier's Manuals, units can conduct hands-on

evaluations of MOS-specific tasks and common tasks not tested in the Common Task Test.

Unit commanders should plan adequate time in their training schedules for the conduct of systematic hands-on evaluations at the unit level. Hands-on evaluations are used by noncommissioned officers to determine if soldiers can perform tasks to Soldier's Manual standards. Commanders should also integrate hands-on evaluation of tasks critical to the unit mission into collective training. For example, hands-on evaluations of common and MOS tasks can be used as one part of squad tests and internal Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP). No results of internal evaluation will be reported beyond the unit level; however, unit commanders are directed to use commander's evaluations results in preparing enlisted evaluation reports and in making recommendations for promotions and other career decisions.

To insure individual proficiency is being maintained, commanders are encouraged to conduct external evaluations. Evaluations of MOS and common tasks may be conducted during IG inspections, as part of an ARTEP external evaluation, during Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE), or during annual training for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard units. A representative sampling of soldiers is satisfactory for the conduct of these evaluations.

— Skill Qualification Tests (SQT). All soldiers in Skill Levels 1 through 4 are required to take an annual (every two years in RC) SQT for their MOS and skill level. RC soldiers take the SQT corresponding to their Duty MOS (DMOS) and the skill level of the DMOS. The SQT is a performance-based test on Soldier's Manual tasks. It is keyed to skill levels within an MOS. Tasks on the SQT are evaluated by multiple-choice questions with one correct answer per question. Questions require the soldier to either perform a part of the task or to describe how to perform the task. For example, a question may require a soldier to extract information from a reference manual as he would do on the job, or it may require the soldier to pick an illustration of correct task performance from up to five choices. To eliminate unnecessary memorization and to increase relevance to the job and test validity, SQT commonly use illustrations, document extracts, and audiovisual materials. The size of the SQT may vary among MOS. Most tests are about two hours long.

Testing is scheduled by fiscal year and announced by a yearly test announcement circular. The test period for an SQT is three months for the Active Component, six months for the Reserve Component. Testing for a soldier who cannot be tested during the specified three-month test period may be done up to nine months after the opening of the test period. A SQT notice is distributed to units prior to the test period. Receipt of the notice, however, is not an eligibility condition for testing. The notice is brief and contains a list of the Soldier's Manual tasks used to develop the SQT.

All SQT are machine scored by the U.S. Army Training Support Center. However, Skill Level 1 SQT may be scored manually at the option of the local commander so that he can obtain immediate test results. After a soldier's SQT is scored by USATSC, Individual Soldier's Reports (ISR) are prepared and sent to the soldier, his commander, (Active Component only) and the local military personnel office. The ISR contains the soldier's SQT score and a listing of those tasks on which the soldier has shown a training weakness. The goal is to return the ISR to the soldier within 30 days of the test date. Summary reports providing consolidated unit performance on SQT's and the CTT are provided to unit commanders, company through MACOM level. SQT scores are forwarded to MILPERCEN within 60 days after the Active Component test period closes for inclusion in the Enlisted Master File (EMF).

Collective Training.

Collective training refers to developing in a group of soldiers those interdependencies and teamwork that go to make up team performance. The terms "Collective Training" and "Unit Training" cannot be used interchangeably. Unit training includes both individual and collective training. The primary features of collective training are that it is decentralized and performance oriented. Performance-oriented collective training is training units to do the same tasks or missions that they will do in wartime, and to do them well enough to insure success on the battlefield. The performance objective is the basis of the performance-oriented approach. Training is conducted to attain the objective. Included within the objective are the training tasks, conditions, and evaluation standards. The standards are used to determine the unit's ability to

accomplish the task and are measured in GO/NO GO terms. The evaluation is designed to be used to develop timely remedial training programs. Figure 21-14 describes Collective Training in Units.

Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP). The ARTEP is a total training strategy to include documents, devices, and simulations. The primary collective training documents are ARTEP Mission Training Plans (AMTP) and drills. AMTP are designed to provide a complete training guide for a specific echelon of the unit. Each AMTP contains information on "what" to train and "how" to train and also provides information on officer and NCO development in the form of tasks leaders must be capable of performing before a unit can successfully accomplish each mission. Drills support the AMTP by providing the small unit leader (platoon and below) the doctrinally correct method of performing selected collective tasks. Service schools develop AMTP and drills for units for which they are proponent.

AMTP consist of:

a. *Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EO's).* T&EO's are the foundation of the AMTP. They provide measurable, objective performance standards which form the bases for training and internal and external evaluations to assist commanders in identifying specific training strengths and weaknesses. T&EO's are developed for each collective task and placed in Chapter 5 of the AMTP.

b. *Situational Training Exercises (STX).* STX are short, scenario-driven, mission-oriented tactical exercises to train a group of closely related collective




FIGURE 21-14

tasks and drills. STX provide preconstructed, short-term exercises that are central to sustainment training for tactical mission proficiency. STX support training at company, platoon, and staff section level. STX provide the leader a method to train using doctrinally-approved tactics and techniques, but unlike a drill, do not establish the method of execution as doctrine. STX may be modified based on local METT-T. This method provides for a degree of standardization without stereotyping training. Fully developed STX reduce the amount of time required to plan training by providing detailed information on resource requirements, recommended preliminary (drill, leader, and individual) training, OPFOR requirements, etc. The STX should be supported by doctrinal graphics and clear illustrations which assist the leaders in the conduct of the exercise. STX will be outlined for all platoon and company level missions. Fully developed STX, consisting of groupings of T&EO's (collective tasks and drills) for at least one mission, are placed in Chapter 4 of the AMTP. Outlined STX are placed in Chapter 3.

c. *Field Training Exercises (FTX).* Each AMTP will contain one or more fully-developed FTX for critical wartime missions identified for the unit and approved by the school review board (if only one, it will be for the most difficult mission). This requirement is optional for platoon-level AMTP's. FTX are the highest level exercise used by a platoon, company, or battalion to train to mission proficiency at its level. Training developers use FM 25-4, "How to Conduct Training Exercises," to develop AMTP FTX's.

d. *Training Matrixes.* Training matrixes are designed to aid the leader in using the AMTP to plan training. Leaders are required constantly to identify and prioritize missions, collective tasks, leader tasks, and individual tasks that are required based on known contingency plans and the mission training guidance provided by their commanders. Training matrixes provide an organized set of relationships which make the leader's job easier.

e. *Mission Outlines.* Mission Outlines are graphic portrayals of the relationship between critical wartime missions and the subordinate tasks inherent in those missions. Mission outlines are designed to provide the commander with a visual outline of his unit's critical wartime missions in a format which facilitates the planning and management of training at his level. Mission outlines will be prepared for all critical platoon, company, and battalion wartime missions using the same general format.

Drills are the collective training approach that "bridges" the gap between individual and collective training. Drills are a method of training small units. They form an integral part of standardization, sustainment, and building teamwork.

Commander's Assessment. The ARTEP is both a training and an evaluation program. During training, the unit leadership continuously evaluates the performance of individuals and units against the prescribed standards. This "train-evaluate-train" philosophy acknowledges that observed deficiencies are noted by the commander and become the focus of follow-on training. As ARTEP evolves and service schools develop Unit Tests, commanders will be able to use the test, on a discretionary basis, to obtain a more objective assessment of unit readiness through a detailed evaluation of considerably more subtasks/measurable events performed in a stress-based, mission-related scenario.

ARTEP Training. The MTP is based on the training principles listed in FM 25-1.

a. Train as the unit will fight. Units will fight as they are trained. Soldiers will remember the last way they performed a task, right or wrong. It is imperative that soldiers and units perform to established standards and that these standards are rigidly enforced by leaders.

b. Commanders are the primary trainers. Leaders at all levels are responsible for the training and performance of their soldiers and units. Their personal involvement is essential to training and battlefield success. Leaders are expected to lead.

c. Train using published Army doctrine. The MTP and supporting materials conform to published doctrine.

d. Performance-oriented training. Units become proficient in the performance of critical tasks and missions by practicing the tasks and missions. Soldiers learn by doing, with coaching and critiquing by the leaders, and good after-action reviews.

e. Mission-oriented training. Training must be focused on attainment of critical wartime mission proficiency. The FTX provides mission orientation. Subordinate exercises are designed to support parts of mission proficiency.

f. Train to sustain proficiency. The cornerstone of the ARTEP is the concept of sustaining proficiency (train—evaluate—train). Sustainment requires practice and repetition. Evaluation illuminates training weaknesses. Emphasis is on sustaining skills and correcting identified weaknesses simultaneously. The mission outlines and sequentially smaller training components allow selection of tasks and groups of tasks to facilitate this process and reduce planning time. Matrixes highlight mission training weaknesses with greater resolution and assist in selecting vehicles which will yield the greatest results. They are training management tools.

g. Train to challenge. Challenging training builds competence and confidence by developing and honing skills. It inspires excellence by fostering initiative, enthusiasm, and eagerness to learn.

h. Train to fight and support as a combined arms team. Company STX's and battalion FTX's include combined arms team training.

Drill Training.

a. A unit's ability to accomplish its mission frequently depends on the ability of its soldiers to execute key actions instinctively as immediate reactions to a situation or order. The ability to do this is fundamental to survival on the battlefield. Standard combat drills are designed to focus on a limited number of key actions that every like unit in the Army must master. A drill is a collective task at squad or platoon level which has been identified as one of the most vital tasks performed by that unit for success in combat. It is totally or largely METT-T independent, requires minimal leader actions to execute, is executed on a cue such as a specified enemy action or simply a leader order, and is executed in the same way every time. Drills may be equipment based (prepare to fire check) or enemy action based (react to ambush/dismount carrier).

b. Drills do several important things:

(1) They allow squads and platoons to perform critical tasks instantly because they have been practiced repetitively.

(2) They reduce the communications requirements because soldiers know what they have to do.

(3) They build teamwork.

(4) They save time, energy, and lives.

c. Drills may be trained using a talk-through, walk-through, and run-through method.

External Feedback. A semi-formal feedback system provides anonymous data to assist in the continuing development of the Battalion-level ARTEP. A questionnaire, in convenient return format, is included in each ARTEP for unit commanders to comment upon the usefulness of the ARTEP for evaluation, and also as the basis for their training programs. Until an automated feedback system is developed, this questionnaire will continue to be the primary source of feedback.

Combat Readiness Training Strategy.

The Chief of Staff recently approved a new training strategy for the Army consisting of the National

Training Center (NTC), Combat Maneuver Training Complex (CMTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

- The NTC, at Fort Irwin, California, is the Army's key facility for training mechanized and armor battalion task forces. In FY 86, the NTC reached a constant level of 28 battalion rotations per year. Realistic conditions are the most significant feature of the NTC. Commencing in FY 90, NTC will increase to 36 battalion rotations per year structured in 12 brigade-size rotations. Implementation of the NTC expansion plan provides additional improvements in NTC training. The brigade headquarters and supporting elements will be fully integrated into NTC exercise and evaluation play.

- The CMTC at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany is designed to provide the same force-on-force training benefits for USAREUR maneuver battalion task forces that CONUS-based units experience at the NTC. The CMTC will provide an annual opportunity for USAREUR battalions to train in a realistic battlefield environment against a skilled opposing force. Through integration of instrumentation and observer/controllers, the CMTC will gather valuable information from unit after-action reviews and Army lessons learned. Procedures similar to those used at the NTC will be used to enhance training at the CMTC. An in-theater opposing force will be stationed at Hohenfels in FY 90. The CMTC is projected to be fully operational by FY 91.

- JRTC, designed to train the Total Army for low-to-mid intensity conflict, is the Army's third entity of the combat readiness training strategy. The JRTC operations group and opposing force will initially be stationed at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, with the mission of conducting training exercises at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and at additional sites that support unit war plans. Full implementation of the program is contingent on the results of a pilot rotation to be conducted in October 1987. Subsequent planning calls for an additional 6 battalions to be trained in FY 88, followed by 13 battalions in FY 89.

- The BCTP, located at Fort Leavenworth, is designated to provide division and corps commanders and battle staffs advanced combat training opportunities through the medium of battle simulations. The concept envisions an NTC-like training atmosphere with a full-time observer/controller staff, a standardized professional threat, and a comprehensive after-action review package supported by advanced technology and the Corps/Division Battle Simulation System. The program has two major components: Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) and the Technology Integration Laboratory. The MTT's will provide on-site training programs for division and corps

level commands. The program consists of two phases: Phase I is a battle command training seminar. The seminar will last 3-5 days and will allow the commander and principal staff to participate in AirLand Battle discussions, threat updates, decision exercises, and simulation familiarization. Phase II is, a 9-day exercise designed to train the commander and battle staff in an environment that replicates combat. The second component of BCTP is the Technology Integration Laboratory. This facility will be an integrating center for doctrine, leadership, command and control, lessons learned, and the handoff of emerging technology to commanders and staffs.

In combination, these facilities will provide state-of-the-art, multi-echelon, combined-arms training in joint and combined environments for the full spectrum of forces. This strategy will allow the Army to enhance standards, train leaders, train units, standardize doctrine, and provide critical feedback through after-action reviews and comprehensive take-home packages. The goal of this combat readiness training strategy is to provide the environment to achieve and sustain enhanced levels of combat readiness for the Total Army.

Training Management.

The Army must prepare to cope with a demanding transition period in the '80s. Training management will be complicated by constrained resources, force modernization, the introduction of new doctrine and organizational concepts related to it, and the continuing requirement for individual training in the unit. Effective training programs and exercises must be designed to get the most use from available resources.

Training management is the process commanders and their staffs use to plan training and to identify the related resources needed to conduct and evaluate training. It involves all echelons and applies to any unit in the Army regardless of strength, mission, organization, or equipment. Training management must work in unison with other unit programs to achieve the common goal—a well trained unit.

FM 25-2 and AR 350-41 establish the doctrine for Army training management. FM 25-2, one of a series of manuals, discusses training management in units. It provides commanders with a management process they can use to plan training; take necessary resource actions; and evaluate soldier and unit proficiency, training, and training management. It describes long-range, short-range, and near-term planning and the related resource actions. Conduct of training and evaluation are also described. Appendixes contain sample planning documents to guide the development of a unit training program. The methods and examples presented in this manual have proved successful in units throughout the Army.

This manual is written for company commanders and the commanders and their staffs at battalion level and

above in both Active Component and Reserve Component units. It applies to combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units, to include table of organization and equipment and table of distribution and allowance units.

Other manuals in the series include FM 25-1, FM 25-3, and FM 25-4. FM 25-1 sets forth the overall training philosophy and principles for the U.S. Army. It is written for leaders in the units, in the training base, and in the agencies that develop training support materials. FM 25-3 explains principles and procedures for conducting training in units. It is written primarily for NCO's and officers at company level. FM 25-4 describes how to plan, conduct, and control training exercises. It is written for commanders and planners at battalion level and above.

Programs to assist commanders to meet the training challenges of the 1980's include the Training Management Control System (TMACS) and the Integrated Training Management System (ITMS).

Training Management Control System (TMACS).

TMACS is an automated aid to help unit commanders plan training, evaluate the resource impact of training plans, and record training accomplished and resources expended. The system, developed by FORSCOM, uses a mini-computer with consoles at brigade-level headquarters. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA, is the Functional Proponent; FORSCOM is the Proponent Agency and Computer Systems Command is the Assigned Responsible Agency.

Integrated Training Management System (ITMS).

The ITMS began as the Battalion Training Model (BTM) and was first conceived by members of the Army Training Study (ARTS) in 1978-79. Its design was to fill the need for an automated system to: (1) link training readiness and resources; (2) automate management of training in the battalion and higher; (3) provide factual, scientifically validated time frames for conduct of sustainment training; (4) interface with other training related areas—maintenance, supply, personnel, etc.; (5) be user friendly and not require additional personnel authorizations or equipment; as well as (6) answer the question of "How much training is enough?" primarily in the training base.

ITMS was developed as a computerized mathematical model that, when expanded and validated, could identify a quantifiable link between training readiness and resources. ITMS has two levels of application, the unit (BN), and the installation (DIV) and above.

As initially developed, ITMS was only a simulation. For it to give optimal, unit-specific training management, it needed the following inputs for each type of unit:

- Specific training tasks related to unit missions and training events.

- Relation between those tasks and unit readiness levels (iterations needed for each level).
- Cost factors for each event.
- Individual and collective task retention (sustainment) data.
- Unit personnel turbulence data.
- Assets and resources available.
- Priority of tasks.

The first three inputs are currently being developed and in a program called the Battalion Level Training Model (BLTM), and should be available for integration into scheduling system in the near future. Additional specifics will be provided upon publication of Improved ARTEP documents (Mission Training Plans (MTP) and Drills).

In March 1984, the Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA) was tasked by DA DCSOPS (DAMO-TR) to develop and field an automated training management system that would do all those things BTM was envisioned to do, and to plug in and exchange information automatically with those other automated systems that will be available at the unit level (SIDPERS, ULLS, TACCS, etc.). The system being developed to meet this requirement is the ITMS. Because all the functional attributes of BTM are needed by the ITMS, ADEA and U.S. Army Training Board (USATB) are working together to develop the final product. The core of ITMS is the research and initial development work done by USATB and ARI on BTM. The name Battalion Training Model has been phased out and replaced with the name Integrated Training Management System to avoid confusion.

Subsystems of the ITMS are: a scheduling model, a skill (task) retention model, a costing routine, and a maintenance performance system (MPS) program.

ITMS will not only assist field commanders in managing unit training, but also will provide quantitative data at higher levels to justify resources for unit training.

ITMS is being developed by the Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA). USATB, under ADEA proponentcy, coordinates the efforts of the Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Construction Engineer Research Laboratory (CERL) to develop a useable scheduling model for use in the ITMS. ITMS is scheduled for fielding by the end of 1987.

Army's Standardization Program (ASP). This program was designed to counter the effects of turbulence by eliminating or reducing the requirement for soldiers to be retrained on joining a new unit. The objective was to standardize procedures used by soldiers to operate, maintain, and fight major systems.

The ASP was established by a letter from the Army Chief of Staff on 10 June 1980. It was formalized by Chapter 5 of *AR 350-1: Army Training*, 1 August 1981. A recent (1982) DAIG inspection revealed ASP has not been implemented effectively throughout the Army.

The dilemma is how to standardize without stifling initiative. HQDA is producing a capstone regulation, *AR 34-84-2: Army Standardization Policy*, which makes each ARSTAFF agency responsible for standardization within its own functional area. The new ASP received CSA approval and was fielded in mid-FY 84.

Army Modernization Training (AMT).

Overview. *AR 350-35, Army Modernization Training (AMT)*, provides policy and procedures and assigns responsibilities for the planning and execution of new systems training. The regulation provides a process for the expeditious integration of equipment into the force structure through New Equipment Training (NET), Displaced Equipment Training (DET), Doctrine and Tactics Training (DTT), and Sustainment Training (ST).

NET is designed to support force integration through identification of personnel, training, training aids, and devices required to support new or improved equipment; by planning for the orderly transfer of knowledge from the materiel developer to the trainer, user, and supporter by documenting requirements in NET Plans (NETP's); and the deployment of NET Teams (NETT) to train soldiers to operate, maintain, and provide instruction on modernized equipment. NET is tied to the RDA Life Cycle System Management Model (LCSMM), (Chapter 17). The interface of NET and LCSMM is shown in Figure 21-15.

DET applies to systems that are being replaced by new equipment, but remain in the inventory. Planning for and executing DET is similar to the process used in NET; the objectives of both training programs are the same. Responsibility for DET planning differs: FORSCOM and WESTCOM, as applicable, are responsible for planning DET for the USAR, CNGB for the Army National Guard, and TRADOC for the Active Component.

DTT is conducted in conjunction with NET or DET. DTT provides commanders, battle staffs, operators, and trainers with a doctrinal basis for employment of new or displaced materiel.

ST is a command responsibility. The training base shares the responsibility for ST by assuring that a pool of trained replacements is established to support the sustainment effort. The ultimate responsibility for ST, however, remains with the commander.

The Players. NET management in the commodity commands is addressed by an organic NET management division, not the designated system Project/Program Manager (PM). While the majority of NET managers are assigned to AMC, NET managers also are assigned to Information Systems Command and U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency for the management of information and medical systems, respectively.

The Process. NETP's are the linchpins of the modernization process. NETP's document the training

NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING: PLANNING PROCESS




FIGURE 21-15

requirements, schedules, and resources required to train units receiving new systems. Materiel developers produce, coordinate, publish, and distribute NETP's. This assures that resources programmed in support of NET are synchronized with the PM's developmental milestones.

NETP's are living documents, initiated by the materiel developer, and coordinated with the combat and training developers, to define training strategies. NETP's change as materiel development, operations, maintenance, and fielding concepts evolve. Revised NETP's are routinely reviewed and approved at the semiannual HQDA Consolidated Training Support Work Group (CTSWG) Conference and published semiannually in *DA Circular 350-XX-X* (Consolidated NETP's). The CTSWG provides the forum for identification and resolution of potential problems that might impact the efficient execution of NET or DET. MACOM attendance at CTSWG conferences is essential to the meaningful review of proposed NET strategies for all new systems to be fielded to affected commands. Joint development of acceptable plans that can economically assure success in the proliferation of new system training must be achieved early.

NET strategies include: unit training, selected cadre training (train-the-trainer), and exportable training. Validation and verification of the NET program of instruction are conducted by both materiel and training developers. The NET manager also provides training for depot maintenance personnel, Logistics Assistance Representatives, NETT members, and training base instructor personnel. Instructor and key personnel training is more technical than that required by operator/users but produces the expertise required to support the logistics and training base requirements.

Automation. The Army Modernization Training Automation System (AMTAS)—operational since 1985—provides the capability for automated preparation, review, distribution, and storage of the existing 700+ NETP's. AMTAS is a fully integrated, automated system with capability for interactive development, updating, staffing, and distribution of NETP's. The AMTAS data base is used to electronically publish *DA Circular 350-XX-X* and can provide updated NETP's instantaneously. All MACOMs, as well as all MSCs of AMC and TRADOC, have access to AMTAS.

The Army's extensive modernization effort demands that all commands continue to work closely to provide the best training on new systems, first through NET/DET and then through effective sustainment programs.

THE TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM

General.

Training support provides the foundation on which the Army training system runs. That foundation includes training management, TDY funds, training facilities, ranges, Advanced Collective Training Facilities, Troop Schools, equipment and supplies, training land, ammunition, devices and simulators, simulations, resident course materials, extension training materials, publications, audiovisual materials, learning centers, correspondence courses, and evaluation/standardization. This foundation enables the training system to meet Total Army training needs with trained individuals and units. The system model is at Figure 21-16.

Input.

The Training Support System relies on input from the PPBES (Chapter 14), the Training Policy and Resourcing Subsystem, and the Training Doctrine and Training Development Subsystem.

Organization for Training Support.

The Army Training Support Center (ATSC) at Fort Eustis, VA, a field operating activity of TRADOC, is a key organization for training support. ATSC is tasked to standardize, publish, and distribute the bulk of training support products, which are developed at the service schools as described earlier. The following list highlights some of ATSC's more significant training support functions.

- Manages Training Extension Courses (TEC), Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP), and Audiovisual (AV) products.
- Provides TRADOC staff supervision of Armywide requirements for training device, simulator and simulation development and fielding.
- Responsible for the supervision of training-unique ammunition development.

- Manages Army target requirements and standardization of Army ranges.


- Responsible for the production, distribution, administration, scoring and reporting of the SQT program, and formulates policies affecting the production and structure of Soldier's Manuals, Trainer's Guides and Job Books.

- Manages and directs the research, development, and evaluation of Tactical Engagement Simulation systems.

- Coordinates with Product Manager—Army Communicative Systems (under PM—TRADE) for military applications of new communicative technology such as microprocessors and video discs for the delivery of doctrinal, instructional, and technical materials.

- Acts as focal point for studies and developing training strategies to accommodate training ammunition reductions through the use of training devices, simulation, and substitution.

THE TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM



ACCP – ARMY CORRESPONDENCE COURSE PROGRAM
ARTEP – ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM
EIDS – ELECTRONIC INFORMATION DELIVERY SYSTEM
ETM – EXTENSION TRAINING MATERIALS
ICTP – INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING PLAN
ITP – INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PLAN

ITEP – INDIVIDUAL TRAINING EVALUATION PROGRAM
MOPIC – MOTION PICTURE
POI – PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION
STP – SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATIONS
TEC – TRAINING EXTENSION COURSE

FIGURE 21-16

- Responsible for the development, coordination, publication, and distribution of *DA Circular 350-85-4*, Standards in Weapons Training, used for determining training ammunition requirements.

Process.

The Training Support System manages training materials and services supporting the training base and unit training programs. It provides the manuals, audiovisual aids, simulators, devices, real estate, ranges, ammunition, and other tools necessary to conduct training in units and institutions. It is a multi-billion dollar program managed by TRADOC.

The need for extension training materials (ETM) may be identified in the TRAS documents (ITP, POI), the individual and collective training plan (ICTP), collective training plans, and Unit MOS Training Plans. However, the Training Program Worksheet is used to program development of new or revised ETM into the Army Extension Training Information System (AETIS). The AETIS is an interactive management information system which automates the integration of training requirements and products into the Army training inventory and the maintenance of a centralized ETM data base.

These plans are the commandant's basic means of identifying products that will provide field commanders and trainers with the exportable training materials necessary to support training outside the U.S. Army service schools. Exportable training includes both collective and individual training and is based on tasks, conditions, and standards. It is specifically designed for use in the field or garrison training environments to bring both individuals and units to the desired level of training. The MACOM and operational units, like TRADOC, also get involved in the preparation of training materials, but on a limited scale. The remainder of this section will examine the principal training support available.

Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).

A program that prescribes the missions and collective tasks that a unit must perform to accomplish its mission and survive on the battlefield. For the trainer, ARTEP provides the tasks, combat conditions, minimum standards, and training support requirements that assist in the conduct of performance-oriented training. For the training manager, ARTEP is a tool that will aid in assessing training proficiency, establishing training objectives, and programming resources. The ARTEP is a total training program and not just a test.

The Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP). The Army Institute for Professional Development (IPD) is the Army manager of the ACCP. IPD offers courses and subcourses developed by TRADOC and DOD schools. Enrollment options include individual and group study. All courses and subcourses are listed in *DA PAM 351-20*, Army

Correspondence Course Catalog. Soldiers, E5 and below, earn promotion points, one for every five credit hours completed. In addition, reservists earn retirement points for completing correspondence courses, one for every three credit hours completed.

Training Extension Course (TEC). TEC lessons are designed to assist unit trainers in upgrading the individual MOS/job proficiency of their Skill Level 1 and 2 soldiers. The lessons, which are either audiovisual, audio only or print, provide performance-oriented training on MOS subjects needed by soldiers. TEC provides the trainer immediate access to high quality, self-paced lessons, each one of which has been validated for training effectiveness. TEC lessons are prepacked and are ready for presentation to individuals or small groups. TEC is scheduled to be replaced by the Electronic Information Delivery System (EIDS).

Extension Training Materials (ETM) Catalog. This catalog provides a one-source listing of all applicable and available extension training materials. The products listed support MOS tasks, common tasks, and general subjects. ETM include Training Extension Course (TEC), Audiovisual Programs and Graphic Training Aids (GTA), Training Literature Products, Army Correspondence Course Programs (ACCP), Reserve Component School Course Materials, Devices, and Resident Exportable Materials (REM). The catalog is designed primarily for trainers, training managers, and learning center personnel as a helpful tool in identifying ETM in support of training individual MOS tasks and collective unit tasks.

Department of the Army Visual Information Production Program (DAVIPP) and Educational Television (ETV). The Department of the Army Audiovisual Production Program (DAVIPP) is an Army-wide, highly recognized and widely disseminated program of audiovisual requirements which are approved and funded by the Department of the Army. TRADOC DAVIPP requirements consist of television and motion picture products which are systematically designed, developed and validated by TRADOC schools and exported to support individual and unit training. The TRADOC Educational Television (ETV) programs which are not in the DAAPP are also available to support individual and unit training when the programs have been systematically designed, developed, and validated by the TRADOC schools.

Training and Audiovisual Support Centers (TASC).

These centers are the focal points on the installations for training support products and services. A production activity as well as centralized library for training products and equipment, the TASC provides support to Active Army, Reserve Component units, and ROTC activities within an assigned regional area. Organized to meet specific training needs responsively, the majority

of TASC are capable of providing production support on still photography, graphic arts, television, audioproducts, and the fabrication of training devices. These capabilities vary within TASC according to assigned mission requirements. Audiovisual products and training devices described in *DA PAM 108-1*, *DA PAM 310-2*, and *TRADOC PAM 71-9* are maintained at TASC for loan. The new *DA Pam 350 Series* provides a listing of all Extension Training Materials (ETM) needed for training at the unit level. User-operated audiovisual equipment, such as projectors, audio tape recorders, and video cassette players, is also available for loan to units or individuals. TASC are authorized and operated under the provisions of *AR 108-2: Training and Audiovisual Support*.

The Armywide Doctrinal and Training Literature Program (ADTLP). The Armywide Doctrinal and Training Literature Program (ADTLP) is a schedule of training and doctrinal literature publications scheduled for DA print during the ensuing two fiscal years. Types of publications scheduled through the TRADOC portion of the ADTLP are: Field Manuals (FM), Training Circulars (TC), Soldier Training Publications (STP), and Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP).

— Soldier Training Publications (STP). Soldier's Manuals (SM), Trainer's Guides (TG), and Job Books (JB) are training publications which were published as field manuals or training circulars until January 1984. At that time, HQDA approved their consolidation into Soldier Training Publications (STP). Consequently SM and TG in print as FM, and JB in print as TC are to be converted to STP as they are revised. This conversion process should be completed by 1987. Information on STP can be found in *DA Cir 310-84-1*, new Department of the Army Soldier's Training Publications (STP).

— Field Circulars (FC). FC are closely related to FM's. They are used to disseminate training directives, policies, or information of an interim nature which later may be incorporated into revision of existing training publications or converted to other type publications, such as FM's. FC are used also to promulgate new training doctrines, tactics, and techniques that require immediate dissemination. FC's provide essential information for training and are referenced in ARTEP's. When the streamlined FM production process is fully implemented, FC will no longer be published.

— Graphic Training Aids (GTA). GTA are visual materials developed and produced by a TRADOC school or another agency. GTA contain doctrine, tactics, and techniques used to train units and individual soldiers. GTA are produced as charts, showcards, booklets, posters, simulations, and decks of cards. They serve as a substitute for more expensive equipment in the performance-oriented training of critical tasks. GTA support SQT and CTT, and complement other

training aids, such as TEC and training films used by Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves.

Battlefield Training Simulations. This is a generic term for interactive vehicles, both manual and computer supported, through which command and staff elements are trained and rehearsed for the command and control of wartime missions. Two subsets exist: battle simulations for maneuver-type units; and CS/CSS simulations for nonmaneuver-type units. Previous developmental efforts have concentrated on battle simulations. Now TRADOC's Combined Arms Center has the responsibility to take the lead in the development of a full family of state-of-the-art, cost-effective simulations, available and affordable by the Reserve Components. A brief examination of on-board and planned simulations illustrates their utility. Figure 21-17 displays the current battle simulations.

BATTLE SIMULATIONS

ECHOLON	MANUAL SIMULATIONS	COMPUTER SUPPORTED SIMULATIONS
CORPS	FB:BC	JESS
DIV	FB:BC	JESS
BDE	FB:BC	COMBAT-SIM CAMMS
BN	FB:BC	COMBAT - SIM CAMMS ARTBASS
CO	DUNN-KEMPF BLOCKBUSTER	
PLT	DUNN-KEMPF BLOCKBUSTER	

FB:BC FIRST BATTLE: BATTALION THROUGH CORPS

FIGURE 21-17

(1) *Dunn-Kempf* highlights the lethality/capabilities of U.S. and opposing-force weapons and the resultant increased importance of the proper use of terrain. Miniature equipment pieces, representing forces up to U.S. company and reinforced opposing-force tank battalion, are used by individual players to employ the combined arms team and its assets (to include smoke, supporting and suppressive fires). Through simulation, free-play combat situations are enacted on terrain boards. This is a vehicle for training small unit leaders and for use in the refresher or continuation training of company, battalion, or brigade commanders and staffs. Dunn-Kempf requires a minimal amount of administrative support.

(2) *Blockbuster* was developed to train platoon/company personnel in urban operations and exercise company-level commanders and subordinate

leaders in the planning and conduct of the defense of a village-size urban area. As with Dunn-Kempf, Blockbuster is particularly appropriate for training in small unit tactics, weapon systems capabilities and lethality, the proper employment of weapons, and relationship of terrain and man-made obstacles to such weapons.

(3) *Computer-Assisted Map Maneuver System (CAMMS)*. CAMMS is a battle simulation designed to exercise commanders and staffs at brigade and battalion levels. CAMMS is capable of presenting an exercise consisting of armor, mechanized infantry, and cavalry maneuver brigades and battalions with normal combat support and combat service support elements in a non-nuclear environment against an appropriate enemy force. The program can be used to play any unit from platoon level up to a full maneuver brigade, in any combination. The simulations are used at the units' locations through a portable computer terminal interfacing with a central computer program. Administrative support is extensive.

(4) *ARTBASS* is being fielded and will provide a real-time, two-sided, computer-driven battle simulation to train maneuver battalion commanders and their staffs in command and control of combat operations. ARTBASS will be packaged in commercial-type trailers, allowing it to be moved from site to site. The equipment will be portable and will set up in any suitable building. The ARTBASS training system will be capable of training a task-force size element.

(5) *FIRST BATTLE: BATTALION THROUGH CORPS (FB:BC)*. FB:BC is designed to provide a manual battle simulation based upon a single methodology which can exercise commanders and staffs in a realistic CPX mode from battalion through corps level. FB:BC will replace WAR EAGLE, FIRST BATTLE, and PEGASUS and will provide a training tool for transition into ARMY 86.

(6) *JESS* is a computerized battle simulation system designed to drive the joint task force command post exercise (CPX) portion of a Joint Readiness Exercise (JRX) and Corps command and control training. The heart of the system is an interactive computer model of military field operations. Simulated battle results from JESS are used in real time to provide realistic responses to combat actions for training commanders and staffs in JRX's and Corps level exercises. The Army will modify JESS and adopt it as the Corps-level CPX driver.

Tactical Engagement Simulations. Engagement simulations are a family of training techniques and equipment designed to simulate realistically the lethality and casualty-producing effects of modern weapons in two-sided, free-play tactical training exercises. Tactical engagement simulation adds to realism by assessing casualties in real time and reinforcing basic battlefield

techniques of camouflage and concealment, suppression, fire control, marksmanship, and techniques of tactical engagement. The value of engagement simulation can only be assessed relative to the objective of unit tactical training. That objective is to provide combat units with the skills required to fight and survive on the modern battlefield. It differs from other types of training in that it must address the combat environment, the violent interaction of two forces who are out to destroy one another. In order to prepare combat units to operate effectively in this environment, it is necessary to train them to operate against a realistic opposing force. It is not sufficient to merely train units to fire at the enemy. They must be trained to fire and move against an enemy who is firing back and doing everything in its power to neutralize or avoid their fire.

The current engagement simulation in use is the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Simulation System (MILES). MILES and its follow-on system, the Air Ground Engagement Simulation/Air Defense (AGES/AD), use laser transmitters and detector systems for the weapons found in, or in support of, the combined arms team and task force—air defense weapons, direct fire weapons, antiarmor, and attack helicopters.

These programs are designed to produce accurate, real-time casualty assessment in an environment of highly realistic, opposing force, free-play tactical exercises.

MILES uses encoded transmitters and detector systems that can distinguish and recognize the type of weapon engaging them. An M16 will kill only personnel, but not a tank; but, a tank can kill any system that presents itself as a target, within the maximum effective range of its armament. Additionally, real-world probability of kill, given a one-round hit by ammunition type, is included in the detector logic system. Further, through the use of blank ammunition and signature simulators, all weapons produce an appropriate visual and auditory signature as they would in combat.

Currently, the basis of issue plan will provide a division-size unit with enough MILES devices to conduct exercises up to reinforced battalion task force level.

MILES is more than just a family of training devices. It is a system that is truly unique in the history of collective training. For the first time, combat units will have the ability to "kill" and "suppress" a hostile, lethal, determined, and noncooperative opponent, or be destroyed by it.

MILES allows the evaluation of unit training and proficiency based solely upon individual and collective performance. The system provides objective outcomes resulting in detailed training analysis of strengths and deficiencies which lead to improved tactical training programs and increased combat readiness. More than any system, MILES allows units to train the way they will fight.

The Army Fielded AGES/AD systems in 1985 to augment MILES by including divisional air defense weapons such as Vulcan, Chaparral and Stinger missiles plus the UH-1, OH-58, and AH-1 helicopters into combined arms training exercises. Future developments will include MILES for the UH-60, OH-58-D, CH-47D, and the AH-64.

New Training Technology.

Electronic Information Delivery System (EIDS). EIDS answers some of the Army's information delivery problems with scheduled fielding beginning in FY 87. The basic system will consist of a video disc player, 16-bit microprocessor and a television monitor. EIDS is a totally new approach to delivering Army doctrinal, training and technical information. It not only increases the capabilities and dimensions of the training base, but also benefits AC/RC units by extending the applications of training from the classroom to the training environment and maneuver area. EIDS can provide realistic scenarios to give users practice in making tactical decisions. This is especially critical when employing combined arms teams, principles of reconnaissance and tactics. EIDS can give commanders at all levels practice with these requirements and make them more confident and aggressive on the battlefield. In addition EIDS—

- a. Allows more simulated hands on training.
- b. Provides challenging surrogate travel simulations.
- c. Provides for planning and leadership scenarios.
- d. Provides cost and training effectiveness by replacing high-cost, low-density equipment.
- e. Reduces the reliance on full-scale, high fidelity simulators.
- f. Reduces spare parts use and maintenance requirements.
- g. Provides realistic tactical exercises without troops.

Interactive Video-Teletraining School of the Air, ATSC. Interactive video-teletraining explores the concept of using an educational television network for exporting training to the Active and Reserve Components. With the increased emphasis on modernization, standardization and the necessity to export critical perishable training material, a video-teletraining network provides a solution. The concept uses satellite communications to incorporate one-way video and two-way audio/telephone links between school and remote location to disseminate training and provide for interactivity between student and instructor.

Army Master Range Plan.

Development of a Department of the Army Master Range Plan is necessary to ensure that training requirements for the new weapons systems being introduced in the 1980's can be met. The Army Master

Range Plan will match the training demands of new equipment and force structure with well-designed ranges and training areas. It will evaluate and compare existing assets in ranges with requirements projected for the future. New requirements may then be programmed so ranges will be ready by the time new systems are fielded and more efficient use of existing ranges will occur. A related action is the fielding of FM 25-7: Training Ranges. This manual provides guidelines for trainers to assess current and projected range upgrade and construction requirements. Expanded range requirements and limited range areas will require the development, where feasible, of multipurpose ranges which will have to be carefully engineered. Completion of these actions will provide the foundation for the master plan which is used by the Training Directorate, ODCSOPS, HQDA for programming and funding ranges to meet Army requirements.

Department of the Army Range Modernization Program.

The Army Range Modernization Program was initiated in 1982. Since inception, the program has matured into an effective management system for fielding of training ranges in support of Army modernization and training requirements. Specifically, the program provides modern up-to-date training facilities to support the live-fire and maneuver training requirements of new weapons systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. An essential theme of range modernization remains to provide enhanced, instrumented ranges at home station — a vital link in unit training strategies since these type facilities provide the means to attain, sustain and train to weaknesses that have been identified in course of joint exercise participation and/or rotation to an Advanced Collective Training Facility.

The Multipurpose Range Complex (MPRC) is the keystone range facility. It provides a multitude of challenging gunnery experiences for tank and mechanized infantry units up to the platoon level. In addition, the MPRC can be used to enhance dismounted infantry and helicopter live-fire exercises. Fifteen of eighteen ranges planned in the program will have been completed or under construction by FY 88. Significantly, MPRC's are programmed for Gowen Field, Idaho and Camp Grayling, Michigan to support, in part, the M60A3 modernization program for the Reserve Components and as cornerstone facilities in support of RC high intensity battalion/task forces training at these sites.

The Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) facilities provide the Army with the capability to conduct both individual and collective training. The MOUT's are designed to replicate the specialized training techniques that will be experienced with fighting in built-up areas. Sixteen MOUT complexes are in the Army range program. However, only seven such facilities will have been completed or under construction by FY 88.

In conjunction with major range initiatives, the Army is also developing other facilities to support small caliber weapons training. These ranges are designed, for the most part, to promote individual rifle marksmanship for Active and Reserve Component units.

The Training Ammunition Management System (TAMS).

Under TAMS, training ammunition requirements and fiscal year authorizations are developed using training strategies established in the *DA Circular 350-85-4: Standards in Weapons Training*. Ammunition is then authorized on the basis of these projections, war reserve requirements, procurement programs (what's available), and Army priorities. TAMS authorizations and actual expenditures are accounted for by the Training Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS). TAMS permits the Army to justify its requirements to the Congress and provides flexibility in the authorizations among the commands.

TRAINING ISSUES

Common Military Training. Common Military Training is used to describe training requirements imposed by higher headquarters from DA on down. Studies by the Army Research Institute indicated that over 60 Army regulations prescribed training requirements of some form. These requirements were, in turn, multiplied or expanded by intervening headquarters. The result is not only a massive headache for the unit commander, but also a loss of time for unit training. This is an area in which centralized management can actually free more time for the commander. At DA steps were taken to do that. They include:

- (1) Establishment of ODCSOPS as the central clearing house for all regulations which prescribe training requirements.

- (2) Establishment of policy which will require most combat-related training requirements emanating from DA to be incorporated into ARTEP's and SM's. Directives which prescribe noncombat requirements, e.g., safety training, will clearly designate target audience, training objectives, and outline training plans.

Materiel. Materiel is a problem that impacts on training in two ways. First, the cost of acquiring materiel and second, the time that must be allocated for maintenance. The influx of new equipment and materiel will focus more attention on materiel as a training problem. New concepts in the development of technical manuals (Skill Performance Aids—SPA) and in maintenance practices show promise for assisting commanders in reducing maintenance training, cost,

and time. The Army is developing and producing simulators to reduce the use of actual equipment for training.

Training Ammunition. Training ammunition is resourced for TO&E units on the basis of *DA Circular 350-85-4, Standards in Weapons Training*. The circular is the product of the Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) which was chartered to determine the quantities and types of munitions essential for soldiers, crews, and units to attain and sustain weapon proficiency relative to readiness levels making maximum use of aids, devices, simulators, simulations, and subcaliber firing. The STRAC program is managed by the ATSC's STRAC Program Directorate (SPD) which is Department of the Army's executive agency for establishing, disseminating, evaluating, and revising weapon standards and strategies. FY 86 was the first year of implementation of the STRAC program. An evaluation of the program was performed throughout the training year by SPD. The evaluation has confirmed that STRAC has been successful in meeting the terms of its charter with only minor revisions required to realize the full potential of the STRAC program. A revised *Standards in Weapons Training* is to be published in the form of a DA PAM during FY 87.

Facilities. The facilities problem is difficult to define because it varies considerably from post to post, from one time to another, and between theaters. Units overseas have a critical problem. Training for the most part is restricted to local training areas (LTA). Depending upon size and the type terrain, LTA may be unsuitable for certain types or levels of training. Regardless of their quality, their number is decreasing as the demand for land increases. Most units must go to training centers, such as Grafenwohr in Germany, to fire large caliber weapons or conduct battalion-level exercises. Time is limited in these areas, the cost of movement to them is high, and local forces increasingly are requiring them for their own use.

CONUS-based units also have problems. Facilities must be shared during the best training months with ROTC Summer or Reserve Component Annual Training. Aside from the problem of losing the use of these facilities for 6-10 weeks, it places a greater demand on facility use during the remainder of the year.

TC 25-1, Training Land, helps commanders determine the adequacy of their maneuver and range areas and develop convincing proposals for land acquisition.

Force Modernization. Modern weapons systems are being integrated into the force at an unprecedented rate. The management of that modernization is a major challenge for the Army. Army trainers are trying to forecast the impact that the introduction of new equipment will have on individual and collective training, and the training support system. This section presents some thoughts on that impact.

Impacts begin with the identification of individual and collective training requirements and the formulation of an initial training concept in the ICTP. The ICTP triggers changes to the Individual Training Plans (ITP) which identify strategies to satisfy training requirements for specific enlisted MOS and officer specialties. Introduction of new equipment requires the ITP to be revised, resulting in redesigned training programs. The magnitude of new systems will require revisions of most high density MOS's in the 1980's. Ideally, the ITP and associated programs are based upon a job-task analysis for each duty position. As new job data are generated, the analysis is updated to reflect additional skills related to new systems. This job and task analysis data is then used to revise existing courses of instruction and other training programs and materials.

In some cases, new equipment systems are sufficiently different to require a new MOS. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle will require a crew trained in the operation of a complex turret and may require establishment of a discrete MOS for these crewmen. Other systems which do not generate a new MOS may require discrete new courses of instruction.

Initial Entry Training costs will be increased by two factors. First, few of the new systems replace older systems one for one; therefore, training for a new system adds to the number of tasks taught in an MOS. Second, duty assignment uncertainties require overtraining when more than one equipment system relates to an MOS.

NCOES courses will also require revision. In certain cases, the introduction of more complex equipment or a reallocation of tasks among the skill levels may require the development of new NCOES courses.

Soldier Training Publications will also have to be written and distributed to the field along with delivery of the new equipment systems. At the same time, exportable training materials must be available to unit training programs and individual study. In conjunction with the revision of Soldier's Manuals, the service schools will revise skill qualification tests for the MOS. The increased resources required to support training loads associated with modernization have yet to be determined. One problem is programming of all older systems for the ARNG/USAR. This creates an inefficient training base which must train old and new systems concurrently.

Modernization also generates large-scale revisions in collective training programs. ARTEP's must be revised to incorporate characteristics of the new systems and the new tactical doctrine. Additionally, the supporting "How-to-Fight" and "How-to-Train" publications, upon which unit training programs depend, must be rewritten.

Resources to support training developments for 42 of the major new equipment systems have been programmed, but competing Army programs precluded programming sufficient resources to satisfy all

requirements identified. This iterative programming hinders long-range planning and makes our program less credible to senior reviewers. A new management information system, the Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS), which was explained earlier, will assist in determining total development and training costs associated with Army modernization.

The modernization efforts also generated new training support challenges. Because modernization will mean in some cases that more tasks and more complicated tasks need to be learned, greater pressures will be felt on existing range facilities. Costs associated with ammunition and the operation and maintenance of new systems will affect the way we train.

Plastic and limited-range ammunition offer considerable potential for continuing effective training within the constraints of time, space, fuel, and money. At the same time, this ammunition should help to increase crew proficiency and expand the number of ranges available for training and the numbers and types of systems which can utilize existing ranges. Other benefits expected include increasing the useful life of range targets, and decreasing costs for land acquisition and range construction.

This does not mean that existing ranges will suffice through the 1980's. On the contrary, the Army Master Range Plan, now being developed, will correlate range design and construction with fielding of new weapon systems. Standard, multi-use ranges also will help absorb the impact of modernization.

Training devices have also taken on new significance as a result of modernization. They offer safe or less expensive training on dangerous or expensive tasks. They can reduce consumption of equipment in units, and the diversion of equipment to training. Training devices also help address the range and ammunition impacts of modernization. Subcaliber and laser devices, simulators, and other training equipment can help reduce training ammunition expenditures and enable effective gunner training which would otherwise be restricted by ammunition costs, nonavailability of weapon systems, or range dimensions.

To maintain readiness as Active and Reserve Component units receive new equipment, special attention will be given to transition training and the sustainment training necessary to ensure complete assimilation of the new system capabilities. The extent, location, and timing of transition training will be determined jointly by the commands affected.

Mobilization Training. The transition from training in peacetime to training after mobilization is an issue that is growing rapidly in importance. Chapter 12 presents definitions, factors, and planning steps pertaining to mobilization. This section deals with training aspects of mobilization, most in the form of probable impacts on the training base. These impacts do not even scratch the surface.

Mobilization will pose problems for the installation staff. Post staff officers will turn to the civilian community for contracted food service, buses and other transportation, telephones, engineer support, and others. The civilian community may also provide training material such as four-wheel drive vehicles for scout training. Local workers will be hired to expand base operations support.

Training will be accelerated with longer days and weeks. The ratio of students to equipment will increase—more students, less equipment. There will be increased reliance on subcaliber and simulators due to ammunition shortages.

Shortages may cause substitution of older weapons, vehicles, and personal equipment during training. For example, M-14 rifles may be used in lieu of M-16 rifles, and commercial 4WD vehicles may replace personnel carriers for teaching mounted reconnaissance techniques.

SUMMARY

Everything the Army does in peacetime involves training in some aspect. So "training" is difficult to capture in a single, simple system. This chapter discussed five training systems: Policy and Resourcing; Training Doctrine and Training Development; Institutional Training; Forces Training; and Training Support.

Training policy and resourcing is the responsibility of HQDA ODCSOPS, specifically the Training Directorate. Resourcing necessitates some interesting interfaces with other systems. The ARPRINT, for example, relies on input from ODCSPER as well as ODCSOPS.

Training Doctrine and Training Development are TRADOC responsibilities. The Army schools are key players in those systems, as well as in the Institutional Training System. Forces Training is supported by TRADOC and conducted by the Army MACOM's. Forces Training includes individual training in units and collective training.

Training support is the foundation of Army Training. It manages training materials and services supporting the training base and unit training programs. It is a multi-billion dollar enterprise managed by TRADOC through the U.S. Army Training Support Center.

Probably the single biggest current training challenge is Force Modernization. Force Modernization will impact on all U.S. Army training systems and Army trainers are trying to forecast the impact the new equipment will have. Ranges and training ammunition are areas that are receiving special attention.

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CHAPTER 22


ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to define and review the Information Mission Area (IMA) and present an overview of information management concepts.

The IMA consists of associated resources and activities employed in the development, transmission, use, integration, and management of information in the Army. Associated resources include information; doctrine; data; knowledge; engineering; applications; communications (information transfer); processing equipment; and related personnel, services, facilities, and organizations. The IMA transcends three separate environments of information all of which overlap to some degree (Figure 22-1).

INFORMATION MISSION AREA



RELATIONSHIP OF THE THREE SUBDIVISIONS WITHIN
ARMY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

FIGURE 22-1

The purpose of information management is to improve Armywide decisionmaking by enhancing the quality and flow of information in the three environments, each of which includes five integrated disciplines: Automation (to include office automation), telecommunications, visual information (formerly audiovisual activities), records management, and

printing and publishing. Technological advancements in the state of the art have all but erased the lines of distinction between the five disciplines. Merging of these technologies brought about the establishment of the IMA.

The policies, responsibilities, and procedures that govern the management of information support and resources throughout the Army are discussed in detail in AR 25-1, The Army Information Management Program.

ARCHITECTURES

Information Architecture.

Planning, control, and management of all Army information is developed within an Army Information Architecture which is prepared at the HQDA level. The information architecture is prepared by each ARSTAF agency, Major Army Command (MACOM), installation, or other authorized activity. The architecture describes Army information in terms of what it is, where it is, and who controls it. It is called an architecture because it is essentially a framework that defines the relationships between all elements involved in information management. The information architecture serves as a blueprint for developing plans and the actions necessary to carry out those plans. It insures integration of information flow and resources by identifying information needs. The architecture, based on information systems planning, precludes the fielding of unnecessary or redundant information systems and permits sharing information resources. Moreover, the architecture at various levels of command serves as a source of guidance to develop information management plans for those levels. The information architecture is constructed in three parts (Figure 22-2).

To develop the information architecture, Army commanders determine their actual information needs. From this information, managers determine the capabilities that should exist to meet these needs and forward these requirements for approval and inclusion in the overall Army Information Management Master Plan (IMMP).

Information Systems Architecture.

The Army employs a three-tier architecture, based on distributing processing power to three specific levels within the Army structure—the regional, installation, and end-user (Figure 22-3). The major portion of the Army Corporate Data Base that is available for use by

INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE MODEL




FIGURE 22-2

THREE TIER STRUCTURE




FIGURE 22-3

end-users is stored at the regional and installation level. End-user terminal devices serve to satisfy office automation needs.

Data Common to All Echelons.

Army information, wherever it is, is a corporate resource available to all within the bounds of security and need to know. The Standard Army Multicommand Management Information System (STAMMIS) data base is defined as that portion of the total Army data base that contains data common to all echelons. It consists of:

(a) A central depository of common information required by DA, MACOM's, installations, and corps/divisions.

(b) A production data base to support daily operations in the areas of continuous updates, real-time updates, on-line entries, high volume transactions, and complex work scheduling.

(c) Data stored on local micro/mini computers in an office environment.

ENVIRONMENTS OF INFORMATION

Strategic Environment.

Examples of strategic information include information about unit readiness, unit deployability status, strategic movement capabilities, strategies, and information for decisionmaking in crisis actions. Systems which process this type of information include the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), WWMCCS Information System (WIS), and Defense Data Network (DDN). Geographically, the information is processed between the National Command Authority (NCA) and the command headquarters of joint, unified, and specified commands. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), HQDA, and several MACOM's including U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Army Materiel Command (AMC), and overseas Army theater commands are major participants as both users and providers of this information. Procurement of equipment to process this information normally follows Department of Defense and Joint Regulations.

Tactical/Theater Environment.

This is information used to prepare for and fight the battle within the theaters. Examples of the kind of information include unit status, unit employability, fire support capabilities, supply rates, key terrain, avenues of approach, and enemy disposition/capabilities/intentions. Systems which process this type of information include the Command and Control subsystems, the Tactical Combat Service Support Computer Systems (TACCS), wartime Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS),

and tactical and theater communications systems. Geographically, the information is processed between the foxhole and the command headquarters of the joint, unified, or specified commands. Equipment used to process this information often is developed to military specifications, and their procurement follows the procedures in AR 70-1 and AR 1000-1. The Theater/Tactical environment is managed under AR 11-39.

Sustaining Base Environment.

This information is created and used for the purpose of efficiently managing Army resources, including installation management, as well as sustaining the fighting force. Examples of this type of execution are: force structure, payrolls, information related to the Army Stock Fund, installation housing, and financial management. Systems which process this information include SIDPERS, Standard Army Financial System (STANFINS), Army Standard Information Management System (ASIMS), and DDN. Geographically, this information is processed predominantly in the Continental United States, but it is also processed in overseas areas such as Korea and Europe. The MACOM's are the major Army participants in creating and using this type of information. General purpose, commercially available equipment is normally used to process this information. The Sustaining Base Environment is managed under AR 25-5.

ARMY WIDE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Secretariat and Army Staff.

The Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, (DISC4) has general staff responsibility for the IMA and its organizations and systems, which includes integrating all aspects of IMA and assigning responsibility for management of information systems. All Army staff agencies develop and maintain an information architecture and designate an agency information manager.

MACOM's.

All MACOM's develop and maintain a command information architecture, appoint a principal staff officer for information management, and prepare an annual Information Management Plan (IMP) update.

U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC).

The USAISC plans, engineers, installs, operates, maintains, tests, and evaluates information systems in support of Army commands and agencies. Army information systems are those configurations of hardware and software used to gather, store, retrieve,

process, transfer, record, and display information. An information system will employ one or more of the five IMA disciplines (automation, communications, printing and publishing, records management and visual information). USAISC:

(a) Operates and maintains DISC4 assigned information systems, including Standard Army Multicommand Management Information Systems (STAMMIS).

(b) Plans, develops, engineers, acquires, and installs information systems as assigned by the DISC4. These systems may support theater/tactical, strategic, or sustaining base information requirements.

(c) Develops and implements information standards for the Army as assigned by the DISC4.

(d) Advises, assists, and provides technical support to information users as assigned.

(e) Is the focal point for processing procurement requests with the General Services Administration (GSA) as assigned.

(f) Coordinates with the combat and materiel developers for assigned information systems.

(g) As assigned, maintains an Armywide inventory of information systems and services for use by all Army commands.

(h) Identifies information system requirements in support of Military Construction Army (MCA) projects.

(i) Provides products and associated services for assigned IMA responsibilities.

(j) Plans, programs, and conducts New Equipment Training (NET) for assigned USAISC information systems.

Information Management for the Sustaining Base Regulation Requirement.

AR 25-5, Information Management for the Sustaining Base, contains the policies, responsibilities, and procedures that govern the management of sustaining base information.

Information Management Plan/Information Management Master Plan.

An IMP is the means through which sustaining base mission support information initiatives to satisfy information requirements and support the information architecture are identified and approved. IMP's are prepared at the lowest levels of command and are consolidated at MACOM level to become the MACOM IMP. The MACOM IMP's are forwarded to HQDA for approval and consolidation in the Army Information Management Master Plan (IMMP).

Army Organization for the Sustaining Base Information Staff Officers.

At MACOM headquarters level, the principal staff officer for information management is usually

designated the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (DCSIM). At Army installations and comparable levels the principal staff officer is designated the Director of Information Management (DOIM). At other levels of command MACOM's may, but are not required to, appoint an information manager. As a principal staff officer, the DCSIM has specific duties, such as command policy, planning, priorities determination; validation of requirements; and staff overview of the operation of information systems and equipment which are not or have not yet become the responsibility of USAISC. Examples of the former are tactical systems and equipment and the records management subdiscipline.

DCSIM's and DOIM's serve as the commander or director of the supporting USAISC organization. This is the "dual hat" relationship. The Commander of USAISC-Fort Meade is dual-hatted as the DOIM on the Fort Meade installation commander's staff. There is also an Operational Control (OPCON) relationship (Figure 22-4) between the local commanders and the supporting USAISC organization. The OPCON relationship puts the supported commander in the rating chain of the USAISC commander or director, thus insuring responsive information systems support.

DUAL HAT RELATIONSHIP IN CONUS




FIGURE 22-4

U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC).

The USAISC is a major Army command whose commander reports to the Chief of Staff, Army. To carry out its assigned worldwide responsibilities as described earlier in this chapter, USAISC is organized with five geographic Operations and Maintenance (O&M) commands, each of which provides information services to users in the theater or area of operations (Figure 22-5). They are the 7th Signal Command in Conus, the 5th Signal Command in Europe, the 1st Signal Brigade in Korea, USAISC-Japan in Japan, and USAISC-WESTCOM in Hawaii. In each theater or area (except CONUS) the USAISC commander is dual-

hatted as the principal staff officer for information management on the supported MACOM commander's staff. Each USAISC commander is the single spokesman for USAISC corporate capabilities.

USAISC is organized with several specialized (non O&M) commands and activities, the principal one being the U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering Command (USAISEC) (Figure 22-5).

The USAISC Business Area.

The USAISC is in the business of providing service to users. The command is in many ways comparable to utility companies like the local telephone company, the telegraph company, the long distance company, the cable company, and other businesses providing information services to the public. USAISC's "public" are Army commands and agencies and others as assigned. USAISC has five principal IMA subdisciplines assigned (Figure 22-6) and operates the same kinds of facilities, which provide the same kinds of services as can be found in the private sector.

Chargeback.

In the future, under HQDA direction, USAISC will employ Chargeback in providing information services. Chargeback is a system of charging users for information services in order to sensitize them to their demands for the services, and to encourage efficiencies and economies in the way USAISC provides these services to users. Users will reimburse USAISC for services based on an output-oriented bill. Under the Chargeback concept a base level of funding will be provided to USAISC and the funding amount above the base level will be provided to the other MACOM's so they may reimburse USAISC. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution for Information Systems and Services will be processed as directed by AR 25-5.




FIGURE 22-5

The Commander, USAISEC, serves as the DA Program Manager, Army Information Systems, and exercises the full-line authority of the Commander, USAISC for the fielding of projects assigned to his Project Managers. The USAISEC is the Army's selection and acquisition activity for Army information systems, acting under the authority delegated by the General Services Administration; is the hardware engineer and systems software designer and installer; and, also tests installed systems for acceptance and evaluates systems for performance in compliance with established standards. USAISEC field officers are collocated with and under the OPCON of 7th Signal Command, 5th Signal Command, 1st Signal Brigade, and USAISC-WESTCOM.

THE ISC BUSINESS AREA

- ★ TELECOMMUNICATIONS
- ★ AUTOMATION
- ★ VISUAL INFORMATION
- ★ PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
- ★ RECORDS MANAGEMENT

ISC FACILITIES	SERVICES TO MACOMS
TELEPHONE PLANTS	RECORD & VOICE COMMUNICATIONS
DATA PROCESSING INSTALLATIONS	INFORMATION TRANSFER
CENTRAL DESIGN AGENCIES	VISUAL INFORMATION SUPPORT
PRINT PLANTS	DATA PROCESSING SERVICES
DUPLICATING FACILITIES	OFFICE AUTOMATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS	SOFTWARE SUPPORT
TRANSMISSION FACILITIES	PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
VISUAL INFORMATION ACTIVITY	MAIL
OFFICE AUTOMATION SYSTEMS	

AS ASSIGNED BY ARMY:

- ENGINEER/DESIGN
- ACQUIRE
- INSTALL
- TEST & EVALUATE

FIGURE 22-6

SUMMARY

This chapter presents an overview of Army information systems and how DA plans, operates, and manages them. Information is a responsibility of command at all levels. The DISC4 is responsible for overall coordination of information systems activities in the U.S. Army. This responsibility is to develop the ultimate total Army information systems network designed to satisfy information processing and transfer requirements in peace and war. This network is comprised of three subnets: tactical/theater, strategic, and sustaining base.

The USAISC mission is to refine and support total Army information requirements, support the Army portion of the Defense Communications System (DCS), and provide tactical/strategic/sustaining base information management for the U.S. Army. Obviously, these provide a balance of information systems and services supporting the ability of the Army to sustain the combat forces.

The DISC4, in concert with the USAISC, provides the DA-level program management of Army information systems. In order to meet the challenge of the 1980's, the thrust of the efforts must be on wartime readiness. The Chief of Staff of the Army looks to the USAISC to maintain its assigned portions of the Army's peace and wartime Command, Control,

Communications (C3) posture in a constant state of readiness. To carry out this responsibility, the USAISC has resources which include a balanced military and civilian force of approximately 35,000 and financial resources which total over 2.2 billion dollars annually. The command's mission accomplishment spans the globe and is a vital factor in maintaining the readiness of the U.S. Army to fulfill its worldwide mission.

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CHAPTER 23

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

President Reagan signed Executive Order (EO) 12333 on 4 December 1981. The EO was intended to provide for the effective conduct of U.S. intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights. EO 12333 superseded EO 12036 which shaped the U.S. intelligence structure under President Carter.

Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers is needed to develop a sound national security and foreign policy. It is critical to international negotiations and the development and monitoring of international agreements. On another level, defense planners and managers responsible for the development of weapons systems and force structure need accurate, long-range projections of the forces of foreign powers as a basis for their recommendations and decisions. Measuring the ability of U.S. forces to deter or defend against attack requires knowledge of the current deployment and capabilities of potential adversaries and their plans for future weapon systems and deployments. At another level, information on the enemy is needed to support the operational commander engaged in combat.

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, and analysis of all available information pertinent to a subject of interest to its consumers. This chapter is about the management of that effort.

The chapter defines intelligence and provides an overview of the need for intelligence by decisionmakers. It includes the composition and responsibilities at the national, DOD, and Army levels. It also provides a look at the Army's concepts for the management of all-source intelligence and operations security (OPSEC) at the tactical level and the need for an effective national-tactical intelligence interface.

INTELLIGENCE DEFINED

Definition by User.

Intelligence serves many users with disparate as well as overlapping areas of interest. In terms of the organization served, intelligence may be thought of as national or departmental and strategic or tactical.

National intelligence, produced for top-level policymakers, consists of integrated interdepartmental

intelligence and covers the broad aspects of national security. *Departmental intelligence* is produced by one department or agency, and is of primary interest to that department or agency.

Strategic intelligence is required for the formulation of national policy and plans. Within the Army, *strategic intelligence* is referred to as that intelligence required and used at Echelons Above Corps (EAC) to support strategic planning or operations. *Tactical intelligence* is that intelligence required at Echelons Corps Level and Below (ECB) to support the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Often due to overlap in operations and resources, a clear differentiation between EAC and ECB is difficult to achieve.

Definition by Means of Collection.

The four major collection disciplines are Human Resource Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). Often an intelligence collection requirement is fulfilled by tasking more than one of the collection disciplines or more than one system or element within a single discipline.

Human Resource Intelligence. HUMINT refers to the collection of foreign intelligence by the use of people as opposed to the use of technical collection systems.

Imagery Intelligence. IMINT is that intelligence derived from photographic, radar, infra-red, and electro-optical imaging techniques.

Signals Intelligence. SIGINT is that intelligence obtained through the collection and processing of electromagnetic radiations. SIGINT is a general term which includes Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT).

Measurement and Signature Intelligence. MASINT encompasses a broad spectrum of collection not addressed by HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT. MASINT involves electro-optic intelligence to include laser intelligence, radar intelligence, unintentional radiations intelligence, electromagnetic pulse radiation, acoustic intelligence, and debris collection. MASINT is currently emerging and taking form as an established discipline within the intelligence area.

Definition by Use.

Basic Intelligence is encyclopedic and not time sensitive, encompassing such information as strengths and capabilities for foreign forces; target information; and geographic, demographic, or biographic data. It is a useful desk reference for operations officers.

Current Intelligence resembles a newspaper in that it ages rapidly. It mainly consists of short articles informing top policymakers on yesterday's events, today's issues, and tomorrow's expected problems.

Estimative Intelligence projects forward in time and is predictive in nature. It tries to foretell the future (often as a variety of possible outcomes) for high-level policymakers.

Definition by Subject.

The intelligence product may be focused on military, political, economic, scientific and technical, sociological, demographic, topographic, or biographic subjects or may cover several or all of these aspects in a single report.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

The following constitute the National Foreign Intelligence System:

- The National Security Council (NSC).
- The Senior Interagency Group—Intelligence (SIG-I).
- The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
- The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
- The National Security Agency (NSA).
- The offices within the DOD responsible for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence.
- The intelligence elements of the military services.
- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State.
- The Department of the Treasury.
- The Department of Energy. (Intelligence Elements).
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- Staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The goal of the U.S. intelligence effort is to provide the President and the National Security Council (NSC) information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of U.S. interests from foreign threats. To reach this goal, the intelligence system is organized as shown at Figure 23-1. Within the NSC, the Senior Interagency Group—Intelligence (SIG-I) formulates policy, monitors decisions, and evaluates the adequacy and effectiveness of collection efforts.

While not a member of the Intelligence Community (IC), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides program and budget guidance for development of the National Foreign Intelligence program as part of the Federal Budget.

The senior oversight body within the Executive Department is the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). It is charged with reviewing the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsels who have oversight responsibilities for agencies within the IC. The IOB reviews the internal guidelines of each agency within the IC concerning the legality or propriety of intelligence activities, and reports to the Attorney General any matters involving questions of legality. In addition, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have key oversight rules which involve investigations, appropriations for intelligence programs, charter legislation, and evaluations of the quality of intelligence.

The National Security Council reviews, guides, and directs the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, special activities, and attendant policies and programs.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is concurrently Director, CIA, is responsible directly to the President and the National Security Council. He is the primary advisor to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence and is the intelligence system's principal spokesman to Congress. He develops objectives and prepares guidance for the IC to enhance its capabilities for responding to expected future needs for foreign national intelligence, formulates policies concerning intelligence arrangements with foreign governments, and coordinates intelligence arrangements between agencies of the IC and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments. The DCI is responsible for the development, presentation and justification of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget. A complete list of DCI responsibilities is contained in EO 12333.

Other senior officials are responsible for contributing, within their areas of capability, to the national foreign intelligence collection effort and for cooperating with other IC members to achieve efficiency and provide mutual assistance. In addition, they are responsible for management of the collection of departmental intelligence.

Pursuant to EO 12333, the DCI establishes boards, councils, committees, or groups as required for the purpose of obtaining advice from within the Intelligence Community. Three such organizations are shown on Figure 23-1.

— The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB). The NFIB advises the DCI on production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence; interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; protection of intelligence sources and methods; activities of common concern; and other matters referred to it by the DCI. Although not mentioned in EO 12333, the DCI has decided to continue the NFIB but removed from its charter responsibility for addressing resource issues. Those responsibilities were assigned to the National Foreign Intelligence Council.

— The National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC). NFIC advises the DCI on priorities and objectives for the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and any other such matters referred to it by the DCI.

— Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR&DC). IR&DC advises the DCI on research and development strategy and technologies that will best contribute to the attainment of national intelligence objectives.

CIA and DOD members of the IC have an additional responsibility: the collection of strategic and tactical intelligence, provided that the collection requirements are of sufficient priority. Activities designed primarily to collect tactical intelligence are not included within the NFIP. Nonetheless, tactical intelligence resources support national requirements to the extent practicable. The interface between national and tactical intelligence is addressed later in this chapter.

CIA responsibilities, under the direction of the NSC, include the collection of foreign intelligence and the development, conduct, or provision of support for technical and other programs which collect national foreign intelligence. The CIA is responsible for the conduct of counterintelligence activities abroad and for the coordination of counterintelligence activities conducted abroad by other members of the IC. The FBI is responsible for domestic counterintelligence activities. In addition, the CIA is responsible for coordinating collection outside the United States of intelligence

ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333




FIGURE 23-1

information. The CIA conducts special activities* approved by the President and conducts services of common concern for the IC as directed by the NSC. The CIA produces and disseminates foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic, and sociological intelligence required to meet the needs of the President, the NSC, and other elements of the US Government. The CIA also produces and disseminates counterintelligence studies and reports on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking.

* Special activities are defined in EO 12333 as: activities in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities but which are not intended to influence U.S. political processes, public opinion, policies or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.

The responsibilities of all agencies depicted in Figure 23-1 are detailed in EO 12333.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

The DOD is the nation's largest user of intelligence information and the largest investor in intelligence programs. DOD has a particular responsibility to support operational commanders at all levels. Defense Intelligence, as part of the IC, is faced with a growing number of challenges to the successful accomplishment of its Defense intelligence mission.

— The international environment has grown more complex. Changing political alignments, growing economic interdependence, increased international terrorism and international narcotics trade have resulted in increased intelligence requirements.

— The military capabilities and sophistication of hostile or potentially hostile foreign governments are growing steadily. Detailed knowledge of these capabilities is required for the development of U.S. forces and the development of countermeasures.

— Soviet activities and those of their surrogates, as well as activities of other nations whose interests and goals are inimical to U.S. policy objectives, continue to expand in all areas of the world.

— Technological developments have greatly increased the amount of information which can be collected; however, the ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate finished intelligence has not kept pace with the ability to collect raw information.

A schematic of the DIS is shown in Figure 23-2. The DCI and the SECDEF may jointly designate additional DOD programs as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence programs.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the primary advisor and staff assistant to the SECDEF for such matters as international politico-military affairs and arms limitation negotiations, intelligence analysis and requirements, and the integration of departmental plans and policies with overall national security objectives. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has the responsibility for the overall management of DOD intelligence activity. This includes confirming requirements and priorities for intelligence collection, production, research and development, and systems acquisition.


The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (C³I), the principal deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, is responsible for intelligence resource management including related warning and reconnaissance activities.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

The Director of the DIA is responsible for satisfying the foreign military intelligence requirements (less cryptologic) of the JCS, major components of the Defense Department and other authorized recipients and for providing military intelligence contributions to national intelligence production. The director of the DIA is a member of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The DIA produces, or through tasking and coordination assures the production of, foreign military and military-related intelligence. The Director of the DIA works extensively with the services to provide support that meets a wide variety of needs. Cooperative service efforts go into the Defense-Wide Intelligence Plan (D-WIP). The D-WIP is the principal long-range planning document of DOD, providing a broad range of recommendations to improve future intelligence capabilities. The DIA provides intelligence support to the JCS and to unified and specified commands, provides central management for the Defense Attache System, participates in the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and operates the Defense Intelligence School.

In addition, the DIA supervises the DOD Indication and Warning System and provides support to the National Military Command Center through the National Military Intelligence Center. The DIA has the responsibility to satisfy the DOD intelligence collection requirements; coordinate and review activities of the DOD collection resources not assigned to the DIA; and exercise technical direction and coordination of the DOD HUMINT program. The DIA is functionally organized into two main branches directed by a Vice Director for Management and Operations and a Vice Director for Foreign Intelligence.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM



C³I - COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE

DIS – DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

DIA - DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

JCS - JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

NSA – NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

DMA – DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY

U&S CMDS – UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

CSS - CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FIGURE 23-2

National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Security Service (CSS).

The Director of the NSA is also the Chief of the Central Security Service and manages the largest single program contained in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. He is responsible for the operations of an effective unified organization for SIGINT activity. This responsibility requires extensive interaction, coordination, and cooperation with the services. No other department or agency may engage in such activity without a delegation of authority by the SECDEF. The NSA's SIGINT collection, processing, and dissemination activities involve both positive and counterintelligence information and are in direct support of military commanders and military operations and responsive to national foreign intelligence requirements. The Director of the NSA is responsible for the research and development required to meet the needs for SIGINT and Communications Security (COMSEC). He is the executive agent for executing the responsibilities of the SECDEF for the COMSEC of the Government. He also has oversight of the Tactical Cryptologic Program (TCP) that lies

outside the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and is responsible for providing training and training support to the Services.

Defense Investigative Service.

The Defense Investigative Service was established in 1972 to consolidate all DOD personnel security investigations within one agency and thereby reduce resource requirements, increase managerial efficiency and provide a more prompt response to overall defense needs for personnel security investigations. The service operates under the staff supervision of the DOD General Counsel.

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).

The DMA was established to consolidate to the extent practicable all defense mapping, charting, and geodetic operations. This includes production, source data storage and retrieval, and management of distribution facilities, the Topographic Center, and the Defense Mapping School.

Others.

Finally, there are offices within the DOD for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs. They are responsible for carrying out consolidated reconnaissance programs and for delegating authority to various departments and agencies for research, development, procurement, and operation of designated means of collection.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE


The Secretary of the Army has delegated to the Under Secretary of the Army responsibility for the general supervision of the intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, and intelligence oversight activities of the Army. See Figure 23-3 for a simplified organization of the Army Intelligence System.

The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military services are responsible for the collection, production, and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence, including information on indications and warnings, foreign capabilities, plans and weapons systems, scientific and

technical developments. The conduct of counterintelligence activities and the production and dissemination of counterintelligence studies and reports is a service responsibility as are the development, procurement, and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment, and the conduct of related research, development, and test and evaluation activities.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).

The DCSINT is responsible to the Chief of Staff for the overall coordination of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Army. He has general staff responsibility for intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence automation, signals intelligence, censorship, threat validation, intelligence collection, security, meteorologic, topographic, and space activities. He monitors Army intelligence training, force structure, and readiness. The DCSINT, under the general guidance and tasking of DIA, exercises general staff supervision over Army and Army-supported Intelligence Data Handling System resources and over all-source intelligence production within the Army. He



* COMMAND IS SUPPORTED BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNITS ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. ARMY INSCOM.

**AFMIC IS A FIELD OPERATING AGENCY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MANAGED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WITH JOINT RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SURGEON GENERAL AND DCSINT.

FIGURE 23-3

is the Director for Army Budget Program 3I (Intelligence); is responsible for the Army's input into the DOD Consolidated Cryptologic Program; and is the Army SIGINT focal point. The DCSINT is responsible for the total Army Automation Security Program (AASP). The DCSINT participates in Army POM building by providing advice to Senior Program Managers on ranking of intelligence requirements. Moreover, the DCSINT coordinates top intelligence requirements with MACOMs during submission of POM Assessment Letters and Program Analysis Resource Reviews.

U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (AIA).

The AIA is a Field Operating Activity of the DCSINT. This agency commands ITAC, MSIC, and FSTC. The AIA is the Army focal point for the production and dissemination of scientific and technical intelligence, general intelligence (less medical), and counterintelligence. It is responsible also for providing threat support and managing the Army's foreign materiel exploitation program.

U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC). The ITAC produces general intelligence and counterintelligence. Production emphasis includes threat analysis support, IMINT exploitation, and foreign exercise analysis. The ITAC is presently located at the Washington Navy Yard, District of Columbia.

U.S. Army Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC). The MSIC produces scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence on foreign missiles and space trends. Production emphasis includes antiballistic, short-range ballistic, surface-to-air and antitank guided missiles, and related Command and Control (C2) electronics. MSIC is located at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC). The FSTC produces S&T intelligence on foreign ground force materiel. Production emphasis includes artillery, infantry, engineer, armor, and helicopter weapon systems, chemical warfare, and electronic warfare. FSTC is located in Charlottesville, Virginia.

Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC).

On October 1, 1982, the U.S. Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency (MIIA) was reestablished as the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center. The AFMIC is a joint agency of the Military Departments, subject to authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and under the management of the Secretary of the Army as executive agent. This management authority is exercised through the DCSINT and the Surgeon General of the Army.

The AFMIC has the sole responsibility within the DOD for the production of required medical, scientific

and technical intelligence, and general medical intelligence. The AFMIC also organizes and executes all medical aspects of the DOD Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program. The AFMIC is located at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland.

Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

INSCOM, a Major Army Command, provides a single commander for those Intelligence, Security, and Electronic Warfare (ISEW) units which operate at echelons above corps. INSCOM units, which are located both in CONUS and at many overseas locations, support requirements which are national, departmental, strategic, operational, and tactical. The operations of INSCOM units include: collection and dissemination of all-source, multidisciplined intelligence; counterintelligence operations, including OPSEC support; and electronic warfare planning and coordination activity. In each major overseas area, a Military Intelligence (MI) Group provides multidisciplined ISEW support to Army EAC in theater, reinforces MI units organic to operational and tactical commands at the Echelon Corps and Below (ECB), and satisfies tasking from national and departmental authorities for SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, counterintelligence operations, and OPSEC support in response to strategic requirements. In CONUS, single and multidisciplined INSCOM MI groups, units and other organizations, some of them strategically deployable for contingencies, provide a wide range of threat analysis, security, and OPSEC support to national and departmental agencies, contractors for sensitive projects and systems, and CONUS-based tactical consumers, including FORSCOM units and the Army component of United States Central Command. INSCOM also plays a significant role in training at the National Training Center and with its REDTRAIN program which supports maintenance and development of intelligence skills in EAC and ECB MI units. Finally, INSCOM supports TRADOC in the EAC ISEW combat development process with doctrinal and force structure input, and is a materiel developer for certain specialized types of intelligence-related materiel.

Special Security Group (SSG). The SSG, a major subordinate unit of INSCOM, is responsible for implementing and enforcing national policies relating to the distribution and security of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), and manages the Army component of the Defense Special Security System (DSSS). In this role, it administers, acquires, distributes and safeguards SCI for the Army, and exercises security cognizance over Special Security Officers (SSOs) in tactical units.

Tactical Support.

Military Intelligence units play a significant role in providing combat support at corps, division, Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), and separate brigade levels. These Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) units support the commander at each level with tactical intelligence derived from a wide range of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) systems. This tactical support for the commander is accomplished through four major IEW tasks: situation development, target development, electronic warfare, and counterintelligence. A commander's informational and operational needs are satisfied by the successful integration of the four IEW tasks into unit operations.

The MI brigade (CEWI) provides dedicated IEW support to both the Heavy and Light Corps. The MI battalion (CEWI) provides tactical intelligence to division commanders, and a MI company (CEWI) supports the ACR and separate brigades. The MI brigade employs a large number of airborne IEW systems including photo, side-looking airborne radar, and communications and non-communications intercept aerial platforms, and also ground resources such as jammers, voice intercepts, and interrogators. Although the MI company is similar to, but smaller than, the MI battalion, both units employ a multidiscipline collection effort with a wide assortment of organic IEW systems. For example, jammers, communications intercepts, and ground surveillance radars provide close-in IEW support. The MI units also have operational control of a CEWI platoon (flight), which provides airborne communications intercept and jamming support.

A substantial G2 staff exists both in corps and division headquarters to coordinate the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence. At corps and division, the ACofS, G2, is the senior intelligence officer responsible to the commander for providing IEW support to the commander. The MI commander provides the G2 the means to accomplish the intelligence mission by training, maintaining, and employing intelligence assets. FC 34-1, IEW Operations, the Keystone Intelligence Manual, expands upon FM 100-5, Operations, by establishing the doctrinal foundation for IEW operations, including the employment of MI units at all echelons, corps and below.

THE MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

The National Security Council provides overall Executive Branch guidance, direction, and review for all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The NSC has special committees within its framework which deal with its intelligence responsibilities.

In addition to the management of the individual agencies or elements thereof which constitute the intelligence system, management of intelligence focuses

mainly on the management of intelligence resources, requirements, collection tasking, collection, and analysis and production.

Resource Management.

The primary means for resource management within the IC is the National Foreign Intelligence Program. It includes the programs of the CIA, the intelligence programs of the DOD, and other programs of agencies designated by the DCI, a department head, or by the President as constituting the national foreign intelligence program. The DCI has authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget submitted to the President through the OMB and must present and justify the budget to the Congress. The DCI provides guidance for program and budget development to program managers and heads of departments and agencies. The Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management is the principal advisor to the DCI on all matters relating to the NFIP budget prior to its presentation to the President and Congress.

The Army participates in three of the thirteen programs of the NFIP; the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP), and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). Program management for the CCP comes from the Director, National Security Agency. The CCP includes resources for SIGINT projects and activities. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency is the Program Manager for the GDIP which includes funds for DIA, service HUMINT, Intelligence Data Handling Systems, Intelligence Production activities of the services, and some intelligence activities of unified and specified commands. The Foreign Counterintelligence Program provides resources for service activities and receives program management from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Program and budget information is prepared by each of the services and is forwarded through program managers to the DCI, with copies going to the Secretary of Defense.

In addition to the NFIP budget, many intelligence resources are included in the FYDP under the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program. This program includes most intelligence resources directly supporting operational commanders, to include MI(CEWI) organizations and equipment.

Unified and Specified (U&S) Commanders now formally participate in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process for intelligence resources. Through the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP), U&S Commanders identify their intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination resource requirements for this Headquarters and components. The TIAP has become the driving force for acquiring the requisite military intelligence capabilities through the 1990's.

Collection Management.

The intelligence cycle begins and ends with the user. A user's needs are passed to the producer for fulfillment. If the producer cannot satisfy the user's needs, the producer levies the requirement on the collector. The user must be able to state clearly his intelligence interests or needs (requirements) in addition to those that are already satisfied by existing finished intelligence. Requirements compete for limited collection resources at the national, departmental, strategic, and tactical levels. Requirements are prioritized in accordance with the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP). The military commander must make his case for the priority of his requirement if resources not assigned or organic to his command are needed to fulfill the requirement.

The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) coordinates the formulation of DOD requirements, validates the requirements, and establishes DOD priorities among requirements. The DIA, in its support role to the JCS, prepares a listing of intelligence priorities for strategic planning for JCS publication and validates the intelligence requirements of the military services. A prioritized list of both long-term and short-term interests is established by the NSC and passed to the CIA. There a determination is made as to whether sufficient intelligence exists to fulfill the requirement or whether additional is needed. If additional intelligence is needed, detailed prioritized requirements are passed to the Intelligence Community staff for collection tasking.

All collection operations are conducted in response to validated requirements for the production of finished intelligence. The IC staff tasks its members for collection to fulfill prioritized requirements. The selection of the specific collection resource rests with the department or the program manager. The management aspects of collection involve assuring that the assets selected are the most cost-effective that can fulfill the requirement on a timely basis.

Collection operations tasked by the DIA in response to DOD-generated requirements are normally conducted on an all-source, common-service basis. Army strategic collection is managed by INSCOM. Conduct of intelligence operations at the tactical level to support directly the commanders' immediate needs is usually accomplished by assigned or supporting intelligence organizations. Tactical commanders obtain most information on their areas of influence from assigned or supporting assets including MI units, artillery, cavalry, aviation, and maneuver units in contact. Additional information and intelligence on the area of influence is provided from higher echelons.

The DIA does not own intelligence collection assets except for the Defense Attache System. Intelligence collection resources at all levels are limited. Centralized collection control and continuous coordination are required to ensure the most effective and responsible intelligence collection possible.

Analysis and Production Management.

National intelligence production is the responsibility of the DCI and is exercised through the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, which establishes schedules and priorities for all national intelligence production. Further, the directorate retains the resources and capability to produce intelligence assessments which are not coordinated with other elements of the Intelligence Community.

The Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence is the principal advisor to the DCI on the production of national intelligence, both as to the manner in which it is accomplished and what it contains. He is responsible for organizing national efforts to assess and evaluate foreign intelligence data in support of intelligence objectives established by the NSC. He is the head of the Directorate of Intelligence and oversees production generated in response to standing requirements, new requirements, or as the need is perceived.

No single intelligence product format meets the needs of all users. It is necessary to have a continuing dialogue between the user and the producer of intelligence while assuring that the user does not influence the conclusions of the final product.

The most prestigious intelligence product is the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which is prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence for DCI approval and forwarding to the President. The PDB may be considered as the DCI's principal daily report to the President. National intelligence estimates and similar publications are reviewed by the NFIB prior to submission to the DCI for approval and subsequent dissemination.

Individual departments and agencies establish their own production schedules and priorities for the production of departmental intelligence. The DIA establishes production schedules in the DOD and levies production responsibilities on the U&S commands and members of the IC.

OTHER USES OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence in a useable form must quickly reach leaders and staff who need it to guide preparation of plans and orders. Managers must develop a clear understanding of what intelligence is available or can be obtained and how it can assist in the proper development of their programs. Managers must clearly state their intelligence requirements to the appropriate intelligence organization.

The following are a few examples of program areas in which intelligence can have a significant impact:

— *Organizational Design and Force Structure.* Force structure designers must consider the multiplicity of the threats and must also include nonthreat factors such as the deployment capabilities and limitations of allied forces. There must also be balance between the greatest

threat and the most imminent threat in the development of a force structure. The force planner must include intelligence participation in every phase of his planning and decisionmaking. To do this, he must be aware of the intelligence support available and how to task the system.

— **Materiel Systems Management.** The project/program manager must consider technical developments in foreign countries, new foreign weapons systems and countermeasures developments and future developments, as well as terrain and weather considerations. This includes an assessment of how an adversary may react to the development of a new, friendly system. The adversary reaction may include development of a totally new piece of equipment to counter a specific threat. The project manager must have the latest intelligence available which could affect his program. He must make the intelligence system aware of his intelligence needs. The combat developer must also be aware of technical developments and must work closely with the materiel developer to insure that a project/program will counter or surpass assessed threat capabilities. Both must be prepared to amend a program prior to its completion to counter a new threat capability. Intelligence requirements are not limited to hostile forces. Technological breakthroughs in friendly or neutral nations should also be factored into U.S. materiel acquisition planning. Managers of systems of breakthrough technology must use available intelligence support to protect characteristics of the developing system as a measure of OPSEC in the R&D arena. Other factors that should be taken into account in these processes include long-range planning and consideration of opponent's strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities.

— **Training Systems Development.** Doctrine and training decisions must be based on sound intelligence. Foreign military capabilities and deployments are dynamic, and U.S. doctrine and training decisions must be equally dynamic. To be effective in battle, U.S. soldiers must know the enemy, to include enemy doctrine, tactics, equipment, strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Training development and implementation must be closely tied to materiel systems management.

SUMMARY

Intelligence is vital to the national security of the United States, but the importance of intelligence in various program and planning areas is not always fully recognized. While concentrating on intelligence production, the four major intelligence collection disciplines—Human Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and Measurement and Signature Intelligence—should be used as efficiently as possible within constrained resources.

The National Intelligence Program under the supervision of the DCI includes CIA programs, and major DOD programs as well as programs within other U.S. Government agencies. The National Security Council provides overall review, guidance, and direction for all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

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- (5) *DIA Organization, Mission and Key Personnel,* Jan 1980 RCS-2600-926-80. (Unclassified)
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CHAPTER 24

THE ARMY HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

Health service support and medical research and development have played a vital role in the Army since 1775. Since that time innovations in technology, medical practice, and human goals have evolved to revolutionize the practice of medicine. The practice of medicine has, in turn, made a dedicated effort to keep pace with the constantly changing battlefield doctrine to meet the needs of the soldier.

The health services support system encompasses all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health professional care from the policy and decisionmaking level to the combat medic in the field. The command and management of health service resources within the Army is, for the most part, directed and monitored through the special staff offices allied to the medical field. Hand in hand with the total Army management system, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) conducts various programs specifically designed to meet the force modernization requirements, unit readiness, research and development, and peacetime patient care missions for the uniformed services.

This chapter is intended to identify the functions and responsibilities of the AMEDD as related to total Army management systems. The AMEDD has developed various management systems specifically designed to enhance the development and control of resources associated with the health services support system. Great emphasis has been dedicated to improving health service personnel management, materiel procurement, medical research and development, health services automation, health facilities construction projects, and health professional education and training. These systems are controlled directly by the Surgeon General.

MEDICAL READINESS

The Army Medical Department is charged with the responsibility to conserve the Army's fighting strength. It accomplishes this mission by:

- Promoting a healthy, vigorous, and fit fighting force.
- Insuring that the Army is supported by highly trained medical units and individuals utilizing state of the art equipment, doctrine, organization and techniques.

— Instilling the confidence in soldiers that they and their families will receive quality medical care.

— Achieving a medical team that manifests the very highest level of skills and ethics.

The importance of the medical system on the battlefield is paramount. It is responsible for rapidly evacuating casualties from the battle area so the combat commander can continue to fight the battle. The system is then responsible for returning as many of those soldiers as possible to their units. The importance of the medical system becomes clear when one considers the fact that it is the combat commander's primary, and possibly only, source of replacements in the early stages of a major combat engagement.

THE SYSTEM

Army Medical Department Functional Relationships.

The Surgeon General (TSG) is responsible for development, policy direction, organization, and overall management of an integrated Army-wide health service system and is the medical materiel developer for the Army. This includes formulating policy and regulations on health service support, health hazards assessment, and the establishment of health standards. The following definitions are basic to an understanding of the Health Service System.

Army Medical Department (AMEDD). Those Army special branches that are under the supervision and management of TSG. Specifically, these special branches are the Medical Corps (MC), Dental Corps (DC), Veterinary Corps (VC), Medical Service Corps (MSC), Army Nurse Corps (ANC), and Army Medical Specialist Corps (AMSC). Also included within the AMEDD are those medically-related Career Management Field (CMF) soldiers (e.g., CMF 91, etc.) and DA civilians employed with AMEDD organizations and activities.

Health Services. All services performed, provided, or arranged for (regardless of location) which promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of individuals or groups, and those services which contribute to the maintenance or restoration of a healthy environment. It includes, but is not limited to, preventive, curative, and restorative health measures; medical department doctrine; medical aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense; health

professional education and training; health-related research; transportation of the sick and wounded; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; health care administration, supply, and maintenance; medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, and optical services.

Health Standards. All measures, criteria, or bases of comparison developed or obtained concerning personal and environmental health services to determine the content, extent, value, quality method of measurement, and other characteristics of health services or the state of health of an individual or community. This includes, but is not limited to, the establishment of physical and mental fitness standards for military duty; collection and evaluation of epidemiological, social, demographic, and related data; and the establishment of normative baselines for comparative purposes.

Medical Research. Medical research is the search for and discovery of systems, technologies, and techniques which keep the soldiers' performance at an acceptable level. It is geared to address problems which may cause the soldier to become ineffective by means of physical, psychological, or environmental influences of the battlefield.

Staff Relationships.

In establishing health services and health standards to maintain the Army's fighting strength, the AMEDD crosses all staff boundaries within the Department of Defense (DOD) (see Figure 24-1). The following functional relationships exist.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD(HA)). The ASD(HA) has statutory responsibility for overall supervision of the health affairs of DOD and is principal staff assistant and advisor to SECDEF for all DOD health policies, programs, and activities.

The Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG). Has Army staff responsibility for the following:

- Health services for the Army and other agencies and organizations.
- Health standards for Army personnel.
- World-wide command programs to protect and enhance health by control of the environment and prevention of disease.
- Policies and regulations concerning the health aspects of Army environmental programs.

HEALTH SERVICES




FIGURE 24-1

- Health professional education and training for the Army, to include training programs for all specialties in medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine.

- Medical research, development, test, and evaluation for the Army.

- Research and development activities for nutrition and wholesomeness in support of the DOD Food Service Programs.

- Medical materiel life cycle management.

- Medical materiel concepts, medical materiel requirements documents, and requirements for validity and viability.

- Technical review and evaluation of medical and nonmedical materiel to determine possible existence of health hazards.

- Program management for Army medical automation.

- Army execution of the Tri-Service Medical Information System (TRIMIS) Program.

- Medical aspects of the Security Assistance Program.

- Program Director for Operations and Maintenance Army, Program 8 (Medical).

- Commanding personnel, organizations, and facilities as assigned; technical staff supervision over all other facilities and units of the Army involved in delivery of health services.

- Executive agent for the Secretary of the Army for all DOD Veterinary Services.

COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

The AMEDD has four Medical Commands within the Army structure. Health Services Command (HSC) is under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, Army as a Major Army Command; 7th Medical Command is a subordinate command of U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army; 18th Medical Command is a subordinate command of Eighth U.S. Army.

The fourth medical command is the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC). It is a field operating agency of TSG.

Health Services Command.

The mission of the U.S. Army Health Services Command is to:

- Plan for expansion of the Army's CONUS hospital system during a period of wartime mobilization. In war, the HSC hospitals must provide patient care to: mobilizing and deploying forces; an expanding training base; and patients returning from the combat theater. It must also train a rapidly expanding military medical force.

- Provide medical, dental and veterinary services.

- Provide (under the auspices of the Academy of Health Sciences) medical and allied health care professional education and training for Army Medical

Department personnel and for other Army personnel, members of other Services, other Federal agencies, and for authorized foreign national personnel.

- Responsible for medical combat development activities in support of the Army in the field.

- Advise all commanders who do not have adequate organic medical and dental capability on health service matters.

- Develop AMEDD Manpower Staffing Standards.

- Provide TSG direct support in the following Armywide functions:

- — Health care education and training;

- — Health care studies;

- — Medical equipment test and evaluation;

- — Medical combat development;

- — Development of standard automated health care;

- — Environmental and occupational health;

- — Patient administration and biostatistics;

- — Development of AMEDD TOE;

- — Basis of issue—medical assemblage sets, kits, and outfits.

7th Medical Command, Europe and 18th Medical Command, Korea (7th and 18th MEDCOM).

The missions of the 7th and 18th Medical Commands are to:

- Provide Communications Zone field army level health service support to MACOM and other organizations, as directed.

- Provide command, control, staff planning, and supervision of operations, training, and administration of hospital centers, medical groups, and Medical Department Activities.

- Perform medical regulating activities.

- Furnish professional specialty consultation services.

- Develop policy and guidance for management of medical materiel, medical equipment maintenance, and optical fabrication.

- Provide medical staff services as Chief Surgeon.

- Inform the Commander and his staff on the health of the command and on health service aspects of matters affecting combat service support.

- Provide current information concerning the medical aspects of combat service support to the surgeons of higher headquarters.

- Coordinate health service support to commands and other organizations as directed.

- Provide area and regional health services.

- Supervise medical aspects of the command drug and alcohol abuse prevention and control program.

U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC).

The mission of USAMRDC is to:

- Plan, coordinate, direct, execute, supervise, and review the U.S. Army Medical Department Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (AMEDD RDTE) Program.

- Support the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) by developing necessary biological data bases.

- Be the medical materiel developer for The Surgeon General.

- Command eleven subordinate units (institutes, laboratories, and activities) at eight CONUS locations and five OCONUS locations.

Staff Surgeons.

The senior Medical Corps officer present for duty with a headquarters (other than medical) will be officially titled—

- The “Surgeon” of the field command.

- The “Chief Surgeon” of the overseas major Army command.

- The “Director of Health Services (DHS)” at the installation level.

The Surgeon/DHS is responsible for the staff supervision of all health matters and policies.

The Director of Health Services (DHS) and the Director of Dental Services (DDS) will serve on the installation commander’s staff. Normally, the commander of the medical center (MEDCEN) or Army Community Hospital is the DHS and the commander of the dental activity is the DDS.

Dual Hat Positions.

By mutual agreement between commanders, the appropriate medical staff officer may, as an additional duty, serve as the staff surgeon to other commands which do not have medical staff officers assigned. The following are examples:

- The Commander, 7th Medical Command also serves as the Chief Surgeon, USAREUR and Seventh Army.

- The Commander, 18th Medical Command also serves as Surgeon, Combined Forces Command, Korea, and Surgeon, 8th U.S. Army.

- The Commander, Tripler Army Medical Center, also serves as the WESTCOM Surgeon and as the Director of Health Services for U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii.

Medical Materiel at the Installation Level.

DA policy states that medical materiel functions are subfunctions of the Army health care system, which are directed by The Surgeon General and operated within the framework of the overall logistics system.

Accountability policy is prescribed and approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Headquarters, Department of Army.

Medical logistics is a technical function. It concerns items that are used for the treatment of patients. These items are generally procured, stored, and distributed differently from other types of supply items. They present difficult problems of deterioration and obsolescence. For these reasons, this function must be administered and directed by persons with extensive knowledge of the current utility of medical supply items in light of continuing advances and improvements in the techniques of medical science.

At the wholesale level, medical materiel is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). However, once shipped by DLA to an installation, it comes under the control of the Surgeon/DHS.

SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the mission, organization, functions, and staff relationships of the Army Medical Department. The health services support system encompasses all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health professional care from the policy and decisionmaking level to the combat medic in the field. The command and management of health service resources within the Army is, for the most part, directed and monitored through the special staff offices allied to the medical field. Hand in hand with the total Army management systems, the AMEDD conducts various programs specifically designed to meet the force modernization requirements and peacetime patient care missions for the uniformed services.

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CHAPTER 25

CONCLUSION

This text began on the note that it was written for those who were preparing to assume high level leadership, command, and management positions with the responsibility of providing this nation the kind of Army it needs. It was written to serve as a means for projecting thoughts for further study, consideration, and discussion. The design began with a theoretical base, moved toward a management philosophy, and then presented an overview of the practice of management in the United States Army. The intent was to generate more questions than were answered and to surface more problems than were solved.

Although this chapter is entitled, "CONCLUSION," the word is used in the sense of being the end or last part of something rather than as a judgment, decision, or opinion. This chapter will offer neither the answers to questions nor the solutions to problems. To the contrary, in this concluding chapter we will raise some of the principal questions and identify significant issues that confront the Army as it moves from its present state to its desired future state. It has been suggested that we are obligated to provide this country the kind of Army it needs—an alert, responsive, and effective Army, and an Army that meets the desires of the American people.

What kind of Army does this nation really need? The implications and ramifications of that question are enormous. It cannot be answered simply. We can begin by asking the questions raised by Peter Drucker, "What business are we in?" and "What business should we be in?" The statutory mandate for the Army is found in Title 10, United States Code, Section 3062, which states:

"(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;

(2) supporting the national policies;

(3) implementing the national objectives; and

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and

such aviation and water transport as may be organic, therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

(c) The Army consists of—

(1) the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Army Reserve; and

(2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Army without component.

(d) The organized peace establishment of the Army consists of all—

(1) military organizations of the Army with their installations and supporting and auxiliary elements, including combat, training, administrative, and logistic elements; and

(2) members of the Army, including those not assigned to units, necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the national defense in the event of a national emergency."

Section (a) tells us that we need the kind of Army that is capable of preserving peace and providing defense of certain United States interests, supporting national policies, and implementing national objectives.

Section (b) sets the Army's responsibilities for its own organization and operation with peacetime components—expandable to a wartime posture.

The remainder of this chapter addresses the issues facing strategic decisionmakers in relating the charges of Section (a) into capabilities needed to discharge the tasks of Section (b). Specific questions and issues (a sampling) are raised as the major operating systems are discussed in the general sequence of organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining the force.

SENIOR COMMAND

No institution can endure without a clear understanding of its purpose and objective. Because the

Army runs the most traumatic gamut of purpose—from peace to war, and an almost schizophrenic existence in peacetime as it maintains its readiness for war—an unequivocal and purposeful guide must be established.

The effective senior commander guides his unit by setting broad objectives, using mission-type orders, setting the example and standards of performance, adhering to a high code of values, demonstrating personal integrity and strong character, and employing normal supervisory techniques. Viewing the organization as a system, the senior commander devotes energy to fine tuning it to create conditions conducive to maximum effectiveness of each subordinate unit and individual. It is the leadership role of the senior commander to set vision, design interdependencies, establish the culture, and develop effective information systems.

The Army has translated its warfighting purpose to its principal peacetime mission: readiness. The maintenance of a ready warfighting capability provides the assurance that preparing for war serves to preserve the peace.

The ultimate command challenge remains the ability to perform during wartime. Because of the complexity and lethality of modern weapons, accompanied by a wider variety and intricacy of military organizations, demands have already increased markedly in the past decade. Future land battles with fast moving developments and high attrition rates will place unprecedented stress on the ability of the senior commander. The commander of the future will have to be composed, audacious, and resourceful, capable of highly independent action. As an enlightened leader, the commander will have to have a comprehensive understanding of the organization's capabilities, limitations, and its people. The hallmarks of superior command will remain—integrity, professional competence, ethical performance, and adherence to sound leadership principles.

STRATEGIC DECISION SYSTEM

Strategic decisionmaking is aimed at the highest level of the organization. In this text, the level is Headquarters, Department of the Army, where the senior leaders are responsible for determining Army managerial strategy. Their primary task is to relate the Army to its environment and to design comprehensive plans and programs that will achieve Army goals and objectives. The environment is complex and ever changing. The environment exists as a set of forces that often constrain the Army decisionmakers. Two major classifications of environmental factors were discussed in this text; tasking forces (higher headquarters so to speak), which impact directly upon the way the Army prepares its programs, and societal pressures and constraints which are a source of great uncertainty. The Army may not have a codified or authoritatively

described set of management or organizational principles that would be described as a strategic management concept. However, it does have a fairly broad consensus on some general principles. It does have a set of eight "Total Army Goals"; a structured Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES); and an Army management philosophy (AR 5-1). The Army educational system has begun to emphasize instruction on the systems view of force integration, "How the Army Runs." Senior Army managers must thread a course between management systems, environmental forces, and personal experience to determine the future direction of the Army. They must integrate their activities to strike a balance between relating the Army to external factors and managing the Army to control internal factors. To manage both the internal affairs of the Army dealing with resource management and the external affairs of the Army dealing with military strategy and military operations requires that the senior managers agree on their respective tasks. While accomplishing these strategic managerial tasks, information is pervasive. It is generated by all, needed by all, and used by all. It is a fact, driven by compression of time, the growing mass of information used, and increased pressure on control of the forces, that the systems application of automation is essential. The substance of the managerial strategy the senior managers develop for the Army comes from the combination of a variety of sources: the posture statements, the daily meetings, the Army Policy Council, the formal organization, the managerial climate, the law, Congressional and DOD constraints, the PPBES, and the goals, policies, and programs developed by the process of top management. The students of this arena must be prepared for the complexity and ambiguity they surely will encounter.

The strategic management concept lies both inside and outside of the PPBES while at the same time is adjusted to the pressures that come from the environment. It is overly simplistic to say that the Army is purely reactive, although clearly much reacting goes on. It is also incorrect to assume that the PPBES is the end-all. If we emphasize the PPBES exclusively, the result will be that little vision and conceptualization will be exerted in the strategic management process. To be reactive is natural, particularly when a practical and immediate approach to many problems must be taken. However, a corporate strategic management concept, with great emphasis on readiness, must be free of the pressures present in the more process-oriented PPBES. Even a cursory analysis of our foreign policy and the strategic equation indicates to the Army what the threat is and that it must be addressed. Of the various options open to the decisionmaker, the question is where do we challenge uncertainty with Army resources? Hard choices have to be made. Resource allocation problems are increasingly complex. Thus, for decisionmakers to exercise their judgment effectively, ways must be found to assist them with complicated and interrelated issues.

It is for this reason that the use of quantitative techniques and automation has assumed a rapidly growing role in a wide range of Army decision situations. No Army decisionmaker is likely to master all the decision technology skills. But, every decisionmaker must understand what they are, what they can do for him, and what they require from him so that he can make effective decisions for the Army.

As was discussed earlier, the statutory mandate for the Army tells us that we need the kind of Army that is capable of preserving peace and providing defense of certain United States interests, supporting national policies, and implementing national objectives. What are these interests, policies, and objectives? Their identification and analysis, impacted by the environment in which the Army exists, poses many questions that confront the Army's top decisionmakers.

— What is the real mission for the Army of the future?

— At what stage would the U.S. commit the Army over a shortage of energy resources? over Soviet expansion?

— Is the manpower needed for the Total Army reasonably attainable from the recruiting base?

— What is the readiness trade-off of a constant Active Component end strength?

— What is the combat potential of the light infantry division?

— Will the American people pay the price for an 18-division Active and 10-division Reserve force?

— With both the President and the Congress taking active roles in setting national priorities in the Federal Budget, is there a danger that Army resources will become a victim of the political process?

— Since so much of the military budget relates to personnel costs and the Army is labor intensive, what effect will this kind of budget pressure have on the size of the Total Army in the future?

— What effects may come from the growing tendency toward micro-management by Congress? How can we better cope with the high degree of direction and guidance external to the Army?

— Should the strategic management structure of the Army include both an Army Secretariat and an Army General Staff? If so, what should be the role of each?

— Is there too much master planning, centralized management, and centralized resource control exerted by Headquarters, Department of the Army? How much should be decentralized?

ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND FORCE STRUCTURE

The Army must be organized primarily for prompt and sustained combat, according to law and logic. Our force planning is predicated on the role of the Army in implementing the national security strategy. What kind

of forces the Army develops, and with what orientation, depends on the perception of the threat facing us, and on how our national and military strategy intends to counter the threat. The multiplicity of threats, locales, and strategies requires a most flexible mix of forces. Our force structure emphasizes this: primarily armor-heavy forces for Europe, a mix of heavy and light forces for contingencies, and specially-tailored light forces in locales such as Korea, Alaska, and Panama.

The current 28-division force (18 AC, 10 ARNG) is organized under the Total Army Concept, which combines Active and Reserve Components and civilian support elements in a balanced force that is intended to provide maximum combat potential from the allotted resources. In recent years, the trend has been to place more missions and force structure into the Reserve Components in order to make additional resources available for modernization and other force structure initiatives.

The Army must have a combat-ready force with the flexibility of engaging in a wide spectrum of operations, ranging from anti-terrorist actions, to unconventional warfare, to limited scope operations (such as rescuing noncombatants from a troubled country), to conventional, and nuclear war. Some of the principal considerations involved are:

— Integrate new materiel, doctrine, and organizational concepts.

— Improve deployability.

— Achieve balance among the components.

— Maximize early combat power and sustaining support.

— Maintain Reserve Components at a state of readiness which will provide timely augmentation to both combat forces and sustaining forces. Reduce the turbulence caused by organizational changes in Reserve Components.

— Consolidate around the 28-division force.

Some questions and issues confronting the Army complicate its design and structure for the future. Some of these are of immediate concern.

— Have we achieved an optimum balance between Active and Reserve Components in our force structure, or do we expect too much of our Reserves?

— Can the Army mobilize and deploy to project combat power promptly?

— Are the plans of overseas MACOM's realistic in the sense of time-phased deployment of forces? realistic in view of decreasing resources?

— What are the realities of force planning that rely on POMCUS? Should we have more or less forward deployment of units?

— Do we provide adequate training resources and full-time support personnel to assist Reserve Component units to maintain appropriate readiness levels?

— Do we have adequate resources at installations to expand the CONUS base and to support the mobilized force?

— Can the CONUS industrial base provide ammunition, supplies and equipment required to sustain the mobilized and deployed force in combat?

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Overall readiness results from the composite effect of manning, equipping, training, and maintaining the ability to deploy and sustain the force. Each element interplays with every other element, and each element requires a balanced share of the financial resources available to the Army. Except for costs directly associated with the Vietnam conflict, the Army's budget declined in real terms between 1964 and 1975. In recent fiscal years, DOD and Congress increased funding levels for force integration and improving readiness. However, in the future, funding levels are anticipated to decline, and the challenge will be to continue to maximize readiness with fewer and fewer resources.

Heretofore, considerable emphasis was given to budget formulation and defense of dollar requirements. Increased emphasis is now given to budget execution and accounting for that which we have. Some of the principal challenges are:

— Creating (and maintaining) a greater fiscal awareness at all levels of command.

— Developing resource management techniques for application at each level of command.

— Implementing an effective, systematic, and coordinated review process to assure funds have been properly accounted for and are being used wisely.

— Simplifying the budget process, and redirecting the budget expert's time to analysis and recommending program improvements.

— Overcoming the multitude of deficiencies in the mechanized information process and producing valid managerial reports systems.

— Improving our factors and cost estimating relationships used to estimate Life Cycle operating and support costs for our weapons systems.

— Implementing internal control procedures at all levels to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

— Developing/refining a process of costing training (i.e., division/brigade cost models).

Continuing into the 1980's and 1990's, we see increasing attention given budget matters by a Congress guided by both the law and the political process. We must ask ourselves the following questions:

— Are we allocating appropriate amounts to manpower, equipment, training, and maintenance? Do our programs and budget systems facilitate that process?

— Should more multi-year appropriations be enacted by Congress to restore contractor confidence in government and provide resource management efficiencies?

— What solutions are available to the Army to better control the proliferation of automated information systems?

— Are savings real under the "contracting out" program? What are the effects upon Army readiness of "contracting out"?

— How reliable are the Army's cost estimating processes?

MATERIEL SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT

The post-Vietnam revitalization of the Army's materiel acquisition program recognized the requirement for modernization of the force. Those responsible for materiel systems management are dedicated to improving the combat forces and developing an Army with a high deterrent value and a strong sustained combat capability. With the anticipated stabilization of the combat portion of the force, opportunities exist for shifting resources toward improving the logistics posture of the Army and providing greater sustainability. The Army is currently engaged in major efforts to provide effective logistics modernization Armywide. In addition to programs discussed in Chapters 17 and 18 other actions and initiatives include:

— Increased emphasis on logistics standardization, Log R&D and unit productivity improvements.

— Assignment of resources to facilitate logistics support at the lowest capable level including automation.

— Expanded use of priority transportation to shorten the logistics pipeline.

— Continuing analysis of host nation agreements, mutual support agreements with other services, and civilian contract support with a view towards seeking increased efficiencies and improved deployability.

The introduction of new weapons and materiel into the inventory during the 1980's and 1990's plus the redistribution and continued sustainment of displaced systems and materiel, have caused an affordability problem for the Army that is expected to continue into the 1990's. All systems are required; however, it is improbable that sufficient funds will be available to fully field and concurrently sustain all of them. Prioritization of materiel requirements is necessary as a basis for making the difficult decisions concerning the proper balance between equipment modernization, strategic deployability and sustainability. Identification of programs and items to be eliminated may be necessary.

Some questions and issues which must be addressed are:

- What is the proper RDTE/Procurement/Sustainability resource balance?
- What are the trade-offs between quality and quantity of weapons systems?
- What are the appropriate trade-offs between war reserves and industrial production capacity?
- Have we determined realistic consumption rates for equipment and ammunition?
- Can we pull off a streamlined materiel acquisition process?
- Have we identified the risks associated with chronic underfunding of consumption requirements?
- Do we fully understand the deployability/sustainability issues that flow from a combat service support structure that is predominantly lodged in the Reserve Components?

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The Army is people. Some of the major challenges facing the Army—and impacting on every commander and manager—lie in the personnel area. Sufficient numbers of quality soldiers must be recruited and retained in an environment of increased competition—and with increasingly constrained financial resources. This force must also be properly trained and deployed. Further, the quality of life lived by soldiers and the benefits they receive must be assured.

The Army's personnel management systems encompass both uniformed and civilian members in Active and Reserve Components—the Total Army. It involves the range of activities, as mentioned above, from procurement through training, development, distribution, promotion, to retirement or separation, and all the associated functions.

Some of the primary considerations affecting the personnel management systems are:

- Shortages in critical specialties.
- Economic and social forces which impact on retention of a sufficient number to develop the career cadre and gain the greatest return on the recruiting investment.
- Mobilization in general, but specific challenges associated with the size of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).
- Increasing reliance on Reserve Component reaction in the total force concept.
- The role of the civilian work force.
- The large number of personnel stationed overseas.

Some of the personnel-related questions and issues facing the Army are:

— Can a quality force be recruited and retained in times of prosperity? If not, should quality be sacrificed for quantity?

— Can the force be recruited to represent all facets of the society from which it is drawn? Should it?

— Can the Army implement the unit manning system without degrading readiness?

— Can the personnel system support force mobilization?

— Will the personnel registration system support mobilization needs? Or should it be expanded to include classification?

— How far can we go in civilianizing some elements of uniformed CONUS units? Or have we exceeded that point?

— What further effort can be made to identify and correct institutional discrimination?

— Will contracting out installation functions impact on readiness? What are the mobilization considerations?

— What impact are family programs actually having on force readiness and retention? Is it significant?

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Approximately one-third of the Army's personnel resources are civilians employed in support roles throughout the world. Therefore, civilian personnel management is an integral part of the Army's effort to manage itself.

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ushered in some of the most sweeping changes to the Federal Civil Service since 1883. It specified the authority and duties of the Merit Systems Protection Board which decides employee appeals of adverse actions and acts against abuses of the merit system and the Special Counsel which investigates and prosecutes prohibited personnel practices. It also defined legitimate "whistle blowing," decentralized many civilian personnel management activities, and enacted an antidiscrimination policy.

Although tied closely together, there is a clear distinction between classification and pay. Classification is the process of determining the level of work involved in a position and the rate of pay is based on laws concerning comparability with the private sector. Most positions are either General Schedule (GS) or Federal Wage System (FWS). The salary rates for GS grades are set by Congress and for FWS grades are determined by local wage surveys of private industry.

The Army civilian career management system establishes basic policies and program requirements for the intake, assignment, training and development of employees in designated occupations. The system provides lines of progression to successively more responsible positions and a coordinated training and development program using both Army and outside facilities. Inventories of GS-12 and above personnel are

maintained at HQDA and MACOM Headquarters for referral consideration.

The Army grievance procedure is established in accordance with Federal regulations. The procedure sets forth specific steps to be followed for resolving employee dissatisfaction with any aspect of working conditions, working relationships, or employment status. Employees who are members of an exclusive bargaining unit may grieve through a negotiated grievance procedure.

The Army will maintain an affirmative willingness to bargain collectively with labor organizations, but commanders must retain certain management rights. If either party requests, a written collective bargaining agreement must be executed and each collective bargaining agreement must contain a negotiated grievance procedure for resolving disputes.

The Army has approximately 170 civilian personnel offices throughout the world. The civilian personnel officer is the designee of the installation commander and as such is responsible for discharging the civilian personnel administrative authority delegated to the commander. However, management of the work force is the responsibility of managers and supervisors.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Program is the culmination of long-standing efforts to eliminate irrelevant factors from consideration in government employment and to assure full compliance with Civil Rights laws and equal employment opportunity regulations. All personnel actions involving Federal employees and applicants must be free of discrimination. Affirmative action programs must be established to correct the imbalances in representation of women and minorities at all grade levels.

Some of the primary considerations affecting the personnel management system are:

- Shortages in critical occupational field.
- Minority recruiting programs.
- System decentralized to installation level.
- The growth of collective bargaining units.
- Employment of foreign national employees.

Some of the civilian personnel-related questions and issues facing the Army are:

- Can the Army compete with industry for personnel with technical skills?
- Should labor-management relations be centralized at Headquarters, Department of the Army? Are Installation Commanders qualified and have the support required to conduct labor negotiations?
- Can the civilian personnel management system support mobilization?
- Is the civilian work force adequately trained? If not, what programs should be implemented?
- What is the impact of contracting installation functions on the current civilian work force?
- Is civilian mobilization planning and management adequate?

ARMY TRAINING

During the late 1980's and the 1990's, the challenge for trainers will be to conduct better training through more efficient management and careful coordination among the components of the training system. That system has been in transition since the late 1970's when the old system was discarded and change became a way of life. The current effort is to allow the system to mature and to work as designed. Training interrelates with all other Army systems, especially Personnel, RDA, and Logistics. It interfaces with budget and manpower programs to provide funds and manpower for the conduct of training.

The HQDA, ODCSOPS, Training Directorate provides the Army a single point of contact for all issues which have training impact. The Training Directorate led the way in designing a Training Strategy to point to the future direction of Army training. Other HQDA guidance defines training policies and is the basis for appropriate regulations and field manuals to implement those policies. Under these broad guidelines TRADOC develops and publishes training doctrine, conducts institutional training, and creates specific training programs that affect nearly every unit in the Army. The TRADOC service schools have a central role in that they are the primary source of doctrine, ideas for new weapons systems, and the training materials used Armywide. Commanders of units in the MACOM's test and use TRADOC material and provide feedback for further development. It is still a fact that most individual training must be done in the units.

For the 1980's, training policy will continue toward decentralization by providing commanders more tools to do the training job. In some other respects, policy will shift toward centralization. The Army is returning to standardized procedures and commonality in battle drills, other combat tasks, and logistics. Commanders and leaders are again accountable for how well they train.

Some of the principal considerations and problems involved in training are:

- Training in a constrained environment.
 - Inadequate budget.
 - Rising costs, e.g. training ammunition.
- Conflicting requirements on time.
- Personnel problems.
 - Turbulence/cohesion.
 - Absenteeism.

Questions and issues confronting Army training system management for the future include:

- Can a method be developed to measure accurately and realistically the effect of training? Can we justify field training in an era of rising costs?
- How much standard training on actual equipment can be replaced by training on simulators?

— Is the Army Training System responding to the volume and complexity of new equipment arriving in our units?

— What will be the long-range impact of the regimental/COHORT system on the training system?

FORCE READINESS

The primary mission of military forces in peacetime is to be prepared for war. The readiness of Army units is a major factor in this preparedness. Readiness, although highly situational and subjective, is a yardstick for programming and budgeting. Our readiness strategy entails maximizing readiness within available resources.

Currently the Army uses the unit status reporting system as a broad and timely indicator of readiness. The Unit Status Report supplements information from other reporting systems and provides information for commanders at all echelons.

The new readiness focus goes beyond unit status to "Force Readiness." Force Readiness is the readiness of the Army as measured by its ability to man, equip, and train its forces, and to mobilize, deploy, and sustain them as required to accomplish assigned missions. There are, under study, new concepts for measuring and managing Force Readiness. Future developments in data management information systems may offer instantaneous correlation and visibility of factors considered in measuring Force Readiness.

Some of the principal problems and considerations for current and future Force Readiness are:

- Attaching a price tag to readiness. (How much readiness for a certain price?)
 - Making accurate readiness assessments.
 - Status report versus management tool.
 - Objectivity versus subjectivity.
 - Budget considerations which force choices between readiness and future forces and equipment.
 - High cost and perishability of readiness.

Questions and issues confronting readiness systems management for the future include:

- Can the Army develop a method of more accurately evaluating force readiness?
- Is a monthly report necessary? Optimum frequency?
- Should the cutoff between ready and not ready be the same for the Active Component and the Reserve Components?
- Is the Army creating a report that will become more of a burden than asset?
- Are forwarding and review procedures necessary and useful?
- Do we need a separate system to measure mobilization readiness?

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, and analysis of all available information pertinent to a subject of interest to its consumers. Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers is needed to develop a sound national security and foreign policy. It is critical to international negotiations and the development and monitoring of international agreements, the development of weapons systems and force structure, measuring the ability of U.S. forces to deter or defend against attack, and supporting the operational command engaged in combat. The collection and management of intelligence can be examined from three levels: National, Department of Defense, and Army.

The goal of the U.S. National Intelligence effort is to provide the president and the National Security Council (NSC) information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of U.S. interests from foreign threats. The National Foreign Intelligence System includes the following: the Central Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Oversight Board, the National Foreign Intelligence Council, the National Foreign Intelligence Board, and Intelligence Research and Development Council.

The DOD is the nation's largest user of intelligence information and the largest investor in intelligence programs. DOD has a particular responsibility to support operational commanders at all levels. Defense Intelligence, as part of the intelligence community, is faced with a growing number of challenges to the successful accomplishment of its Defense intelligence mission. The Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible for satisfying the foreign military intelligence requirements (less cryptologic) of the JCS, major components of the Defense Department and the other authorized recipients and for providing military intelligence contributions to national intelligence production. The National Security Agency manages the largest single program contained in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. It is responsible for the operations of an effective unified organization for Signal Intelligence activity. This responsibility requires extensive interaction, coordination, and cooperation with the services.

The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army are responsible for the collection, production, and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence, including information on indications and warnings, foreign capabilities, plans and weapons systems, scientific and technical developments. The conduct of counterintelligence activities and the production and dissemination of counterintelligence studies and reports is a service responsibility as are the development, procurement, and

management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment, and the conduct of related research, development, and test and evaluation activities. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) is responsible to the Chief of Staff for the overall coordination of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Army. He has general staff responsibility for intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence automation, signals intelligence, censorship, threat validation, intelligence collection, security, meteorologic, topographic, and space activities. The U.S. Army Intelligence Agency is a Field Operating Activity of the DCSINT and is the Army focal point for the production and dissemination of scientific and technical intelligence, general intelligence (less medical), and counterintelligence. Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), a Major Army Command, provides a single commander for those intelligence, security, and electronic warfare units which operate at echelons above corps. INSCOM units, which are located both in CONUS and at many overseas locations, support requirements which are national, departmental, strategic, operational, and tactical.

Intelligence is vital to the national security of the United States, but the importance of intelligence in various program and planning areas is not always fully recognized. While concentrating on intelligence production, the four major intelligence collection disciplines — Human Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and Measurement and Signature Intelligence — should be used as efficiently as possible within constrained resources.

ARMY HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

The need to provide medical support and medical-related services to military units is just as important as raising, supporting, and fielding an Army. The mental and physical health of its members is vital to our success on the battlefield. The Army Medical System covers all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health professional care which ranges from the policy and decisionmaking level to the combat medic in the field. While the system is designed primarily to provide medical support to service members, it also provides certain medical support and services to authorized family members.

The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) conducts important programs which are designed to insure that the overall management of the Armywide health service system is properly integrated. The AMEDD under the management supervision of The Surgeon General (TSG) includes the Medical, Dental, Veterinary, Army Medical Specialist (AMSC), Army Nurse, and Medical Service Corps (MSC). Two important functions of the AMEDD are the establishment of health standards and the formulation of policy and regulations relating to health service support. Health standards are necessary to insure physical and mental fitness standards are

established for military duty as they relate to individuals or groups. Health services, on the other hand, are defined as, but not limited to, services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well being of individuals or groups and those services which contribute to the maintenance or restoration of a health environment.

Within the Army structure, the AMEDD has four Medical Commands: the Health Services Command (HSC) which is a Major Army Command under the Chief of Staff, Army; the 7th Medical Command which is a subordinate command of U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army; and the 18th Medical Command which is a subordinate command of Eighth U.S. Army (Korea). As medical commands, they command, manage, and operate medical centers and laboratories, hospitals, health and dental clinics, medical department activities, area dental laboratories, veterinary services, and other related activities. The fourth medical command is the Medical Research and Development Command. It is subordinate to the Office of the Surgeon General for medical research, development, testing, and evaluation. The HSC provides medical, dental, and veterinary services for the Army and other medical department activities. The HSC provides health services in the United States, the Canal Zone, Alaska, Hawaii, Johnson Island, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Additionally, the HSC is responsible for providing medical professional education and training for AMEDD personnel, as well as selected personnel of other services and departments of the government. HSC also has the responsibility for medical combat developments in support of the Army in the field, as well as the development of medical doctrine and systems.

The AMEDD, as a part of the total Army system, plays a significant and vital role in providing health services to meet force modernization requirements, as well as essential medical services to the soldier and his family.

TOTAL ARMY OF THE FUTURE

Finally, to end this chapter, it is appropriate to refocus on the TOTAL ARMY—projected into the future. The Army of civilians and soldiers, Active and Reserve, exists to play a key role in deterring aggression, and if that fails, to fight and win on the battlefield. All goals are to these ends. Force readiness, human concerns, leadership, mobilization and deployment capability require constant attention. It is also necessary to review equipment needs, training tactics, and doctrine in light of new technological developments. Finally, there is an overriding interest in management practices because these affect each of the other areas. All of the resources entrusted to us—people, equipment, time, money—must be used as efficiently as possible.

The full realization of the Army's capability lies in the future. A strong foundation is in place, but much remains to be done to achieve an acceptable risk posture

in view of the threat. The legacy for the TOTAL ARMY of the future in strength, quality, and readiness, depends upon the timely support given today.

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APPENDIX B

ACRONYM LIST

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ABBREVIATION	FULL TITLE	DEFINED
A		
A-E.....	ARCHITECT-ENGINEER	p. 23-7
AACSC	ARMY AUTOMATION AND COMMUNICATION STEERING COMMITTEE	p. 6-4
AAE	ARMY ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE.....	p. 17-3
AAFES.....	ARMY-AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE.....	p. 16-9
AAMMP	ACTIVE ARMY MILITARY MANPOWER PROGRAM.....	p. 19-1
AAO.....	ARMY ACQUISITION OBJECTIVE (see also Army Procurement Requirement Program).....	p. 18-12
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AASP.....	ARMY AUTOMATION SECURITY PROGRAM	p. 24-7
ABO	ARMY BUDGET OFFICE	p. 15-3
ABOIP	AMENDED BASIS OF ISSUE PLAN	p. 11-5
ABS	ADDITIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSIONS	p. 15-11
AC	ACTIVE COMPONENT	p. 13-1
ACAS.....	ARMY CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM	p. 12-4
ACC.....	ARMY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE	p. 14-3
ACCP.....	ARMY CORRESPONDENCE COURSE PROGRAM	p. 21-30
ACE	ASSISTANT CHIEF OF ENGINEERS	p. 15-5
ACP	ARMY CAPABILITIES PLAN.....	p. 10-9
ACR.....	ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT	p. 14-12
ACT	AUTOMATED CONTROL OF TRAINEES	p. 19-5
ACTEDS	ARMY CIVILIAN TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM.....	p. 20-11
ACTS	ARMY CRITERIA TRACKING SYSTEM	p. 23-3
ADARS	ARMY DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT	p. 17-3
ADCSLOG-SA.....	ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE	p. 18-18
ADCSOPS	ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS.....	p. 14-7
ADEA	ARMY DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT AGENCY	p. 21-19
ADP	AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING	p. 10-14

ADSPEC	ADDITIONAL SPECIALTY.....	p. 19-12
ADSS	ARMY DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM	p. 9-13
ADT.....	ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING.....	p. 13-1
ADTLP	ARMY-WIDE DOCTRINAL AND TRAINING LITERATURE PROGRAM.....	p. 21-31
AEO.....	ARMY ENERGY OFFICE	p. 18-8
AERB.....	ARMY EDUCATION REVIEW BOARD	p. 21-13
AETIS	ARMY EXTENSION TRAINING INFORMATION SYSTEM	p. 21-30
AF	AIR FORCE.....	p. 10-14
AF	APPROPRIATED FUNDS	p. 16-8
AFH.....	ARMY FAMILY HOUSING	p. 15-5
AFMIC.....	ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER	p. 23-7
AFPC.....	ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL	p. 6-5
AFT	ANNUAL FINANCIAL TARGET	p. 20-5
AG	ADJUTANT GENERAL.....	p. 21-4
AG	ARMY GUIDANCE	p. 14-3
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AGR.....	ACTIVE GUARD AND RESERVE.....	p. 13-2
AHS.....	ACADEMY OF HEALTH SCIENCES	p. 21-10
AIA	ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	p. 23-7
AIF.....	ARMY INDUSTRIAL FUND	p. 15-5
AIT.....	ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING	p. 13-8
ALA.....	ARMY LOGISTICS ASSESSMENT	p. 9-3
ALD.....	AVAILABLE TO LOAD DATE	p. 9-4
ALMC	ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CENTER	p. 16-18
ALO.....	AUTHORIZED LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION	p. 9-2
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ALOC.....	AIR LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS	p. 18-2
ALRA.....	ARMY LONG RANGE-APPRAISAL.....	p. 10-9
ALRPG	ARMY LONG RANGE PLANNING GUIDANCE	p. 10-2
AMAG	ARMY MATERIEL ACQUISITION GUIDANCE	p. 14-11
AMC	ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND.....	p. 3-17
AMCCOM	ARMAMENT, MUNITIONS, AND CHEMICAL COMMAND.....	p. 18-9
AMEDD.....	ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT	p. 24-1
AMETA	ARMY MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TRAINING ACTIVITY	p. 21-19
AMIM	ARMY MODERNIZATION INFORMATION MEMORANDUM	p. 3-17
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AMSP.....	ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM.....	p. 21-16

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ANC.....	ARMY NURSE CORPS.....	p. 24-1
ANCOC	ADVANCED LEVEL NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER COURSE	p. 21-12
AOD.....	AREA-ORIENTED DISTRIBUTION	p. 18-10
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ASC	ARMY STAFF COUNCIL	p. 6-5

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ASP	AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT	p. 16-13
ASP	ARMY STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM	p. 21-27
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